The increase in income cyclicality of high-income households and its relation to the rise in top income shares.
Parker, Jonathan A. ; Vissing-Jorgensen, Annette
ABSTRACT We document a large increase in the cyclicality of the
incomes of high-income households, coinciding with the rise in their
share of aggregate income. In the United States, since top income shares
began to rise rapidly in the early 1980s, incomes of those in the top 1
percent of the income distribution have averaged 14 times average income
and been 2.4 times more cyclical. Before the early 1980s, incomes of the
top 1 percent were slightly less cyclical than average. The increase in
cyclicality at the top is to a large extent due to increases in the
share and the cyclicality of their earned income. The high cyclicality
among top incomes is found for households without stock options;
following the same households over time; for post-tax, post-transfer
income; and for consumption. We study cyclicality throughout the income
distribution and reconcile our findings with earlier work. Furthermore,
greater top income share is associated with greater top income
cyclicality across recent decades, across subgroups of top income
households, and, in changes, across countries. This suggests a common
cause. We show theoretically that increases in the production scale of
the most talented can raise both top incomes and their cyclicality.
**********
Since the early 1970s, economic inequality in the United States--as
measured by the distribution of wages and salaries, or of income more
broadly, or of consumption expenditure--has been steadily increasing.
(1) The consensus explanation for the general increase in inequality is
that skill biased technological change has raised the earnings of
individuals with more skills, as measured, for example, by education.
However, accompanying this steady rise in inequality has been a much
larger and more rapid increase in the income share of those at the very
top of the income distribution. The share of (non-capital gains) income
accruing to those in the top 1 percent of the income distribution
increased from 8 percent in the early 1980s to 18 percent in 2008; the
income share for those in the top 0.01 percent increased from around 0.7
percent to 3.3 percent over the same period (Piketty and Saez 2003, Saez
2010). Both the suddenness and the magnitude of these increases have
shifted perceptions about the importance of technological change as the
cause of increased income inequality generally and raised the
possibility of an important role for other factors, such as
"changes in labor market institutions, fiscal policy, or more
generally social norms regarding pay inequality" (Piketty and Saez
2003, p. 3).
In this paper we bring together evidence from a variety of datasets
to show that, as first argued in Parker and Vissing-Jorgensen (2009),
another fundamental shift has occurred across the U.S. income
distribution. During the past quarter century the incomes of high-income
households have become much more sensitive to aggregate income
fluctuations than previously. Before the early 1980s, the incomes of
high-income households were more often than not less cyclical than the
income of the average household. But since around 1982 the incomes of
the top 1 percent have become more than twice as sensitive to aggregate
income fluctuations as the income of the average household.
The fact that this increase in the cyclicality of income of the top
1 percent coincides with the increase in their income share suggests
that a common cause underlies both phenomena. We provide further
evidence for a link between increased income inequality and increased
income cyclicality at the top by documenting, first, that across income
groups within the top 1 percent, higher average income is associated
with higher income cyclicality in the 1982-2008 period; second, that
across decades since the 1970s, cyclicality of the top 1 percent
increases decade by decade as that group's income share increases;
and third, across countries, increases in income cyclicality of the top
1 percent are highly correlated with increases in their income share.
We argue that these facts are not inconsistent with the hypothesis
that the increase in top income shares was caused by rapid technological
progress in information and communications technologies (ICT) since the
early 1980s. If improvements in ICT have increased the ability of the
most talented workers to handle more work or to scale their ideas by
working with more production inputs, then the ICT revolution could have
caused the incomes of the highest paid both to rise and to become more
sensitive to economic fluctuations. The intuition is that individuals
who have less decreasing returns to scale will operate at a greater
scale (that is, with more production inputs) and have lower ratios of
gross revenue to production costs, and therefore have greater
sensitivity of earnings to business cycles.
Expanding on these contributions, we begin in section I by focusing
on the details of the change in income cyclicality of top income groups
in the United States. We use the Statistics of Income (SOI) data of
Thomas Piketty and Emmanuel Saez (Piketty and Saez 2003, Saez 2010),
which are based on tax records, to show that the average income (before
taxes and transfers and excluding capital gains) accruing to those in
the very top of the income distribu-tion has moved substantially more
(in percentage terms) than the overall average in each boom and each
recession since 1982, on average rising 5.0 percentage points more per
year in each boom and falling 3.7 percentage points more per year in
each recession. Before 1982, however, this was not the case.
This high cyclicality is not simply due to capital or
entrepreneurial income. High-income tax units (one or more individuals
filing a single return) tend to have a significant share of income from
wages and salaries (including bonuses), and this type of income has
roughly the same exposure to fluctuations as their nonwage income. Wage
and salary income is also a major source of the change in cyclicality of
top incomes. Before 1982 the wage and salary income of high-income tax
units was roughly acyclical, but since 1982 it has been highly cyclical.
Also, we show that the top 1 percent of earners come from a broad range
of industries and occupations, and we argue that no one industry's
or occupation's pay structure is driving our finding.
Further, we provide three pieces of evidence that although
high-income households are more likely to have stock options, our main
finding is not driven by the potentially endogenous timing of the
exercise of stock options. First, in the period since 1997 for which we
have data, only about 22 percent of households in the top 1 percent have
stock options (that is, were given stock options during the preceding
year or owned stock options when surveyed), and income cyclicality of
households in the top 1 percent is roughly similar if one leaves out
households with stock options. Second, for a sample of top corporate
executives for whom we have information about the value of options
granted, we find that income calculated by including options only when
granted, rather than when exercised, is highly cyclical. To be clear,
this evidence in no way rules out a causal explanation that involves a
general rise in pay for performance--indeed, options income is highly
cyclical for those who have options, and bonus income may serve a
similar purpose for those in the top 1 percent without options income.
Our point is simply that the high cyclicality of the wage and salary
(and overall) income of the top 1 percent is not spuriously generated by
a correlation between the timing of options exercise and aggregate
fluctuations. Third, as a further piece of evidence that the high
cyclicality is neither due to endogenous timing of income without
economic significance nor due to other measurement problems in income
data, we show that the cyclicality of the consumption of households in
the top of the consumption expenditure distribution--specifically, the
top 5 percent by initial consumption--is also more than twice that of
the average household.
Additional evidence confirming the high cyclicality of top incomes
comes from verifying the out-of-sample forecasts made in Parker and
Vissing-Jorgensen (2009) based on cyclicality estimates that excluded
the recent recession. Income data for 2008 and consumption expenditure
data through February 2009 show sharp declines for the top 1 percent
during the recent recession, consistent with these predictions.
How does this new fact relate to the prior literature that
concludes that low-income households bear the brunt of recessions and
benefit the most from expansions? In section II, using data from the
Current Population Survey (CPS), we show that the incomes of
low-education households are more cyclical than those of high-education
households and that the greater cyclicality of the top 1 percent does
not appear in the CPS before 1982. Further, looking at the whole
distribution using a dataset from the Congressional Budget Office that
merges the CPS with the SOI tax data on high incomes, we find that the
sensitivity of the wage and salary income of households in the bottom
two quintiles to fluctuations in aggregate income is slightly higher
than that of households in the third and fourth quintiles and than that
of households from the 80th to the 99th percentiles.
However, in the public CPS data for the period since 1982, when one
ranks by percentile in the income distribution, the top I percent have a
higher cyclicality than even the lowest education group (those with less
than a high school diploma). The cyclicality of the top 1 percent is
even higher when measured using the CPS top 1 percent income series
constructed by Richard Burkhauser and coauthors (2008, 2009) from
underlying CPS data not subject to the top coding applied to the public
files. Thus, top incomes are highly cyclical, but it is harder to
observe this high cyclicality in the publicly available CPS data alone
because of top coding, and because cyclicality is high only for very
high income households. We conclude that across the distribution of
incomes, cyclicality is asymmetrically U-shaped: it is higher for the
bottom quintiles than for the middle and the upper-middle class, but
much higher for the top 1 percent, and especially for the very highest
incomes.
Different cyclicalities of taxes and transfers at different points
in the income distribution can lead to differences in cyclicality
between pre-tax, pre-transfer cash income and disposable (post-tax,
post-transfer) income. We show that taxes and especially transfers
significantly reduce the cyclicality at the bottom of the income
distribution while making less difference to the cyclicality of the very
top. Thus, the cyclicality of top 1 percent incomes relative to the rest
of the population is even greater for disposable income than it is for
pre-tax, pre-transfer income.
Having established and explored our main finding for the United
States, in section III we present evidence from Canada, which has a
different tax system, slightly different culture, and better available
information on top incomes from tax records. In the Canadian tax data,
top income cyclicality is quite similar to that in the United States
during the past quarter century. Further, in the Canadian data we are
able to follow families across years (that is, we use panel data).
Families in the top 1 percent of the income distribution in one year
have income changes to the next year that are almost twice as cyclical
as for the average. This higher cyclicality for the top 1 percent is
similar in repeated cross-sectional data and in panel data, suggesting
that the availability of only repeated cross-sectional data in the U.S.
tax data is unlikely to substantially affect the estimated U.S.
cyclicalities.
Section IV presents evidence of a strong link between increased
income inequality and increased income cyclicality at the top by
exploiting variation across groups, decades, and countries. We split the
top 1 percent into three groups (percentiles 99-99.9, 99.9-99.99, and
99.99-100) and document for the period since 1982 that across these
groups, the higher the average income, the higher the income
cyclicality. Furthermore, calculating cyclicalities by decade since
1970, we show that for a given top group, as its income share increases,
the cyclicality of its income increases. Finally, comparing the period
1970-82 with the period 1982-2007 using data for 10 countries, we find
that those with larger increases in the income share of the top 1
percent also have larger increases in the income cyclicality of the top
1 percent.
The link between increased inequality and increased cyclicality
suggests a common cause of the two phenomena. In section V we argue that
the increase in cyclicality is not inconsistent with an explanation of
the increase in top income shares based on market-driven changes in
incomes rather than, for example, changes in social norms. Specifically,
we outline an explanation for both phenomena based on the rapid
improvements in ICT in recent decades. Skill-biased technological
progress that takes the form of lowering the degree of decreasing
returns to scale for the highest-skill individuals naturally leads to
increases in both the incomes and the income cyclicality of these
individuals.
We emphasize that our results do not imply that the utility or
happiness of high-income households is more cyclical that that of the
average household. In fact, if risk aversion is lower at high
expenditure levels, the utility of high-income households may be less
cyclical than that of lower-income households, even with higher income
cyclicality. Instead, our main finding establishes a new fact that is
informative about changes in incomes and the labor market for high
earners and of particular relevance for theories of the recent rise in
income shares of high-income households.
I. The Changing Cyclicality of High Incomes
In this section we document the changing cyclicality of the income
that accrues to top percentile groups in the income distribution, using
the Statistics of Income data compiled by Piketty and Saez (2003) and
extended by Saez (2010). In doing so, we study the timing of the change
in cyclicality documented by Parker and Vissing-Jorgensen (2009). We
show that the dramatic increase in the cyclicality of high incomes
started in the early 1980s, and that this increase is significantly due
to earned income and not just due to the (potentially endogenous) timing
of executive stock option compensation.
I.A. The Main Facts
The main advantage of the Piketty-Saez data is that since they are
based on administrative data from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) on
individual income tax returns, they provide extensive and accurate
measurement of the very top of the income distribution. However, since
some low-income households do not file tax returns (and even fewer did
in the earlier years covered by the data), there is little detail on the
low end of the income distribution. Piketty and Saez use aggregate
personal income data from the national accounts to calculate aggregate
taxable income up to 1944; after 1944 they use the available tax return
data plus an assumption about the incomes of nonfilers. Using these
data, Piketty and Saez track the trend in the income share of the top 1
percent, 0.1 percent, and 0.01 percent of the income distribution,
information simply not available in survey-based datasets on wages and
incomes. The detail available on tax returns allows the measurement of
pre-tax, pre-transfer cash income excluding realized capital gains. We
exclude capital gains because our focus is on the timing of income, and
the data contain only measures of realized capital gains, not capital
gains as they accrue.
The data have some shortcomings, however. First, income excludes
income paid as benefits (such as employer-paid health benefits and
contributions to pensions) and excludes the employer share of payroll
taxes (Social Security, Medicare, and unemployment taxes). Second, the
unit of observation in these data is a tax unit, not an individual or a
household. There has been a steady downward trend in the number of
individuals per tax unit over time. This is a concern for measurement of
trends if this ratio changes unevenly across income groups, but it poses
less of a concern for our measurement of business cycle exposure. Third,
the data are repeated cross sections and contain little information on
demographics or other information that could allow one to track income
changes for a constant population of households. Thus, the changes in
income we report are based on income and income rank for groups of
households that overlap but are not completely identical across years.
(2)
Finally, incomes as reported to the IRS may be affected by tax
reforms and by a variety of tax avoidance and tax evasion activities
such as nonreporting of income, sheltering of income in 401(k)s, and
changes in the reporting of income between closely held business profits
and personal income. Tax reforms pose a particular concern since they
cause changes in total reported taxable income that are potentially
different across different tilers. To the extent that such changes
disproportionately affect high-income tilers, this creates an
artificially high correlation between changes in aggregate reported
taxable income and changes in the reported taxable income of top income
tilers. To avoid this problem, we do not measure cyclicality from
correlations with tax return-based aggregates, but instead use
aggregates from the national income and product accounts (NIPA; see the
online data appendix for details).3 Given this solution, tax reforms as
well as the other data issues likely pose larger problems for measuring
long-term trends than for measuring cyclicalities (see Reynolds 2007 and
Piketty and Saez 2007).
We begin our analysis of these data by reporting the percent growth
in income across each boom and recession since 1917, where
"boom" and "recession" are defined, respectively, as
periods during which NIPA real income per tax unit, before taxes and
transfers and excluding capital gains, was increasing, and periods
during which it was decreasing. Generally, these periods line up with
recessions and expansions as identified by the Business Cycle Dating
Committee of the National Bureau of Economic Research.
The dramatic increase in the exposure of high-income tax units to
economic fluctuations began in the early 1980s. Table 1 shows the
annualized percent change in average income per tax unit for all tax
units, for the top 1 percent of the distribution, and for fractional
percentiles within the top 1 percent. The final column reports the
difference (in percentage points) between this annualized change for the
top 1 percent and that for all tax units. Since 1982 the incomes of
high-income households have risen more in booms and fallen less in
recessions than the average income. According to the final column, since
the end of the 1981-82 recession, the average income accruing to the top
1 percent of the income distribution has moved substantially more (in
percentage terms) than the overall average in every boom and every
recession, on average rising 5.0 percentage points more per year in each
boom and falling 3.7 percentage points more per year in each recession.
Further, although one might think it natural for high incomes to be
more cyclical, this was not so in the past. In the postwar period before
1982, the incomes of high-income households more often than not moved
less (again in percentage terms) than the income of the average
household. In the postwar period (1947 on) up to 1982, the incomes
accruing to the top 1 percent co-moved less with the business cycle than
did the income of the average household in 9 of the 12 booms and
recessions. Relative to total income per tax unit, income accruing to
the top I percent of tax units on average rose by 1.2 percentage points
per year less in each boom and fell by 1.1 percentage points per year
less in each recession. The difference between this period and the
post-1982 period is economically large. Finally, in the pre-1947 period,
for which the data are of poorer quality and, after 1941, influenced by
wartime policies, the income accruing to the top 1 percent does not
appear systematically more or less cyclical than that of the average
household.
A striking feature of this change, to which we later return, is
that it coincides almost exactly with the acceleration in the share of
income accruing to the highest earners documented by Piketty and Saez
(2003). In their data the income share of the top 1 percent reached its
minimum at 7.7 percent in 1973, grew slightly to equal 8.0 in 1981, and
then started rising rapidly to reach 17.7 percent in 2008. The
coincident timing of the increase in top income shares and the increase
in top income exposure to fluctuations suggests a common cause, as we
discuss in sections IV and V. (4) Notice from table 1 that, consistent
with an out-of-sample forecast in Parker and Vissing-Jorgensen (2009),
incomes of the top 1 percent fell substantially more than the average
income in the recent recession--at least based on 2007-08 growth
rates--with an 8.4 percent fall (again in real per-tax-unit terms) for
the top 1 percent compared with a 2.6 percent fall for the average tax
unit. The fall for the top 0.01 percent is even larger, at 12.7 percent.
We emphasize that these numbers exclude capital gains and thus to a
large extent are driven by wage and salary income, which fell by 3.3
percent from 2007 to 2008 for the average tax unit, by 6.0 percent for
the top 1 percent, and by 17.5 percent for the top 0.01 percent. (We
elaborate on the role of earned income for the top income groups below.)
Hereafter we will characterize the cyclical exposure of any income
group i by a measure of its income cyclicality we call beta, which is
the coefficient on the logarithmic change in income per member in the
total population (Y) in a regression where the dependent variable is the
log change in income per member of income group i ([Y.sub.i]):
(1) [DELTA]ln[Y.sub.i,t+1] = [[alpha].sub.i] +
[[beta].sub.i][DELTA]ln[Y.sub.t+1] + [[epsilon].sub.i,t+1].
Beta is thus the elasticity of the income per member of group i
with respect to average income, so that if average income growth is 1
percent, we expect the income of group i to grow by [[beta].sub.i]
percent.
The top panel of table 2 presents our main findings on the change
in cyclicality in terms of beta for the top 1 percent of the
distribution and within subgroups of the top 1 percent across periods.
The betas of the top 1 percent and the top 0.01 percent of tax units are
2.39 and 3.96, respectively, for the post-1982 period2 These levels of
cyclicality represent very large increases relative to prior periods: in
the periods before 1982, the betas of all top income groups are less
than 1, except for the top 0.01 percent for the period 1917-47.
The second panel of table 2 shows how much more income those in the
top 1 percent and its subgroups received relative to the average
household. These ratios are calculated from the group income shares
(group income share/group size). Income per tax unit in the top groups
was relatively high in 1917-47 (income per tax unit for the top 0.01
percent was 194 times the average income), was relatively lower in
1948-82 (65 times the average for the top 0.01 percent), and has been
relatively high again since 1982 (207 times the average for the top 0.01
percent). In 2008 the top 1 percent included all tax units with incomes
above $342,000; the threshold for the top 0.01 percent was $6.4 million.
Average income for these two groups was $906,000 and $17.1 million,
respectively, in that year.
The different betas and the larger share of income earned by top
groups together translate into a disproportionate fraction of aggregate
income changes falling on high-income households. To estimate the
average fraction of aggregate income changes borne by a group, we
regress (dollar change in real group income per tax unit) x (group share
of population)/(lagged aggregate real income per tax unit) on the growth
rate of aggregate income per tax unit. Across all groups, the numerators
sum to the total real dollar change in income per tax unit, so the
regression coefficients across a complete set of nonintersecting groups
would sum to 1. Since 1982 the fractions of income changes borne by the
top 1 percent and the top 0.01 percent are 26.6 percent and 6.7
percent--27 times and 670 times their shares in the
population--respectively (third panel of table 2).
We emphasize that the increase in top income cyclicality is robust
to using other measures of aggregate fluctuations. The fourth panel of
table 2 measures cyclicality by beta with respect to changes in median
household income (as calculated by the Census Bureau using the CPS) and
with respect to changes in the aggregate unemployment rate. In both
cases, measured cyclicality of the top 1 percent is lower than that for
all tax units in the early period; from there it more than triples,
reaching more than double that of the average tax unit in the recent
period.
Furthermore, these changes in cyclical exposure represent actual
increases in the cyclical volatility of high incomes. That is, the rise
in the cyclical exposure of the top 1 percent is much greater than the
decline in total income volatility that occurred in the Great
Moderation. In the Piketty-Saez data, the standard deviation of the log
change in the average income of the top 1 percent rose significantly,
from 0.039 during 1947-82 to 0.085 during 1982-2008; the corresponding
numbers for the top 0.01 percent are 0.059 and 0.155, respectively. In
terms of cyclicality, the standard deviation of the cyclical component
[[beta].sub.i][DELTA]ln[Y.sub.t+1], rose also for all top income groups,
as the standard deviation of [DELTA]ln[Y.sub.t+1], fell only from 0.029
to 0.023, a much smaller (percentage) fall than the rise in the [3>
in table 2. Thus, for the top l percent, the standard deviation of the
cyclical component [[beta].sub.i][DELTA]ln[Y.sub.t+1], rose from 0.021
during 1947-82 to 0.055 during 1982-2008.
I.B. Wages and Salaries
To reiterate, in all of these results, the incomes of high-income
groups are measured as cash income before government transfers and
taxes, and the income changes are not contaminated by any endogenous
timing of realizations of income reported as capital gains. That said,
our results so far include income from all other taxable sources: wage
and salary income (including bonuses and most stock options),
entrepreneurial income, dividends, interest, and rental incomes. We now
show that our main findings are driven to a large extent by the changing
cyclicality of wage and salary income. We also document that they are
not driven by potentially endogenous timing of stock options (more
exercising of stock options in booms) or solely due to people with stock
options.
Table 3 shows, for the postwar period up to 1982 and the period
since, the average share of each group's income that is from each
source as defined by the IRS (top panel) and the cyclicality of each
type of income (bottom panel). This table documents three main points.
First, in the period since 1982, wage and salary income accounts for
only a slightly lower share of total income (60 percent) for the top 1
percent than for the average household (two-thirds). Wages and salaries
are a smaller but still significant share of income for the top 0.01
percent (40 percent).
Second, and more important, since 1982 the wage and salary income
of high-income groups is much more cyclical than that for all tax units.
To maintain comparability across types of income and in the definition
of an economic fluctuation, for all types we define cyclicality with
respect to fluctuations in NIPA aggregate pre-tax, pre-transfer income
excluding capital gains per tax unit. Since 1982 the wage and salary
income of the top l percent has a cyclicality of 2.4, and that of the
top 0.01 percent a cyclicality of 6.2, compared with a cyclicality of
less than 1 for all tax units. The cyclicality of wage and salary income
of the top 1 percent is about the same as that of their overall income
(and thus as the average cyclicality of their other types of income),
whereas the cyclicality of wage and salary income of the top 0.01
percent exceeds that of all their other types of income.
Third, the change in cyclicality of the top 1 percent since 1982 is
to a large extent driven by the rise in the share of wages and salaries
in their total income and the change in its cyclicality, with a smaller
role for increased cyclicality of dividend and interest income. The top
panel of table 3 shows that the share of wage and salary income in the
incomes of the top 1 percent rose by 15 percentage points across
periods. The bottom panel shows a dramatic increase in the cyclicality
of the wages and salaries of the top 1 percent, from 0.4 in the 1947-82
period to 2.4 in the 1982-2008 period. Across periods there is also a
substantial increase in the cyclicality of dividend and interest income
for the top 1 percent, but these two sources are smaller shares of
income. The cyclicality of entrepreneurial income for the top 1 percent
is relatively stable, at around 2 for both 1947-82 and 1982-2008. For
the top 0.01 percent, the change in cyclicality is more widespread
across categories, but again the largest role is played by wage and
salary income.
We next investigate the role of stock options in our findings. The
rise of stock options coincides with the rise of income inequality, and
the vast majority of stock options are nonqualified options, which are
treated for tax purposes as wage and salary income when exercised. (6)
Because our analysis so far is based on tax return data, it includes
income from nonqualified options in wage and salary income. We are
concerned that either endogenous timing of the exercise of stock options
(if more are exercised in booms) or a correlation between stock market
performance and aggregate income might make our measure of realized top
incomes excessively procyclical even if actual economic earnings were
not. Thus, we address two questions concerning options. First, is income
from options sufficiently prevalent in the top 1 percent to be the main
driver of high wage and salary cyclicality? Second, do we still find
high cyclicality of top incomes if we include options in income when
granted (at values determined by the BlackScholes model) instead of when
exercised (as in the tax data)?
To address the first question, we use the Survey of Consumer
Finances (SCF) for 1998, 2001, 2004, and 2007, which contains
information on wealth and income (for the preceding calendar year) for a
stratified random sample of households that oversamples rich households.
These years of the SCF also include the responses to two survey
questions about stock options. The first asks whether the household
received stock options during the past year, and the second asks whether
the household has a valuable asset not otherwise recorded in the
interview and then asks the household to state what it is, with stock
options being one possible response. SCF data are not top coded, with
the exception that a household is dropped if it has a net worth greater
than the least wealthy person in the Forbes list of the wealthiest 400
people in the United States. (7) On average across the four survey
years, only 22 percent of households in the top 1 percent of the income
distribution had stock options. Furthermore, the cyclicality of income
growth (of non-capital gains income, based on aggregate income
calculated from SCF data and using 3-year real log growth rates) is
around 1.8 both for all households in the top 1 percent and for
households in the top 1 percent without stock options. This indicates
that income from stock options is not driving our main findings.
To answer the second question, we use data on executive
compensation from ExecuComp, which are available for 1992 to 2009. Our
sample definition is described in the online data appendix (at
www.brookings.edu/economics/bpea, under "Conferences and
Papers"). The average number of executives covered in our sample is
6,216 per year. The top panel of table 4 shows that in these data the
average total executive compensation (in real 2008 dollars) was $1.6
million in 1992 based on the value of options exercised. Using the group
income cutoffs in the Piketty-Saez data, on average across 1992-2009, 81
percent of the ExecuComp executives were in the top 1 percent, and 7
percent were in the top 0.01 percent. (8) The second panel of the table
shows that the executives received a substantial fraction of their
income in the form of options. The table also reports betas for each
income component (calculated from annual averages of each type of income
across executives). The beta of overall compensation is 2.9 based on the
value of options granted, and 4.4 based on the value of options
exercised. Given that only a small fraction of those in the top 1
percent have stock options income (according to the SCF data) and that
the beta of executive compensation based on the value of options granted
is about two-thirds that based on the value of options exercised (as
calculated from the ExecuComp data), we conclude that endogenous timing
of options is not likely to have substantially affected our beta
estimates for wages and salaries using the Piketty-Saez data.
Interestingly, these findings do not imply that options are not
critical for the income cyclicality of top earners who do receive stock
options. For executives in the ExecuComp data, options income does drive
the high cyclicality of their wage and salary income: their beta of
compensation excluding options is around 1. That is, the cyclical
component of their income is (granted) options. For these results to be
consistent with our results from the SCF, however, it must therefore be
that nonoptions wage and salary income is highly cyclical for top
earners without options. Bonuses or other incentive pay may play a
central role for these households, but our data sources (aside from
ExecuComp) do not separately break out bonuses.
A final observation can be made from the ExecuComp data. Table 4
also shows the growth rates of real compensation for executives in this
sample for 2007-08 and 2008-09. The negative growth rates for 2007-08
of-8.3 percent and -20.1 percent (depending on which options data are
used) confirm the finding based on the data for all top 1 percent tax
units in table 1 that top income groups were hit harder by the recent
recession than the average household. For 2008-09 the executives in the
ExecuComp data did much worse than the average tax unit (for which we
estimate, using NIPA data, that wage and salary income fell by 5.3
percent in real per-tax-unit terms) when we measure income including the
value of options exercised, but similar to the average tax unit when we
use the value of options granted. (9)
I.C. Who Is in the Top 1 Percent?
To further understand what drives the higher cyclicality of income
of the top 1 percent, it is useful to document the characteristics of
families in that group and how these have changed across periods. Since
this is not feasible in the Piketty-Saez data, we use the March CPS
public use microdata files. We study the characteristics of families and
their heads for the entire population and for the top 1 percent using
pre-tax, posttransfer family income excluding capital gains. (10) Table
5 reports statistics averaged across the 5 years ending in 1982 and
across the 5 years ending in 2008.
Heads of families in the top 1 percent tend to be slightly older
than the average, are more likely to be married, and are less likely to
be retired. They are more likely to be white, self-employed, and more
educated. Perhaps surprisingly, the top 1 percent are widely dispersed
across industries and occupations. This makes it less likely that a
particular industry or occupation is driving most of the high
cyclicality of incomes among this group. For example, it is unlikely
that the increased cyclicality of the top 1 percent is due only to more
of them being employed in finance today than earlier, or to incomes in
financial occupations having become more cyclical (although finance may
be more important for the top 0.01 percent), for two reasons. First, the
share of the top 1 percent in finance (and related industries) is only
16 percent even at the end of our sample period, up by about 4.4
percentage points from the early 1980s. Therefore, whether one assumes
that the beta of incomes in the finance industry is constant but that
more of the top 1 percent are now employed in finance, or one allows the
beta of finance to increase, the beta for finance in the post1982 period
would have to be at least 11 in order for finance to explain the
increase in beta of the entire top 1 percent from 0.7 to 2.4 (top panel
of table 2). (11)
Second, to the extent we can estimate betas of the top 1 percent at
the industry or occupation level, we find no evidence that the beta for
those in finance is dramatically larger than the betas of other top 1
percent households. (12) Jon Bakija, Adam Cole, and Bradley Heim (2010)
provide data for the top 1 percent and the top 0.1 percent that are
comparable to the data from Piketty and Saez but contain information
about occupations (coded from taxpayer responses to the occupation
question on Form 1040). We use their data for 1993, 1997, 1999, and
2001-05 to calculate log growth rates (annualized in the case of 4- or
2-year periods) and regress these on aggregate log growth rates (using
the same aggregate variable we used earlier). Four occupations account
for more than 5 percent of tax units in the top 1 percent and the top
0.1 percent. These are "executives, managers, and supervisors
(non-finance)," "financial professions, including
management," "lawyers," and "medical." Using
these data, we estimate a beta of 1.99 for the full top 1 percent, and
betas for the four subgroups listed of 1.96, 2.34, 1.67, and 0.71. For
the top 0.1 percent we estimate a beta of 2.82 for the full group and
betas of 2.27, 3.08, 3.60, and 2.34 for the four main subgroups (all
estimates listed have associated t statistics of 2 or more). With the
exception of medical occupations within the top 1 percent, this suggests
that betas are high across all the largest subgroups of the top 1
percent and the top 0.1 percent.
I.D. Consumption
We next turn to the question of whether the high cyclicality of
income for high-income households leads to a high cyclicality of
consumption spending. Evidence on this question constitutes a further
test of our main finding, as well as of the extent to which consumption
is smoothed across these income changes, as would be the case for
insurable changes in income or endogenous timing of income.
Unfortunately, high-income groups are generally thought to be
underrepresented in the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CE), and some CE
consumption categories are top coded. (13) Furthermore, in order to have
a sufficient number of households, our analysis here focuses on the top
5 percent of CE households rather than the top 1 percent. Nonetheless,
our analysis shows higher cyclicality for high-consumption households.
We use the CE data to construct measures of household-level
spending from January 1982 to February 2009 for different groups ranked
by their expenditure level in the quarter before the interview. Our
consumption measure is nondurables plus some services; the main
categories of excluded services are health care, education, and housing
(except for the nondurable and service components of household
operations). We deflate the reported consumption values using the Bureau
of Labor Statistics (BLS) price index for nondurables. For each
household we calculate logconsumption growth rates from one quarter to
the next and average these across households in a given group (using
survey weights). We then calculate annual log growth rates by summing
four quarterly log growth rates. For each group we run a time-series
regression of the four-quarter log growth rates in consumption per
household on the log growth rate of one of four different series (in
separate regressions): NIPA pre-tax, pre-transfer income; NIPA
disposable (that is, post-tax, post-transfer) income; NIPA personal
consumption expenditures (PCE) on nondurables and services; and CE
average consumption for all households (using our consumption
definition). For comparability across regressions in table 6 and for
comparability with the earlier tables, the first three regressions all
use the same price deflator, the CPI series from Piketty and Saez,
whereas the regression with CE average consumption as the explanatory
variable uses the BLS deflator (since both the left- and the
right-hand-side variable are based on the same consumption measure).
Table 6 shows that the sensitivity of the consumption of households
in the top 5 percent of the distribution (ranked by initial consumption)
to aggregate income fluctuations is between 1.9 and 2.6, depending on
the income measure used, whereas the sensitivity to aggregate
consumption fluctuations is almost 5. (14) This compares with a
sensitivity of the consumption of the full set of CE households that is
substantially less than 1 with respect to NIPA incomes.
The implications of this higher cyclicality are borne out in the
expenditure response of high-consumption households to the recent deep
recession. Figure 1 shows that CE consumption in the recent recession
fell substantially more for high-expenditure households--more than 10
percent from 2007 to 2008--than the average for all households. This
finding is The difference is due not to differences in the samples, but
rather to the price index used: Parker and Vissing-Jorgensen (2009) used
a PCE deflator to deflate NIPA consumption, whereas the results reported
here use the CPI series from Piketty and Saez. consistent with the
out-of-sample forecast in Parker and Vissing-Jorgensen (2009). (15)
[FIGURE 1 OMITTED]
These results provide additional evidence that the high cyclicality
of top incomes is not due to the endogenous timing of compensation but
instead affects the standard of living for top income households. We
emphasize, however, that a given percent decline in expenditure
presumably has greater welfare implications for a low-expenditure
household than for a highexpenditure household. This point, along with
the lack of foundation for interpersonal welfare comparisons, suggests
that one should not conclude that high-income households suffer more
from recessions than do lowincome households.
To conclude, we find a dramatic increase in the cyclicality of top
incomes. This increase occurs for total (non-capital gains) income as
well as for wage and salary income alone, and top groups'
expenditures are also highly cyclical during the post-1982 period.
Furthermore, the top 1 percent are active in a wide range of industries
and occupations, making it less likely that a particular industry or
occupation is driving most of the high cyclicality of top groups'
incomes.
II. Cyclicalities across the Full Income Distribution and the
Impact of Transfers, Taxes, and Capital Gains
In this section we use data on the entire distribution of incomes
across households to reconcile our findings with the conventional wisdom
that lowincome households are the most affected by booms and recessions
and that this greater sensitivity is due to higher cyclicality of hours
worked among this group. Further, in studying the entire distribution,
we also characterize how the tax-and-transfer system changes the
cyclicality of take-home income. Finally, we track individual families
rather than the income distribution across years as an alternative to
using repeated cross-sectional data.
II. A. Relating Our Findings to the Conventional Wisdom
Previous studies have shown that the incomes of low-income
households are more cyclical because unemployment falls primarily on
low-wage workers (Clark and Summers 1981, Kydland 1984), whereas the
wages of low-wage households have approximately the same exposure to the
business cycle as those of high-wage households (Solon, Barsky, and
Parker 1994). The flip side is that economic booms raise the standard of
living of low-income households by more than they do high-income
households (Card and Blank 1993, Hines, Hoynes, and Krueger 2001).
Rebecca Blank (1989, p. 142), for example, concludes that "the
income distribution narrows in times of economic expansion." There
are three reasons why the conventional wisdom might not have detected
the high cyclicality of top incomes: first, the time period, since
high-income cyclicality began to rise only in the 1980s; second, the
focus on broad groups, since cyclicality is high only for the very top
of the distribution; and third, the top coding of incomes in
conventional survey datasets, since this masks changes in income at the
top end of the income distribution.
To begin, we track income groups using the March CPS public use
microdata files for 1968-2008. The definition of income is the standard
Census definition, namely, pre-tax, post-transfer income excluding
capital gains, and the unit of observation is a Census-defined family.
(16) We drop changes across years with major top code changes, and we
note that after 1996 the data report the mean income for families above
the top-coded amount, whereas before they simply report the income top
code amount in place of actual income when top coded.
Following some of the earlier literature, the top panel of table 7
shows the cyclicality of incomes of low-education families (which are
typically also lower-income families) and high-education families
(typically higher-income families). Families are categorized according
to the characteristics of the head, and we examine cyclicality with
respect to average CPS income and the NIPA pre-tax, pre-transfer income
(excluding capital gains) measure used in the earlier tables. Even
during the period from 1982 on, there is some evidence that the
conventional facts about cyclicality hold in that low-education
households are more exposed to economic fluctuations than high-education
households.
Turning to the top 1 percent, we show in the sixth column of table
7 that from 1968 to 1982, incomes in the top 1 percent of the
distribution in the CPS were less cyclical than the average, with a beta
of roughly 0.6. Thus, the previous literature is entirely correct about
the early part of the period it studies. But when one focuses on the top
1 percent in the period since 1982 (next column), the cyclicality of
that group's income is estimated to be 1.97 or 1.00, depending on
the measure of income used--estimates as large as those for families
with less than a high school education. The higher top 1 percent
cyclicality after 1982 is presumably due to the later period, to
increases in the top code level at several points over the years, and,
after 1996, to the increased variability in amounts reported for
topcoded observations.
Finally, we use a measure of the top 1 percent income share in the
CPS constructed by Burkhauser and others (2008, 2009) using internal
Census Bureau data for the CPS. These data measure top 1 percent income
shares more accurately than is possible with the top-coded, publicly
released microdata because the internal data are subject only to
high-end censoring due to the number of digits allocated to the
internally recorded income variable. That said, there are a number of
additional issues with the accuracy of internal CPS top income data, and
the series of Burkhauser and coauthors does not show as significant an
increase in top income shares as the tax data (see Burkhauser and others
2008, 2009, and Atkinson and others 2010). Despite these caveats, as
displayed in the last two columns of table 7, these internal CPS survey
data show an even higher cyclicality of the top 1 percent than the
public data, and one that is very similar to that of the Piketty-Saez
data from table 3. (17)
The previous literature, furthermore, shows that the cyclicality of
the incomes of low-income families is largely due to the cyclicality of
their hours worked. We now show that hours cyclicality plays only a
minor role for the cyclicality of the top 1 percent. First, using all
families in the CPS, we calculate average usual hours worked per week in
each year for different income groups. For each group we regress the
change in log average hours on the change in log real NIPA income
(pre-tax, pre-transfer income, excluding capital gains), using data for
1982-2008. The cyclicality of hours for the top 1 percent is 0.26 (but
with a standard error of 0.30), which is similar to the cyclicality of
hours for all families, which we estimate to be 0.22 (with a standard
error of 0.06). Thus, although the results are weak statistically, there
is no evidence of a different cyclicality in hours for the top 1
percent. Second, we use the CPS hours data to adjust our measure of the
wage and salary income of the top 1 percent from the Piketty-Saez data.
We regress log growth in wages and salaries on log growth in hours and
use the residual in place of the original wage and salaries series in
our analysis of cyclicality. The cyclicality of
"hours-adjusted" wages and salaries is estimated to be 2.2 for
the top 1 percent, only slightly lower than the cyclicality of the
unadjusted series, which is 2.4 (table 3). A similar exercise for the
bottom quintile (using merged SOI-CPS data on the bottom quintile's
income, as described in the next subsection) finds that most of the
cyclicality for that group is in fact due to the cyclicality of hours
worked, consistent with the previous literature. (18) Our analysis
implies that, in contrast with the bottom end of the distribution, most
of the cyclicality of the top 1 percent is due to fluctuating payments
for work rather than fluctuating hours worked.
We conclude that our results on income cyclicality both by
education group in the CPS and for the top 1 percent before 1982 support
the conventional view that low incomes are more cyclical. However, after
1982, even in this conventional survey dataset which has top-coded
incomes, high income cyclicality is observable for the top 1 percent,
and even higher cyclicality can be measured from versions of the data
not subject to the top coding imposed on the public release files.
Furthermore, this high cyclicality does not appear to be driven by
cyclicality in hours worked, as it is for the bottom income groups. We
now turn to a dataset from the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) that
combines information from the CPS and the SOI data and allows us to
study the entire distribution of income without the confounding issues
of top coding.
II.B. Cyclicalities across the Full Income Distribution
To study the complete income distribution, this subsection employs
a dataset from the Congressional Budget Office (2008) that merges data
from the IRS SOI and data from the CPS to estimate average household
income for different groups of households in different years. The two
most important differences between the SOI-CPS data from the
Congressional Budget Office and the SOI data used in tables 1, 2, and 3
are the unit of analysis and the definition of income used to sort
households. The unit of analysis is the household in the SOI-CPS data
and a tax unit in the SOI data. In terms of income, in the SOI-CPS data,
households are sorted on pre-tax income per effective householder
including transfers and capital gains, whereas in the Piketty-Saez SOI
data, tax units are sorted on pre-tax income excluding transfers and
capital gains. Our online data appendix provides further details.
The SOI-CPS data confirm our earlier findings for top income groups
for this different set of choices about income measurement and unit of
analysis. Table 8 shows statistics on the income distribution and
cyclicality across the first four quintiles, in detail for the top
quintile, and then in further detail for the top 1 percent. Focusing
first on wages and salaries and on pre-tax, pre-transfer income
excluding capital gains, as in all our analysis up to this point, we
find (top panel) that the top 1 percent in the SOI-CPS data earn about
11 times, and the top 0.01 percent about 150 times, the average income;
both these results are fairly similar to those reported in the second
panel of table 2. The second panel of table 8 shows that all household
groupings except the top 1 percent get 60 to 70 percent of their income
from wages and salaries. This number drops to 44 percent for the top 1
percent, and 27 percent for the top 0.01 percent. (19) The first two
rows of the third panel confirm our main findings on the post-1982
cyclicality of top income groups (compare this panel with the second
panel of table 3). For the top 1 percent, both wages and salaries and
overall pre-tax, pre-transfer income (excluding capital gains) per
householder are more than twice as cyclical as the average income of all
households, and for households in the top 0.01 percent, both wages and
salaries and overall income are more than three times as cyclical as the
average. (20)
Second, the first two rows of the third panel of table 8 show that
the incomes of households in the bottom two quintiles are a bit more
cyclical than those of households from the middle quintile up to the
90th to 95th percentile. Thus, even in this period of high exposure of
very high income groups, households in the lowest income quintile still
have a slightly higher cyclicality of income than households in the
middle and upper-middle parts of the distribution, but a much lower
cyclicality than those at the top end. (21)
In sum, the recent cyclicality of wages and salaries and pre-tax,
pre-transfer income is asymmetrically U-shaped, higher for the bottom
two quintiles than for the middle and upper-middle part of the income
distribution, and dramatically higher for the top 1 percent and the top
0.01 percent.
II.C Cyclicality and Transfers, Taxes, and Capital Gains
The different levels and cyclicalities of the incomes of different
groups in the income distribution lead to different levels and
cyclicalities of taxes and transfers, and therefore different
cyclicalities of disposable income and ultimately of consumption. In
this section we document that taxes and transfers reduce the cyclicality
of income except at the very top. We also investigate the role of
capital gains.
First, the top two panels of table 8 show that adding transfers to
our definition of income raises the incomes of the lowest quintile
substantially but makes only a small difference to the incomes further
up the distribution; the ratio of top income to average income falls
slightly, since aggregate income is higher when transfers are included.
Next, adding capital gains to income works the same way at the other end
of the distribution, increasing the incomes of the top groups and so
raising their relative incomes, while lowering the relative incomes of
the bottom groups. Finally, subtracting taxes lowers the incomes of the
top groups the most and so raises the relative incomes of the bottom
quintiles.
Second, the third panel of table 8 shows that the income
cyclicalities of the bottom income groups are significantly reduced by
transfers, which are large for the bottom quintile (about 40 percent of
pre-tax, pre-transfer, pre-capital gains income) and countercyclical.
The cyclicality of income for the bottom quintile falls from 0.76 to
0.41 as a result of transfer income alone, and that of the second
quintile falls from 0.90 to 0.61. Third, capital gains increase
cyclicality for all groups, and the importance of capital gains rises
steadily with income, corresponding to the larger fraction of income
coming from capital gains for higher-income groups. Including capital
gains raises the income cyclicality of the top 1 percent from 2.2 to
3.3. (22) Finally, taxes modestly lower the cyclicality of income for
groups below the 99th percentile, while increasing cyclicality for the
top 1 percent.
The fourth panel of table 8 summarizes the impact of different
income levels and cyclicalities by calculating the fraction of aggregate
income changes borne by each group. On average, the top 1 percent bears
29 percent of changes in aggregate pre-tax, pre-transfer income
excluding capital gains, and as much as 48 percent of changes in
aggregate post-tax, post-transfer income including capital gains. (23)
Overall, the cyclicality of the middle income groups is more stable
across different income measures than that of the top and bottom of the
income distribution. The cyclicality of the lowest income groups is
significantly reduced by transfers, and that of the top income groups is
significantly raised by including realized capital gains.
II.D. The Cyclicality of Same-Family Income
So far, because we use datasets that have good coverage of the top
end of the income distribution, our analysis measures the cyclicality of
the average income of the top 1 percent of the income distribution
rather than the cyclicality of a given set of tax units or households.
The top 1 percent of the distribution contains somewhat different people
from year to year. Could the cyclicality of the change in incomes of the
group of people that start in the top 1 percent be different from the
cyclicality of the distribution that we have estimated so far? Such a
difference could arise, for example, from a correlation between
individual income risks and aggregate fluctuations. We have already
provided, in our consumption analysis in section I.D, some evidence of
high cyclicality in data covering a constant set of households from one
period to the next. Here we further investigate the cyclicality of
same-family income in two ways.
First, we link families across our March CPS extracts (which we
also used in section II.A) for 1982-2009. In each year we categorize
families into percentiles based on the entire distribution of families,
and then we take the subsample of those that can be tracked to the
following survey year and calculate the change in average income for
each income group from this set of families. Thus, we calculate the
annual log change in average income for groups of families that, in the
first year of the change, are all within a certain part of the income
distribution. Because of the small number of families in the top 1
percent that can be linked across years, the standard errors of the
cyclicalities estimated for the top 1 percent in regressions parallel to
those in table 7 are very large, around 1.6. For the top 5 percent, the
sample is larger and the standard errors are somewhat smaller. The
cyclicalities of same-family incomes for the top 5 percent are estimated
to be 1.46, with a standard error of 0.80, with respect to average CPS
income and 0.80, with a standard error of 0.86, with respect to NIPA
income.
Second, in the next section we turn to tax data in which we can
track the same families over time. Doing so requires using tax data from
another country, but one that has also had an increase in top income
inequality.
We can summarize the main results of sections II.A through II.D as
follows: First, it is harder to observe high income cyclicality in the
top 1 percent in the public use CPS data, because of top coding and the
fact that cyclicality is high only for very high income families.
Second, in looking at the entire distribution of incomes, the
cyclicality of pre-tax, pre-transfer incomes excluding capital gains is
asymmetrically U-shaped: it is slightly higher for the bottom two
quintiles of the income distribution than for the next groups up to
around the 95th percentile (and even up to the 99th percentile when
focusing on wages and salaries), and very high for the top 1 percent and
especially the top 0.1 and 0.01 percent. Third, transfers significantly
reduce cyclicality at the bottom of the income distribution, essentially
equating cyclicality across the distribution except for the top. The
realization of capital gains raises the cyclicality of incomes at the
very top even higher; taxes generate a small additional increase in
cyclicality at the top.
III. Canada
Saez and Michael Veall (2007) show that Canada has also had a large
increase in income inequality at the high end of the income distribution
that roughly coincides temporally with the U.S. increase but is slightly
less extreme. Canada has a slightly different tax system and culture but
presumably is affected by the same changes in economic factors, such as
technology and trade, as the United States. Thus, to provide another
observation on the cyclicality of top incomes and to provide information
about possible causes, we analyze the cyclicality of Canadian top
incomes. There are also a number of ways in which the Canadian data are
better than the U.S. data, most notably in that we can track the same
families across years.
Our data come from the Longitudinal Administrative Databank, which
contains records for 20 percent of all tax returns filed in Canada from
1982 to 2007. Working with Statistics Canada, we extracted information
on the average incomes of families in different groups in the income
distribution, both as repeated cross sections and tracking the families
in different groups in the income distribution in a given year into the
following year, as we were able to do with a subset of the CPS. (24)
Further, we obtained data on income by source, as in the SOI data from
Piketty and Saez, and on taxes and transfers, as in the SOI-CPS data
from the CBO. We asked Statistics Canada to rank households and
construct groups based on income calculated from pre-tax, pre-transfer
income excluding capital gains.
Table 9 summarizes our results on the cyclicality of pre-tax,
pre-transfer income excluding capital gains for different income groups
in Canada with respect to aggregate Canadian income fluctuations for
both sampling procedures (same households from year to year, and not).
First, focusing on wages and salaries and pre-tax, pre-transfer income
excluding capital gains, the top panel of table 9 shows (comparing with
table 2) that the ratio of income of the top 1 percent to average income
is somewhat lower in Canada than in the United States, although this
point should be qualified by possible differences in tax laws and tax
avoidance by high-income households between the two countries. (25)
Second, comparison of the second panel of table 9 with table 3
shows that the top 1 percent in Canada and in the United States get
similar shares (about 60 percent) of their income from wages and
salaries. However, in Canada the top 0.01 percent get about 70 percent
of their income from wages and salaries, compared with only 40 percent
in the United States (from table 3).
Third, turning to our main point of interest, the third panel of
table 9 shows that top incomes in Canada, as in the United States, are
highly cyclical in the period since 1982. In Canada the top 1 percent
and the top 0.01 percent have cyclicalities of 1.6 and 3.0 in the recent
period, slightly lower than the corresponding cyclicalities in the
United States (top panel of table 2), which are 2.4 and 4.0,
respectively. The next two sections argue that this pattern across the
two counties--higher cyclicality for those at the top of the income
distribution--is representative of a close relationship and potentially
a common cause of both high income shares and high cyclicality at the
top in the period since the early 1980s.
Fourth, table 9 also shows the effect of capital gains, taxes, and
transfers in Canada. Looking across rows in the third panel reveals that
in Canada the government has little effect on the cyclicality of incomes
at the top of the distribution. At the bottom, however, the effect of
transfers is far larger in Canada than in the United States (table 8).
The beta for the lowest income quintile before taxes and transfers is
over 6, compared with 0.76 for the United States, whereas that after
transfers is 0.36, quite similar to the 0.41 in the U.S. data. Although
one might be tempted to credit the Canadian welfare state, it seems
unlikely that the United States and Canada are truly so different in the
exposure of pre- versus post-transfer incomes. Instead, the large impact
of transfers on the cyclicality of the bottom group in Canada is likely
due to very low average pre-tax, pre-transfer incomes for this group
(with very low average incomes, even moderate transfers can change the
cyclicality substantially). Lower pre-tax, pre-transfer incomes for the
bottom group in Canada are due in large measure to the Canadian groups
being defined in terms of an income measure that excludes transfers, and
to the SOI-CPS data in table 8 excluding households with negative income
from the bottom income category.
Finally, the bottom panel of table 9 shows that in Canada the
income changes from one year to the next that occur for those households
who are in the top 1 percent in the first year also have a high
cyclicality with respect to changes in aggregate Canadian income,
roughly similar to that found in the third panel using repeated
cross-sectional data. This is something we could not observe in the U.S.
tax data. Thus, the cyclical exposure from one year to the next for
families that start in the top 1 percent of the income distribution (but
who may fall elsewhere in the distribution in subsequent years) is
similar to the cyclical exposure of the annually reported top 1 percent
of the income distribution (a group that contains somewhat different
families from year to year). This is less so, however, for the top 0.01
percent. The three groups of families that start in the various income
groups within the top 1 percent (bottom panel) have similar
cyclicalities, whereas for the same three groups in the annually
reported top 1 percent of the distribution (third panel), the top 0.01
percent have (economically) significantly higher cyclicality than the
other two groups. Nonetheless, the fact that we estimate high
cyclicalities for the top 1 percent in both cross-sectional data and
panel data is evidence against the hypothesis that the cyclicality of
top incomes in panel data in the United States would be quite different
from what we have estimated from repeated cross-sectional data. To
conclude our discussion of the bottom panel of table 9, we note that the
roles of taxes, transfers, and capital gains are broadly similar to
those in the third panel.
IV. The Empirical Link between Income Cyclicality and Income Shares
at the Top
Having explored in detail the rise in the cyclicality of high
incomes in the last three decades, we now show that this increase is
closely related to the rise in the share of income accruing to the top
of the income distribution. Specifically, we present three pieces of
evidence that the higher the level of income inequality, the higher the
income cyclicality of the rich. We exploit variation across groups,
time, and countries. First, in the post-1982 period, the higher a group
is in the income distribution (within the top 1 percent), the higher is
that group's income cyclicality. Second, across decades, as the
income share of a given top group increases, the cyclicality of its
income increases, consistent with the fact that the increase in the
income share of the top 1 percent starts at almost exactly the same time
as the increase in the income cyclicality of that group. Third, across
countries, those with larger increases in the income share of the top 1
percent have experienced larger increases in the income cyclicality of
the top 1 percent. This tight empirical link between inequality and
cyclicality at the top end of the income distribution in the past
quarter century strongly suggests that these two phenomena share a
common cause.
[FIGURE 2 OMITTED]
Before we turn to this evidence, figure 2 complements the basic
facts displayed in tables 1 and 2 by plotting the income shares from the
Piketty-Saez data. (26) These data show both that the dramatic rise in
top income shares started in the early 1980s, when cyclicality also
increased, and that cyclicality and the income share of the top income
groups are not linked in the first half of the 20th century. Top income
shares were large in the prewar period, a period in which we do not find
evidence of higher cyclicality of the incomes of the top 1 percent.
Piketty and Saez (2003) argue that different factors drove the income
shares of the top 1 percent during the period of declining inequality
than during the later period of increasing inequality. They argue that
the decline in the income share of the top 1 percent, and of the
highest-income groups within the top 1 percent, from around 1928 to
around 1970 was driven in large part by declines in capital income
(income from dividends and interest), which were in turn due to a
combination of the Great Depression and the large tax increases enacted
to finance the war; these included large increases in corporate income
taxes that almost mechanically reduced distributions to stockholders. In
contrast, an increase in wage and salary income is the key driver of the
more recent increase in the income share of the top 1 percent. The lack
of correspondence between top 1 percent income share and income
cyclicality together with the different income composition in the
earlier period suggests that the decline in top income shares from 1928
to 1970 was not driven by the same factors as the more recent increases.
This is consistent with our explanation for the recent changes: the ICT
revolution did not happen in reverse in the early to middle part of the
20th century.
Our first piece of additional evidence of a link between the
cyclicality and the income shares of the top 1 percent is that, for
groups further up the income distribution within the top 1 percent,
there is both a larger income share (relative to the size of the group)
and a larger income cyclicality during the period since 1982. Figure 3
graphs the cyclicality of income over the period 1982-2008 for each
income group (using data from tables 2 and 3 and the same calculations
for other income groups) against the time-series average of the log
ratio of that group's average income to the average income of all
tax units. (27) The first panel of figure 3 focuses on pre-tax,
pre-transfer income excluding capital gains, and since we argue that the
high cyclicality of wage and salary income is a key driver of the high
overall cyclicality of the incomes of the top 1 percent, the second
panel focuses on wage and salary income alone. It is apparent from both
graphs that groups higher up in the income distribution within the top 1
percent have both higher ratios of income to average income and higher
income cyclicality. Inequality at the top is extreme: the incomes of the
top 0.01 percent are on average 212 times the average income (see the
second panel of table 2). Similarly, cyclicality at the top is extreme:
that of the top 0.01 percent is about four times that of the average
(six times when one focuses on wages and salaries only). This again
suggests a link between the level of income inequality and income
cyclicality.
A simple statistical description of the relationship is that [beta]
in equation 1 is a function of the average log income ratio:
[[beta].sub.i] = [[lambda].sub.0] + [[lambda].sub.1] (1/T)[SIGMA]
ln([Y.sub.i,t]/[Y.sub.t]), where the summation is across the T years for
each income group i, so that equation 1 becomes
(2) [MATHEMATICAL EXPRESSION NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]
We estimate this relationship by stacking data for percentiles
0-90, 90-95, 95-99, 99-99.9, 99.9-99.99, and 99.99-100 using the growth
rates for 1983-2008, for a total of 156 observations. Using pre-tax,
pre-transfer income excluding capital gains results in an estimate of
[[lambda].sub.1] of 0.65. Using wage and salary data results in an
estimate of [[lambda].sub.1] of 1.61. Both estimates are significant at
the 1 percent level, showing that cyclicality increases with income
share across groups.
Second, over time since top income shares first began to rise, as a
group' s income share has increased, so has its cyclicality. To
show this, we estimate betas for each high-income group and decade since
the 1970s, and the time-series average of the log ratio of that
group's average income to the average income of all tax units for
each group and decade. Figure 4 plots decadal betas against decadal
average log income ratios. Again the top panel focuses on pre-tax,
pre-transfer income excluding capital gains, and the second panel on
wage and salary income. For each group, both cyclicalities and average
log income ratios increase over time, leading to a positive association
between a group's cyclicality and its average income ratio. This
pattern is present both in overall income and in wage and salary income.
Notice that when one connects the points by decade, as is done in figure
4, rather than by group, it becomes clear that the relationship between
average log incomes and cyclicalities is strengthening over time: no
relationship was apparent in the 1970s, whereas a strong relationship is
observed in the 2000s.
A statistical description of the relationship underlying figure 4
is that [beta] in equation 1 is a function of the log income ratio, now
allowing for time-series variation in the ratio, so [[beta].sub.i] =
[[lambda].sub.0] + [[lambda].sub.1] ln[SIGMA] ln([Y.sub.i,t]/[Y.sub.t].
Equation 1 then becomes
(3) [MATHEMATICAL EXPRESSION NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]
We estimate this relationship separately for each of the three
subgroups of the top 1 percent--percentiles 99-99.9, 99.9-99.99, and
99.99-100--using the growth rates for 1970-2008. We include
ln([Y.sub.i,t]/[Y.sub.t]) itself as an additional regressor to avoid
potentially spurious significance of the variable of interest,
[DELTA]ln[Y.sub.t+1]ln([Y.sub.i,t]/[Y.sub.t]). Using pre-tax,
pre-transfer income excluding capital gains results in estimates of
[[lambda].sub.1] of 2.09 (t = 1.75) for percentiles 99-99.9, 2.37 (t =
2.01) for percentiles 99.9-99.99, and 2.48 (t = 2.35) for percentiles
99.99-100. Using wage and salary data results in estimates of
[[lambda].sub.1] of 1.46 (t = 2.25), 2.86 (t = 2.31), and 3.03 (t =
2.60) for the three groups, respectively. This confirms, using
time-series variation in income shares (log income ratios) within
groups, that higher income shares are associated with higher
cyclicality.
[FIGURE 4 OMITTED]
Third, we show that the countries with the largest increases in the
income shares of the top 1 percent also have experienced the largest
increases in the cyclicality of incomes of that group. We use the
dataset constructed from tax records from Atkinson, Piketty, and Saez
(2010), which contains annual time-series data for the incomes of the
top 1 percent for 22 countries. We focus on relating changes in top
income shares to changes in top income cyclicality rather than on
post-1982 levels of each variable, because of the differences in tax
systems across countries and the consequent differences in measurement
of top income shares, as well as the host of other differences that
exist across countries. (28) We estimate income cyclicality for the top
1 percent in the period from 1982 onward (the period for which we found
higher top 1 percent income cyclicality for the United States) and for
the period 1970-82 (as a benchmark period). Of the 22 countries, we
exclude 6 (Australia, Finland, Germany, New Zealand, Norway, and the
United Kingdom) for which income measures include capital gains and 1
(Switzerland) for which incomes are not available at an annual
frequency. (29) Furthermore, we require countries to have at least five
observations of growth rates in the 1970-82 period and five in the
1982-2007 period, leading us to drop another 5 countries (Argentina,
China, Indonesia, Netherlands, and Spain). This leaves 10 countries
(Canada, France, India, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Portugal, Singapore,
Sweden, and the United States). The original data for Canada extend only
to 2000, but we obtained data up to 2007 from Michael Veall. (30) As
shown in figure 5, there is a positive relationship between the increase
in top 1 percent beta and the increase in top 1 percent income shares.
The fitted value is from an ordinary least squares regression relating
the change in top 1 percent beta to the change in average top 1 percent
income shares. The slope coefficient in this regression is 0.42 (the
heteroscedasticity-robust standard error is 0.07) and the [R.sup.2] is
0.64.
[FIGURE 5 OMITTED]
Overall, these three different approaches all suggest that in
recent decades, the greater is the top 1 percent income share, the
higher is income cyclicality for those in the top 1 percent.
V. Technological Change and Changes in High-Income Shares and
Cyclicality
This section argues using a simple example that increases in the
scale at which top earners operate naturally lead to increases in both
income and income cyclicality at the top of the distribution. We do not
provide additional tests to support this interpretation of the facts.
Instead we intend in this section to put forward an additional theory,
to be considered in future work, about the underlying economic drivers
behind these two phenomena.
V.A. Existing Theories for Increasing Top Income Shares
The leading explanation for the broad increase in wage and income
inequality that started in the 1970s is that technological change over
this period has complemented the skills of highly skilled workers (see,
for example, Autor, Katz, and Kearney 2008, Acemoglu and Autor 2010).
There is also evidence that changes in economic institutions or
regulation (such as minimum wages and unionization) have increased
income inequality at the lower end of the distribution. At the very top
of the distribution, Piketty and Saez (2003) argue that the speed and
size of the increases in relative earnings are inconsistent with the
main existing theories based on skill-biased technological change, and
that the evidence from top income shares may instead suggest an
important role for changing social norms with respect to high earnings.
Finally, there is a well-developed literature on the rise in relative
compensation for a subset of top earners, namely, corporate chief
executive officers (CEOs). Several explanations have been proposed for
the rise in relative CEO pay, including a shift in social norms
regarding compensation, an increase in managerial power (rent
extraction, captured boards), a shift in demand from specific to general
skills, an increase in the size of firms, and skill-biased technological
change (Kaplan and Rauh 2010, Bertrand 2009).
Top executives are, however, a minority of highly compensated
individuals. Steven Kaplan and Joshua Rauh (2010) document that only
about 5 percent of earners in the top 0.01 percent are executives of
nonfinancial firms. They also show that investment bankers, other
financial asset managers (at hedge, venture capital, private equity, and
mutual funds), lawyers, and to a smaller extent athletes and celebrities
all make up significant fractions of the top income groups. (31) Kaplan
and Rauh argue that the fact that pay has increased dramatically at the
top in each of these sectors is evidence against the first three
explanations above. Neither social norms nor increased managerial power
seems relevant for the pay of many occupations among top earners, such
as hedge fund managers, and specific rather than general skills seem
more important for lawyers, hedge fund managers, investment bankers, and
professional athletes. Expanding on the argument of Xavier Gabaix and
Augustin Landier (2008) that increased CEO pay can be explained by
increased firm size, Kaplan and Rauh further show that the leading
financial services firms, law firms, and hedge, venture capital, and
private equity funds have grown larger over time (measured by inputs or
output). This does not fully explain the increase in CEO pay (and the
top 1 percent income share), however, since average firm size was
increasing before 1980, too. What is needed to explain these facts is
that the impact of firm size on top l percent pay is higher than it was
before, as might arise from skill-biased technological change favoring
those at the top. This would amount to a mix of the last two theories
listed above.
Of these existing theories, which also predict an increase in the
income cyclicality of top earners? The canonical theories of
skill-biased technological change require a separate assumption that the
technology that complements skill has a very cyclical impact on those at
the top of the income distribution? (32) Other theories of rising pay at
the top similarly require additional assumptions--that the ability of
CEOs to "steal" is cyclical or that norms about pay are highly
cyclical (for example, because high pay or conspicuous consumption is
more stigmatized during recessions).
Although changing institutions and regulations, power structures,
or norms may have a role in the changes we have observed, we argue that
these changes are not inconsistent with a theory of skill-biased
technological change--specifically, changes in ICT--in which these
changes have increased the scale at which the top earners operate. We
show theoretically that if advances in ICT have increased the ability to
scale the application of high skills, this naturally implies both that
top incomes will rise and that fluctuations in demand over the business
cycle will affect the incomes of the highest-skill individuals
disproportionately. The next subsection describes this mechanism,
leaving empirical tests or calibrations for future work.
V.B. A Theory of Why Very High Income Individuals Have Higher and
More Cyclical Incomes than in the Past
The rise of ICT has allowed the most skilled in any given
occupation to apply their talents more broadly, for example, to manage
more workers and capital, to entertain more people, or to write more
papers. Thus, ICT has lowered the extent to which quality declines when
more output is produced; in other words, it has made marginal revenue
curves decline more slowly with output. This change has raised the
operational scale and the earnings of the most skilled. The highest
earners tend to have larger fluctuations in their earnings than the rest
of the population because those who operate at a large scale naturally
have lower profit margins and so are more exposed to cyclical
fluctuations.
The following simple model formalizes this argument and illustrates
how those with higher incomes tend also to have more cyclical incomes.
(33) Let each worker produce earnings according to
(4) py - ci = [Ai.sup.[alpha]] - ci,
where 0 < [alpha] < 1 and [alpha]A > c. Further assume
that workers earn the full net revenue they contribute to the firm, so
that earnings are [pi] = [Ai.sup.[alpha]] - ci. Very highly skilled
workers have higher [alpha] than they had in the past, whereas changes
in a for lower-skilled workers are zero or comparatively small. A higher
a means that a worker's marginal product diminishes less rapidly as
the input i increases. The assumption [alpha]A > c ensures that
high-[alpha] workers earn more than low-[alpha] workers. The key change
in our earnings function that generates both increased cyclicality and
increased earnings shares for highly skilled workers is our conjecture
that growth in ICT has increased [alpha] for very highly skilled workers
during the period since 1982.
Three different interpretations of our revenue or earnings function
are useful. First, the most obvious interpretation is that all workers
produce output of identical quality, but the best produce more for given
inputs and have less diminishing returns to scale. In our equations this
corresponds to i being inputs, y = [i.sup.[alpha]], p = A, and c being
the price of the inputs. In this interpretation the ICT revolution
increases the returns to scale (that is, reduces the degree of
decreasing returns to scale) of the best workers and allows them to work
with more inputs; for example, a CEO can manage a larger company.
A second interpretation of equation 4 is that ICT has changed
markets so that highly skilled workers are more like superstars in the
sense of Sherwin Rosen (1981). That is, highly skilled workers produce
the same number of units of output for given inputs as other workers,
but as they produce more output, the quality of that output declines
more slowly than that of other workers does. As in Rosen (1981, p. 849),
"superior talent stands out and does not deteriorate so rapidly
with market size as inferior talent does." In this interpretation
the ICT revolution has lowered how quickly quality declines with output
for the best workers. In our equations this corresponds to i being both
input and output (y = i), the price p being a function of quality that
decreases with output as p(y) = [Ay.sup.[alpha]-1] (SO py =
[Ai.sup.[alpha]]), and c being the marginal cost of producing another
unit of output. For example, the top lawyers (in the post-1982 world)
may be able to write more briefs without the quality of their legal
advice suffering as much as would be the case for less skilled lawyers
(for example, because of the impact of ICT on the ease with which case
histories can be researched).
A final and closely related interpretation is that of an asset
manager paid based on performance. In this interpretation let i be
assets under management, c the expected return investors can earn
elsewhere, and [Ai.sup.[alpha]] the (risk-adjusted) trading profits of
the fund. (34) The earnings equation then captures the idea that the
best fund managers are increasingly able to invest more money without
the returns on their investments deteriorating as much as for other fund
managers.
Given our assumptions, the optimal level of i is
(5) [i.sup.*] = [(A[alpha]/c).sup.1/(1-[alpha])],
with associated earnings for the worker of
(6) [pi] = [(A[alpha]/c).sup.1/(1-[alpha])] c(1-[alpha])/[alpha].
Equation 6 delivers our two main results.
First, because workers with higher [alpha] earn higher incomes (by
assumption), income inequality and top income shares increase when the
[alpha] of top earners increases. In equation 6, d[pi]/d[alpha] > 0.
This occurs because highly skilled workers generate more revenue for
given inputs, and they are optimally matched with more inputs because
they have less decreasing returns to scale.
Second, an increase in the [alpha] of high-[alpha] workers
increases the cyclicality of their earnings. Assume that business cycle
fluctuations are driven by fluctuation in A, representing either market
demand shocks or technology shocks. The percentage change in profits
depends on [alpha] as
(7) dln[pi]/dlnA = 1/(1-[alpha]),
which is positive and increasing in [alpha]. Thus, the cyclicality
of the earnings of a worker increases if the worker's [alpha]
rises. Note that d ln[pi]/d lnA does not depend on whether i is adjusted
optimally in response to the change in A, since by the envelope theorem,
d[pi]/di = 0 at the initial value of A. Thus, the high cyclicality of
earnings is driven not by a higher cyclicality of inputs, but by the
increased sensitivity of earnings to demand that comes from working with
a higher level of inputs. That said, the input scale of more highly
skilled workers is more cyclical in this model; it is just not the cause
of greater income cyclicality.
The intuition for the different cyclicalities is that more highly
skilled workers optimally are working with more inputs (interpretation
1) or producing more output (interpretations 2 and 3). Their revenue is
similarly sensitive to fluctuations as those of lower-skill individuals,
since fluctuations in A affect the revenue of each worker
proportionately. However, for highly skilled workers, costs are higher
relative to revenue, so ci is more substantial relative to
[Ai.sup.[alpha]] for these workers. This makes their earnings, [pi] =
[Ai.sup.[alpha]] - ci, more cyclical. For low-skilled workers, inputs
are small relative to revenue, so fluctuations in earnings are in
percentage terms more similar to fluctuations in revenue.
VI. Conclusion
Coinciding with the increase in the income share of top earners
since the early 1980s has been an increase in the cyclicality of the
incomes of top earners. The high cyclicality that we document for top
incomes, including wages and salaries, appears to be linked empirically
to increases in the income shares of top earners, based on variation
over time, across groups of top earners, and across countries. This
increased cyclicality and its link to increased income shares should
contribute to a better understanding of the reasons behind the increase
in top income shares.
We propose that the information and communications revolution
provides a natural way to think about how technological change may have
raised both top income shares and top income cyclicality. The change in
technology that we suggest--increased scale or increased
"superstar"-type production by top earners--generates a simple
connection between income shares and cyclicality, in that the earnings
of those operating on a larger scale naturally become more sensitive to
the business cycle. Our brief analysis of our posited mechanism leaves
open the question of how well it can quantitatively match the documented
changes in cyclicality over time and across countries.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS For helpful comments we thank the editors, our
discussants Rebecca Blank and Erik Hurst, as well as Jeff Campbell,
Xavier Gabaix, Takashi Yamashita, participants at the Brookings Panel
conference, and seminar participants at Kellogg School of Management and
the Federal Reserve Banks of Cleveland and Chicago. We thank David Autor
and Melanie Wasserman for help with the CPS files. We thank Brian Murphy
and Habib Saani of Statistics Canada for help with the Longitudinal
Administrative Databank. We thank Jeff Larrimore for providing the data
from Burkhauser and others (2008, 2009) and Michael Veall for providing
data from Saez and Veall (2007) updated to 2007. We thank the Zell
Center and Kellogg School of Management for funding. Nicolas Ziebarth
provided excellent research assistance.
The authors report no relevant potential conflicts of interest.
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JONATHAN A. PARKER
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ANNETTE VISSING-JORGENSEN
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(1.) For wages and salaries this change was first documented by
Bound and Johnson (1992) and Katz and Murphy (1992). The increase that
began in the 1970s and 1980s continued through the 1990s and into the
2000s in the top half of the wage distribution (Autor, Katz, and Kearney
2008). On increasing inequality in consumption, see Cutler and Katz
(1991), Attanasio and Davis (1996), and Heathcote, Perri, and Violante
(2010). Although the survey information on households suggests that the
increase in the overall distribution of inequality in expenditure has
been significantly less than that observed for income, this may
partially be an issue of measurement of expenditure (see, for example,
Aguiar and Bils 2010).
(2.) We address each of these issues in our analysis of the
Canadian data below and argue that focusing on a constant set of
households does not lead to materially different results for the income
cyclicality of the top 1 percent.
(3.) In our analysis this seems to be an important issue only for
the 1986 tax reform (top group cyclicalities are higher in the 1980s if
a tax-based measure of aggregate income is used). For the 1993 tax
reform, Goolsbee (2000) provides evidence that executives timed the
exercise of their options to take advantage of lower tax rates in 1992,
thus seemingly raising aggregate income in 1992 at the expense of income
in 1993. In the NIPA data, aggregate income growth was marginally
negative from 1992 to 1993. To avoid artificially overstating our claim
about extreme growth rates for top groups, we include 1993 as a boom
year in table 1. Note, however, that Hall and Liebman (2000) argue that
the high incomes in 1992 may not have been tax motivated, and they show
that income shifting is not evident in response to two tax reforms of
the 1980s.
(4.) Top income shares were also large in the prewar period, a
period in which we do not find evidence for higher cyclicality of the
incomes of the top 1 percent. Piketty and Saez (2003) argue that
different factors drove the income shares of the top I percent during
the period of declining inequality and during the period of increasing
inequality; see our discussion in section IV. See also Kuznets (1953).
(5.) It is worth clarifying that there is no mechanical tendency
for a group to become more exposed to the cycle as its income share
increases, but in fact the opposite. In the limit, as a group's
income becomes a larger and larger share of all income, its exposure to
the aggregate tends toward 1.
(6.) Qualified stock options are taxed as capital gains when
exercised and the stocks received are sold, provided that they are held
for a year and that the stocks purchased with them are held for another
year. The gain resulting from the difference between the strike price
and the market price, however, can count toward income for purposes of
the alternative minimum tax. We do not deal here with the accounting
treatment of stock options for financial reporting, which differs from
the tax treatment for the individual; for example, it allows
corporations to deduct more on their tax returns than they expense on
their financial statements.
(7.) This should not affect our results substantially, since the
top 400 families correspond to only a small fraction of even the top
0.01 percent.
(8.) With an average of 137 million tax units across 1992-2009, the
top 1 percent consists of, on average, 1,370,000 households, and the top
0.01 percent of, on average, 13,700 households. Households headed by
executives represented in ExecuComp thus make up a tiny fraction of both
the top 1 percent and the top 0.01 percent.
(9.) The more meaningful comparison here is probably the one based
on value of options exercised, since N1PA wages and salaries are based
on that concept (see Moylan 2008). The treatment of options in the NIPA
is unlikely to materially affect our results, since options income is
only a tiny fraction of overall NIPA income. Furthermore, as shown in
the bottom panel of table 2, our main results are very similar when we
use unemployment or median income to measure aggregate fluctuations.
(10.) We use this definition of income to match with previous work
using the CPS, since comparability is important for our analysis in
section II.A.
(11.) We calculate this as follows. Let a and a denote the share of
the top 1 percent employed in finance during 1982-2008 and 1947-82,
respectively, and let [beta]' and [beta] denote the income
cyclicality of the top 1 percent in these two periods. If the beta of
those in the top 1 percent not employed in finance was constant at 1,
then a'[beta]' + (1 - a') = 2.4 and a[beta] + (1 - a) =
0.7, and thus a'[beta]' - a[beta] - (a' - a) = 1.7.
Suppose (based on table 5) that a' = 0.16, and assume (to give
finance its best chance at being the explanation) that a = 0.06 (lower
than the pre-1982 value from table 5). Then 0.16 x [beta]' -
0.06[beta] = 1.8. Consider two possible cases: If [beta] = [beta]',
then [beta]' = 18. Alternatively, if [beta] = 1, then [beta] =
11.6.
(12.) The CPS data (described in more detail in section II) are
problematic for this purpose because values assigned to top-coded
observations are not industry specific, implying that betas for top 1
percent households across industries could spuriously look similar. With
that important reservation, we find that within each of the four
industries listed in table 5, betas for families in the top 1 percent
are much larger than for the average family, and the top 1 percent
finance industry beta is roughly similar to that for the nonfinance
industries taken as a group.
(13.) Because of the way the CE is structured, the
respondent's burden rises with expenditure: more time is required
to report more expenditure. Further, there is evidence that
underreporting rises with expenditure. See, for example, Aguiar and Bils
(2010).
(14.) The sensitivities of top household consumption to NIPA
consumption are a bit lower than similar statistics for a shorter sample
reported in Parker and Vissing-Jorgensen (2009).
(15.) For better readability, the figure focuses on annual data,
calculated as within-year averages (using survey weights) of quarterly
consumption values across households in a given group (multiplied by 4).
Furthermore, because we are interested in showing levels of growth
rates, not only their betas with respect to aggregates, we sort
households according to current consumption rather than consumption in
the previous quarter. The latter method is theoretically more meaningful
but, with measurement error in consumption, leads to a mechanical
negative bias in growth rates for top groups. As discussed in Parker and
Vissing-Jorgensen (2009), this does not affect the estimation of betas
when log growth rates are used, but it would bias this figure.
(16.) This definition has the benefit of dropping households
consisting of unrelated individuals, but the disadvantage of dropping
single individuals without children. The latter account for only about
10 percent of households in the top 1 percent, but 24 percent of the
general population, according to the 1995 SCF.
(17.) To use these data, which report "true" (internal
CPS) income shares, we infer the missing amount of income of the top 1
percent (denoted x) and thus also the missing amount from total income
in the public CPS (denoted Y) from the relationship (Y + x) x (internal
CPS income share) = ([Y.sup.1%] + x), where [Y.sup.1%] is the total
income of the top 1 percent of families in the public data. Burkhauser
and others (2010) provide two series for the internal CPS top 1 percent
income share, one based on households and one based on tax units. Since
neither matches our choice of CPS unit of analysis perfectly, we show
results based on both.
(18.) Castro and Coen-Pirani (2008) provide further analysis of the
cyclicality of hours, focusing on a comparison of college-educated with
non-college-educated individuals.
(19.) The somewhat smaller role of wages for the top groups than in
the top panel of table 3 is probably due to the fact that households in
the SOI-CPS data are sorted by an income measure that includes capital
gains.
(20.) For comparability with earlier tables, the right-hand-side
variable in this panel is (as in tables 1, 2, and 3) the log growth rate
in real NIPA pre-tax, pre-transfer income per tax unit, excluding
capital gains. The alternative would be to use the aggregate income from
the SOI-CPS data. This leads to similar results.
(21.) The cyclicality of the bottom quintile in the SOI-CPS data is
not as high as one might have expected from the cyclicality of
low-education households in the CPS. When using CPS data with families
sorted on income rather than education, we find a cyclicality for the
bottom quintile in the CPS that is similar to that found for the bottom
quintile in the SOI-CPS data.
(22.) Notice that the betas reported in the third panel of table 8
are all with respect to aggregate pre-tax, pre-transfer income excluding
capital gains.
(23.) In order for these fractions to sum to 1 across groups, we
base aggregate income changes on aggregates from the SOI-CPS data
themselves. To avoid potential biases in our estimates of betas from
having SOl-based data on both the left- and the right-hand side of the
regression, we omit the growth rates for the years around the 1986 tax
reform (1985-86, 1986-87, and 1987-88).
(24.) The Canadian tax system is based on the individual, so
tracking families involves summing income across family members (legal
and common law spouses and children) if more than one live at the same
address.
(25.) We compare the Canadian data with our results in tables 2 and
3 rather than table 8 because tables 2 and 3 (like the Canadian data)
are based on sorting households using pretax, pre-transfer income
excluding capital gains, whereas the data underlying table 8 are
available only sorting households using pre-tax, post-transfer incomes
including capital gains.
(26.) As in tables 1.2. and 3. these shares are for income
excluding capital gains, and the data come from Piketty and Saez (2003)
as updated in Saez (2010).
(27.) The betas depicted are from table 3 and are based on growth
rates for 1983-2008. The average log income ratios are calculated as the
time-series average of the log income ratio (average group income for
the year to average income for all tax units for that year), using
income ratios for the initial year of each growth rate used (1982 2007).
(28.) An example is whether the unit of analysis is the family or
the individual. See Atkinson, Pikeny, and Saez (forthcoming), table 3
and related text.
(29.) We include Finland in the set for which incomes include
capital gains. Although it is possible to calculate top 1 percent income
shares from the original article (Jantti and others 2010), it appears
infeasible to calculate aggregate totals that fully exclude capital
gains.
(30.) The updated data from Veall start in 1982. We use the
original data for earlier years and the updated data from 1982 on, with
growth rates always calculated using income data from the same dataset.
In the dataset from Atkinson, Piketty, and Saez (2010), U.S. aggregate
income is based on tax records. This may bias upward the beta of the top
1 percent in the period that includes the 1986 tax reform (if incomes
are distorted by tax reform effects more for the top 1 percent than for
other groups). We therefore drop the growth rates for 1987 and 1988 for
the United States but could alternatively use NIPA aggregate income as
in our earlier analysis (the 1986 growth rate is not an outlier in this
dataset).
(31.) Bakija and others (2010) provide much more detailed
occupational information, indicating that another large subgroup within
the highest income groups is people in medical occupations.
(32.) One approach would be to assume that the latest technologies
that complement the skills of the most highly paid are tied to new
investment (in physical capital of higher quality, in equipment and
software, or in organizational capital). Then, since investment is
highly procyclical, skill-biased technological change could lead to both
higher incomes and higher cyclicality of incomes for those with the
highest skills.
(33.) Our earnings function is in the spirit of the equilibrium
model of Lucas (1978).
(34.) This structure corresponds to a setting with no management
fees and a 100 percent carry, but the results should generalize to a
more standard contract with a 2 percent fee and 20 percent carry.
Table 1. Changes in Real Income per Tax Unit by Income Group in
Expansions and Recessions, 1917-2008
Percent per year except where stated otherwise (a)
99.0th- 99.9th-
All tax Top 1 99.9th 99.99th
Period units percent percentile percentile
Expansions (periods with increasing aggregate personal income
per tax unit)
2003-07 1.8 7.8 5.6 8.7
1991-2000 2.6 5.8 4.4 7.5
1982-89 2.2 7.9 6.0 10.7
1980-81 0.8 -2.7 -3.3 -1.3
1975-79 1.6 1.4 0.9 2.4
1958-73 2.6 1.9 2.0 1.6
1954-57 3.7 2.6 3.1 1.0
1949-53 5.0 -0.1 0.9 -2.0
1947-48 1.4 4.7 3.3 8.4
1938-44 11.0 3.6 4.5 3.0
1933-37 8.3 9.3 9.7 9.1
1924-29 1.8 4.3 3.0 4.1
1921-23 12.1 10.3 9.9 9.7
Recessions (periods with decreasing aggregate personal income
per tax unit)
2007-08 -2.6 -8.4 -6.7 -8.9
2000-03 -2.3 -5.8 -4.3 -7.7
1989-91 -1.7 -3.5 -2.2 -6.0
1981-82 -1.4 2.4 0.3 4.6
1979-80 -2.7 -0.9 -1.5 -0.5
1973-75 -4.5 -2.5 -3.2 -1.2
1957-58 -1.9 -4.7 -4.3 -5.7
1953-54 -1.1 2.2 2.5 0.2
1948-49 -2.3 -4.1 -4.1 -5.3
1944-47 -5.5 -0.4 0.6 -2.6
1937-38 -8.0 -17.7 -14.4 -22.6
1929-33 -9.5 -12.8 -11.8 -12.5
1923-24 -1.2 7.5 6.0 8.8
1917-21 -7.6 -10.5 -6.1 -13.2
Change for
top 1 percent
minus change
for all
tax units
Top 0.01 (percentage
Period percent points)
Expansions (periods with increasing
aggregate personal income per tax
unit)
2003-07 13.9 6.0
1991-2000 9.0 3.2
1982-89 14.3 5.7
1980-81 -0.7 -3.5
1975-79 3.7 -0.2
1958-73 1.0 -0.8
1954-57 2.0 -1.1
1949-53 -4.1 -5.1
1947-48 7.5 3.3
1938-44 -0.7 -7.4
1933-37 7.8 1.0
1924-29 10.4 2.5
1921-23 14.1 -1.8
Recessions (periods with decreasing
aggregate personal income per tax
unit)
2007-08 -12.7 -5.8
2000-03 -8.3 -3.5
1989-91 -5.6 -1.8
1981-82 15.7 3.9
1979-80 3.6 1.8
1973-75 1.9 2.0
1957-58 -6.1 -2.8
1953-54 3.7 3.2
1948-49 -1.2 -1.8
1944-47 -2.4 5.1
1937-38 -24.0 -9.7
1929-33 -17.7 -3.4
1923-24 13.3 8.7
1917-21 -22.0 -2.9
Sources: National Income and Product Accounts data, Piketty and Saez
(2003), and Saez (2010). See the online appendix
(www.brookings.edu/economics/bpea, under "Conferences and Papers") for
details.
(a.) Geometric annual averages calculated over the indicated period.
Income is real pre-tax, pre-transfer income excluding capital gains
and per tax unit; the same measure is used to define income groups.
Table 2. Cyclicality of Real Income per Tax Unit, by Income Group,
1917-2008 (a)
All tax Top 1 99.0th-99.9th 99.9th-99.99th Top 0.01
Period units percent percentile percentile percent
Income cyclicality (beta) (b)
1982-2008 1.00 2.39 1.75 3.08 3.96
(0.57) (0.38) (0.80) (1.11)
1947-82 1.00 0.72 0.81 0.63 0.02
(0.20) (0.16) (0.36) (0.36)
1917-47 1.00 0.90 0.82 0.94 1.12
(0.17) (0.14) (0.20) (0.31)
Ratio of group average income to average for all tax units
1982-2008 1.0 13.6 9.2 36.2 206.6
1947-82 1.0 8.7 7.1 18.7 64.6
1917-47 1.0 15.4 10.7 42.6 194.4
Fraction of aggregate income change borne by group (c)
1982-2008 1.00 0.266 0.117 0.082 0.067
(0.059) (0.024) (0.019) (0.018)
1947-82 1.00 0.056 0.046 0.010 0.000
(0.016) (0.010) (0.007) (0.002)
Alternative measures of beta (b)
Regressing group income growth on median income growth
1982-2008 0.98 2.27 1.78 2.73 3.43
(0.14) (0.77) (0.51) (1.10) (1.49)
1967-82 0.93 0.52 0.64 0.32 -0.19
(0.13) (0.25) (0.19) (0.44) (0.58)
Regressing group income growth on unemployment rate
1982-2008 -0.023 -0.058 -0.043 -0.076 -0.091
(0.004) (0.018) (0.012) (0.025) (0.035)
1948-82 -0.021 -0.015 -0.017 -0.013 -0.006
(0.002) (0.005) (0.004) (0.009) (0.009)
Sources: Authors' regressions using data in table I. with additional
data for median income growth and the unemployment rate. See the
online appendix for details.
(a.) Standard errors are in parentheses.
(b.) Coefficient on the log growth rate of average income per tax unit
for all tax units (top panel) or on the log growth rate in median
household income or on the change in the unemployment rate (bottom
panels), in a regression where the dependent variable is the log
growth rate of average income per tax unit in the indicated group.
(c.) Coefficient on the growth rate of average aggregate income per
tax unit in a regression where the dependent variable is (change in
group average income per tax unit) x (group share of
population)/(lagged aggregate average income per tax unit).
Table 3. Composition of Income and Cyclicality of Income Growth, by
Top Income Group and Income Source, 1947-82 and 1982-2008a
1947-82
99.0th- 99.9th-
All tax Top 1 99.9th 99.99th Top 0.01
Income source units percent percentile percentile percent
Average share of income from indicated source
Wages and 71.9 45.2 49.4 38.8 20.3
salaries
Entrepreneurial 13.1 28.3 31.2 23.7 11.1
Dividends 3.5 17.5 11.1 27.1 56.2
Interest 8.2 5.3 5.0 5.8 6.9
Rent 3.4 3.8 3.4 4.6 5.4
Beta of group's income from indicated source
Total income 1.00 0.72 0.81 0.63 0.02
(0.20) (0.16) (0.36) (0.36)
Wages and 1.12 0.36 0.44 0.20 -0.54
salaries (0.05) (0.14) (0.13) (0.27) (0.85)
Entrepreneurial 1.39 1.87 2.08 1.82 -1.54
(0.25) (0.68) (0.59) (0.99) (2.52)
Dividends 1.16 0.85 0.96 0.83 0.62
(0.29) (0.38) (0.39) (0.68) (0.34)
Interest 0.00 -0.10 -0.14 -0.04 0.06
(0.19) (0.48) (0.44) (0.66) (0.80)
Rent 0.62 -0.44 -0.17 -0.73 -1.14
(0.41) (0.87) (0.98) (0.93) (1.53)
1982-2008
99.0th- 99.9th-
All tax Top 1 99.9th 99.99th Top 0.01
Income source units percent percentile percentile percent
Average share of income from indicated source
Wages and 67.3 60.3 67.4 53.5 40.0
salaries
Entrepreneurial 10.2 22.8 19.5 25.8 32.0
Dividends 5.0 6.8 5.1 8.4 12.3
Interest 15.3 7.7 6.2 8.9 12.2
Rent 2.1 2.4 1.9 3.5 3.5
Beta of group's income from indicated source
Total income 1.00 2.39 1.75 3.08 3.96
(0.57) (0.38) (0.80) (1.11)
Wages and 0.87 2.38 1.32 3.61 6.20
salaries (0.06) (0.58) (0.31) (1.08) (1.93)
Entrepreneurial 1.33 2.07 2.29 0.76 1.53
(0.33) (1.31) (1.13) (2.91) (1.78)
Dividends 1.24 2.65 3.37 2.33 1.64
(0.57) (1.26) (0.97) (1.62) (1.93)
Interest 1.54 4.52 4.41 5.24 3.84
(0.39) (1.28) (1.18) (1.22) (1.71)
Rent -1.36 -0.26 -0.49 -0.37 -0.54
(1.29) (1.61) (3.61) (2.07) (1.54)
Sources: See table I. See the online appendix for details.
(a.) Income is total pre-tax, pre-transfer income excluding capital
gains. Standard errors are in parentheses.
Table 4. Cyclicality of Income of Corporate Executives, 1992-2009
1992 2009
Millions of 2008 dollars
Average real total compensation
Based on value of options granted (a) 1.45 2.43
Based on value of options exercised (b) 1.63 2.39
Percent
Average share of total compensation by
component, based on value of options
granted (c)
Salary 32.6 20.2
Bonus 18.6 5.6
Stock grants 7.0 29.3
Option grants 29.6 19.4
Other (d) 12.2 25.6
Standard
Beta error
Cyclicality of component income growth (e)
Based on value of options granted
Total compensation 2.89 0.86
Salary -0.12 0.13
Bonus 1.01 0.93
Stock grants 2.82 1.02
Option grants 5.36 1.70
Other (d) 0.97 1.57
Based on value of options exercised
Total compensation 4.39 1.15
Option grants 10.86 2.24
Excluding options
Total compensation 1.01 0.62
2007-08 2008-09
Percent
Growth rate of total real compensation
Based on value of options granted -8.3 -5.3
Based on value of options exercised -20.1 -18.2
Sources: Authors' calculations using ExecuComp data. See the online
data appendix for details.
(a.) ExecuComp series tdc1.
(b.) ExecuComp series tdc2.
(c.) Average compensation from the indicated component divided by
average total compensation. Numbers may not sum to 100 because of
rounding.
(d.) For example, nonequity incentive plan compensation.
(e.) Estimation based on log growth and excluding the 2005-06 growth
rate, which may be affected by changes in reporting requirements in
2006.
Table 5. Demographic, Educational, and Occupational Characteristics of
Heads of Families in the Top 1 Percent of the Income Distribution,
1978-82 and 2004-08 (a)
Top 1 percent (b)
Characteristic 1978-82 2004-08
Units as indicated
Demographics
Average age 50.7 47.8
Percent with children under 18 37.9 50.6
Average no. of children under 18 0.7 1.0
Percent married 97.8 97.0
Percent retired 7.0 12.3
Percent white 95.9 88.3
Percent self-employed 39.4 27.8
Percent of all family heads
Education
Less than high school 5.3 1.3
High school diploma 15.6 9.8
Some college 13.7 13.0
College degree 31.6 33.1
Post-college education 33.7 42.8
Industry
Manufacturing and construction 22.0 11.8
Finance, insurance, and real estate 11.6 16.0
Professional services 24.7 41.8
Wholesale and retail trade 13.3 9.2
Other 28.4 21.3
1982-85 1998-2001
Occupation (c)
Executive, administrative.
or managerial 34.7 35.5
Professional specialty 29.6 32.1
Sales 16.0 13.1
Other 19.7 19.3
All families
Characteristic 1978-82 2004-08
Units as indicated
Demographics
Average age 45.1 46.9
Percent with children under 18 51.5 46.4
Average no. of children under 18 1.0 0.9
Percent married 87.3 84.6
Percent retired 14.8 29.6
Percent white 87.6 81.7
Percent self-employed 11.6 9.1
Percent of all family heads
Education
Less than high school 30.2 12.1
High school diploma 33.2 31.3
Some college 18.0 27.5
College degree 12.3 18.6
Post-college education 6.3 10.5
Industry
Manufacturing and construction 28.3 14.9
Finance, insurance, and real estate 3.9 5.2
Professional services 11.4 23.0
Wholesale and retail trade 12.8 9.7
Other 43.5 47.1
1982-85 1998-2001
Occupation (c)
Executive, administrative.
or managerial 10.8 12.3
Professional specialty 9.4 11.6
Sales 8.3 8.4
Other 71.6 67.7
Sources: Authors' calculations using Census public use data from
the March CPS files from 1979 to 2009, referring to the previous
year's income and labor force characteristics. See the online data
appendix for details.
(a.) "Families" excludes people not living with someone related to
them by blood or marriage. This definition includes about 90 percent
of households in the top 1 percent of the income distribution and 76
percent of households in the general population (as determined from
the 1995 Survey of Consumer Finances). Reported percentages and
averages are averaged across years in the indicated period.
(b.) As defined by CPS family income (pre-tax, post-transfer income
excluding capital gains).
(c.) We use a common occupation coding for income years 1982-2001.
Table 6. Cyclicality of Real Consumption among All Households and the
Top 5 Percent, January 1982-February 2009,
All Top 5
Measure households percent
Ratio of group average consumption to average 1.00 2.52
consumption of all households
Beta from regression of consumption on: (b)
NIPA pre-tax, pre-transfer personal income 0.58 1.94
(0.14) (0.50)
NIPA post-tax, post-transfer personal income 0.61 2.60
(0.23) (0.61)
NIPA nondurables and services consumption 1.17 4.80
(0.27) (0.97)
CE consumption for all households 1.00 2.38
(0.30)
Fraction of total CE consumption fluctuations 1.00 0.32
borne by group (c) (0.04)
Sources: Authors' calculations and regressions using data from the
Consumer Expenditure Survey (CE).
(a.) Consumption includes expenditure on nondurable goods and some
services. Groups are defined based on their consumption in the
previous survey interview. Changes for all variables in all
regressions are measured as 4-quarter log growth rates. Standard
errors are in parentheses.
(b.) Each beta is the coefficient on the log change in the indicated
aggregate in a regression where the dependent variable is the log
change in consumption per household in the indicated group.
(c.) Coefficient on the growth rate of aggregate CE consumption per
household in a regression where the dependent variable is (change in
group average consumption per household) x (group share of
population)/ (lagged aggregate average consumption per household).
Table 7. Cyclicality of Income by Education and of Top 1 Percent,
Using CPS Data (a)
Cyclicality by level of education, using public
use data on families, 1982-2008
Less Some
than high high Some College More than
Beta school school college graduate college
With respect to 1.52 0.94 0.91 1.08 0.73
CPS income (0.19) (0.13) (0.14) (0.14) (0.21)
With respect to 0.85 0.67 0.67 0.78 0.63
NIPA income (0.34) (0.19) (0.20) (0.22) (0.23)
Cyclicality of top 1 percent
Using public use Using public use
data on families and internal data (b)
1982-2006, 1982-2006,
Beta 1968-82 1982-2008 series 1 series 2
With respect to 0.55 1.97 2.57 2.44
CPS income (0.30) (0.75) (0.58) (0.35)
With respect to 0.64 1.00 1.81 2.18
NIPA income (0.46) (0.83) (0.84) (0.62)
Source: Authors' regressions using Census CPS data and data from
Burkhauser and others (2010).
(a.) Public use data are March CPS public use data files from 1968 to
2009; see the online data appendix for further details. When using
these data, we drop changes across the following years with major top
code changes: 1980-81, 1983-84, 1994-95, and 2001-02. In addition,
when using internal CPS data for households (series 1) we drop changes
for 1992-93, when the Census allocated more digits to the internal
record that stores the income series; series 2, covering tax units, is
adjusted for this jump. We do not use income data for 1973-75 because
the 1975 data are missing weights, and the 1973 and 1974 data have
more than 1 percent of income data top coded. Income for defining the
top 1 percent and in the regressions is CPS family income, which is
pre-tax, post-transfer income excluding capital gains. Standard errors
are in parentheses.
(b.) Data are based on internal CPS files and are from Burkhauser and
others (2010), provided (in updated version) by the authors. Series 1
from Burkhauser and others (2010) measures the top t percent income
share in the distribution of households, and series 2 measures top 1
percent income share in the distribution of tax units.
Table 8. Cyclicality of Income by Measure of Income and Income Group,
Merged IRS SOI and CPS Data, 1982-2005
All Lowest Second
Measure or source of income households quintile quintile
Ratio of average income in group
to average for all households
Pre-tax, pre-transfer excluding 1.00 0.17 0.47
capital gains
Pre-tax, post-transfer excluding 1.00 0.23 0.51
capital gains
Pre-tax, post-transfer including 1.00 0.22 0.49
capital gains
Post-tax, post-transfer including 1.00 0.26 0.54
capital gains
Average share of indicated source
in pre-tax, pre-transfer income
excluding capital gains (percent)
Wages and salaries 67.20 61.89 67.55
Pensions 5.02 3.09 4.44
Proprietors' and other business 6.54 5.27 4.07
income
Interest and dividends 6.92 3.02 3.08
In-kind income 6.67 20.94 13.30
Imputed taxes 6.95 5.61 5.90
Other 0.69 0.16 1.65
Pre-tax, pre-transfer income 100.00 100.00 100.00
excluding capital gains
Cash transfers 7.27 40.43 18.23
Capital gains 5.13 0.36 0.37
Taxes 24.22 10.16 15.55
Post-tax, post-transfer income 88.19 130.63 103.04
including capital gains
Beta of indicated income source
or measure with respect to
aggregate (NIPA) pre-tax, pre-
transfer income excluding capital
gains
Wages and salaries 0.83 0.79 1.00
(0.08) (0.38) (0.34)
Pre-tax, pre-transfer income 0.90 0.76 0.90
excluding capital gains (0.12) (0.32) (0.27)
Pre-tax, post-transfer income 0.78 0.41 0.61
excluding capital gains (0.11) (0.24) (0.20)
Pre-tax, post-transfer income 1.07 0.45 0.64
including capital gains (0.22) (0.24) (0.20)
Post-tax, post-transfer income 0.91 0.38 0.50
including capital gains (0.21) (0.24) (0.19)
Fraction of aggregate (merged IRS
SOI and CPS) income change borne
by indicated group
Pre-tax, pre-transfer income 1.00 0.034 0.097
excluding capital gains (0.011) (0.022)
Post-tax, post-transfer income 1.00 0.016 0.041
including capital gains (0.013) (0.020)
Middle Fourth 80th-90th
Measure or source of income quintile quintile percentile
Ratio of average income in group
to average for all households
Pre-tax, pre-transfer excluding 0.76 1.14 1.58
capital gains
Pre-tax, post-transfer excluding 0.79 1.12 1.52
capital gains
Pre-tax, post-transfer including 0.75 1.08 1.47
capital gains
Post-tax, post-transfer including 0.80 1.10 1.46
capital gains
Average share of indicated source
in pre-tax, pre-transfer income
excluding capital gains (percent)
Wages and salaries 69.45 72.14 72.85
Pensions 6.25 5.84 5.53
Proprietors' and other business 3.22 3.09 3.80
income
Interest and dividends 4.15 4.47 4.88
In-kind income 9.28 6.79 5.25
Imputed taxes 6.16 6.34 6.37
Other 1.50 1.32 1.27
Pre-tax, pre-transfer income 100.00 100.00 100.00
excluding capital gains
Cash transfers 10.35 5.87 3.72
Capital gains 0.49 0.77 1.32
Taxes 18.71 21.21 23.51
Post-tax, post-transfer income 92.14 85.43 81.53
including capital gains
Beta of indicated income source
or measure with respect to
aggregate (NIPA) pre-tax, pre-
transfer income excluding capital
gains
Wages and salaries 0.63 0.78 0.70
(0.18) (0.11) (0.16)
Pre-tax, pre-transfer income 0.66 0.69 0.67
excluding capital gains (0.13) (0.08) (0.12)
Pre-tax, post-transfer income 0.48 0.59 0.61
excluding capital gains (0.11) (0.08) (0.10)
Pre-tax, post-transfer income 0.51 0.63 0.68
including capital gains (0.11) (0.08) (0.12)
Post-tax, post-transfer income 0.40 0.49 0.51
including capital gains (0.12) (0.10) (0.12)
Fraction of aggregate (merged IRS
SOI and CPS) income change borne
by indicated group
Pre-tax, pre-transfer income 0.115 0.158 0.107
excluding capital gains (0.018) (0.016) (0.013)
Post-tax, post-transfer income 0.056 0.100 0.075
including capital gains (0.018) (0.018) (0.011)
90th-95th 95th-99.0th
Measure or source of income percentile percentile
Ratio of average income in group
to average for all households
Pre-tax, pre-transfer excluding 2.04 3.05
capital gains
Pre-tax, post-transfer excluding 1.96 2.91
capital gains
Pre-tax, post-transfer including 1.92 2.94
capital gains
Post-tax, post-transfer including 1.86 2.78
capital gains
Average share of indicated source
in pre-tax, pre-transfer income
excluding capital gains (percent)
Wages and salaries 70.30 62.44
Pensions 5.45 4.71
Proprietors' and other business 5.56 11.44
income
Interest and dividends 6.49 10.05
In-kind income 4.38 3.21
Imputed taxes 6.46 6.65
Other 1.33 1.50
Pre-tax, pre-transfer income 100.00 100.00
excluding capital gains
Cash transfers 3.02 2.38
Capital gains 2.35 5.90
Taxes 25.25 28.08
Post-tax, post-transfer income 80.12 80.19
including capital gains
Beta of indicated income source
or measure with respect to
aggregate (NIPA) pre-tax, pre-
transfer income excluding capital
gains
Wages and salaries 0.44 0.67
(0.14) (0.15)
Pre-tax, pre-transfer income 0.67 1.01
excluding capital gains (0.10) (0.16)
Pre-tax, post-transfer income 0.66 1.01
excluding capital gains (0.09) (0.16)
Pre-tax, post-transfer income 0.79 1.24
including capital gains (0.12) (0.26)
Post-tax, post-transfer income 0.65 1.11
including capital gains (0.14) (0.29)
Fraction of aggregate (merged IRS
SOI and CPS) income change borne
by indicated group
Pre-tax, pre-transfer income 0.064 0.132
excluding capital gains (0.011) (0.014)
Post-tax, post-transfer income 0.063 0.140
including capital gains (0.009) (0.012)
99.0th- 99.9th
Top 1 99.9th 99.99th
Measure or source of income percent percentile percentile
Ratio of average income in group
to average for all households
Pre-tax, pre-transfer excluding 10.96 5.77 29.42
capital gains
Pre-tax, post-transfer excluding 10.31 5.47 27.55
capital gains
Pre-tax, post-transfer including 12.80 6.37 36.42
capital gains
Post-tax, post-transfer including 11.17 7.14 31.14
capital gains
Average share of indicated source
in pre-tax, pre-transfer income
excluding capital gains (percent)
Wages and salaries 44.20 65.83 38.18
Pensions 1.85 3.22 1.16
Proprietors' and other business 21.33 26.57 23.66
income
Interest and dividends 18.72 21.52 21.75
In-kind income 1.03 1.93 0.42
Imputed taxes 11.01 11.08 12.69
Other 1.87 2.28 2.17
Pre-tax, pre-transfer income 100.00 100.00 100.00
excluding capital gains
Cash transfers 0.87 1.59 0.37
Capital gains 31.39 23.34 41.52
Taxes 41.22 43.37 45.90
Post-tax, post-transfer income 91.05 109.97 95.99
including capital gains
Beta of indicated income source
or measure with respect to
aggregate (NIPA) pre-tax, pre-
transfer income excluding capital
gains
Wages and salaries 2.40 1.40 4.15
(0.84) (0.59) (1.27)
Pre-tax, pre-transfer income 2.16 0.77 3.07
excluding capital gains (0.73) (0.77) (1.00)
Pre-tax, post-transfer income 2.16 0.78 3.06
excluding capital gains (0.72) (0.74) (0.99)
Pre-tax, post-transfer income 3.28 1.82 4.16
including capital gains (1.03) (0.48) (1.62)
Post-tax, post-transfer income 3.48 2.35 4.56
including capital gains (1.16) (0.77) (1.81)
Fraction of aggregate (merged IRS
SOI and CPS) income change borne
by indicated group
Pre-tax, pre-transfer income 0.288 0.048 0.098
excluding capital gains (0.049) (0.016) (0.016)
Post-tax, post-transfer income 0.482 0.185 0.159
including capital gains (0.052) (0.020) (0.018)
Top 0.01
Measure or source of income percent
Ratio of average income in group
to average for all households
Pre-tax, pre-transfer excluding 150.59
capital gains
Pre-tax, post-transfer excluding 140.68
capital gains
Pre-tax, post-transfer including 242.46
capital gains
Post-tax, post-transfer including 206.14
capital gains
Average share of indicated source
in pre-tax, pre-transfer income
excluding capital gains (percent)
Wages and salaries 26.54
Pensions 0.39
Proprietors' and other business 24.14
income
Interest and dividends 25.31
In-kind income 0.06
Imputed taxes 21.65
Other 1.88
Pre-tax, pre-transfer income 100.00
excluding capital gains
Cash transfers 0.11
Capital gains 92.48
Taxes 62.78
Post-tax, post-transfer income 129.81
including capital gains
Beta of indicated income source
or measure with respect to
aggregate (NIPA) pre-tax, pre-
transfer income excluding capital
gains
Wages and salaries 5.88
(2.34)
Pre-tax, pre-transfer income 3.33
excluding capital gains (1.71)
Pre-tax, post-transfer income 3.34
excluding capital gains (1.70)
Pre-tax, post-transfer income 5.47
including capital gains (2.09)
Post-tax, post-transfer income 6.09
including capital gains (2.30)
Fraction of aggregate (merged IRS
SOI and CPS) income change borne
by indicated group
Pre-tax, pre-transfer income 0.065
excluding capital gains (0.017)
Post-tax, post-transfer income 0.161
including capital gains (0.022)
Sources: Authors' calculations and regressions using IRS SOI and CPS
data merged by the Congressional Budget Office. See the online data
appendix for details.
(a.) Income measures are average income per household. The distribution
of income is measured across individuals and is based on household
pre-tax, post-transfer income including capital gains, with income
adjusted for household size by dividing by the square root of the
number of people in the household. Standard errors are in parentheses.
Table 9. Cyclicality of Income by Measure of Income and Income Group
in Canada, 1982-2007 (a)
Measure or source All Lowest Second
of income families quintile quintile
Ratio of average income in group to
average for all families
Pre-tax, pre-transfer 1.00 0.04 0.32
excluding capital gains
Pre-tax, post-transfer 1.00 0.21 0.43
excluding capital gains
Pre-tax, post-transfer 1.00 0.22 0.43
including capital gains
Post-tax, post-transfer 1.00 0.26 0.49
including capital gains
Average share of indicated source in
pre-tax, pre-transfer income excluding
capital gains (percent)
Wages and salaries 78.4 65.7 59.5
Pensions 5.5 18.0 14.5
Business and 5.6 -20.1 6.2
professional income
Interest and dividends 6.6 27.9 11.6
Other investment 3.9 8.5 8.2
income
Pre-tax, pre-transfer 100.0 100.0 100.0
income excluding
capital gains
Cash transfers 12.8 571.3 51.3
Capital gains 3.5 27.1 4.0
Taxes 21.5 9.0 10.7
Post-tax, post-transfer 137.8 707.3 166.0
income including
capital gains
Beta with respect to average pre-tax,
pre-transfer income excluding capital
gains for all families
Pre-tax, pre-transfer 0.94 6.21 1.86
income excluding (0.13) (1.27) (0.31)
capital gains
Pre-tax, post-transfer 0.71 0.36 0.80
income excluding (0.11) (0.33) (0.21)
capital gains
Pre-tax, post-transfer 0.79 0.43 0.85
income including (0.11) (0.31) (0.19)
capital gains
Post-tax, post-transfer 0.71 0.37 0.72
income including (0.12) (0.32) (0.20)
capital gains
Same-household beta with respect to
average pre-tax, pre-transfer income
excluding capital gains
Pre-tax, pre-transfer 0.90 7.40 1.73
income excluding (0.13) (3.29) (0.36)
capital gains
Pre-tax, post-transfer 0.68 0.51 0.86
income excluding (0.12) (0.71) (0.26)
capital gains
Pre-tax, post-transfer 0.76 0.57 0.90
income including (0.12) (0.72) (0.26)
capital gains
Post-tax, post-transfer 0.69 0.50 0.83
income including (0.12) (2.53) (0.94)
capital gains
Measure or source Middle Fourth 80th-90th
of income quintile quintile percentile
Ratio of average income in group to
average for all families
Pre-tax, pre-transfer 0.73 1.26 1.85
excluding capital gains
Pre-tax, post-transfer 0.76 1.19 1.70
excluding capital gains
Pre-tax, post-transfer 0.75 1.18 1.68
including capital gains
Post-tax, post-transfer 0.80 1.19 1.65
including capital gains
Average share of indicated source in
pre-tax, pre-transfer income excluding
capital gains (percent)
Wages and salaries 74.2 83.2 86.2
Pensions 9.8 5.5 3.5
Business and 4.7 3.6 3.4
professional income
Interest and dividends 6.6 4.5 4.1
Other investment 4.7 3.2 2.8
income
Pre-tax, pre-transfer 100.0 100.0 100.0
income excluding
capital gains
Cash transfers 16.8 7.0 3.5
Capital gains 2.6 2.1 2.1
Taxes 16.1 19.6 21.5
Post-tax, post-transfer 135.5 128.7 127.2
income including
capital gains
Beta with respect to average pre-tax,
pre-transfer income excluding capital
gains for all families
Pre-tax, pre-transfer 1.06 0.73 0.64
income excluding (0.16) (0.10) (0.09)
capital gains
Pre-tax, post-transfer 0.67 0.59 0.59
income excluding (0.15) (0.10) (0.09)
capital gains
Pre-tax, post-transfer 0.71 0.64 0.64
income including (0.13) (0.09) (0.09)
capital gains
Post-tax, post-transfer 0.63 0.61 0.61
income including (0.15) (0.12) (0.10)
capital gains
Same-household beta with respect to
average pre-tax, pre-transfer income
excluding capital gains
Pre-tax, pre-transfer 1.01 0.77 0.70
income excluding (0.15) (0.11) (0.12)
capital gains
Pre-tax, post-transfer 0.65 0.60 0.60
income excluding (0.15) (0.11) (0.12)
capital gains
Pre-tax, post-transfer 0.71 0.65 0.66
income including (0.15) (0.10) (0.12)
capital gains
Post-tax, post-transfer 0.68 0.61 0.62
income including (0.44) (0.64) (0.25)
capital gains
90th- 95th-
Measure or source 95th 99.0th Top 1
of income percentile percentile percent
Ratio of average income in group to
average for all families
Pre-tax, pre-transfer 2.43 3.41 8.81
excluding capital gains
Pre-tax, post-transfer 2.20 3.07 7.86
excluding capital gains
Pre-tax, post-transfer 2.19 3.10 8.34
including capital gains
Post-tax, post-transfer 2.09 2.87 6.89
including capital gains
Average share of indicated source in
pre-tax, pre-transfer income excluding
capital gains (percent)
Wages and salaries 85.5 77.9 60.5
Pensions 2.9 2.9 2.2
Business and 4.0 8.2 17.4
professional income
Interest and dividends 4.6 7.0 14.6
Other investment 2.9 4.0 5.3
income
Pre-tax, pre-transfer 100.0 100.0 100.0
income excluding
capital gains
Cash transfers 2.2 1.5 0.7
Capital gains 2.5 4.2 9.4
Taxes 23.0 26.0 35.9
Post-tax, post-transfer 127.7 131.6 145.9
income including
capital gains
Beta with respect to average pre-tax,
pre-transfer income excluding capital
gains for all families
Pre-tax, pre-transfer 0.64 0.75 1.58
income excluding (0.09) (0.11) (0.29)
capital gains
Pre-tax, post-transfer 0.62 0.74 1.57
income excluding (0.10) (0.11) (0.29)
capital gains
Pre-tax, post-transfer 0.67 0.84 1.84
income including (0.10) (0.11) (0.39)
capital gains
Post-tax, post-transfer 0.63 0.77 1.64
income including (0.10) (0.13) (0.48)
capital gains
Same-household beta with respect to
average pre-tax, pre-transfer income
excluding capital gains
Pre-tax, pre-transfer 0.72 0.93 1.58
income excluding (0.16) (0.23) (0.35)
capital gains
Pre-tax, post-transfer 0.64 0.87 1.56
income excluding (0.15) (0.23) (0.34)
capital gains
Pre-tax, post-transfer 0.70 1.00 1.82
income including (0.15) (0.23) (0.41)
capital gains
Post-tax, post-transfer 0.64 0.88 1.58
income including (0.15) (0.12) (0.13)
capital gains
99.0th- 99.9th
Measure or source 99.9th 99.99th Top 0.01
of income percentile percentile percent
Ratio of average income in group to
average for all families
Pre-tax, pre-transfer 6.99 20.12 70.59
excluding capital gains
Pre-tax, post-transfer 6.25 17.90 62.66
excluding capital gains
Pre-tax, post-transfer 6.59 19.38 65.82
including capital gains
Post-tax, post-transfer 5.57 15.27 50.77
including capital gains
Average share of indicated source in
pre-tax, pre-transfer income excluding
capital gains (percent)
Wages and salaries 58.1 65.0 70.0
Pensions 2.5 1.7 0.7
Business and 21.0 10.6 3.0
professional income
Interest and dividends 13.1 17.4 21.2
Other investment 5.2 5.4 5.1
income
Pre-tax, pre-transfer 100.0 100.0 100.0
income excluding
capital gains
Cash transfers 0.8 0.4 0.1
Capital gains 8.8 11.6 8.3
Taxes 34.2 40.1 40.3
Post-tax, post-transfer 143.9 152.1 148.6
income including
capital gains
Beta with respect to average pre-tax,
pre-transfer income excluding capital
gains for all families
Pre-tax, pre-transfer 1.26 2.17 2.98
income excluding (0.21) (0.45) (0.85)
capital gains
Pre-tax, post-transfer 1.25 2.16 2.97
income excluding (0.21) (0.45) (0.85)
capital gains
Pre-tax, post-transfer 1.50 2.63 3.02
income including (0.29) (0.62) (0.91)
capital gains
Post-tax, post-transfer 1.33 2.51 2.24
income including (0.40) (0.77) (0.95)
capital gains
Same-household beta with respect to
average pre-tax, pre-transfer income
excluding capital gains
Pre-tax, pre-transfer 1.48 2.20 1.60
income excluding (0.35) (0.46) (0.93)
capital gains
Pre-tax, post-transfer 1.45 2.18 1.59
income excluding (0.34) (0.46) (0.93)
capital gains
Pre-tax, post-transfer 1.68 2.54 1.85
income including (0.38) (0.54) (1.07)
capital gains
Post-tax, post-transfer 1.48 2.38 1.02
income including (0.17) (0.25) (0.49)
capital gains
Source: Authors' calculations and regressions using data extracts from
the Longitudinal Administrative Databank at Statistics Canada.
(a.) Individuals are summed within families, and families are ranked
by pre-tax, pre-transfer income excluding capital gains in each year.
Aggregate income is market income (personal income less transfers) per
family. All betas for income measures that include capital gains
exclude changes to and from 1994, because that year is an outlier due
to a change in tax law (see Saez and Veall 2007). Standard errors are
in parentheses.
Figure 3. Betas and Log Ratios of Group Income to Average Income,
by Income Group, 1982-2008 (a)
Pre-tax, pre-transfer income excluding capital gains
Average ln(income ratio) (a)
0 0-90
1 90-95
2 95-99
3 99-99.9
4 99.9-99.99
5 99.99-100 percentile
Wage and salary income
Average ln(wage and salary ratio) (a)
0 0-90
1 90-95
2 95-99
3 99-99.9
4 99.9-99.99
5 99.99-100 percentile
Source: Authors' calculations based on data from Piketty and Saez
(2003), extended by Saez (2010).
(a.) Average across years of the log of the group's average income
divided by aggregate average income.
Note: Table made from line graph.
Comments and Discussion
COMMENT BY
REBECCA M. BLANK (1) This paper by Jonathan Parker and Annette
Vissing-Jorgensen is highly interesting. Its primary conclusion, that
incomes have become markedly more cyclical at the very top of the income
distribution in the past 25 years, is surprising and intriguing. The
paper presents a new fact about the world that was not previously known,
and this makes it likely that the paper will stimulate further research
and debate.
For an empirical economist, there is much to like in this paper.
The authors do an extremely thorough job of data analysis. They use
multiple datasets to confirm and test their results, with substantial
attention to proving the robustness of what they find. Any careful
reader will come away impressed by the serious data work in the paper
and persuaded that the cyclicality of incomes among the top I percent of
U.S. households has indeed increased. That said, as with most papers
that uncover new facts, there is more work to be done to understand and
interpret this result, so that it informs the theoretical framework that
economists use when thinking about income generation, inequality, and
macroeconomic change.
It is important to be clear about what the results in this paper do
not show. The greater cyclicality that the authors discuss appears to be
focused at the very top of the income distribution, particularly among
the top 1 percent of households. Hence, this result does not overturn
the frequently noted result that incomes are more cyclical among
lower-income families than among higher-income families. On average,
income in the bottom quintiles is more cyclical than in the middle
quintile, as the authors' table 8 demonstrates. Furthermore, the
authors reiterate the fact that the cyclical nature of unemployment, in
particular, seems to lead to income cyclicality among lower-income
families.
On the question of who is most hurt by cyclical downturns, nothing
in this paper refutes the widely held belief, buttressed by substantial
evidence, that lower-income families (particularly those headed by
someone with less education, working in a lower-wage job) experience
greater economic deprivation in a recession than do other families.
These families experience a disproportionate share of unemployment and
are more likely than other families to need government assistance to
survive economically during bad economic times. The fact that income and
consumption patterns (as the authors show) are also highly cyclical at
the very top of the income distribution is less likely to signal
deprivation, although it may well create real stress within these
families. Households in the top 1 percent of the income distribution
have substantial savings and assets and can smooth their consumption if
they wish. This means that the consumption cyclicality that they
experience (matching their income cyclicality) is best viewed as an
economic choice on their part. In contrast, consumption cyclicality
among very poor families who have no savings is much more likely to be
an involuntary and unavoidable response to changes in earnings and
income.
It would therefore be inaccurate to interpret the results in this
paper as saying something about well-being. Parker and Vissing-Jorgensen
are clear on this point, but it is worth stressing nonetheless. The
results in this paper do, however, inevitably raise the question of why
this cyclicality has increased among households at the very top of the
income distribution, particularly given the close relationship between
rising cyclicality and increases in absolute levels of inequality, which
the authors document. At the end of the paper, Parker and
Vissing-Jorgensen present a theory that focuses on changes in
information and communications technologies (ICT) that have increased
the ability of highly skilled persons to leverage their skills and
expand their income, leading to rising inequality. The authors'
model suggests that this exposes them to greater cyclical fluctuations.
I find this model a plausible story, although it is just that at
the moment--a possible story, without supporting evidence. To
investigate whether the data support this theory, one would want to look
at changes in earnings levels and cyclicality among high-earning workers
who might have greater "leverage" due to the ICT revolution,
and among those who might be less affected by this phenomenon.
Unfortunately, when one is exploring a phenomenon that is primarily
visible in only the top 1 percent of the population, such investigations
are hard to pursue.
What is happening in ICT may be only part of the change in the
economic environment facing top-earning workers. The expanded global
markets in which more and more companies are operating also provide
scope to utilize the gains from ICT that did not exist before. It might
have been useful for the authors to say more about globalization and how
it relates to their theory.
My biggest hesitation about the causal hypothesis that Parker and
Vissing-Jorgensen present is that it is unclear to me why it would be
limited to workers at the extreme top of the income distribution. Both
the greater global marketplaces and the expanded possibilities created
by new ICT should have benefited many higher-skilled workers. The
authors' results suggest that the increased income cyclicality they
observe is closely related to cyclicality in wages and salaries among
the topmost earners and does not reflect rising cyclicality in hours of
work or in other forms of income. At a minimum, this suggests that
compensation among the very top earners is more tied to overall economic
performance than it is among workers even slightly lower in the earnings
distribution. Perhaps additional theoretical structure is needed to
explain why compensation practices at the very top differ from those
even a little lower on the wage spectrum.
For instance, one question I would be very interested in knowing
more about is how compensation packages for top earners differ across
industries and occupations. Although Parker and Vissing-Jorgensen
indicate that the top 1 percent of earners are spread across industries
(table 5 in their paper), my guess is that there may be different
compensation practices for (say) those who manage money for large
manufacturing firms than for those who manage the firm's
operations. And the ability of new ICT to enlarge the possible value
generated by these different top managers might also vary. It may take a
series of more micro-focused case studies, looking at very highly paid
senior people in a selected group of industries and occupations, to
better understand and investigate both the authors' theory and
their empirical results.
Let me close with a comment about the data. As the authors note, it
is extremely difficult to study the phenomenon of income cyclicality at
the top because very few of the available datasets are large enough to
produce a reasonable-sized sample among the top 1 percent of earners.
And very few available datasets are accurate enough to produce
informative data about that group, even if their samples were larger.
Among survey statisticians there is widespread concern about lower
survey response rates among the extremely wealthy. (Of course, sample
weighting techniques can adjust for this, but a small number of
observations with larger weights will lead to less accuracy.)
In addition, noisy data can lead to a top 1 percent sample that
includes households whose actual income would not place them in this
category. For all of these reasons, annual cross-sectional datasets
based on relatively small samples of the population (such as the Current
Population Survey or the Consumer Expenditure Survey) are probably of
limited value in addressing the questions raised by this paper. For this
reason, I would place less reliance on tables 5 and 6, which use those
data, than on other results in the paper. Even if one combines a number
of years' data together to produce a larger sample, data
reliability questions may still pose problems for the researcher.
This means that there are probably two datasets best suited to look
at this small sliver of the population: the Statistics of Income data,
which the authors use intensively, and the American Community Survey
(ACS). The ACS, which the authors do not use, replaced the old
"long form" of the decennial census after the 2000 census. It
collects information monthly on a wide variety of indicators (including
income, earnings, and family composition) from a random sample of
families. In any one year, the ACS samples a little over 1.9 million
households. Although the ACS lacks data from before the 2000s, and so
cannot be used to investigate long-term trends in cyclicality, it can be
used to look in much greater depth at who the families and individuals
are at the very top of the income distribution in recent years, and at
how different types of households and families responded to the Great
Recession. Those who want to explore these issues further should think
about the possibilities provided by the ACS for this research question.
Overall, this is a fine paper. In some ways it merely adds to the
puzzle of why and how inequality and earnings among very top earners
have changed over the past 25 years. But by adding a new fact about
income cyclicality, and closely linking that fact with rising incomes
among these earners, the paper provides information that will help
economists winnow out the various theories that have been proposed to
explain widening inequality. The most believable explanations will be
those that explain both the rising levels of income and the rising
income cyclicality in this group.
COMMENT BY
ERIK BURST This paper by Jonathan Parker and Annette
Vissing-Jorgensen documents an interesting, important, and novel set of
facts pertaining to the cyclicality of income for very high income
individuals. The paper shows that in recent years, households in the top
1 percent of the income distribution have much more cyclical incomes
than most other households. Additionally, the paper shows that this high
relative cyclicality is a relatively recent phenomenon, that it moves in
lockstep (decade by decade) with the well-documented increase in income
inequality driven by the increasing income share for these households,
and that it is robust to controlling for stock options, household fixed
effects, and taxes and transfers. The facts are very carefully
documented, and I have no comments whatsoever on the existing empirical
work in the paper.
The second part of the paper lays out a simple theory to explain
these facts. In particular, it asks what factors could possibly result
both in an increasing share of income earned by very high income
individuals and in an increasing cyclicality of income for those
individuals. The authors propose a model where information and
communications technologies have increased the optimal production scale
for the most talented individuals. Nothing in the paper convincingly
supports or convincingly refutes this theory. Rather, as the authors
note, it is simply one theory that could simultaneously generate
increasing income inequality and increasing cyclicality among those with
very high incomes.
My comments are structured in two parts. First, I want to emphasize
that the authors make no claims about the welfare costs of recessions.
They are very clear about this. However, it is a point worth
reemphasizing so that the paper's implications are not
misconstrued. Second, I will offer some new facts related to the
changing nature of compensation that took place for higher-income
households during this period. In particular, bonus income increased in
importance for high-income households during the 1990s and early 2000s.
As I show below, bonus income is much more cyclical than other types of
income and is more closely associated with the finance industry than
with other industries.
WHAT THIS PAPER IS NOT ABOUT. Upon reading this paper, one is
tempted to use the facts that it documents to make statements pertaining
to the distributional costs of business cycle fluctuations. The authors
caution readers against making such types of calculations. I want to
underscore this point.
The authors show (convincingly) that the cyclicality of income is
much higher for those with very high incomes than for other income
groups and that this cyclicality has been increasing over time. Do these
results imply that the cost of business cycles, in terms of standard
utility-based measures of welfare, is higher for those with very high
incomes than for those at other points of the income distribution? Do
the results imply that over the last two and a half decades, those with
very high incomes are bearing an increasing brunt of business cycle
variation in terms of changes in welfare? The answer to both of these
questions is a resounding no. Variations in income (and, to a lesser
extent, in consumption) do not map directly onto variations in standard,
utility-based measures of welfare. Households with sufficient wealth can
self-insure against income fluctuations by accumulating and then drawing
down assets. Households can maintain consumption flows despite variation
in consumption outlays by delaying the replacement of durables, and even
some goods traditionally defined as nondurable, such as clothing or
vacation spending, have aspects of durability. Finally, given standard
assumptions about household preferences, concave utility functions imply
that a given change in expenditure will have a much smaller effect on
utility for individuals with very high expenditure than for individuals
with lower expenditure.
Two other facts need to be emphasized. First, households with very
high incomes may have anticipated the increase in risk to their incomes
that the authors document, and if so, one would expect them to have
demanded compensation for bearing that risk. This could explain the fact
that those with very high incomes are earning higher returns on their
labor and simultaneously facing more variable labor income streams. The
story is analogous to the difference between investing in stocks and
investing in bonds. If the earnings of those with very high incomes have
become more stock-like (taking more of an equity stake in their
employing firm through their labor investments), it is not surprising to
see them bearing more risk and receiving higher returns. Second, and a
related point, the variation in income for these households could be
either transitory or permanent. In order to compute standard welfare
calculations using income and expenditure data (even if one could
measure the service flow of expenditure correctly), one needs to know
whether the observed variation in income was perceived as a transitory
shock or as a permanent shock. To the extent that business cycle
variation implies differences in expectations about the evolution of the
permanent component of income for individuals at different points of the
income distribution, welfare calculations again become complicated.
Collectively, the results in this paper do not suggest that the
brunt of business cycles in terms of changing well-being is being
disproportionately borne by those with very high incomes in recent
periods. What the paper does show is that the income of those at the top
of the income distribution has become more cyclical. I view these
results as potentially informative about the changing nature of
compensation in the economy over the last few decades, not as an input
into how we think about the distributional costs of cyclical variation.
Like the authors, I would caution readers against using the paper's
results to draw conclusions about how cyclical variations affect
well-being for individuals at different points of the income
distribution.
THE INCREASING IMPORTANCE OF BONUS INCOME AT THE TOP. The paper
left me with a few lingering questions about which components of
earnings are driving the results. First, how important are bonuses for
individuals at the top of the income distribution? Second, are bonuses
more important for individuals in some professions than in others?
Third, has the composition of bonus-receiving professions been changing
over time? Fourth, is bonus income more cyclical than other types of
income? Finally, can bonuses help explain the correlation between the
increased share of income and the increased cyclicality of income for
very high income households?
Some of these questions are hard to answer with existing datasets.
I will try to provide some information on some of these questions using
data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), and will then
discuss further why bonus income could help explain the facts documented
in the paper. I wish to emphasize that these PSID results are meant to
be only suggestive. The PSID is not an ideal dataset for analyzing the
earnings behavior of very high income households, because of its limited
sample size.
The PSID disaggregates labor earnings into the following
categories: regular wage and salary income, bonus income, income from
commissions, tips, overtime compensation, and business income. For nay
analysis I use data from the 1995, 1997, 1999, 2001, 2003, 2005, and
2007 waves of the PSID, and I pool bonus and commission income together,
because commissions, like bonuses, could be related to work effort and
could vary with the state of the aggregate economy. I restrict the
sample to male heads of households between the ages of 16 and 70 who
were currently employed and had positive earnings during the preceding
year. The earnings reports I use are total earnings (from all sources)
within a particular category from the preceding year. For example, bonus
earnings reported in the 1995 wave of the PSID refer to all bonuses
earned during calendar 1994. All earnings data are converted into 2000
dollars, when applicable.
To compute earnings percentiles, I rank all earnings for
individuals within the sample separately for each year. Given the sample
sizes, I classify households into the top 2.5 percentiles (the richest
households), percentiles 2.5-5.0, percentiles 5.0-10.0, and the bottom
90 percentiles. I look at three measures: the share of households
receiving either bonus or commission earnings, the share of total
earnings that come from either bonus or commission earnings, and the
fraction of household heads who work in the finance industry. As it
turns out, the inclusion of commissions adds little to the analysis;
essentially all the results are driven by bonuses rather than
commissions, and therefore in what follows I refer to the sum of bonus
and commission income simply as bonus income.
My table 1 shows, first, the fraction of household heads in each of
the above percentile ranges who received bonus income. These results
pool the data across all years. Only 9 percent of household heads in the
bottom 90 percentiles of the income distribution received bonus income.
For the other income groups, the fraction receiving bonus income rises
with income, reaching 29 percent in the highest income group. The table
also shows the average fraction of income that comes from bonuses across
all households within the different percentile ranges. This is
calculated as the simple average of the bonus share across all
individuals within each range. This share likewise increases as one
moves up the earnings ladder. For example, the average individual in the
top 2.5 percentiles gets about 8 percent of earnings from bonuses,
compared with 1 percent for the average individual in the bottom 90
percentiles. Finally, the third line of table 1 shows the average bonus
share for those households who reported positive bonus income. The
conclusion from table 1 is that bonus income is more important for
higher-earning than for lower-earning households.
Figure 1 shows the time-series patterns in the bonus share of
earnings for household heads in the bottom 90 percentiles and for those
in the top 2.5 percentiles. The figure shows a dramatic increase in the
share of income earned from bonuses between 1994 (from the 1995 survey)
and 2004 (from the 2005 survey) for the latter group. For example,
whereas in 1994 roughly 5 percent of this group's earnings came
from bonuses, in 2004 that figure was roughly 10 percent. In contrast,
those in the bottom 90 percentiles show no discernable trend in the
share of income earned from bonuses.
[FIGURE 1 OMITTED]
To summarize, the PSID results show that the share of income from
bonuses among households at the top of the income distribution was
increasing at the same time that these households, according to the data
that the paper uses, were seeing both an increased share of total income
and an increased cyclicality of income. This suggests that the rise in
bonus income among these households may relate to the patterns
documented by Parker and Vissing-Jorgensen.
Is there a statistical relationship between the receipt of bonus
income and working in the finance sector? Steven Kaplan and Joshua Rauh
(2010) show that individuals in the finance sector increased their share
in the very top of the income distribution during the 1990s and the
early 2000s. The same patterns hold in the PSID data. In 1994, 12
percent of individuals in the top 2.5 percent of the income distribution
were in the finance industry; by 2004 this figure had risen to nearly
18.5 percent.
Table 2 shows the results of three regressions. Each regresses some
measure of the importance of bonus income on a dummy variable indicating
whether the individual is in the finance industry, a dummy for whether
the individual is in the top 10 percent of the income distribution, and
a dummy for whether the individual is in the top 2.5 percent of the
income distribution. (If the individual is in the top 2.5 percent, both
the top 10 percent dummy and the top 2.5 percent dummy have a value of
1.) I run these regressions on the entire pooled sample. As the table
shows, being in the finance industry increases the likelihood of
receiving a bonus, the share of income that comes from bonuses, and the
share of income coming from bonuses conditional on receiving a bonus.
Given that the finance industry has been increasing in importance
over time, a natural question is how much of the increasing share of
bonus income for those individuals with very high income during the
1990s and early 2000s (documented above) was simply due to the
increasing prominence of individuals in the finance industry in that
group. To address this, I run two regressions on a sample that includes
only those individuals in the top 2.5 percentiles of the income
distribution. The first simply regresses the share of income from
bonuses on year dummies. The second regresses the same dependent
variable on year dummies, a dummy for whether the individual was in the
finance industry, and an interaction of the finance dummy with the year
dummies. Figure 1 also plots the coefficients on the year dummies from
these regressions and shows that a substantial part of the increase in
the bonus share of earnings for this group, particularly after 1998, was
due to the increasing importance of the finance industry.
The PSID data do not go back far enough in time to allow a full
analysis of the cyclicality of bonus income. However, it is not a leap
to think that bonus income is more cyclical than other types of income,
given that it is usually linked to firm performance or profits. If that
is the case, then as bonus income has been a more important component of
income for those with very high incomes, this could be a cause of the
increased cyclicality of income for these individuals.
What can the increasing importance of bonus income reveal about the
relationship between the rising share of total income accruing to very
high income individuals and the increased cyclicality of income for
these individuals? One possibility is that the facts documented in the
paper are simply driven by the increasing share of very high income
individuals working in the finance industry. On average, individuals
employed in finance receive a larger share of their income as bonuses,
and they are more likely to be represented among the very rich. Although
this is likely to be some of the story, it is not the entire story. As
shown in the paper, some evidence suggests that it is unlikely that the
compositional switch within the group of very high income individuals
toward finance solely explains their results.
The rise in importance of bonus income does reveal that the nature
of compensation has been changing. Ex ante, higher-income individuals
are relying more on bonus income as a form of compensation. Bonus income
is more risky than some other forms of compensation in that it is
directly tied to firm profits. To be willing to bear this risk, these
high-income individuals need to be compensated for it. As a result, the
shift toward bonus income can be consistent with the rising share of
income for these households as well as with the increased cyclicality.
But why has the compensation structure changed such that those who had
very high incomes to begin with are willing to bear this additional
income risk? Are such risk-sharing agreements efficient, in that they
better align incentives between the high-income workers and the firm?
Are the high-income workers becoming synonymous with the firm itself? If
these workers are now willing to take on more risk of the firm's
profitability, does that imply that the other workers are now facing
less risk? Does it imply that other investors in the firm are facing
less risk? The facts in this paper should be leading economists to ask a
whole new series of questions about the allocation of risk within the
economy.
SUMMARY. Overall, this is a very nice paper. The methodology is
well executed, and the results are well documented. The question
remaining is what is driving those results. The paper proposes one
story. But there is nothing in the paper that confirms (or contradicts)
this story. It appears that the changing nature of compensation of very
high income individuals in the form of the rising importance of bonus
income is potentially part of the story. The facts documented in the
paper, collectively, should point researchers toward addressing a whole
series of interesting questions.
REFERENCE FOR THE HURST COMMENT
Kaplan, Steve, and Joshua Rauh. 2010. "Wall Street and Main
Street: What Contributes to the Rise in the Highest Income?" Review
of Financial Studies 23, no. 3: 1004-50.
(1.) These comments reflect the personal opinion of the author and
do not necessarily represent the views of the Department of Commerce or
the U.S. Government.
Table 1. Importance of Bonus Income across the Income Distribution,
Pooled Years, Percent
Labor earnings percentiles
Indicator Bottom 90 5-10 2.5-5 Top 2.5
Fraction receiving bonus income,
all heads of household 9 19 22 29
Share of bonus income in total
income, all heads of household 1 3 4 8
Share of bonus income in total
income, bonus recipients only 11 17 20 28
Sample size 25,028 1,117 542 533
Source: Author's calculations using data from the 1995, 1997, 1999,
2001, 2003, 2005, and 2007 waves of the Panel Study of Income
Dynamics.
(a.) Sample includes all currently employed male heads of household
between ages 16 and 70 who had positive income in the preceding year.
Percentiles are defined within each year separately. All differences
are statistically significant from each other except for the 5-10
percentile and 2.5-5 percentile comparisons.
Table 2. Regressions Explaining Bonus Income with Finance Industry
Employment and Income, Pooled Years (a)
Dependent variable
Bonus share of total income
Dummy for All heads of Bonus
Independent variable positive bonus households recipients only
Dummy for employment 0.075 0.041 0.159
in finance industry (0.026) (0.012) (0.052)
Dummy for income in 0.103 0.024 0.057
top 10 percentiles (0.021) (0.007) (0.030)
Dummy for income in 0.087 0.043 0.084
top 2.5 percentiles (0.026) (0.017) (0.047)
Constant 0.091 0.009 0.104
(0.004) (0.001) (0.009)
Sample size 27,220 27,220 2,902
Source: Authors' regressions using data from the 1995, 1997, 1999,
2001, 2003, 2005, and 2007 waves of the PSID.
(a.) Sample includes all currently employed male heads of household
between ages 16 and 70 who had positive income in the preceding year.
Percentiles are defined within each year separately. Robust stan dard
errors are in parentheses.
GENERAL DISCUSSION George Perry observed that developments in the
financial sector can largely explain the sharp rise in economy-wide
inequality between 1982 and 2008 that the authors analyze. In the
authors' data, wages and salaries of the top 0.1 percent of the
income distribution were $183 billion higher in 2008 than if they had
just kept up with the average rise since 1982. Wages and salaries per
worker in finance rose nearly twice as much as the economy-wide average
over this period, and total wages and salaries in finance in 2008 were
$154 billion higher than if the per worker average had simply kept up
with the rest of the economy. Hedge funds, which were in their infancy
at the start of the 1980s, managed an estimated $2.5 trillion in 2008,
which would account for roughly $100 billion of financial wages and
salaries that year. Hedge funds are also characterized by high earnings
volatility, as are other leveraged financial activities that generate
very high incomes and greatly expanded over this period. All this
suggests that finance is not just part of the income distribution story
but the dominant part. Economies of scale have always existed in
finance. What has changed in the financial sector is the increasing
application of leverage and risk.
Refer Gtirkaynak found one of the most fascinating findings in this
paper to be that not just income, but also consumption, has become more
volatile at the top of the income distribution. That finding is
surprising, because one would think that individuals at the very top
also have sufficient wealth to smooth their consumption. He further
suggested that the paper's findings might be explained in terms of
the standard risk-return relationship in finance. If a greater
proportion of an individual's compensation is in the form of
bonuses, which are more volatile than wages and salary, that individual
would have to be compensated more on average to be willing to accept
that risk.
Benjamin Friedman was likewise fascinated by the finding of higher
consumption volatility at the high end. He proposed three potential
explanations. First, available statistics other than those from tax
records (which do not report consumption directly) are unreliable at the
extremes, and so the finding might simply be spurious. Second, even
though people at the top of the income distribution also have higher
wealth-to-income ratios, much of that wealth is in illiquid form and so
might not be available to smooth consumption. Third, consumption by
people at the very top may be lumpier. Whatever the explanation, it was
a puzzling finding that seemed to go against accepted knowledge. Erik
Hurst added that even if consumption is volatile for the really wealthy,
their utility is probably not much affected. Happiness data show that
happiness is not more volatile for the very rich than for other
households.
William Nordhaus thought that what might be going on at the very
top end is that some people are able to impose a "tax" on the
profits of companies that they control, in the form of bonuses, stock
options, or perks. Because profits are cyclical, this income will also
be cyclical. To the extent that compensation structures are becoming
more incentive-based, moving away from a fixed base pay, this should
contribute to making top incomes more cyclical. Nordhaus was also
concerned that capital gains are a very large omitted part of income. To
the extent that some cyclicality of the capital gains component is not
getting measured, that would be another explanation for the paper's
finding.
James Hines noted that the Tax Reform Act of 1986 changed not only
tax rates but also the definition of taxable income. Some of the
difference in the proportion of income going to the very top depends on
this definitional change. Also, because tax rates on the very rich are
much lower today than in earlier decades, the rich have less incentive
to avoid classifying some income as taxable income. The estate tax,
which has seen an extreme reduction recently, also bears on the
decisionmaking of top income groups. Assets can now be given to a trust
in the name of a child and will not show up as income.
Gary Burtless argued that another important change was in the
incentive to hold income within corporations as opposed to organizing
the firm so that the income is immediately treated as though distributed
to all of the owners. Before the Tax Reform Act of 1986, there was a
strong incentive for corporate income to be held within companies rather
than distributed to rich shareholders; after the reform, this incentive
changed. Many companies were reorganized so that company income was
taxed only once, as personal income to shareholders. Income at the top
might be more cyclical today in part because some income was formerly
sheltered within the corporation. Under current law, all the cyclicality
in that corporate income will be reflected directly in the owner's
personal income tax.
Robert Gordon noted that the share of total executive income taking
the form of stock options rose dramatically during the 1990s. Also, the
two big recent episodes of stock market volatility were synchronous with
the business cycle, making it difficult to distinguish between its role
and that of the stock market cycle. Gordon suggested that quite a bit of
the increase in top income cyclicality might be due to the increased
dependence of very top income earners on stock options. He proposed as a
possible explanation a general increase in the market power of managers,
which could help to explain both the increase in inequality and the
increased downward responsiveness of labor hours to the decline in
output, as has occurred in the last two recessions. The question was how
much of this shift in market power is due to growing strength at the top
versus growing weakness at the bottom. It could be that the eroding
market power of workers at the bottom created a vacuum, and the top
moved in.
Karen Dynan was interested in how the authors' findings
related to the so-called Great Moderation. If top income groups
accounted for a greater share of total income in this period, and at the
same time were experiencing greater income volatility, how does that
square with the stylized fact of greater moderation in the macroeconomy,
and how might that inform the understanding of that period?
Justin Wolfers found the paper's analysis to be extremely
thorough across datasets, and the results as reliable as they could be
given certain weaknesses in the data. He also noted that the main
finding is not only well supported, but surprising. Two years ago, if
someone had surveyed 100 labor economists and asked them whether rich
people were more likely than others to get hurt by recessions, the
majority, he believed, would have said no. Wolfers also suggested
further testing the theory using data from the so-called Great
Compression of the 1920s through the 1950s--a period that also saw a
large shift in income inequality but in the opposite direction.
Robert Hall observed that the rational thing to do when one's
lifetime resources change immediately and dramatically is to change
one's consumption immediately and dramatically. There is no reason
to think that high-income households would act any differently in such
circumstances. Following up on Gfirkaynak's point about the
risk-return relationship, Hall noted that there is also a lot of
evidence that ordinary wages contain an insurance element, especially
among longer-term workers, who are typically insulated from layoffs.
Somebody has to stand on the other side of this insurance deal. To the
extent that that somebody is the high-income shareholders of the same
firms, this could explain the observed volatility of their incomes.
Bruce Meyer reported that a student of Anthony Atkinson had found
that high-income shares of total income rise dramatically after
financial crises. This result comes from 50 years of data from many
countries. He wondered how much of what the paper found to be going on
is about the timing of income changes in response to financial shocks.
Laurence Ball thought the facts reported in the paper were
basically right, and he agreed with Perry that hedge funds must be a big
part of the story. But he also wondered how precisely hedge funds might
be driving the observed change in cyclicality. Possible explanations
included regulatory changes, changes in social norms, changes in tax
rates, or some combination of those elements.