Explaining a productive decade.
Oliner, Stephen D. ; Sichel, Daniel E. ; Stiroh, Kevin J. 等
PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH IN THE United States rose sharply in the mid-
1990s, after a quarter century of sluggish gains. That pickup was widely
documented, and a relatively broad consensus emerged that the speedup in
the second half of the 1990s was importantly driven by information
technology (IT). (1) After 2000, however, the economic picture changed
dramatically, with a sharp pullback in IT investment, the collapse in
the technology sector, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and
the 2001 recession. Given the general belief that IT was a key factor in
the growth resurgence in the mid-1990s, many analysts expected that
labor productivity growth would slow as IT investment retreated after
2000. Instead labor productivity accelerated further over the next
several years. More recently, however, the pace of labor productivity
growth has slowed considerably.
In light of these developments, researchers and other commentators
have been intensely interested in the course of productivity growth
since 2000. Distinguishing among the possible explanations for the
continued strength in productivity growth is challenging, because much
of that strength appeared in measured multifactor productivity (MFP),
the unexplained residual in the standard growth accounting setup.
Nevertheless, potential explanations can be divided into two broad
categories: those centered on IT and those unrelated or only loosely
related to IT.
The simplest IT-centered story--that rapid technological progress
in the production of IT and the induced accumulation of IT capital
raised productivity growth--does not work for the period after 2000,
because the contributions to growth from both the production and the use
of IT declined. A second IT-related story that has received a great deal
of attention is that IT investment proxies for complementary investments
in intangible capital, and a growing body of research has highlighted
the important role played by such intangibles. (2) A third IT-related
story identifies IT as a general-purpose technology that spurs further
innovation over time in a wide range of industries, ultimately boosting
growth in MFP. (3) Because this process takes time, the gains in MFP
observed since 2000 could reflect the follow-on innovations from the
heavy investment in IT in the second half of the 1990s.
Another broad set of explanations highlights forces not specific to
IT. Gains in labor productivity since 2000 could have been driven by
fundamental technological progress outside of IT production, as implied
by the strong growth in MFP in other sectors. (4) Alternatively, the
robust advance in labor productivity could reflect broader macroeconomic
factors such as normal cyclical dynamics, a decline in adjustment costs
after 2000 as investment spending dropped back, greater-than-usual
business caution in hiring and investment, or increased competitive
pressures on firms to restructure, cut costs, raise profits, and boost
productivity. The profit-driven cost-cutting hypothesis, in particular,
has received considerable attention in the business press. (5)
In this paper we try to sort out these issues using both aggregate
and industry-level data. (6) We investigate four specific questions.
First, given the latest data and some important extensions to the
standard growth accounting framework, is an IT-centered story still the
right explanation for the resurgence in productivity growth over
1995-2000, and does IT play a significant role when considering the
entire decade since 1995? Second, what accounts for the continued
strength in productivity growth after 2000? Third, how has investment in
intangible capital influenced productivity developments? Finally, what
are the prospects for labor productivity growth in coming years?
Our analysis relies in part on neoclassical growth accounting, a
methodology that researchers and policymakers have used for many years
to gain insights into the sources of economic growth. Notably, the
Council of Economic Advisers, the Congressional Budget Office, and the
Federal Reserve Board routinely use growth accounting as part of their
analytical apparatus to assess growth trends. (7)
Of course, growth accounting is subject to limitations, and in
recent years many analysts have leveled critiques at this methodology.
For example, the standard neoclassical framework does not explicitly
account for adjustment costs, variable factor utilization, deviations
from perfect competition and constant returns to scale, outsourcing and
offshoring, management expertise, or the intangibles that are omitted
from published data. In addition, researchers have raised a host of
measurement issues that could affect the standard framework. (8) It is
well beyond the scope of this paper to deal with all of these critiques,
but we augment the standard framework to account for some of the most
salient ones. In particular, we take on board time-varying utilization
of inputs, adjustment costs for capital, and intangibles. Our intent is
to broaden the standard framework to get a fuller view of productivity
developments during the past decade.
Briefly, our answers to the four questions we pose are as follows.
Both the aggregate and the industry-level results indicate that IT was
indeed a key driver of the pickup in labor productivity growth over
1995-2000. IT also is a substantial contributor to labor productivity
growth over the full decade since 1995, although its contribution is
smaller after 2000. In the aggregate data, this conclusion stands even
after accounting for variable factor utilization, adjustment costs, and
intangible capital.
Regarding the continued strength in labor productivity growth since
2000 in the published data, our answer has a number of elements. As a
matter of growth accounting arithmetic, the smaller--although still
sizable--contribution of IT after 2000 was more than offset by several
factors, the most important being faster MFP growth outside the
IT-producing sector. Just as the aggregate data highlight different
sources of productivity growth during 1995-2000 than since 2000, so do
the industry data. The industry composition of labor productivity growth
across these periods shifted significantly, and we report evidence that
IT capital was linked to changes in industry productivity growth in the
1990s but not in the period since 2000.
The industry data also suggest that the rapid post-2000
productivity gains were due, at least in part, to restructuring and cost
cutting in some industries as highlighted by Robert Gordon. (9) In
particular, those industries that saw the sharpest declines in profits
from the late 1990s through 2001 also tended to post the largest gains
in labor productivity in the early 2000s. Because these
restructuring-induced advances probably were one-time events (and could
be reversed), they are unlikely to be a source of ongoing support to
productivity growth.
In addition, the industry evidence indicates that reallocations of
both material and labor inputs have been important contributors to labor
productivity growth since 2000, a point that Barry Bosworth and Jack
Triplett also note. (10) Although it is difficult to pin a precise
interpretation on the reallocation results, the importance of these
reallocations could be viewed as evidence that the flexibility of the
U.S. economy has supported aggregate productivity growth in recent years
by facilitating the shifting of resources among industries.
The incorporation of intangibles into the aggregate growth
accounting framework takes some of the luster off the performance of
labor productivity since 2000 and makes the gains in the 1995-2000
period look better than they looked in the published data. In addition,
the step-up after 2000 in MFP growth outside the IT-producing sector is
smaller after accounting for intangibles than in the published data.
Thus any stories tied to a pickup in MFP growth (such as IT as a
general-purpose technology) may apply to the entire decade since 1995
and not simply to recent years. This framework also implies that
intangible investment has been quite sluggish since 2000, coinciding
with the soft path for IT capital spending. All else equal, this pattern
could be a negative for labor productivity growth in the future to the
extent that these investments are seed corn for future productivity
gains.
Finally, our analysis of the prospects for labor productivity
growth highlights the wide range of possible outcomes. We report updated
estimates of trend growth in labor productivity from a Kalman filter
model developed by John Roberts; (11) these results generate a
2-standard-error confidence band extending from 1 1/4 percent to 3 1/4
percent at an annual rate, with a point estimate of 2 1/4 percent. In
addition, we solve for the steady-state growth of labor productivity in
a multisector model under a range of conditioning assumptions. This
machinery also suggests a wide range of outcomes, extending from about 1
1/2 percent to just above 3 percent, with a midpoint of 2 1/4 percent.
Notwithstanding the wide band of uncertainty, these estimates are
consistent with productivity growth remaining significantly above the
pace that prevailed in the twenty-five years before 1995, but falling
short of the very rapid gains recorded over the past decade.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews the
aggregate growth accounting framework and presents baseline results that
account for variable factor utilization and adjustment costs. The
section that follows uses the approach of Susanto Basu and coauthors to
generate time series for intangible investment and capital services and
presents growth accounting results for the augmented framework. (12)
This approach complements that in the 2005 and 2006 papers by Carol
Corrado, Charles Hulten, and Daniel Sichel, who also developed time
series of intangible investment and capital and incorporated those
estimates into a standard growth accounting framework. We then turn to
the industry data to supplement the insights that can be drawn from the
aggregate data. Finally, we discuss the outlook for productivity growth
and present some brief conclusions.
Aggregate Growth Accounting: Analytical Framework and Baseline
Results
We use an extension of the growth accounting framework developed by
Oliner and Sichel to analyze the sources of aggregate productivity
growth in the United States. (13) That framework was designed to measure
the growth contributions from the production and use of IT capital, key
factors that emerged in the second half of the 1990s. The framework has
some limitations, however. It excludes intangible capital, which has
received much attention in recent research on the sources of
productivity gains. It also imposes the strict neoclassical assumption
of a frictionless economy and thus abstracts from cyclical influences on
productivity growth and from the effects of adjustment costs arising
from the installation of new capital goods.
The growth accounting framework in this paper incorporates all of
these considerations. We meld the original Oliner-Sichel model with the
treatment of adjustment costs and cyclical factor utilization developed
by Basu, John Fernald, and Matthew Shapiro. (14) In addition, we take
account of intangible capital by drawing on the model of Basu, Fernald,
Nicholas Oulton, and Sylaja Srinivasan. (15)
Analytical Framework
The model that underlies our analytical framework includes six
sectors. Four of these produce the final nonfarm business output
included in the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPAs): computer
hardware, software, communications equipment, and a large
non-IT-producing sector. The NIPAs omit production of virtually all
intangible capital other than software. Our model accounts for this
capital by adding a fifth final-output sector that produces the
intangible assets excluded from the NIPAs. In addition to the five
final-output sectors, our model includes a sector that produces
semiconductors, which are either consumed as an intermediate input by
the final-output sectors or exported to foreign firms. To focus on the
role of semiconductors in the economy, the model abstracts from all
other intermediate inputs.
Following BFS, we allow the length of the workweek, labor effort,
and the utilization of capital to vary over time. We also assume that
the installation of new capital diverts resources from the production of
market output. As in BFS, these adjustment costs depend on the amount of
investment relative to existing capital. Boosting the ratio of
investment to capital increases the fraction of output that is lost to
adjustment costs. (16) To complete the model specification, we assume
that the production function in every sector exhibits constant returns
to scale and that the economy is perfectly competitive. (17)
Given this model, the appendix in the working paper version of this
paper shows that growth in aggregate labor productivity can be expressed
as (18)
(1) ALP [equivalent to] V - H = [summation over j]
([[alpha].sup.K.sub.j] - [[phi].sub.j]) ([??].sub.j] - [??]) +
[[alpha].sup.L][??] + M[??]P,
where a dot over a variable signifies the growth rate of that
variable, V is aggregate value added in nonfarm business, H is aggregate
hours worked, [K.sub.j] is the aggregate amount of type-j capital used
in the nonfarm business sector, [[alpha].sup.L] and
[[alpha].sup.K.sub.j] are, respectively, the income shares for labor and
each type of capital, [[phi].sub.j] is the adjustment cost elasticity of
output with respect to type-j capital, q is an index of labor quality,
and MFP denotes multifactor productivity. The various types of capital
include computer hardware, software, communications equipment, other
tangible capital, and intangible capital other than software; each type
of capital is produced by the corresponding final-output sector in our
model. Except for the adjustment cost effect captured by [[phi].sub.j],
equation 1 is a standard growth decomposition. It expresses growth in
labor productivity as the sum of the contribution from the increase in
capital per hour worked (capital deepening), the contribution from the
improvement in labor quality, and growth in aggregate MFP. (19
Aggregate MFP growth, in turn, equals a share-weighted sum of the
sectoral MFP growth rates:
(2) M[??]P = [summation over i][[mu].sub.i][M[??]P.sub.i] +
[[mu].sub.S][M[??]P.sub.S],
where S denotes the semiconductor sector and i indexes the
final-output sectors in our model (listed above). The weight for each
sector equals its gross output divided by aggregate value added. These
are the usual Domar weights that take account of the input-output
relationships among industries. (20) Equation 2 has the same structure
as its counterpart in an earlier paper by Oliner and Sichel. (21) The
only formal difference is that including intangible capital increases
the number of final-output sectors from four to five. (22)
Finally, the sectoral MFP growth rates in equation 2 can be
expressed as
(3) [M[??]P.sub.i] = [[xi].sub.i] [[??].sub.i] - [summation over i]
[[phi].sub.j,i] ([[??].subj,i] - [[??].sub.j,i]) + [[??].sub.i]
for the final-output sectors and
(4) [M[??]P.sub.S] = [[xi].sub.S] [[??].sub.S] - [summation over j]
[[phi].sub.j,S] ([[??].sub.j,S] - [[??].sub.j,S]) + [[??].sub.S]
for semiconductor producers, where the [xi]'s represent the
elasticity of sectoral output with respect to the workweek (W), the
I's and K's denote sectoral investment and capital services
for each type of capital, the [phi]'s represent the sectoral
adjustment cost elasticities for each type of capital, and the z's
represent the true level of technology. All of the [xi]'s and
[phi]'s take positive values.
In the BFS model that we adopt, firms vary the intensity of their
factor use along all margins simultaneously, which makes the workweek a
sufficient statistic for factor utilization in general. Lengthening the
workweek boosts measured MFP growth in equations 3 and 4 as firms obtain
more output from their capital and labor. Regarding adjustment costs,
faster growth of investment spending relative to that of capital
depresses measured MFP growth as firms divert resources from producing
market output to installing new plant and equipment. The effects of
factor utilization and adjustment costs drive a wedge between measured
MFP growth and the true pace of improvement in technology [??].
Data, Calibration, and Measurement Issues
This section provides a brief overview of the data used for our
aggregate growth accounting, discusses the calibration of key
parameters, and addresses some important measurement issues. (23) The
national accounts data that we discuss here exclude virtually all forms
of intangible capital except for investment in computer software. We
defer the consideration of intangible capital until the next section.
Our dataset represents an up-to-date reading on productivity
developments through 2006 based on data available as of the end of March
2007. We rely heavily on the dataset assembled by the Bureau of Labor
Statistics (BLS) for its estimates of MFP in the private nonfarm
business sector. This dataset extended through 2005 at the time we
conducted the analysis for this paper. We extrapolated the series
required for our framework through 2006, drawing largely on
corresponding series in the NIPAs.
To calculate the income share for each type of capital in our
framework, we follow the BLS procedure that distributes total capital
income across assets by assuming that each asset earns the same rate of
return net of depreciation. (24) This is the same method used by Oliner
and Sichel and by Jorgenson, Ho, and Stiroh. (25) Consistent with the
standard practice in the productivity literature, we allow these income
shares to vary year by year. (26)
These data and procedures generate a series for aggregate MFP
growth via equation 1. Given this series as a top-line control, we
estimate MFP growth in each sector with the "dual" method
employed by various researchers in the past. (27) This method uses data
on the prices of output and inputs, rather than their quantities, to
calculate sectoral MFP growth. We opt for the dual approach because the
sectoral data on prices are available on a more timely basis than the
corresponding quantity data. Roughly speaking, the dual method compares
the rate of change in a sector's output price with that of its
input costs. Sectors in which prices fall quickly compared with their
input costs are estimated to have experienced relatively rapid MFP
growth. (28)
The expression that links aggregate and sectoral MFP growth
(equation 2) involves the Domar weight for each sector, the ratio of the
sector's gross output to aggregate value added. For the four
NIPA-based final-output sectors, gross output simply equals the value of
the sector's final sales, which we estimate using data from the
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). For the semiconductor sector we
calculate gross output based on data from the Semiconductor Industry
Association as well as data constructed by Federal Reserve Board staff
to support the Federal Reserve's published data on U.S. industrial
production.
The final step is to calculate the influence of adjustment costs
and factor utilization on the growth of both aggregate and sectoral MFP.
In principle, we could use equations 3 and 4 to calculate the effects at
the sectoral level and then aggregate those effects using equation 2.
However, as equations 3 and 4 show, this bottom-up approach requires
highly disaggregated data on investment and the workweek and equally
disaggregated output elasticities with respect to adjustment costs and
the workweek (the [phi]'s and the [xi]'s). Unfortunately,
estimates of the required sectoral elasticities are not available.
To make use of readily available estimates, we work instead from
the top down. That is, we model the effects of adjustment costs and the
workweek for the nonfarm business sector as a whole and then distribute
the aggregate effects across sectors. Let W and [xi] denote,
respectively, the percentage change in the workweek for aggregate
nonfarm business and the elasticity of nonfarm business output with
respect to this aggregate workweek. Then the workweek effect for
aggregate nonfarm business equals [xi]W. Similarly, we measure the
aggregate effect of adjustment costs as [phi]([??] -[??]), where [??],
[??] and [phi] denote, respectively, growth in aggregate real investment
spending, growth in aggregate real capital services, and the aggregate
adjustment cost elasticity. To complete the top-down approach, we assume
that the adjustment cost and workweek effects are uniform across
sectors. Under this assumption, the top-down version of equations 2
through 4 is as follows (starting with the sectoral equations):
(5) [M[??]P.sub.i] = 1/[bar.[mu]][[xi][??] - [phi]([??] - [??]] +
[[??].sub.i]
(6) [M[??]P.sub.S] = 1/[bar.[mu]][[xi][??] - [phi]([??] - [??]] +
[[??].sub.i]
(7) M[??]P = [summation over i] [[mu].sub.i][M[??]P.sub.i] +
[[mu].sub.S][M[??]P.sub.S] = [xi][??] - [phi]([??] - [??]) + [summation
over i][[mu].sub.i][[??].sub.i] + [[mu].sub.S][[??].sub.S],
where [bar.[mu]] [equivalent to] [summation over i] [[mu].sub.i] +
[[mu].sub.S]. One can easily verify that the second equality holds in
equation 7 by substituting for [M[??]P.sub.i] and [M[??]P.sub.s] from
equations 5 and 6. Equations 5 through 7 serve as our empirical
counterpart to equations 2 through 4.
We follow BFS in specifying [xi], [??], and [phi]. Starting with
the workweek effect, we specify the aggregate elasticity [xi] to be a
weighted average of BFS's sectoral estimates of [xi] for durable
manufacturing, nondurable manufacturing, and nonmanufacturing. Using
weights that reflect current-dollar output shares in these sectors, we
obtain an aggregate value of [xi] equal to 1.24. To measure the workweek
itself, we use the BLS series for production or nonsupervisory workers
from the monthly survey of establishments. Because the workweek in
equations 5 through 7 is intended to measure cyclical variation in
factor use, we detrend the log of this monthly series with the
Hodrick-Prescott filter (with) [lambda] = 10,000,000 as in BFS) and use
the detrended series to calculate W on an annual basis.
With regard to adjustment costs, we set the output elasticity [phi]
equal to 0.035. (29) This elasticity is based on estimates of capital
adjustment costs by Shapiro. (30) More recent studies provide estimates
of adjustment costs on both sides of [phi] = 0.035. Robert Hall
estimates capital adjustment costs in an Euler equation framework
similar to Shapiro's but uses more-disaggregated data and a
different set of instruments for estimation. (31) Hall cannot reject the
hypothesis that [phi] = 0. In contrast, Charlotta Groth, using
industry-level data for the United Kingdom, estimates [phi] to be about
0.055. (32) The divergent results in these studies highlight the
uncertainty surrounding estimates of capital adjustment costs but do not
suggest the need to move away from a baseline estimate of [phi] = 0.035.
We apply this elasticity to the difference between the growth rates of
aggregate real business fixed investment from the NIPAs and the
corresponding capital services series ([??] - [??]).
To summarize, we use annual data from BEA and BLS through 2006 to
implement the aggregate growth accounting framework in equation 1. This
framework yields an annual time series for aggregate MFP growth. We then
use the dual method to allocate this aggregate MFP growth across
sectors. Finally, we calculate the effects of adjustment costs and
changes in factor utilization on both aggregate and sectoral MFP growth,
drawing heavily on parameter values reported by BFS.
Results
Table 1 presents our decomposition of labor productivity growth in
the nonfarm business sector using the published data described above.
These data exclude intangible capital other than business investment in
software, which, again, is already treated as an investment good in the
NIPAs. The next section fully incorporates intangible capital into our
measurement system and presents an augmented set of growth accounting
results.
Focusing first on the published data, table 1 shows that average
annual growth in labor productivity picked up from about 1.5 percent a
year during 1973-95 to about 2.5 percent during the second half of the
1990s and then rose further, to more than 2.8 percent, in the period
after 2000. Our results indicate that an important part of the initial
acceleration (about 0.6 percentage point of the total speedup of just
over 1 percentage point) reflected the greater use of IT capital. In
addition, growth of MFP rose notably in the IT-producing sectors, with
an especially large increase for producers of semiconductors. The pickup
for the semiconductor sector mirrors the unusually rapid decline in
semiconductor prices from 1995 to 2000, which the model interprets as a
speedup in MFP growth. (33) The last line of the table shows that, all
told, IT capital deepening and faster MFP growth for IT producers more
than accounted for the total speedup in labor productivity growth during
1995-2000. These results confirm that the IT-centric story for the late
1990s holds up after incorporating the latest vintage of data and
extending the framework to account for adjustment costs and utilization
effects.
The table also quantifies the influence of adjustment costs and
changes in utilization during this period (the two lines under
"Growth of MFP"). These two factors, on net, do not explain
any of the upward swing in MFP growth from 1973-95 to 1995-2000, which
is consistent with the results in BFS. Although the greater utilization
of capital and labor had a positive effect on MFP growth during
1995-2000, this influence was offset by the negative effect from the
higher adjustment costs induced by the investment boom of that period.
Table 1 tells a sharply different story for the period since 2000.
Even though labor productivity accelerated another 0.35 percentage
point, the growth contributions from IT capital deepening and MFP
advances in IT-producing sectors dropped back substantially. At the same
time, MFP growth strengthened in the rest of nonfarm business, adding
roughly 3/4 percentage point to annual labor productivity growth during
2000-06 from its 1995-2000 average. And, given the minimal growth in
hours worked after 2000, even the anemic advance in investment outlays
led to a positive swing in the growth contribution from non-IT capital
deepening ("Other tangible capital"). (34)
All in all, table 1 indicates that IT-related factors retreated
from center stage after 2000 and that other factors--most notably, a
surge in MFP growth outside the IT-producing sectors--were responsible
for the continued rapid advance in labor productivity as reported in the
published data. (35) Nonetheless, averaging over the period 1995-2006,
the use and production of IT capital are important, accounting for
roughly two-thirds of the post-1995 step-up in labor productivity
growth. The next section of the paper examines whether the inclusion of
intangible capital changes this characterization.
We conclude this discussion with two points. The first concerns the
use of the year 2000 as the breakpoint for comparing the boom period of
the late 1990s with more recent years. We chose 2000 rather than 2001 to
avoid splitting the two periods at a recession year, which would have
accentuated the need for cyclical adjustments. However, our main
findings are robust to breaking the two periods at 2001. Second, our
big-picture results are very similar to those in Jorgenson, Ho, and
Stiroh, (36) which contains the latest estimates from the framework
pioneered by Dale Jorgenson. Consistent with our findings, their
framework emphasizes the role of IT in explaining the step-up in labor
productivity growth during 1995-2000. It also shows a reduced
contribution from IT after 2000, which was more than offset by other
factors. The differences in results are relatively minor and largely
stem from the broader sectoral coverage in the Jorgenson, Ho, and Stiroh
framework. In particular, their framework incorporates the flow of
services from owner-occupied housing and consumer durable goods into
both output and capital input. The stocks of these assets have grown
rapidly since the mid-1990s, and so Jorgenson, Ho, and Stiroh's
estimates of non-IT capital deepening are larger than those reported
here.
Aggregate Growth Accounting with Intangible Capital
The growth accounting analysis in the previous section relies on
published data, which exclude virtually all types of intangible capital
except software. As argued by Corrado, Hulten, and Sichel, (37) any
intangible asset that generates a service flow beyond the current period
should be included in the capital stock, and the production of such
assets should be included in current-period output. Applying this
standard, in their 2006 paper (henceforth CHS) Corrado, Hulten, and
Sichel estimated that the intangible investment excluded from the NIPAs
amounted to roughly $1 trillion annually over 2000-03, an amount nearly
equal to outlays for business fixed investment included in the national
accounts, and they constructed a growth accounting system that includes
a broad set of intangibles through 2003.
Of total business investment in intangibles, CHS estimate that
scientific and nonscientific R&D each accounted for about 19 percent
during 2000-03; computerized information, which consists mostly of the
software category already included in the NIPAs, accounted for 14
percent; brand equity accounted for 13 percent; and firm-specific
organizational capital accounted for about 35 percent. The last category
contains many well-known examples of the successful deployment of
intangible capital, including Wal-Mart's supply-chain technology,
Dell's build-to-order business model, and Intel's expertise in
organizing semiconductor production. (38)
The CHS estimates of intangible investment and capital are a
valuable addition to the literature, but the source data for their
series are currently available only through 2004 or 2005. Thus their
approach cannot be used to develop growth accounting estimates that are
as timely as those based on published data. As an alternative, we
construct a data system for intangibles that runs through 2006, based on
the framework in BFOS. In the BFOS model, firms use intangible capital
as a complement to their IT capital. Because of this connection to IT
capital, we can generate estimates of intangible investment and capital
from published data on IT capital and related series.
BFOS used their model for a more limited purpose: to specify and
estimate regressions to discern whether intangibles could explain the
MFP growth patterns in published industry data. They did not formally
build intangibles into an integrated growth accounting framework along
the lines of CHS. That is precisely what we do here. (39)
Description of the Model
The basic features of the BFOS model are as follows. Firms have a
(value-added) production function in which IT capital and intangible
capital are complementary inputs:
(8) [V.sub.t] = F[G([K.sup.IT.sub.t], [R.sub.t]), [K.sup.NT.sub.t],
[L.sub.t], [z.sub.t],
where [K.sup.IT.sub.t], [R.sub.t]) and [K.sup.NT.sub.t] denote IT
capital, intangible capital, and tangible capital other than IT capital,
respectively; [L.sub.t] is labor input; and [z.sub.t], is the level of
technology. For simplicity, BFOS assume that there are no adjustment
costs and that factor utilization does not vary. The function G that
combines IT capital and intangible capital is assumed to take the
constant elasticity of substitution form:
(9) G([K.sup.IT.sub.t],[R.sub.t]) =
a[([K.sup.IT.sub.t])sup.([sigma]-1))/[sigma]] + (1 - a)
[([R.sub.t])sup.[sigma]-1)/[sigma]]]sup.[sigma]/([sigma]-1)]
where [sigma] is the elasticity of substitution between
[K.sup.IT.sub.t] and [R.sub.t], and a governs the income share of each
type of capital.
Because [K.sup.IT.sub.t] and [R.sub.t], are separable from other
inputs, firms minimize costs by first choosing the optimal combination
of [K.sup.IT.sub.t] and [R.sub.t], and then selecting other inputs
conditional on this choice. For the first-stage optimization, the usual
first-order condition sets the ratio of the marginal products of
[K.sup.IT.sub.t] and [R.sub.t], equal to the ratio of their user costs,
which implies
(10) [R.sub.t] = [K.sup.IT.sub.t][(1 -
a/a)sup.[sigma]][([r.sup.IT.sub.t]/[r.sup.R.sub.t]sup.[sigma]],
where [r.sup.IT.sub.t] and [r.sup.R.sub.t] denote the respective
user costs. Equation 10 implies the following expression for the growth
of intangible capital:
(11) [[??].sub.t] = [[??]sup.IT.sub.t] +
[sigma]([[??].sup.IT.sub.t]- [[??].sup.R.sub.t]).
Importantly, equation 11 enables us to calculate a model-implied
series for the growth rate of intangible capital based solely on data
for IT capital and user costs and on an assumed value for the elasticity
of substitution between intangible capital and IT capital. No direct
data on intangible capital are required. We chain together the time
series of growth rates from equation 11 to produce an indexed series for
the level of real intangible capital, R.
To implement equation 11, we calculate [[??].sup.IT.sub.t] and
[[??].sup.IT.sub.t] from the same BLS data that we used in the previous
section. We also need to specify the user cost for intangible capital
([r.sup.R.sub.t]) and the elasticity of substitution between IT capital
and intangible capital ([sigma]). We use data from CHS to calculate
[[??].sup.R.sub.t] and [sigma], as described next.
CHS measure the user cost of intangible capital in accord with the
standard Hall and Jorgenson formulation: (40)
(12) [r.sup.R] = [p.sup.R]([rho] + [[delta].sup.R] -
[[PI].sup.R])[T.sup.R],
where [p.sup.R] is the price index for this type of capital, [rho]
is the nominal rate of return net of depreciation, [[delta].sup.R] is
the depreciation rate, [[PI].sup.R] is the expected capital gain over
and above that captured in the depreciation rate, and [T.sup.R] accounts
for the tax treatment of intangible assets. Equation 12 is identical to
the user cost formula that we employ for all other types of capital in
our growth accounting framework. We adopt CHS's specification of
each term in the user cost formula.
To select a value for the elasticity of substitution [sigma], we
examined the CHS series for the income shares of IT capital and
intangible capital. (41) If [sigma] were equal to one (the Cobb-Douglas
case), the ratio of the IT income share to the intangible income share
drawn from data in CHS (which we denote by [[alpha]sup.R,CHS.sub.t])
would be constant. In fact, the ratio of the IT income share to the
intangible income share trends upward in the CHS data. Given that the
user cost of IT capital has fallen relative to that of intangible
capital, the upward trend in the share ratio implies more substitution
toward IT capital than would occur in the Cobb-Douglas case. We find
that setting [sigma] to 1.25 approximates the upward trend in the share
ratio.
To complete the system, we need a nominal anchor to convert the
indexed series for R, to dollar values. For the nominal anchor, we
require that the average income share of intangible capital in our
framework over 1973-2003 (denoted [bar.[[alpha].sup.R,BFOS.sub.t]) equal
the average value of the CHS-based share over the same period: (42)
(13) [bar.[[alpha].sup.R,BFOS] = [bar.[[alpha].sup.R,CHS]
To satisfy equation 13, we scale the indexed levels series for
intangible capital, [R.sub.t], by [psi]. The income share for intangible
capital in year t is then
(14) [[alpha].sup.R,BFOS.sub.t] =
[r.sup.R.sub.t][R.sub.t][psi]/[p.sub.t][V.sub.t] +
[r.sup.R.sub.t][R.sub.t][psi],
where the denominator equals the sum of published nonfarm business
income and the income accruing to intangible capital. We average
equation 14 over the period 1973-2003, substitute the average share into
the left-hand side of equation 13, and solve for the scaling factor
[psi]. We then apply this scaling factor to the indexed levels series
for [R.sub.t], and denote the resulting series for real intangible
capital by [R.sup.*.sub.t]. Given [R.sup.*.sub.t], the associated series
for real intangible investment comes from the standard perpetual
inventory equation:
(15) [N.sup.*.sub.t] = [R.sup.*.sub.t] - (1 - [[delta].sup.R])
[R.sup.*.sub.t-1].
We calculate growth in real intangible investment from the series
for [N.sup.*.sub.t].
We now have all the pieces we need to incorporate intangibles into
our growth accounting framework. An important point is that including
intangible assets affects both the output and the input sides of the
production accounts. On the output side, the growth of production equals
a weighted average of growth in real intangible investment [N.sup.*] and
growth in published real nonfarm business output. The weight for each
component equals its share in the augmented measure of current-dollar
output. On the input side, the total contribution from capital now
includes a term for intangible capital, calculated as the income share
for intangible capital times the growth rate of this capital in real
terms, [[alpha].sup.R,BFOS.sub.t] x [??]. The income shares for all
other inputs are scaled down so that the shares (including that for
intangible capital) sum to one. (43)
Results
The results from this augmented growth accounting framework, shown
in table 2, differ in important respects from the results based on
published data. As can be seen by comparing the first two lines, labor
productivity growth during 1995-2000 becomes stronger once we include
intangibles, but it becomes less robust during 2000-06. Indeed, in the
augmented framework, the productivity advance since 2000 is estimated to
be well below that posted during 1995-2000, reversing the relative
growth rates for the two periods based on published data. This reversal
arises from the time profile for real investment in intangibles. As
shown in the lower part of the table, real intangible investment is
estimated to have surged during 1995-2000, boosting growth in aggregate
output, and then retreated during 2000-06.
The growth contribution from intangible capital deepening
("New intangible capital" in table 2) follows the general
pattern for IT capital, moving higher during 1995-2000 and then falling
back. This similarity reflects the explicit link between intangible
capital and IT capital in the BFOS model. The lower part of the table
provides full detail on the growth of intangible capital and its
determinants from equation 11. Despite the broadly similar growth
contour for intangible capital and IT capital across periods, intangible
capital increases much less rapidly than IT capital in each period,
because of the quality-adjusted declines in IT prices that cause the
user cost of IT capital to trend lower. This user cost effect became
more pronounced during 1995-2000--when the prices for IT capital goods
fell especially rapidly--restraining the growth of intangible capital
even though the growth of IT capital jumped.
Taken together, the revisions to the output and the input sides of
the growth accounting equation imply a revised path for MFP growth,
after controlling for the effects of adjustment costs and factor
utilization ("Growth of MFP excluding above effects"). The
inclusion of intangibles leaves a somewhat smaller imprint on MFP growth
than on the growth of labor productivity, as the revisions to the two
sides of the growth accounting equation are partly offsetting.
Consistent with the more muted revision from the published data, the
path for MFP continues to show the fastest growth after 2000. However,
the pickup in MFP growth from 1995-2000 to 2000-06, at 0.04 percentage
point, is negligible compared with that indicated by published data (see
the equivalent line in table 1).
Robustness Checks
The BFOS model imposes a strictly contemporaneous relationship
between the growth of intangible capital and the growth of IT capital.
This relationship may be too tight, as the two forms of capital
accumulation may be subject to (unmodeled) adjustment costs and
differences in project length from the planning stage to final rollout.
To examine the robustness of our results, we consider alternative
timing assumptions for the growth of intangible capital. The first two
alternatives smooth the growth of intangible capital without introducing
leads or lags relative to the growth in IT capital. The idea is that
some projects to produce intangible capital may be long-lived and thus
may not display the same stops and starts as purchases of IT capital. We
implement this timing change by using a three-year or a five-year
centered moving average for the growth rate of IT capital and its user
cost on the right-hand side of equation 11. The third timing change
allows intangible capital growth to lag IT capital growth by a year but
does not affect the relative volatility of the series. This timing
assumption embeds the often-expressed view that firms take time to
accumulate the intangible capital needed to fully leverage their IT
investments.
Our reading of the literature suggests that the first two
alternatives fit the facts better than the introduction of a systematic
lag from IT capital to intangible capital. Case studies published
elsewhere portray the installation of IT capital and associated changes
in business practices and organization as interwoven rather than
strictly sequential. (44) Sinan Aral, Erik Brynjolfsson, and D. J. Wu
support this view, noting that "[as] firms successfully implement
IT (and complementary intangible investments) and experience greater
marginal benefits from IT investments, they react by investing in more
1T," a process they characterize as a "virtuous cycle."
(45) Nonetheless, we consider the scenario with the lagged accumulation
of intangible capital for the sake of completeness.
As the top panel of table 3 shows, these alternative timing
assumptions have some effect on the period-by-period growth of real
intangible capital but do not change the basic result, namely, that this
type of capital essentially has not grown since 2000. The series for
intangible investment, shown in the bottom panel of the table, is also
reasonably robust to alternative timing assumptions. In each case, real
intangible investment is estimated to have declined since 2000. As a
further robustness check, the table also displays the CHS series for
intangible capital and intangible investment, which we have extended
through 2005 based on some of the key source data in their framework.
(This is a preliminary extension of the CHS series for illustrative
purposes only and should not be regarded as official CHS data.) The
extended CHS series for intangible investment and capital exhibit
patterns across periods that are broadly similar to those in our series.
Notably, the CHS series decelerate sharply after 2000, and the growth
rates for 2000-05 are the weakest for the three periods shown,
confirming an important qualitative feature of our estimates. Because
the CHS series are constructed independently from the series in this
paper, the qualitative correspondence between them lends credibility to
the basic thrust of our results, if not to the precise figures.
Table 4 explores the growth accounting implications of the
alternative timing assumptions for intangible capital. For each timing
assumption we show three key variables: growth in labor productivity,
the growth contribution from intangible capital deepening, and MFP
growth (after controlling for the effects of adjustment costs and factor
utilization). Most features of the baseline results are robust to the
alternative assumptions. In every case, labor productivity is estimated
to have grown more rapidly during 1995-2000 than during 2000-06,
reversing the relative growth rates based on published data. In
addition, the growth contribution from intangible capital deepening is
always largest during 1995-2000 and then drops back to essentially zero
during 2000-06. Finally, although the alternative timing assumptions
generate a larger step-up in MFP growth after 2000 than in the baseline,
they nonetheless temper the increase by 0.2 to 0.3 percentage point
relative to the published data.
Industry-Level Productivity
We now turn to the industry origins of U.S. productivity growth
during the late 1990s and after 2000. The aggregate data show that the
sources of productivity growth changed after 2000, which suggests that
the industry-level origins of aggregate productivity growth and the
underlying forces may also have changed. To explore this, we construct
productivity accounts for sixty industries that span the U.S. private
economy from 1988 to 2005. Although measurement error, omitted
variables, and endogeneity problems always make it difficult to identify
the sources of productivity gains, we make some progress by exploiting
cross-sectional variation in industry productivity over time and by
examining the link between productivity and observable factors such as
IT intensity and changing profit shares.
The industry analysis presented here focuses on labor productivity,
reflecting our interest in understanding the industry origins of
aggregate labor productivity growth. Moreover, we do not have the
detailed data on labor quality, intangible investment, or adjustment
costs at the industry level necessary to create comparable estimates of
MFP growth. To the extent that intangible capital is correlated with IT
investment, however, one can interpret the IT intensity results as
broadly indicative of the whole suite of activities that are
complementary to IT.
Output Measures, Data, and Summary Statistics
OUTPUT MEASURES. Industry output can be measured using either a
gross output or a value-added concept, each with its advantages and
disadvantages. (46) Gross output corresponds closely to the conventional
idea of output or sales and reflects all inputs including capital,
labor, and intermediate energy, materials, and services. Value added, by
contrast, is a somewhat artificial concept that strips out the
contribution of intermediate inputs and incorporates only capital and
labor.
Although both value added and gross output are used for
productivity analysis, we favor gross output. Empirical work by, among
others, Michael Bruno; J. R. Norsworthy and David Malmquist; Jorgenson,
Frank Gollop, and Barbara Fraumeni rejects the existence of value-added
functions on separability grounds. (47) Basu and Fernald show that using
value-added data leads to biased estimates and incorrect inferences
about production parameters. (48) A later contribution by the same
authors argues against the value-added function because failure of the
neoclassical assumption about perfect competition implies that some of
the contribution of intermediate inputs remains in measured value-added
growth. (49) Value added has the advantage, however, that it aggregates
directly to GDP.
DATA. We use three pieces of U.S. industry-level data--output,
hours, and capital stock--from government sources. The first two create
a panel of average labor productivity (ALP) across U.S. industries, and
the third is used to develop measures of the intensity of the use of IT.
One practical difficulty is the recent conversion of the industry data
from the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) system to the North
American Industrial Classification (NAICS) system, which makes it
difficult to construct long historical time series or to directly
compare the most recent data with earlier results.
BEA publishes annual data on value added and gross output for
sixty-five industries that together make up the private U.S. economy.
(50) These data, which are based on an integrated set of input-output
and industry production accounts, span 1947-2005 for real value added
and 1987-2005 for real gross output. Although BEA also publishes various
measures of employment by industry, it does not provide industry-level
series on hours worked. We obtain hours by industry from the Output and
Employment database maintained by the Office of Occupational Statistics
and Employment Projections at BLS. Complete data on total hours for all
industries begin in 1988. (51) Because these hours data are currently
available only to 2004, we use the growth rate of full-time equivalent
employees for the disaggregated industries, from BEA data, to proxy for
hours growth in 2005.
We create two measures of industry ALP--real value added per hour
worked and real gross output per hour worked--by combining the BEA
output data with the BLS hours data across industries for 1988 to 2005.
The third data source is the Fixed Asset accounts from BEA for
nonresidential capital. These data include forty-six different types of
nonresidential capital for sixty-three disaggregated NAICS industries
since 1987. To estimate capital services we map the asset-specific
service prices from Jorgenson, Ho, and Stiroh onto these assets and
employ Tornqvist aggregation using the service price and a two-period
average of the capital stock for each asset in each industry. (52) The
resulting measure of capital services is an approximation, because we
miss industry variation in rates of return, asset-specific inflation,
and tax code parameters. Nevertheless, it captures the relatively high
service prices for short-lived assets such as IT capital, defined as
above to include computer hardware, software, and communications
equipment.
We combine these three sources of data to form a panel from 1988 to
2005 for a private industry aggregate, fifteen broad sectors, and sixty
disaggregated industries. The fifteen-sector breakdown follows
BEA's convention, except that manufacturing is broken into durables
and nondurables. The number of disaggregated industries is smaller than
that available from either BEA or BLS, because of the need to generate
consistently defined industries across all data sources. All aggregation
is done via Tornqvist indices, except for hours, which are simply
summed. Both the broad sectors and the disaggregated industries sum to
the private industry aggregates of nominal output from BEA, hours from
BLS, and nominal nonresidential capital from BEA. The list of industries
and their 2005 value added are reported in appendix table A-1.
SUMMARY STATISTICS. Table 5 reports estimates of labor productivity
growth from our industry data and compares them with the latest
estimates from BLS, The first two lines of the top panel report average
annual growth of ALP for the BLS business and nonfarm business sectors,
and the third line reports the private industry aggregate described
above. Although our private industry aggregate grows somewhat less
rapidly than the BLS aggregates, all three series show similar trends: a
pickup of ALP growth of about 1 percentage point after 1995 and a
smaller increase after 2000.
The second panel of table 5 reports estimates for the fifteen broad
NAICS sectors. These sectors range in size from the very large finance,
insurance, real estate, rental, and leasing sector, at 23.3 percent of
2005 value added, to the very small agriculture, forestry, fishing, and
hunting sector, at only 1.1 percent. In terms of ALP growth, eight of
these fifteen sectors, which accounted for 73 percent of value added in
2005, showed faster productivity growth over 1995-2000 than over
1988-95. (53) The further acceleration in aggregate productivity after
2000 occurred in seven sectors, which accounted for only 44 percent of
2005 value added. Although productivity in the large retail trade,
wholesale trade, and finance sectors all decelerated after 2000, the two
trade sectors continued to post impressive productivity gains through
2005.
The pickup in aggregate productivity growth in the mid-1990s
appears to have originated in different sectors than did the subsequent
step-up in 2000. Six sectors (agriculture, durable goods, wholesale
trade, retail trade, finance, and arts and entertainment) show an
acceleration after 1995 but a deceleration after 2000, whereas five
sectors (construction, nondurables, utilities, information, and other
services) show the opposite pattern. Together these eleven sectors
produced 72 percent of value added in 2005. In their analysis of MFP
growth, Corrado and others reach a similar conclusion, although Bosworth
and Triplett emphasize the continued importance of service industries as
a source of aggregate productivity growth. (54)
Table 5 also summarizes, in the third and fourth panels, the
disaggregated industry data by reporting the mean, median, and
hours-weighted mean productivity growth rates across these industries
for gross output and value added, respectively. One interesting
observation is the divergence in trends between gross output and
value-added measures of productivity: the post-1995 gains are strongest
for gross output, whereas the post-2000 gains are strongest for value
added. Both series incorporate the same hours data, so that this
divergence directly reflects differences between the gross output and
value-added output measures.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to investigate this divergence
further. For completeness, we report results for both gross output and
value added, although, again, we prefer gross output because it is a
more fundamental measure of production and does not require additional
assumptions about the nature of the production function.
Finally, we emphasize that there is enormous heterogeneity among
the disaggregated industries that lie beneath these summary statistics,
both within time periods and across time. For example, thirty-seven of
the sixty industries, which accounted for nearly 60 percent of aggregate
output, experienced an acceleration of productivity after 1995 but a
decline after 2000, or vice versa. This highlights the widespread
churning and reallocation of resources among industries, which we show
to be an important source of aggregate productivity gains.
Industry Origins of the Aggregate Productivity Gains
We now review how the data for the disaggregated industries can be
aggregated to form economy-wide productivity estimates, and we employ
this familiar framework to identify the industry origins of the
aggregate productivity gains over 1988-2005.
DECOMPOSITION AND REALLOCATIONS. At the industry level, real value
added is defined implicitly from a gross output production function as
(16) [[??].sub.i] = [[alpha].sup.v.sub.i][[??].sub.i] + (1 -
[[alpha].sup.v.sub.i])[[??].sub.i],
where [[alpha].sup.v.sub.i] is the average share of nominal value
added in nominal gross output for industry i, and [M.sub.i] denotes real
intermediate inputs. (55) One attractive property of industry value
added is that it aggregates to a simple expression for growth in
aggregate value added:
(17) [??] = [summation over i][v.sub.i][[??].sub.i],
where [v.sub.i] is the average share of industry i's nominal
value added in aggregate nominal value added. Aggregate hours worked, H,
is the simple sum of industry hours, [H.sub.i],
(18) H = [summation over (i)][H.sub.i],
and aggregate labor productivity is defined as [ALP.sup.v]= V/H.
Equations 16, 17, and 18 can be combined to yield the following
decomposition of ALP growth: (56)
(19) [MATHEMATICAL EXPRESSION NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.]
where [ALP.sup.Y] is industry labor productivity based on gross
output and [m.sub.i] is the average ratio of nominal industry
intermediate inputs to nominal aggregate value added. This equation
simplifies to
(20) [A[??]P.sup.v] = ([summation over
(i)][v.sub.i][A[??]P.sup.v.sub.i]) + ([summation over
(i)][v.sub.i]([[??].sub.i] - [??]) = ([summation over
(i)][v.sub.i][A[??]P.sup.v.sub.i]) + [R.sup.H].
The first term in equation 19 is a "direct productivity
effect" equal to the weighted average of growth in gross output
labor productivity in the component industries. The second term,
[R.sup.M], is a "reallocation of materials," which reflects
variation in intermediate input intensity across industries. It enters
with a negative sign because when more intermediate inputs are used to
raise gross output, [??] > [??], these must be netted out to reach
aggregate productivity. The third term, [R.sup.H], is a
"reallocation of hours." Aggregate hours growth, [??],
approximately weights industries by their (lagged) share of aggregate
hours, and so aggregate productivity rises if industries with
value-added shares above their hours shares--that is, those industries
with relatively high (nominal) productivity levels--experience growth in
hours. Equation 20 is a simplification using value-added labor
productivity at the industry level. (57)
Table 6 reports estimates of the decomposition framework in
equations 16 to 20. The first line in the top panel repeats the
productivity estimates that come from the BEA data on aggregate private
industry output and the sum of hours worked from BLS. The second line
reports the estimates we derive by explicitly aggregating the detailed
industries as in equations 17 and 18. There is a small divergence for
the middle period, but the two estimates tell the same story of a large
productivity acceleration after 1995 and a smaller one after 2000. (58)
The second and third panels of table 6 report the decomposition
from equations 19 and 20 using gross output data and value-added data,
respectively. Both panels indicate a substantial increase in the direct
contribution of industry-level productivity after 1995 (1.31 percentage
points for gross output and 0.83 percentage point for value added),
followed by a large decline after 2000 for gross output (-0.94
percentage point) and no change for value added.
Both the materials and hours reallocation terms turn positive after
2000, boosting the aggregates and suggesting that an important part of
the post-2000 productivity gains stemmed from the shifting of inputs
among industries. (59) In fact, we do not observe an increase in
productivity growth after 2000 when looking at the direct industry
contributions, an insight that is only possible with industry-level
data. (60)
The materials reallocation term contributes positively to aggregate
productivity growth when gross output is growing faster than materials,
which implies that value added is growing faster than gross output (see
equation 16). This pattern has held since 2000 and likely reflects some
combination of substitution among inputs, biased technical change, and
new production opportunities such as outsourcing. Better understanding
of these forces is an important area for future work.
[FIGURE 1 OMITTED]
The reallocation of hours is positive when industries with
relatively high productivity (in nominal terms) have strong hours
growth. Growing reallocations are consistent with the notion that
increased competitive pressures, flexible labor markets, and
restructuring were part of the productivity story in recent years.
Elsewhere Stiroh discusses some evidence of increased flexibility of
U.S. labor markets and reports evidence of increased reallocation across
industries. (61)
To provide an alternative perspective, we calculate the annual
cross-sectional correlation between hours growth and the lagged level of
ALP for the sixty disaggregated industries. Figure 1 plots the estimated
correlations for both the value-added and gross output measures of labor
productivity; the figure also shows the term from equation 19 for the
annual reallocation of hours to high-productivity industries. All three
series seem to have trended upward, particularly since the early 1990s,
which suggests that industries with relatively high productivity have
become more likely to show strong hours growth in the following year.
There also seems to be a cyclical component, as the correlations and
hours reallocations rise during recessions, consistent with the notion
of a cleansing effect of recessions. (62)
This interpretation of the reallocation of hours is suggestive; we
have provided neither a deep economic explanation nor sophisticated
econometric evidence that might identify the causal factors. Rather we
are highlighting what appears to be an increasingly important source of
aggregate productivity growth and pointing toward further research.
ROLE OF IT CLASSIFICATIONS. Table 6 also quantifies the direct
contributions from IT-producing, IT-using, and other industries.
Consistent with the classification scheme used by BEA, (63) we identify
four industries as IT-producing: computer and electronic products,
publishing including software, information and data processing services,
and computer system design and related services. Following Stiroh, (64)
we identify industries as IT-using if their IT capital income share
(nominal IT capital income as a share of nominal nonresidential capital
income) is above the median for all industries, excluding the four
IT-producing industries. All remaining industries are labeled
"other industries." This leaves four IT-producing industries
with nearly 5 percent of aggregate value added in the most recent
period, twenty-six IT-using industries with 59 percent, and thirty
"other industries" with the remainder. (65)
As shown in table 6, the IT-producing and IT-using industries more
than account for the direct contribution from individual industries to
the productivity acceleration during 1995-2000. After 2000, however, the
impact of IT is much less clear-cut, with the swing in the growth
contributions from all three groups of industries concentrated in a
fairly narrow range.
For the full decade from 1995 to 2005, the direct contribution from
the IT-using industries was far larger than it had been over 1988-1995,
despite the decline after 2000 based on gross output data. In contrast,
the direct contribution from "other industries" remained
smaller throughout 1995-2005 than it had been before 1995. This
distinction highlights the important role for IT use in driving the
faster growth in productivity that has prevailed over the entire period
since the mid-1990s.
The contribution from the IT-producing industries moved up during
1995-2000 and back down during 2000-05, with the size of the swing
depending on which output measure one uses. That said, both output
measures show that the IT-producing industries made relatively large
contributions to aggregate productivity growth throughout the sample
period. For example, using the value added figures, the four
IT-producing industries accounted for 19 percent (0.47 + 2.52) of
aggregate productivity growth over 2000-05, far above their 4 percent
share of value added.
Potential Explanations for the Industry Variation
We now explore two specific questions about the cross-sectional
distribution of productivity growth. First, was the link between IT and
productivity growth after 2000 as strong as in the second half of the
1990s? The simple decompositions presented above suggest that it was
not, but we examine this more formally here. Second, is there evidence
for the idea that competition and restructuring contributed to the
strong productivity gains after 2000?
IT AND PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH. This section examines the link between
industry-level productivity growth and IT intensity. The intuition is
straightforward: if IT plays an important role in productivity growth
through either the direct capital deepening effect, a complementary but
omitted input, or productivity spillovers, one should expect the most
IT-intensive industries to show the largest productivity gains. We
estimate cross-sectional regressions that relate the change in
productivity growth over two periods to IT intensity at the end of the
first period as
(21) [DELTA][A[??]P.sub.i] = [alpha] + [beta][IT.sub.i] +
[[epsilon].sub.i],
where [DELTA]A[??]P is the change in productivity growth between
two periods (from 1988-95 to 1995-2000, from 1988-95 to 1995-2005, or
from 1995-2000 to 2000-05).
We use two alternative measures of IT intensity. The first is a
qualitative indicator of relative intensity: a dummy variable equal to
one if the IT share of total nonresidential capital income exceeds the
industry median and zero otherwise. (66) This qualitative approach
allows a broad interpretation of IT as a proxy for related investments
such as intangible capital and the improved management practices that
typically accompany IT. Moreover, this type of indicator variable is
robust to the type of measurement error in the capital stock described
by Randy Becket and coauthors, (67) but it misses the variation in IT
intensity across industries. Our second measure is the actual share of
IT capital services in total nonresidential capital services. This
quantitative measure better captures differences in IT intensity but is
more prone to measurement error. We estimate the IT share regressions
with data from all sixty industries and from fifty-six industries after
dropping the four IT-producing industries; the latter sample removes
some outliers and focuses on the impact of the use of IT.
We define IT intensity as that just before the period of
acceleration, for example in 1995 when analyzing the change in
productivity growth after 1995, and in 2000 when examining the change
after 2000. Although this procedure is not perfect, it helps control for
the endogeneity of investment. In the dummy variable specification,
[beta] represents the change in productivity growth across periods for
IT-intensive industries relative to the change for other industries; in
the quantitative specification, [beta] represents the increase in the
change of productivity growth associated with a marginal increase in IT
intensity.
Table 7 presents the results. The first three columns examine
changes in the second half of the 1990s by comparing 1995-2000 with
1988-95. The middle three columns extend the data to 2005 but keep the
breakpoint and the measure of IT intensity at 1995. The final three
columns focus on the post-2000 gains by comparing the change in
productivity from 2000 to 2005 with that from 1995 to 2000. The top
panel uses gross output as the output measure, and the bottom panel uses
value added. All estimates use ordinary least squares (OLS) with robust
standard errors. (68)
The estimates through 2000 suggest a link between IT intensity and
the change in productivity growth using the gross output data, but the
results are weaker using the value-added data. When we extend the data
to include the post-2000 period and compare 1995-2005 with 1988-95, both
sets of estimates show large and significant IT effects. The final three
columns indicate that IT intensity in 2000 is not a useful predictor of
the change in productivity growth after 2000. (69)
These results show that the most IT-intensive industries in 1995
experienced larger increases in productivity growth after 1995 and that
these gains lasted through 2005. Although the IT intensity variable
explains only a relatively small portion of the overall variation across
industries, the size of the IT effect is economically large:
IT-intensive industries showed an increase in productivity growth that
was between 1.5 and 2.0 percentage points greater than in other
industries when 1995-2005 is compared with 1988-95. Despite data
revisions and the shift to NAICS, the results are similar to those in
earlier work, indicating strong support for the view that IT use
mattered for the productivity gains after 1995. Of course, to the extent
that IT capital is correlated with other factors such as management
skills or intangible capital, these gains should be attributed to the
whole suite of business activities that accompany IT investment, and not
narrowly to changes in physical capital.
By contrast, the post-2000 acceleration in productivity does not
appear to be tied to the accumulation of IT assets in the late 1990s. In
particular, we find no evidence that industries that sowed lots of IT
capital in the late 1990s reaped a particularly large productivity
payoff after 2000. Although these results are surely confounded by
cyclical dynamics that were especially severe in the high-technology
sectors, analysis of an earlier vintage of the industry data by Stiroh
shows that the reduced correlation between IT and productivity is not
due solely to the high-technology slowdown in 2001. (70)
COMPETITIVE PRESSURES AND PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH. One idea that has
received considerable attention is that U.S. firms may have been under
increased pressure in the 2000s to cut costs and raise efficiency in
order to maintain profitability in a more globalized and competitive
environment. (71) Robert Gordon, for example, concludes that the
"savage cost cutting and layoffs" that followed the profit
boom of the late 1990s likely explain the unusual surge of productivity
in the early 2000s. (72) Mark Schweitzer notes that managers have
stressed the need to realign business processes without hiring
additional workers, although he admits that empirical support is
limited. (73) Erica Groshen and Simon Potter raise the possibility that
new management strategies promoted lean staffing in order to increase
efficiency. (74) Firms may have been better able to carry out these
strategies in an environment of more flexible and efficient labor
markets. (75)
If the cost-cutting hypothesis is true, productivity growth should
have been relatively strong and hours growth relatively weak after 2000
in those industries that experienced the biggest decline in profit in
earlier years and thus were under the most intense pressure to
restructure. To identify those industries, we examine the change in the
profit share derived from the BEA industry data, where the profit share
is defined as gross operating surplus (consumption of fixed capital;
business transfers; other gross operating surplus such as profits before
tax; net interest; and miscellaneous payments) as a share of value
added. Although one might want to remove the consumption of fixed
capital and the normal return to capital, those data are not available
at a detailed level. Our profit share measure should be viewed as a
broad measure that includes the gross return to capital.
We then compared industry growth from 2001 to 2004--the period of
extremely rapid aggregate productivity gains--with changes in
industry-level profit shares from the 1997 peak in the aggregate profit
share to the 2001 trough. As a first pass, figures 2 and 3 plot the
growth of hours and labor productivity from 2001 to 2004 against the
change in the profit share from 1997 to 2001 for sixty industries. These
scatterplots offer some support for the restructuring hypothesis, as a
decline in the profit share is associated (significantly) with slower
hours growth and faster ALP growth. (76) To gauge the magnitude of this
effect, note that industries with below-median changes in the profit
share experienced hours growth 2 percentage points slower on average
than did other industries and labor productivity growth about 3
percentage points faster. (77)
[FIGURE 2 OMITTED]
[FIGURE 3 OMITTED]
We also estimate cross-sectional regressions that relate growth in
the early 2000s to the lagged change in the profit share as
(22) [[??].sub.i] = [alpha] + [beta][DELTA][PR.sub.i] +
[gamma][Z.sub.i] + [[epsilon].sub.i],
where [??] is average annual growth of either hours, intermediate
inputs, labor productivity, or output from 2001 to 2004, [DELTA]PR is
the change in the profit share from 1997 to 2001, and Z are controls.
Equation 22 is obviously a reduced-form regression, and the controls are
therefore intended to soak up variation attributable to other factors. Z
includes the contemporaneous change in the profit share from 2001 to
2004, to control for demand effects; lagged growth in the dependent
variable from 1997 to 2001, to control for longer-run trends (for
example, the possibility that some industries may be in secular
decline); and the IT capital service share, to control for IT intensity.
Finally, we interacted the IT capital service share with the lagged
change in the profit share, to examine whether IT intensity facilitated
adjustment to competitive pressures.
Table 8 reports estimates of equation 22 without and with these
controls. The top panel uses input growth (either hours or intermediate
inputs) as the dependent variable, the middle panel uses labor
productivity measures based on gross output or value added, and the
bottom panel uses the two output measures. All estimates use OLS with
robust standard errors.
The hours growth regressions reveal a strong positive link, as
industries with large declines in the profit share over 1997-2001
experienced significantly slower hours growth from 2001 to 2004. There
is no similar link with intermediate inputs. Firms might have been
expected to economize on all margins, but differences in adjustment
costs could explain the different results for hours and intermediate
inputs. The results in the middle panel show a strong negative link
between the lagged change in the profit share and productivity growth.
Finally, the bottom panel reports some evidence that output growth was
faster in the industries with a declining profit share, but the link is
weaker and far less robust than that between labor productivity and the
profit share. (78)
These results support the hypothesis that competitive pressure and
restructuring help explain the post-2000 productivity gains. One
interpretation is that firms in those industries where profits fell most
dramatically through 2001 became cautious, hired fewer workers, and
improved productivity and efficiency after 2001. Moreover, the absence
of strongly significant effects in the output regressions, together with
the robustness of the results to the inclusion of the contemporaneous
change in the profit share, suggests that this was not just a demand
story, but rather reflects how firms chose to produce a given amount of
output. Similarly, the results are robust to including a lagged
dependent variable, and so it does not appear that we are merely
capturing long-run trends. Finally, these estimates provide additional
evidence that IT was not a driving factor in the early 2000s, as both
the level of IT intensity and the interaction term are insignificant in
all except the hours regressions.
Productivity Trends and Outlook
This section turns to the outlook for productivity growth. After
highlighting issues with the recent data, we report long-period averages
of labor productivity growth to provide a benchmark for assessing the
strength of recent growth. We also present trend estimates from a Kalman
filter model and estimates of the steady-state growth implicit in our
aggregate growth accounting model. Finally, we compare these trend
estimates with those reported by other analysts.
What Do the Recent Data Say?
Assessing the underlying trend in labor productivity growth since
2000 has been complicated by major data revisions to both output and
hours worked and by swings in actual productivity growth. Table 9
displays both dimensions of the recent data. Moving down a column in the
table shows the effect of revisions across successive vintages of data,
while moving across a line shows the effect of adding additional years
to the period covered by the data. (79)
For 2000-03, the average growth of labor productivity was reported
initially in March 2004 to have been 3.8 percent. This surprisingly
robust gain led many analysts to ask why labor productivity growth had
accelerated further despite sluggish investment spending, the 2001
recession, and other adverse shocks. However, subsequent revisions
reduced the rate of advance to 3.4 percent. (80) The initial estimates
for 2000-04 and 2000-05 were revised downward in a similar fashion,
tempering some of the earlier optimism about the underlying trend. In
addition to these revisions, smaller gains in labor productivity over
the past few years have brought down the average growth rate, reported
in the bottom line of the table. In the current vintage of data (March
2007), growth over 2000-06 averaged 2.8 percent, a full percentage point
below the initial reading for the first three years of this period.
Long-Period Averages
Long-period averages of labor productivity growth provide one way
to put the recent figures into perspective. The first column of table
10, using data from BLS, shows productivity growth rates over several
periods extending back to 1909. These data cover a broader sector of the
economy than nonfarm business and so do not line up perfectly with the
estimates presented earlier in the paper. That said, labor productivity
growth according to these figures has averaged 2.2 percent a year since
1909. (81) The second column shows productivity growth rates over
selected periods since 1950 for the nonfarm business sector; here growth
averaged 2.7 percent a year during 1995-2006, similar to that during the
so-called "golden era" of productivity from 1950 to 1973 and
well above the postwar average of 2.1 percent a year. Thus by historical
standards the performance of labor productivity since 1995 has been
quite strong.
Kalman Filter Estimates
As one approach to obtaining time-varying estimates of the trend in
labor productivity, we use a slightly modified version of the Kalman
filter model developed by John Roberts. (82) Although alternative
implementations could yield answers that differ from the one presented
here, the Roberts model has some appealing features. (83) In particular,
it allows for shocks to both the level and the growth rate of trend
productivity, and it controls for cyclical changes in productivity
growth by assuming that hours adjust gradually to output following a
cyclical shock. We estimate the model by the maximum likelihood method,
using standard BLS data on labor productivity in the nonfarm business
sector from the first quarter of 1953 to the fourth quarter of 2006.
For the fourth quarter of 2006, this procedure estimates that the
trend in labor productivity growth was 2 1/4 percent a year, roughly 1/2
percentage point below the average pace of productivity growth since
2000. Put another way, the model interprets some of the extraordinary
growth in the years immediately after the 2001 recession as transitory.
The model also delivers a 2-standard-error confidence band around the
estimated trend, ranging from 1.3 percent to 3.2 percent. Thus
considerable uncertainty surrounds this estimate of trend productivity
growth.
Steady-State Analysis of Labor Productivity Growth
As a complement to the Kalman filter estimate of the trend in labor
productivity growth, we calculate the growth rate that would prevail in
the steady state of our aggregate growth accounting model. For this
exercise we use the version of the model that excludes our added
intangibles, so that our estimates can be compared with those of other
researchers. We stress at the outset that we do not regard these
steady-state results as forecasts of productivity growth over any
period. Rather this exercise yields "structured guesses" for
growth in labor productivity consistent with alternative scenarios for
certain key features of the economy.
The steady state in our model is characterized by the following
conditions. Real output in each sector grows at a constant rate (which
can differ across sectors), and real investment in each type of capital
grows at the same constant rate as the real stock of that capital.
Because [??] = [??] for each type of capital, adjustment costs have no
effect on MFP growth (sectoral or aggregate) in the steady state. On the
labor side, we require that hours worked grow at the same constant rate
in every sector, that the workweek be fixed, and that labor quality
improve at a constant rate.
Under these conditions the steady-state growth rate of aggregate
labor productivity can be written as follows: (84)
(23) A[??]L = [summation over (i)][(([[alpha].sup.K.sub.i] -
[[phi].sub.i])/[[alpha].sup.L])([[??].sub.i] +
[[beta].sup.S.sub.i][[??].sub.S])] + [??] + [??],
where the [alpha]'s denote income shares, the [phi]'s
denote the adjustment cost elasticity of output with respect to each
type of capital, [[beta].sup.s.sub.i] is the share of total costs in
final-output sector i represented by purchases of semiconductors, [??]
is the rate of increase in labor quality, [[??].sub.i]and [[??].sub.s],
denote the rates of improvement in sectoral technology, and [??] is the
Domar share-weighted sum of these sectoral rates of improvement. Recall
that the [??] terms (sectoral or aggregate) equal the growth of MFP
after controlling for the effects of changes in factor utilization and
adjustment costs. No explicit terms for capital deepening appear in
equation 23. However, capital deepening is determined endogenously from
the improvement in technology, and the terms in brackets account for the
growth contribution from this induced capital deepening. (85)
The steady-state equation depends on a large number of parameters
(income shares, sectoral output shares, semiconductor cost shares, and
so on). We consider a range of parameter values. (86) For the most part,
steady-state growth is not very sensitive to these parameters
individually. However, the results do depend importantly on two
parameters: the rate of improvement in labor quality and the rate of
advance in technology outside the IT-producing sectors ("other
nonfarm business"). (87) Following Jorgenson, Ho, and Stiroh, (88)
we assume that labor quality will improve by 0.15 percent a year, well
below the historical rate of increase, as the educational attainment of
new labor force entrants rises more slowly than in the past and
experienced workers reach retirement age. For the value of [??] in other
nonfarm business, we consider values ranging from 0.19 to 0.98 percent a
year. The lower-bound figure equals the average annual growth of [??] in
this sector over 1973-2000, which allows for reversion to the
longer-term average prevailing before the recent period of rapid gains.
The upper-bound figure equals the average annual increase over 2000-06,
minus 1/4 percentage point to account for the likelihood that some of
the advance during this period was transitory.
Table 11 presents the results from the steady-state exercise using
equation 23. The estimated range for steady-state labor productivity
growth runs from 1.46 percent at an annual rate to 3.09 percent. The
wide range reflects our uncertainty about the values of the parameters
that determine steady-state growth. The center of the range is 2 1/4
percent, about 1/2 percentage point below the average rate of labor
productivity growth since 2000. This step-down from the recent average
largely reflects the assumption that improvements in labor quality will
slow and that gains in MFP, after controlling for adjustment costs and
factor utilization, will not be as robust as the average pace since
2000.
Comparing Results
Table 12 compares the results from our steady-state and Kalman
filter analyses with forecasts of labor productivity growth from a
variety of sources. All but three of these forecasts have a horizon of
ten years. The other three have shorter horizons. (89) These forecasts
for average annual growth in labor productivity range from 2 percent to
2.6 percent. As noted above, the midpoint of our estimated range for
steady-state growth and the estimated trend from the Kalman filter are
both 2 1/4 percent, near the center of the range of these forecasts.
Thus there seems to be considerable agreement that labor productivity
growth will remain reasonably strong over a medium-term horizon.
That said, one should be humble about this type of exercise, for a
number of reasons. First, both the Kalman filter and our steady-state
machinery point to a very wide confidence band around the point
estimates. Second, the data on labor productivity through 2006 still
could be revised significantly. In the future we might be looking at a
picture of actual labor productivity growth for recent years that is
different from the one we see today. Finally, as a general matter,
economists do not have a stellar track record in forecasting trends in
labor productivity. Although we think the analysis here moves the debate
forward, we are acutely aware of the inherent limitations.
Conclusion
Productivity developments since 1995 have raised many important and
interesting questions for productivity analysts and policymakers, four
of which we address in this paper. First, given the data now available
and the various critiques of neoclassical growth accounting that have
arisen in recent years, is IT still a critical part of the story for the
observed acceleration in productivity growth over 1995-2000? Second,
what is the source of the continued strength in productivity growth
since 2000? Third, how has the accumulation of intangible capital
influenced recent productivity developments? And, finally, based on our
answers to these questions, what is the outlook for productivity growth?
We have used a variety of techniques to address these questions,
including aggregate growth accounting augmented to incorporate variable
utilization, adjustment costs, and intangible asset accumulation; an
assessment of industry-level productivity patterns; and Kalman filter
and steady-state analysis to gauge trend productivity.
Both the aggregate and the industry-level results confirm the
central role of IT in the productivity revival during 1995-2000. IT also
plays a significant role after 2000, although its impact appears smaller
than it was during 1995-2000. These results stand even after accounting
for variable factor utilization, adjustment costs, and intangible
capital and so provide strong support for the consensus view that IT was
a key source of growth for the U.S. economy over the past decade.
Our results suggest that the sources of the productivity gains
since 2000 differ in important ways from those during 1995-2000. Along
with the smaller direct role for IT in the latest period, aggregate
productivity growth since 2000 appears to have been boosted by industry
restructuring in response to profit pressures and by a reallocation of
material and labor inputs across industries. We also find considerable
churning among industries, with some industries showing accelerating
productivity in the second half of the 1990s and different ones
accelerating in the most recent period.
Adding intangible capital to our aggregate growth accounting
framework changes the time profile for productivity growth since 1995
relative to the published data. The measure of intangible assets used in
this paper implies that the fastest gains in labor productivity occurred
during 1995-2000, with some step-down after 2000. In addition, the
inclusion of intangibles tempers the size of the pickup in MFP growth
from 1995-2000 to 2000-06.
Finally, in terms of the productivity outlook, both the Kalman
filter and the steady-state analyses deliver broadly similar results and
highlight the wide range of uncertainty surrounding estimates of growth
in trend labor productivity. In both cases the central tendencies
suggest a rate for trend productivity gains of around 2 1/4 percent a
year, a rate that is consistent with productivity growth remaining well
above the lackluster pace that prevailed during the twenty-five years
before 1995, but somewhat slower than the 1995-2006 average.
Comments and discussion
Martin Neil Baily: The three authors of this paper have made some
of the strongest contributions to the productivity literature in recent
years, and it is terrific to see them team up to provide an important
new analysis of the productivity acceleration that started in the
mid-1990s. In particular, I liked the creative way they have adapted the
growth accounting framework to take account of intangible capital, and I
welcome the new insights provided by their industry-level regression
analysis, particularly those highlighting the role for competitive
pressure.
Labor productivity accelerated in the United States starting in
1996, after over twenty years of slow growth. That acceleration has been
widely attributed to the revolution in information technology, a natural
enough inference given that the acceleration coincided with a wave of
capital investment in IT hardware and software. Indeed, some fraction of
the productivity acceleration can certainly be attributed directly to an
acceleration within the IT hardware-producing sector. Around 2000-01,
however, the IT bubble burst, and IT investment slumped as the economy
went into a mild recession. Yet, surprisingly, productivity growth did
not slow down but actually grew even faster over 2002-04. This meant
that the simple correlation between IT investment and productivity broke
down after 2000.
There are three possible responses to what happened. The first is
to conclude that perhaps IT was not as important to the post-1995
productivity acceleration as had been thought. Second, one could argue
that IT investment has a lagged effect on productivity, so that the
high-technology investment boom in the late 1990s had an impact that
spilled over into the post-2000 period. A third hypothesis is that IT
investment creates intangible capital that should be counted as part of
total output. This last option is the approach taken in the growth
accounting section of this paper, and it shifts some of the productivity
acceleration from the post-2000 period backward in time to 1995-2000,
where it coincides with the surge in IT investment.
Working only with aggregate productivity data, one has very limited
information available to identify which (if any) of these three options
is correct. Indeed, on the productivity side, there are really only
three observations to work with: slow growth until 1995, faster growth
after 1995, and even faster growth after 2000. Meanwhile much of the
accumulation in intangible capital is very difficult to observe. The
paper by Corrado, Hulten, and Sichel discussed by the authors develops
measures of intangible capital based on a variety of data sources and
includes software investment, company training, consulting, and the
labor input of employees in job categories that contribute to
organizational capital. (1) The estimates from this work were not
available beyond 2003, and so the present authors do a quick update
through 2005. They report, in their table 3, that intangible capital
accumulation by this measure turned down sharply after 2000.
In this paper the authors do not use the Corrado, Hulten, and
Sichel estimates directly but turn instead to the paper by Basu and
others to develop their new approach to growth accounting. (2) Basu and
others is an interesting and helpful paper, but I am not persuaded that
their approach is a real substitute for direct observation of
intangibles. The basic assumption is that intangible capital investment
is tied very closely to investment in IT hardware, so that the
time-series pattern of the former is derived from that of the latter. It
is entirely plausible that high investment in IT demands an increase in
intangible investment, but whether or not this is the dynamic driving
the observed pattern of productivity growth remains unknown. I note also
that the Basu and others paper has a mixed record in tracking
productivity trends. They do find regression coefficients for the United
States that suggest that heavy IT investment can depress measured
productivity contemporaneously. But as they themselves note, "For
the United Kingdom, the same regression shows little. Almost nothing is
statistically significant, and the signs are reversed from what theory
suggested." (3)
The growth accounting section of the present paper takes a
perfectly sensible approach. The authors observe a puzzle and then
construct an analytical framework that explains the puzzle in a manner
consistent with established theory and methods. They then check the
consistency of their inferred measure of intangible capital with the
Corrado, Hulten, and Sichel approach, which relies more on direct
measurement. My own view, however, is that this section of the paper
relies too heavily on an IT-related explanation of productivity without
addressing the restructuring issue that is supported by the industry
section of this paper.
The industry analysis adds an important additional source of
information to the story, but this section of the paper is not well
integrated with the growth accounting section. There is no effort to
measure intangible capital investment by industry or to link such
investment directly with the relative productivity performances of the
different industries. The authors make the general observation that the
role of IT capital is explored in a way that is consistent with the
first half of the paper. However, the industry analysis draws inferences
from the timing of productivity acceleration that would presumably
change quite a bit if the intangible capital approach were used.
An immediate impression from the industry results is that there is
a lot of noise in the industry growth rates. The productivity estimates
based on value added differ substantially from the estimates based on
gross output. The results reported in the second panel of table 5
suggest regression to the mean, as eleven industries show a reversal in
sign (an industry with an acceleration of productivity after 1995 slows
after 2000, or vice versa). Having worked with both industry and
establishment data myself, I sympathize with the authors as they face
this problem, but this analysis makes heavy demands on the data by
drawing lessons not from productivity levels or growth rates but from
accelerations or decelerations. In part the problem may be that price
and quantity information in the United States is much better for final
goods than for intermediate goods. This problem, which is one that
Edward Denison emphasized, (4) has been alleviated by recent
improvements in the data, but not eliminated.
A key result the authors are looking for is whether or not the
pattern of productivity acceleration by industry is consistent with an
important role for IT investment. In earlier work, Kevin Stiroh reported
a strong link between industries that had a high share of IT capital
input in total capital input in 1995 and the extent to which their
productivity accelerated during 1995-2000. (5) This result remains valid
here, but the same approach for the post-2000 period does not work. As
the authors note, "By contrast, the post-2000 acceleration in
productivity does not appear to be tied to the accumulation of IT assets
in the late 1990s."
Thus the breakdown in the correlation between IT capital and
productivity growth that I noted earlier for the aggregate time-series
data also extends to evidence from the industry-level analysis. The same
result is stated even more strongly by Bosworth and Triplett. (6) They
report an assertion in a recent survey of the literature that there is a
consensus among economists that the U.S. productivity acceleration was
the result of innovations in semiconductor manufacturing. Bosworth and
Triplett respond, on the basis of their own industry-level research,
that "If this is indeed the [economists'] consensus, we
contend it is wrong." (7) No one doubts that IT has been an
important enabling innovation, but it is not the whole story.
Oliner, Sichel, and Stiroh point to the intense restructuring
pressure that occurred after 2000 as a key contributor to growth in
productivity, and I agree with this, as I said earlier. We know that in
2001-03 total hours worked in the nonfarm business sector declined quite
sharply while output and productivity were both strong. This differs
from the traditional pattern of cyclical productivity where employment
declines are associated with weak productivity growth. Companies faced
intense pressure to improve profits in the wake of the technology bust
and the accounting scandals of the period. They reduced employment, kept
investment low, and found ways to cut costs. The authors test this
hypothesis by showing that the industries that had faced profit pressure
before 2000 were the ones that saw the greatest improvement of
productivity after 2001. Given the noisiness of the data, there is a
case for caution in interpreting these results, but overall I found them
interesting.
In 2005 and 2006 labor productivity growth in the nonfarm business
sector was 2.1 percent and 1.6 percent, respectively, well below the
pace of the recent past and even below the 2.5 percent a year trend of
the late 1990s. Is the productivity boom over? The final section of this
paper offers a look at the future, and the authors use the John Roberts
smoothing model as a basis for estimating the productivity growth trend.
They conclude that the trend is now 2 1/4 percent a year--a more
optimistic figure than some, but slower than the 2000-05 rate. I am a
little more optimistic (my estimate of the trend is 2 1/2 percent), (8)
and I am not comfortable with the Kalman filter approach to figuring it
out. The smoothing algorithms became much too optimistic about the trend
in 2002-04 and are turning too pessimistic now. U.S. labor productivity
has the property that trend growth remains stable for extended periods
and then changes abruptly: generally strong growth in 1947-73 was
followed by generally weak growth in 1973-95, which was followed in turn
by generally strong growth in 1995-2006. It is hard to see why this
would be the case, but empirically it is hard to mistake. The trend
accelerated after 1995 to 2.5 percent a year, and the corporate
restructuring discussed in this paper induced temporarily above-trend
growth. It was to be expected that a period of slower-than-trend growth
would follow, and that is what we are seeing now. It is certainly
possible that the productivity boom has ended. But it is the strong
competitive intensity in the U.S. economy, combined with technological
opportunities and rapid globalization, that has driven faster
productivity growth in the past ten years. Their effects are likely to
continue a while longer.
(1.) Corrado. Hulten, and Sichel (2006).
(2.) Basu and others (2004).
(3.) Basu and others (2004, p. 52)
(4.) See Denison (1989).
(5.) Stiroh (2002b).
(6.) Bosworth and Triplett (2007).
(7.) Bosworth and Triplett (2007, p. 17).
(8.) Baily and Kirkegaard (2007).
N. Gregory Mankiw: I enjoyed the opportunity to read and reflect on
this paper by Stephen Oliner, Daniel Sichel, and Kevin Stiroh. I am an
outsider to the vast literature on growth accounting, and this paper
does a good job of bringing the reader up to date on the current state
of play. I want to begin by reflecting on the broader literature before
turning to the results in this paper that I found most intriguing.
To be honest, in my own life as a practical macroeconomist, I do
not spend a lot of time thinking about growth accounting. In fact, I can
estimate with a fair degree of precision that I spend fifteen minutes a
year on the activity. Those are the fifteen minutes that I teach growth
accounting to undergraduate students in my macroeconomics course. I
write down a production function, explain how Robert Solow taught us to
compute his famous residual, and then show some representative
calculations for the U.S. economy. I explain that this residual might be
interpreted as a measure of the rate of technological progress, but I
then explain how it might reflect other phenomena as well, especially
over the short time spans that characterize the business cycle. Having
done all this, I then ignore growth accounting for approximately the
next 364 days (365 days in leap years) until it is time to give the same
spiel to the next cohort of undergraduates.
While reading this paper ! found myself reflecting on my almost
complete lack of attention to the growth accounting literature, to which
this paper very ably contributes. My guess is that my experience is not
all that atypical. There is a small and hardworking band of brothers
(and sisters), including Oliner, Sichel, and Stiroh, toiling in the
fields of growth accounting. But most macroeconomists, like me, do not
spend a lot of time focusing on the results that this literature
produces.
One reason is that this literature seems mired in a host of issues
that quickly make a reader's eyes glaze over. Some of these issues
are technical, such as distinctions between gross output and value added
and the index number theory that bridges that gap. Others involve data
availability, such as the potentially important role of unmeasured
intangible capital. Out of necessity, many of these issues get resolved
by imposing assumptions on the production process which, although not
outlandish, are neither compelling nor verifiable. This paper, for
example, at times makes an assumption about the complementarity between
information technology and intangible capital that seems to be just
pulled out of a hat.
But I think there is a more fundamental reason why the growth
accounting literature fails to have a larger impact. Even if one grits
one's teeth to make it through all the technical issues, and even
if one has enough credulity to buy into all the necessary assumptions,
the exercise does not deliver what we really want. Ultimately, God put
macroeconomists on earth for two reasons: forecasting and policy
analysis. We want to know how the world is likely to look in the future,
and we want to know how alternative policies would change the future
course of history. Unfortunately, growth accounting contributes
relatively little to either forecasting or policy analysis. Instead it
is a deeply data-intensive exercise that often gets so deeply enmeshed
in its own internal logic that it never returns to the big questions of
macroeconomics.
Long ago, some economist--I believe it was Moses Abramovitz--called
multifactor productivity "a measure of our ignorance." That
is, we account for changes in capital, labor, labor quality, and the
many other determinants of output we can measure, and the changes in
output left unexplained are called "multifactor productivity."
But that is really just giving a fancy name to something about which we
are pretty clueless. When reading this paper I started playing a game
where every time I read the authors say something about
"multifactor productivity," I imagined putting some version of
"a measure of our ignorance" in its place.
Let me give an example. At one point the authors write, "MFP
growth strengthened in the rest of nonfarm business, adding roughly 3/4
percentage point to annual labor productivity growth during 2000-06 from
its 1995-2000 average." I rewrote the sentence as follows:
"our ignorance strengthened in the rest of nonfarm business, adding
roughly 3/4 percentage point to annual labor productivity growth during
2000-06 from its 1995-2000 average." Framed in this alternative
way, the statement carries an almost comical hollowness. It also makes
it clear why statements about multifactor productivity are of limited
use for either forecasting or policy analysis. Measured ignorance is
probably better than unmeasured ignorance, but it would be a mistake to
confuse it for real knowledge.
The section of this paper I like best is the one that departs most
from the standard growth accounting paradigm and instead performs
regression analysis on a cross section of industries. The most striking
result is illustrated in the paper's figure 3 and confirmed in
regressions in table 8. Industries that experienced declining profit
from 1997 to 2001 had more rapid productivity growth from 2001 to 2004.
This fact is, on its face, consistent with some of the stories popular
in the press that increased competitive pressure forced companies to
restructure and increase productivity. As a matter of theory, of course,
the story is not very complete, as it fails to explain why industries
were once content to operate unproductively. But at the very least, the
cross-sectional correlation is sufficiently strong and intriguing that
it is worthy of further attention in both empirical and theoretical
work.
In closing, let me note that the authors have done a vast amount of
work here. They have brought to bear a large quantity of data, applying
tools that are state-of-the-art within this literature. But when one is
working with so much data, it is easy to lose the forest among the
trees. This paper presents an impressively large number of trees. What I
am less confident about is whether the literature on growth accounting
adds up to an equally impressive forest.
General discussion: Robert Gordon agreed with the discussants that
the link between investment in information technology and the
acceleration of productivity is much weaker after 2000 than in the late
1990s. He compared the paper's analysis of developments after 2000
with that in his own 2003 Brookings Paper, which was based on quarterly
data through the middle of that year. Both papers found that the lag of
hours behind output was important to understanding the initial
postrecession surge in productivity. However, Gordon noted that the
quarterly data show a sharp slowdown in productivity in the second half
of 2004, which the authors do not explore using their annual data.
Gordon applauded the paper's impressive empirical support for
the idea that profit pressures led to unusual cost-cutting efforts after
2000. And he welcomed the attempt to model formally how IT benefits
might have had important delayed effects on productivity. However, he
questioned the authors' assumption that variations in capacity
utilization are proportional to hours worked per employee. The standard
counterexample to this assumption is the factory that is operating two
assembly lines before the economy goes into recession. The factory
chooses to shut down one assembly line, laying off half the workers, so
that capacity utilization drops by half, while hours per remaining
employee remain unchanged. Stephen Oliner replied that scope for such
adjustments exists in only a few industries and that a strong aggregate
cyclical relationship can be demonstrated between the work week and
output growth.
Richard Cooper pointed out that two of the outliers in the
authors' figure 3 are important IT sectors and conjectured that
they importantly influence the precision of the regression results. He
suggested that using the information available by sector could inform
the analysis of the post-2000 productivity increase. For example, it is
known that it was not mainly competitive pressure, but rather
technological advances, that pushed up labor productivity growth in
these two IT sectors. George Perry suggested that the paper's
results may be sensitive to the choice of 2000 as the breakpoint. In
particular, for the value-added calculations, the behavior of imports of
intermediate goods appears very sensitive to that choice. William
Brainard remarked that the correlation between industry productivity and
profits in the early 2000s could reflect costs of employment adjustment
rather than unusual pressures to improve profits. Because such costs
lead employers to smooth employment fluctuations, output increases much
faster than employment during a recovery, and this produces
corresponding changes in productivity and profits.
Benjamin Friedman replied to Gregory Mankiw's comment
regarding the usefulness of growth accounting. He noted that, a few
years back, productivity in the core European countries had been
catching up to that in the United States, but in more recent years the
gap has widened again. Through the work of Dale Jorgenson and others,
growth accounting has provided an explanation of this closing and
reopening of productivity differentials. Eswar Prasad noted that,
according to the authors' appendix table A-1, the retail trade
sector's share of IT capital services falls from above the median
in 1995 to below the median in 2000. This seems at odds with the
stylized fact that large retailers such as Wal-Mart, where technology
adoption is very important, are taking over from small morn-and-pop
stores, where IT has a much more limited role. This changing composition
within retailing should result in a growing rather than declining role
for IT in this industry. Kevin Stiroh replied that the IT use indicators
are relative, and the data are not inconsistent with the trends Prasad
cited. The results do not show that IT became less important in
retailing, but only that the rest of the economy was catching up with
retailing.
Peter Henry asked the authors for their projection of multifactor
productivity. Oliner replied that their forecast of annual labor
productivity growth of 2 1/4 percent is consistent with a growth rate of
multifactor productivity of approximately 1 percent, with the rest
coming from improvements in labor quality, which are assumed to be
small, and capital deepening.
We thank Martin Baily, John Fernald, Andrew Figura, Dale Jorgenson,
Gregory Mankiw, participants at the Brookings Panel conference, and
participants at the March 2007 Productivity Meeting at the National
Bureau of Economic Research for useful comments and discussions; we also
thank John Roberts for providing code and assistance to implement his
Kalman filter model, George Smith and Robert Yuskavage of the Bureau of
Economic Analysis for help with the industry data, and David Byrne for
assistance with semiconductor data. The views expressed in this paper
are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York, the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, or other staff members at either organization.
APPENDIX A
Industry Data
Table A-1. Value Added, IT Share, and IT Classification of
U.S. Industries
Value added,
2005 (millions IT share,
Name dollars) 2005 (a)
Agriculture, forestry, fishing, 123.1 1.4
and hunting
Oil and gas extraction 159.6 1.8
Mining, except oil and gas 31.5 6.0
Support activities for mining 42.2 8.9
Construction 611.1 19.0
Wood products 39.0 6.4
Nonmetallic mineral products 53.3 9.1
Primary metals 61.1 5.3
Fabricated metal products 130.5 9.3
Machinery 111.1 23.3
Computer and electronic 135.3 23.4
products
Electrical equipment, 47.8 12.8
appliances, and components
Motor vehicles, bodies and 95.4 15.2
trailers, and parts
Other transportation equipment 71.1 28.4
Furniture and related products 37.1 9.6
Miscellaneous manufacturing 72.6 16.0
Food and beverage and 175.7 8.8
tobacco products
Textile mills and textile 23.8 4.0
product mills
Apparel and leather and allied 16.8 7.2
products
Paper products 54.6 6.0
Printing and related support 46.9 12.4
activities
Petroleum and coal products 63.5 9.4
Chemical products 209.2 17.1
Plastics and rubber products 67.7 5.6
Utilities 248.0 5.5
Wholesale trade 743.2 25.4
Retail trade 823.5 14.6
Air transportation 41.0 42.7
Rail transportation 32.3 2.0
Water transportation 9.0 42.3
Truck transportation 114.1 11.5
Transit and ground passenger 17.1 16.8
transportation
Pipeline transportation 9.3 27.6
Other transportation and 89.1 15.1
support activities
Warehousing and storage 32.7 19.0
Publishing industries 150.2 49.8
(includes software)
Motion picture and sound 40.5 16.5
recording industries
Broadcasting and 304.1 46.5
telecommunications
Information and data 60.4 81.7
processing services
Federal Reserve banks, credit 474.7 28.6
intermediation, and related
activities
Securities, commodity 167.4 51.8
contracts, and investments
Insurance carriers and related 296.1 38.9
activities
Funds, trusts, and other 19.5 6.6
financial vehicles
Real estate 1,472.6 8.7
Rental and leasing services 105.8 23.1
and lessors of intangible
assets
Legal services 180.9 47.7
Computer systems design 140.8 89.3
and related services
Miscellaneous professional, 542.5 67.5
scientific, and technical
services
Management of companies 225.8 45.6
and enterprises
Administrative and support 336.6 45.5
services
Waste management and 32.3 6.2
remediation services
Educational services 115.8 22.1
Ambulatory health care 441.9 14.5
services
Hospitals and nursing and 342.2 13.1
residential care facilities
Social assistance 75.4 21.3
Performing arts, spectator 54.0 10.2
sports, museums, and
related activities
Amusements, gambling, and 60.1 4.8
recreation industries
Accommodation 104.6 5.0
Food services and drinking 225.9 5.8
places
Other services, except 282.8 13.8
government
IT classification
IT
[IT.sub. [IT.sub. producing
Name 1995] (b) 2000] (c) (d)
Agriculture, forestry, fishing, 0 0 0
and hunting
Oil and gas extraction 0 0 0
Mining, except oil and gas 0 0 0
Support activities for mining 0 0 0
Construction 1 1 0
Wood products 0 0 0
Nonmetallic mineral products 0 0 0
Primary metals 0 0 0
Fabricated metal products 0 0 0
Machinery 1 1 0
Computer and electronic 1 1 1
products
Electrical equipment, 1 1 0
appliances, and components
Motor vehicles, bodies and 1 1 0
trailers, and parts
Other transportation equipment 1 1 0
Furniture and related products 0 0 0
Miscellaneous manufacturing 1 1 0
Food and beverage and 0 0 0
tobacco products
Textile mills and textile 0 0 0
product mills
Apparel and leather and allied 0 0 0
products
Paper products 0 0 0
Printing and related support 0 1 0
activities
Petroleum and coal products 0 0 0
Chemical products 1 1 0
Plastics and rubber products 0 0 0
Utilities 0 0 0
Wholesale trade 1 1 0
Retail trade 1 0 0
Air transportation 1 1 0
Rail transportation 0 0 0
Water transportation 1 1 0
Truck transportation 0 0 0
Transit and ground passenger 1 1 0
transportation
Pipeline transportation 1 1 0
Other transportation and 0 1 0
support activities
Warehousing and storage 0 0 0
Publishing industries 1 1 1
(includes software)
Motion picture and sound 1 1 0
recording industries
Broadcasting and 1 1 0
telecommunications
Information and data 1 1 1
processing services
Federal Reserve banks, credit 1 1 0
intermediation, and related
activities
Securities, commodity 1 1 0
contracts, and investments
Insurance carriers and related 1 1 0
activities
Funds, trusts, and other 0 0 0
financial vehicles
Real estate 0 0 0
Rental and leasing services 1 1 0
and lessors of intangible
assets
Legal services 1 1 0
Computer systems design 1 1 1
and related services
Miscellaneous professional, 1 1 0
scientific, and technical
services
Management of companies 1 1 0
and enterprises
Administrative and support 1 1 0
services
Waste management and 0 0 0
remediation services
Educational services 0 1 0
Ambulatory health care 1 0 0
services
Hospitals and nursing and 1 0 0
residential care facilities
Social assistance 1 1 0
Performing arts, spectator 0 0 0
sports, museums, and
related activities
Amusements, gambling, and 0 0 0
recreation industries
Accommodation 0 0 0
Food services and drinking 0 0 0
places
Other services, except 0 0 0
government
Source: Authors' calculations based on BEA data.
(a.) Nominal value of IT capital services divided by nominal value of
total nonresidential capital services.
(b.) Equals 1 if 1995 IT capital service share is greater than 1995
median, and zero otherwise.
(c.) Equals 1 if 2000 IT capital service share is greater than 2000
median. and zero otherwise.
(d.) As defined by BEA.
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Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
STEPHEN D. OLINER
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
DANIEL E. SICHEL
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
KEVIN J. STIROH
Federal Reserve Bank of New York
(1.) See Economic Report of the President 2001, Basu, Fernald, and
Shapiro (2001), Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2000, 2003), Jorgenson and Stiroh
(2000), Jorgenson, Ho, and Stiroh (2002, 2005), and Oliner and Sichel
(2000, 2002). In these papers IT refers to computer hardware, software,
and communications equipment. This category often also is referred to as
information and communications technology, or ICT. For industry-level
evidence supporting the role of IT in the productivity resurgence, see
Stiroh (2002b). For an interpretation of the industry evidence that puts
less emphasis on IT, see Bosworth and Triplett (2007) and McKinsey
Global Institute (2001).
(2.) See Corrado, Hulten, and Sichel (2005, 2006), Brynjolfsson and
Hitt (2003), Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson, and Hitt (2002), Basu and others
(2004), Black and Lynch (2001, 2004), and Nakamura (1999, 2001, 2003).
The National Income and Product Accounts (NIPAs) exclude virtually all
intangibles other than software, although the Bureau of Economic
Analysis, which produces the NIPA data, recently released a satellite
account for scientific research and development; see Okubo and others
(2006).
(3.) Bresnahan and Trajtenberg (1995) were the first to write about
IT as a general-purpose technology. See also Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (2000), Schreyer (2000), van Ark (2000),
Basu and others (2004), and Basu and Fernald (2007).
(4.) Jorgenson, Ho, and Stiroh (2007): Bosworth and Triplett
(2007).
(5.) See Gordon (2003), Baily (2003), Schweitzer (2004), and Stiroh
(forthcoming). For references to the business press, see Gordon (2003)
and Stiroh (forthcoming).
(6.) Several other researchers have examined industry data,
including Baily and Lawrence (2001), Stiroh (2002b), Nordhaus (2002b),
Corrado and others (2007), and Bosworth and Triplett (2007). For
references to the literature on industry-level data in Europe, see van
Ark and Inklaar (2005).
(7.) See Economic Report of the President 2007, Congressional
Budget Office (2007a, 2007b), and the latest available transcripts of
the meetings of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC). The 2001 FOMC
transcripts show that staff presentations on the economic outlook
featured growth accounting in the discussion of productivity trends.
Private sector analysts also rely on growth accounting; see, for
example, Global Insight, U.S. Executive Summary, March 2007, and
Macroeconomic Advisers, Macro Focus, March 22, 2007.
(8.) Much has been written about the link between management
expertise and productivity, including Bloom and Van Reenen (2006),
McKinsey Global Institute (2001), and Farrell, Baily, and Remes (2005).
Gordon (2003) and Sichel (2003) provide reasons why offshoring and hours
mismeasurement may have had a relatively limited effect on labor
productivity growth, whereas Houseman (2007) argues that these factors
could have had a significant effect in the U.S. manufacturing sector.
For a discussion of measurement issues related to the pace of technical
progress in the semiconductor industry, see Aizcorbe, Oliner, and Sichel
(2006). For further discussion of issues related to critiques of the
neoclassical framework, see Congressional Budget Office (2007b).
(9.) Gordon (2003).
(10.) Bosworth and Triplett (2007).
(11.) Roberts (2001).
(12.) Basu and others (2004).
(13.) Oliner and Sichel (2000, 2002).
(14.) Basu, Fernald, and Shapiro (2001; hereafter BFS)
(15.) Basu and others (2004; hereafter BFOS).
(16.) Although BFS also include adjustment costs for labor in their
model, they zero out these costs in their empirical work. We simply omit
labor adjustment costs from the start. For additional discussion of
capital adjustment costs and productivity growth, see Kiley (2001).
(17.) The results in BFS and in Basu, Fernald, and Kimball (2006)
strongly support the assumption of constant returns for the economy as a
whole. We invoke perfect competition as a convenience in a model that
already has many moving parts.
(18.) Oliner, Sichel, and Stiroh (2007).
(19.) The weight on [[??].sub.j] - H represents the output
elasticity of type-j capital. In the case without adjustment costs,
[[phi].sub.j] = 0, and so the income share [[alpha].sup.K.sub.j] proxies
for this output elasticity. However, in the presence of adjustment
costs, the first-order condition for the optimal choice of capital
yields the more general result shown in equation 1. In effect, the
income share captures both the direct contribution of capital to
production and the benefit of having an extra unit of capital to absorb
adjustment costs. The weight in equation l nets out the portion of the
income share that relates to adjustment costs, as this effect is
embedded in the MFP term discussed below.
(20.) Domar (1961).
(21.) Oliner and Sichel (2002).
(22.) In contrast to the expression for aggregate MFP growth in
BFS, equation 2 contains no terms to account for reallocations of
output, labor, or capital across sectors. The particularly clean form of
equation 2 arises, in large part, from our assumption of constant
returns to scale and the absence of adjustment costs for labor (which
implies that competitive forces equate the marginal product of labor in
all sectors). In addition, we have assumed that any wedge between the
shadow value of capital and its user cost owing to adjustment costs is
the same in all sectors. Given this assumption, reallocations of capital
across sectors do not affect aggregate output.
(23.) For details on data sources, see the data appendix to Oliner
and Sichel (2002).
(24.) The weight on the capital deepening term in equation 1 for
type-j capital equals its income share minus its adjustment cost
elasticity. As discussed below, empirical estimates of these
asset-specific elasticities are not available, which forces us to
approximate the theoretically correct weights. Note that the weights on
the capital deepening terms in equation 1 sum to one minus the labor
share under constant returns to scale. We replace the theoretically
correct weights with standard income-share weights that also sum to one
minus the labor share. This approximation attaches the correct weight to
aggregate capital deepening but may result in some misallocation of the
weights across asset types.
(25.) Oliner and Sichel (2000, 2002); Jorgenson, Ho, and Stiroh
(2002, 2007).
(26.) Year-by-year share weighting embeds the implicit assumption
that firms satisfy the static first-order condition that equates the
marginal product of capital with its user cost. Strictly speaking, this
assumption is not valid in the presence of adjustment costs, as noted by
BFS and by Groth, Nunez, and Srinivasan (2006). Both of those studies
replace the year-by-year share weights with the average shares over
periods of five years or more, in an effort to approximate a
steady-state relationship that might be expected to hold on average over
longer periods. We found, however, that our results were little changed
by replacing year-by-year shares with period-average shares.
Accordingly, we adhere to the usual share weighting practice in the
literature.
(27.) Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000), Jorgenson, Ho, and Stiroh (2002,
2007), Oliner and Sichel (2000, 2002), and Triplett (1996), among
others.
(28.) Oliner and Sichel (2002) give a nontechnical description of
the way in which we implement the dual method, and the appendix in the
working paper version of this paper (Oliner, Sichel, and Stiroh, 2007)
provides the algebraic details.
(29.) BFS used a larger value for [phi] = 0.05, but subsequently
corrected some errors that had affected that figure. These corrections
caused the value of [phi] to be revised to 0.035.
(30.) Shapiro (1986).
(31.) Hall (2004).
(32.) Groth (2005).
(33.) Jorgenson (2001) argues that the steeper declines in
semiconductor prices reflected a shift from three-year to two-year
technology cycles starting in the mid-1990s. Aizcorbe, Oliner, and
Sichel (2006) report that shorter technology cycles drove semiconductor
prices down more rapidly after 1995, but they also estimated that
price-cost markups for semiconductor producers narrowed from 1995 to
2001. Accordingly, the faster price declines in the late 1990s--and the
associated pickup in MFP growth--partly reflected true improvements in
technology and partly changes in markups. These results suggest some
caution in interpreting price-based swings in MFP growth as a proxy for
corresponding swings in the pace of technological advance.
(34.) The combined effect of adjustment costs and factor
utilization remained essentially zero after 2000. Although the
deceleration in investment spending after 2000 eliminated the negative
effect of adjustment costs, the net decline in the workweek pushed the
utilization effect into negative territory.
(35.) Of course, MFP growth is a residual, so this result speaks
only to the proximate sources of growth and does not shed light on the
more fundamental forces driving MFP growth.
(36.) Jorgenson, Ho, and Stiroh (2007).
(37.) Corrado, Hulten, and Sichel (2005, 2006).
(38.) See Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2000), Brynjolfsson, Hitt, and
Yang (2002), and McKinsey Global Institute (2002) for interesting case
studies regarding the creation of organizational capital.
(39.) The BFOS model focuses on intangibles that are related to
information technology. This is a narrower purview than in Corrado,
Hulten, and Sichel (2005, 2006), who develop estimates for a full range
of intangible assets, regardless of their connection to IT. Although we
do not provide a comprehensive accounting for intangibles, we highlight
the intangible assets that are central to an assessment of the
contribution of information technology to economic growth.
(40.) Hall and Jorgenson (1967).
(41.) Specifically, for the income share of intangible capital, we
use the income share series for "New CHS intangibles," that
is, those intangibles over and above those included in the N1PAs. We
then adjust this series downward to account for the fact that some CHS
intangibles are not related to IT and thus do not fit in the BFOS
framework. As a crude adjustment, we remove the income share associated
with brand equity and one-third of the income share for other components
of "New CHS intangibles."
(42.) We use 2003 as the final year for this calculation because
that is the last year of data in CHS.
(43.) See Yang and Brynjolfsson (2001) for an alternative approach
to incorporating intangibles into a standard growth accounting
framework. Their approach relies on financial market valuations to infer
the amount of unmeasured intangible investment and shows that, through
1999, the inclusion of intangibles had potentially sizable effects on
the measured growth of MFP.
(44.) Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2000), Brynjolfsson, Hitt, and Yang
(2002), and McKinsey Global Institute (2002).
(45.) Arak Brynjolfsson, and Wu (2006, p. 2). Some interpret the
econometric results in Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2003) as support for a lag
between the installation of IT capital and the accumulation of
complementary capital. We believe this interpretation is incorrect.
Brynjolfsson and Hitt show that the firm-level effect of computerization
on MFP growth is much stronger when evaluated over multiyear periods
than when evaluated on a year-by-year basis. Importantly, however, the
variables in their regression are all measured contemporaneously,
whether over single-year or multiyear periods. Accordingly, their
results suggest that the correlation between the growth of IT capital
and intangible capital may be low on a year-by-year basis, but that a
stronger contemporaneous correlation holds over longer periods. boosting
the measured effect on MFP growth.
(46.) For background on industry productivity analysis, see
Jorgenson, Gollop, and Fraumeni (1987), Basu and Fernald (1995, 1997,
2001, 2007), Nordhaus (2002b), Stiroh (2002a, 2002b), Triplett and
Bosworth (2004), and Bosworth and Triplett (2007).
(47.) Bruno (1978); Norsworthy and Malmquist (1983); Jorgenson,
Gollop, and Fraumeni (1987).
(48.) Basu and Fernald (1995, 1997).
(49.) Basu and Fernald (2001).
(50.) Howells, Barefoot, and Lindberg (2006).
(51.) The underlying sources of these data are the BLS Current
Employment Survey (for wage and salary jobs and average weekly hours),
the Current Population Survey (for self-employed and unpaid workers,
agricultural workers, and within-household employment), and unemployment
insurance tax records.
(52.) Jorgenson, Ho, and Stiroh (2007).
(53.) As a comparison, Stiroh (200l, 2002b) reported an
acceleration of ALP after 1995 for six of ten broad sectors, which
accounted for the majority of output using earlier vintages of SIC data.
(54.) Corrado and others (2007); Bosworth and Triplett (2007).
(55.) BEA uses the "double deflation" method to estimate
real value added for all industries as the difference between real gross
output and real intermediate inputs (Howells, Barefoot, and Lindberg,
2006). Basu and Fernald (2001) show that this can be approximated, as in
equation 16, by defining gross output growth as a weighted average of
value added and intermediate input growth.
(56.) As in Stiroh (2002b).
(57.) This value-added approach is similar to the decomposition in
Nordhaus (2002b).
(58.) We also aggregated the industry output data using a Fisher
(rather than the Tornqvist) index and still found a small difference for
the period 1995-2000. We do not have an explanation for this.
(59.) Jorgenson and others (forthcoming) show an increase in both
the intermediate input and hours reallocation terms, although both are
slightly negative through 2004. The results in Bosworth and Triplett
(2007) are similar to ours in some respects (rising direct contribution
of gross output productivity through 2000 followed by a substantial
fall, and an intermediate reallocation term that switches from negative
to positive after 2000), but their hours reallocation term remains
negative through 2005. This divergence reflects differences in the
estimation of the hours series. Bosworth and Triplett (2007) use the BEA
series on fulltime/part-time employees, which they scale by total hours
per employee from BLS for 1987 to 2004. They hold hours per
full-time/part-time employee constant from 2004 to 2005.
(60.) This is analogous to the analysis of the sources of
productivity growth within the U.S. retail trade sector by Foster,
Haltiwanger, and Krizan (2002), who report that the majority of
productivity gains reflect entry and exit, with a very small
contribution from productivity gains within continuing establishments.
(61.) Stiroh (forthcoming).
(62.) Caballero and Hammour (1994).
(63.) See, for example, Smith and Lum (2005) and Howells, Barefoot,
and Lindberg (2006).
(64.) Stiroh (2002b).
(65.) Appendix table A-1 shows this classification scheme for the
sixty detailed industries based on both 1995 and 2000 IT capital income
shares and reports the 2005 share. Baily and Lawrence (2001), Stiroh
(2001), and Jorgenson, Ho, and Stiroh (2005) also use relative shares of
IT capital in total capital to identify IT-intensive industries in the
United States, and Daveri and Mascotto (2002), Inklaar, O'Mahony,
and Timmer (2005), O'Mahony and van Ark (2003), and van Ark,
Inklaar, and McGuckin (2003) do so in international studies.
(66.) This specification is identical to a
difference-in-difference-style regression with a post-1995 or post-2000
dummy variable, an IT intensity dummy, and the interaction estimated
with annual data for the full period.
(67.) Becker and others (2005).
(68.) We also estimated (but do not report) weighted least squares
estimates, which are appropriate if the somewhat arbitrary nature of the
industry classification system makes measurement error more severe in
the relatively small industries. See Kahn and Lim (1998) for a more
detailed discussion of weights in industry regressions. These weighted
estimates are similar to those reported in table 7.
(69.) Stiroh and Borsch (2007) report similar results.
(70.) Stiroh (2006). These results could be consistent with an
IT-based explanation if the pervasiveness of IT makes it difficult to
identify a link econometrically. That is, if IT is integral for all
industries, then measures of IT intensity may not be useful for
classification purposes. This view, however, is inherently untestable.
(71.) Baily (2004) discusses the case study evidence of the impact
of competitive intensity on firms' need to innovate and increase
productivity and argues that competitive pressure gradually increased
during the 1970s and 1980s.
(72.) Gordon (2003, p. 274). See Nordhaus (2002a) for details on
profit trends over this period.
(73.) Schweitzer (2004).
(74.) Groshen and Potter (2003).
(75.) This has been documented by Schreft and Singh (2003) and by
Aaronson, Rissman, and Sullivan (2004).
(76.) The significance of the cross-sectional correlation is robust
to dropping the two major outliers--computers and electronics, and
information and data systems--on the far left of figures 2 and 3.
(77.) t-tests for differences in the mean growth rates between the
two groups of industries reject the hypothesis that the two had equal
growth rates for hours and productivity, but fail to reject the
hypothesis that the two had equal output growth rates.
(78.) As a robustness check, we estimated difference-in-difference
regressions and found that industries with a below-median change in the
profit share from 1997 to 2001 had a bigger decline in the growth of
hours and a bigger increase in the growth of gross output labor
productivity than did other industries. No significant difference
emerged for value-added labor productivity growth. We also ran
regressions with more detailed measures of intermediate inputs,
including energy, materials, and purchased service inputs, as the
dependent variable, but those results were uniformly insignificant and
are not reported. As a second robustness check, we compared hours,
productivity, and output growth for 1992 with the change in the profit
share from 1989 to 1991 and found largely insignificant results,
suggesting that the latest cyclical episode was different from the
previous one.
(79.) The figures in table 9 are calculated from BLS's
quarterly Productivity and Costs data. The definition of nonfarm
business in these data includes government enterprises. In contrast, the
definition of nonfarm business in BLS's MFP data, the data we use
to calculate the labor productivity growth rates in table 1, excludes
government enterprises. This slight difference in sectoral coverage
explains why labor productivity growth for 2000-06 differs by 0.1
percentage point across the two tables. The same explanation accounts
for the slight difference in the average growth rate for 1973-95 between
table 1 and the column for nonfarm business in table 10 below.
(80.) Jorgenson, Ho, and Stiroh (2007) show that such revisions are
not unusual; for example, there was a steady stream of upward revisions
to productivity growth in the mid-1990s.
(81.) There are a number of alternative historical series for labor
productivity. Although they yield different results in some periods, the
patterns of growth and long-run averages are qualitatively similar to
the BLS data presented here. For example, see Gordon (2006).
(82.) In Roberts (2001) the Kalman filter is used to obtain
time-varying estimates of trend growth in both potential output and
labor productivity. Our implementation first uses a Hodrick-Prescott
filter to estimate the trend in hours and then feeds this exogenous
trend to the model. Hence we need to estimate a trend only for labor
productivity.
(83.) For other estimates of trend productivity using Kalman filter
techniques, see Brainard and Perry (2000) and Gordon (2003).
(84.) See the appendix to the working paper version of this paper
(Oliner, Sichel, and Stiroh, 2007) for details.
(85.) Even though adjustment costs have no direct effect on growth
in the steady state, the adjustment cost elasticities ([[phi].sub.i])
appear in the weights on the capital deepening terms in equation 23,
just as they did in the growth accounting equation that applies outside
the steady state (equation 1). As in that case, we lack the information
to specify these asset-specific elasticities. We proceed as we did
before, by replacing the theoretically correct weights with standard
income-share weights that sum to the same value (one minus the labor
share).
(86.) These are listed in the appendix to Oliner, Sichel, and
Stiroh (2007).
(87.) For the IT-producing sectors, the rate of advance in
technology is determined endogenously from the assumed rates of change
in prices for IT capital and a variety of other parameters.
(88.) Jorgenson, Ho, and Stiroh (2007).
(89.) The horizon in Kahn and Rich (2006) is five years, that in
Economic Report of the President 2007 is six years, and that in the
March 2007 Macroeconomic Advisers report is eight years.
Table 1. Contributions to Growth in Labor Productivity Based on
Published Data (a)
1973-95 1995-2000 2000-06
Item (1) (2) (3)
Growth of labor productivity 1.47 2.51 2.86
in the nonfarm business
sector (percent a year) (b)
Contributions front (percentage points):
Capital deepening 0.76 1.11 0.85
IT capital 0.46 1.09 0.61
Computer hardware 0.25 0.60 0.28
Software 0.13 0.34 0.20
Communications 0.07 0.15 0.14
equipment
Other tangible capital 0.30 0.02 0.24
Improvement in labor quality 0.27 0.26 0.34
Growth of MFP 0.44 1.14 1.67
Effect of adjustment costs 0.04 -0.11 0.08
Effect of utilization -0.03 0.13 -0.09
Growth of MFP excluding 0.42 1.11 1.68
above effects
IT-producing sectors 0.28 0.75 0.51
Semiconductors 0.09 0.45 0.23
Computer hardware 0.12 0.19 0.10
Software 0.04 0.08 0.13
Communications 0.04 0.04 0.05
equipment
Other nonfarm business 0.15 0.36 1.17
Memorandum: total IT 0.74 1.84 1.12
contribution (c]
Change Change
at 1995 at 2000
Item (2)-(1) (3)-(2)
Growth of labor productivity 1.04 0.35
in the nonfarm business
sector (percent a year) (b)
Contributions front (percentage points):
Capital deepening 0.35 -0.26
IT capital 0.63 -0.48
Computer hardware 0.35 -0.32
Software 0.21 -0.14
Communications 0.08 -0.01
equipment
Other tangible capital -0.28 0.22
Improvement in labor quality -0.01 0.08
Growth of MFP 0.70 0.53
Effect of adjustment costs -0.15 0.19
Effect of utilization 0.16 -0.22
Growth of MFP excluding 0.69 0.57
above effects
IT-producing sectors 0.47 -0.24
Semiconductors 0.36 -0.22
Computer hardware 0.07 -0.09
Software 0.04 0.05
Communications 0.00 0.01
equipment
Other nonfarm business 0.21 0.81
Memorandum: total IT 1.10 -0.72
contribution (c]
Source: Authors' calculations.
(a.) Detail may not sum to totals because of rounding.
(b.) Measured as 100 times the average annual log difference for the
indicated years.
(c.) Sum of capital deepening for IT capital and growth of MFP in
IT-producing sectors.
Table 2. Contributions to Growth in Labor Productivity: Accounting for
Intangibles (a)
1973-95 1995-2000 2000-06
Item (1) (2) (3)
Growth of labor productivity
in the nonfarm business
sector (percent a year) (b)
Based on published data (c) 1.47 2.51 2.86
Accounting for intangibles (d) 11.58 2.95 2.43
Contributions from (percentage points): (e)
Capital deepening 0.94 1.40 0.75
IT capital 0.44 1.02 0.57
Other tangible capital 0.29 0.02 0.22
New intangible capital 0.22 0.36 -0.04
Improvement in labor quality 0.26 0.25 0.32
Growth of MFP 0.37 1.31 1.36
Effect of adjustment costs 0.04 -0.12 0.10
Effect of utilization -0.03 0.13 -0.09
Growth of MFP excluding 0.36 1.30 1.34
above effects
IT-producing sectors 0.26 0.72 0.47
Intangible sector 0.01 0.08 0.07
Other nonfarm business 0.09 0.50 0.81
Memoranda: Growth rates (percent a year) (b)
Real intangible investment 5.7 12.0 -4.6
Real intangible capital 6.8 7.7 -0.7
services
Real IT capital services 15.6 20.4 8.9
User cost, intangible capital 4.6 1.2 3.6
User cost, IT capital -2.4 -9.0 -4.1
Nominal shares (percent)
Expenditure share, intangible 4.6 6.2 5.1
investment
Income share, intangible 4.7 6.4 6.5
capital
Change Change
at 1995 at 2000
Item (2)-(1) (3)-(2)
Growth of labor productivity
in the nonfarm business
sector (percent a year) (b)
Based on published data (c) 1.04 0.35
Accounting for intangibles (d) 1.37 -0.52
Contributions from (percentage points): (e)
Capital deepening 0.46 -0.65
IT capital 0.58 -0.45
Other tangible capital -0.27 0.20
New intangible capital 0.14 -0.4
Improvement in labor quality -0.01 0.07
Growth of MFP 0.94 0.05
Effect of adjustment costs -0.16 0.22
Effect of utilization 0.16 -0.22
Growth of MFP excluding 0.94 0.04
above effects
IT-producing sectors 0.46 -0.25
Intangible sector 0.07 -0.01
Other nonfarm business 0.41 0.31
Memoranda: Growth rates (percent a year) (b)
Real intangible investment 6.3 -16.6
Real intangible capital 0.9 -8.4
services
Real IT capital services 4.8 -11.5
User cost, intangible capital -3.4 2.4
User cost, IT capital -6.6 4.9
Nominal shares (percent)
Expenditure share, intangible 1.6 -1.1
investment
Income share, intangible 1.7 0.1
capital
Source: Authors' calculations.
(a.) Detail may not stun to totals because of rounding.
(b.) Measured as 100 times the average annual log difference for the
indicated years.
(c.) From table I.
(d.) Derived using methodology discussed in the text.
(e.) Contributions to growth of nonfarm business labor productivity
with accounting for intangibles.
Table 3. Growth of Intangible Capital and Investment Under Alternative
Timing Assumptions for Intangible Capital (a)
Percent a year
Average annual rate
Timing assumption 1973-95 1995-2000 2000-05
Intangible capital services
Baseline timing for intangible 6.8 7.7 -0.9
capital growth
Three-year centered moving average 6.9 7.1 -0.3
Five-year centered moving average 6.8 6.7 0.4
One-year lag relative to baseline 7.4 7.1 -0.2
Memorandum: Corrado, Hulten, and Sichel 5.2 7.3 2.8
series (b)
Intangible investment
Baseline timing for intangible 5.7 12.0 -6.2
capital growth
Three-year centered moving average 6.1 9.1 -5.2
Five-year centered moving average 6.1 8.5 -4.1
One-year lag relative to baseline 6.9 8.8 -8.7
Memorandum: Corrado, Hulten. and Sichel 5.2 8.3 1.1
series (b)
Source: Authors' calculations.
(a.) The alternative timing assumptions pertain to growth of intangible
capital. The effect on intangible investment is calculated through the
perpetual inventory relationship linking investment and capital.
(b.) From Corrado, Hulten, and Sichel (2006). series for "New CHS
intangibles," with preliminary extension to 2005 estimated by the
authors.
Table 4. Growth in Labor Productivity and Selected Growth
Contributions Under Alternative Timing Assumptions for Intangible
Capital (a)
1973-95 1995-2000 2000-06
Item (1) (2) (3)
Baseline (b)
Labor productivity growth 1.58 2.95 2.43
Contribution from 0.22 0.36 -0.04
intangible capital
Contribution from MFP 0.36 1.30 1.34
growth (c)
Three-year centered moving average
Labor productivity growth 1.59 2.77 2.56
Contribution from 0.22 0.32 0.00
intangible capital
Contribution from MFP 0.38 1.13 1.45
growth (c)
Five-year centered moving average
Labor productivity growth 1.59 2.72 2.59
Contribution from 0.22 0.29 0.02
intangible capital
Contribution from MFP 0.38 1.11 1.46
growth (c)
One-year lag relative to baseline
Labor productivity growth 1.62 2.77 2.51
Contribution from 0.23 0.32 0.01
intangible capital
Contribution from MFP 0.39 1.13 1.39
growth (c)
Change Change
at 1995 at 2000
Item (2)-(1) (3)-(2)
Baseline (b)
Labor productivity growth 1.37 -0.52
Contribution from 0.14 -0.40
intangible capital
Contribution from MFP 0.94 0.04
growth (c)
Three-year centered moving average
Labor productivity growth 1.18 -0.21
Contribution from 0.10 -0.32
intangible capital
Contribution from MFP 0.75 0.32
growth (c)
Five-year centered moving average
Labor productivity growth 1.13 -0.13
Contribution from 0.07 -0.27
intangible capital
Contribution from MFP 0.73 0.35
growth (c)
One-year lag relative to baseline
Labor productivity growth 1.15 -0.26
Contribution from 0.09 -0.31
intangible capital
Contribution from MFP 0.74 0.26
growth (c)
Source: Authors calculations.
(a.) Growth of labor productivity is in percent a year and is measured
as 100 times the average annual log difference for the indicated years.
Growth contributions are in percentage points.
(b.) From table 2.
(c.) Alter controlling for effects of adjustment costs and utilization.
Table 5. Estimates of Labor Productivity Growth in the Aggregate and
by Sector
Value added, 2005
Billions Share
Item of dollars (percent)
Value added, aggregate measures (a)
BLS business sector
BLS nonfarm business sector
Private industry aggregate, this paper 10,892 100.0
Value added by broad sector (a)
Agriculture, forestry, fishing, 123 1.1
and hunting
Mining 233 2.1
Construction 611 5.6
Durable goods 854 7.8
Nondurable goods 658 6.0
Utilities 248 2.3
Wholesale trade 743 6.8
Retail trade 824 7.6
Transportation and warehousing 345 3.2
Information 555 5.1
Finance, insurance, real estate, 2,536 23.3
rental, and leasing
Professional and business services 1,459 13.4
Education services, health care, 975 9.0
social assistance
Arts, entertainment, recreation, 445 4.1
accommodation, and food services
Other services, except government 283 2.6
Gross output by detailed industry (b)
Mean
Median
Weighted mean (c)
Value added by detailed industry (b)
Mean
Median
Weighted mean (c)
Average growth rate
of labor productivity
(percent a Year)
1995-
Item 1988-95 2000 2000-05
Value added, aggregate measures (a)
BLS business sector 1.48 2.69 3.07
BLS nonfarm business sector 1.46 2.52 3.02
Private industry aggregate, this paper 1.25 2.24 2.52
Value added by broad sector (a)
Agriculture, forestry, fishing, 1.95 5.31 5.13
and hunting
Mining 3.54 0.59 -4.59
Construction -0.32 -1.19 -0.98
Durable goods 3.57 7.69 6.04
Nondurable goods 2.26 1.78 4.26
Utilities 5.14 3.43 4.03
Wholesale trade 2.24 5.41 3.64
Retail trade 2.69 4.66 4.00
Transportation and warehousing 3.00 2.48 2.12
Information 3.70 2.48 8.85
Finance, insurance, real estate, 1.77 1.83 1.73
rental, and leasing
Professional and business services -0.94 0.16 2.33
Education services, health care, -2.40 -1.22 0.84
social assistance
Arts, entertainment, recreation, 0.65 1.12 0.13
accommodation, and food services
Other services, except government -0.31 -1.45 -0.32
Gross output by detailed industry (b)
Mean 1.80 2.95 2.28
Median 1.62 2.19 1.88
Weighted mean (c) 1.59 2.68 2.19
Value added by detailed industry (b)
Mean 1.78 2.02 2.80
Median 1.74 1.16 2.82
Weighted mean (c) 1.33 1.94 2.46
Change in productivity
growth rate
(percentage points)
1988-95 to 1995-2000
Item 1995-2000 to 2000-05
Value added, aggregate measures (a)
BLS business sector 1.21 0.38
BLS nonfarm business sector 1.06 0.50
Private industry aggregate, this paper 0.99 0.28
Value added by broad sector (a)
Agriculture, forestry, fishing, 3.36 -0.19
and hunting
Mining -2.95 -5.19
Construction -0.87 0.22
Durable goods 4.13 -1.65
Nondurable goods -0.48 2.49
Utilities -1.7 0.60
Wholesale trade 3.17 -1.77
Retail trade 1.97 -0.66
Transportation and warehousing -0.52 -0.36
Information -1.23 6.37
Finance, insurance, real estate, 0.07 -0.11
rental, and leasing
Professional and business services 1.11 2.16
Education services, health care, 1.18 2.07
social assistance
Arts, entertainment, recreation, 0.46 -0.99
accommodation, and food services
Other services, except government -1.14 1.13
Gross output by detailed industry (b)
Mean 1.15 -0.68
Median 0.57 -0.30
Weighted mean (c) 1.09 -0.49
Value added by detailed industry (b)
Mean 0.24 0.78
Median -0.58 1.66
Weighted mean (c) 0.62 0.51
Sources: Authors' calculations.
(a.) Growth of real value added per hour worked. measured as 100 times
the average log difference for the indicated years.
(b.) Calculated across the sixty observations in each period using
real gross output or real value added per hour worked.
(c.) Industries are weighted by hours at the beginning of each period.
Table 6. Decompositions of Aggregate Labor Productivity Growth
1988-95
Share of Contri-
total bution
value to ALP
No. of added (a) growth (b)
Item industries (%) (% pts)
Aggregates
Private industry aggregate (c] 1.25
Aggregated industries (d) 60 1.24
Decomposition using industry real
gross output per hour worked
Industry contribution 60 100.0 1.79
IT-producing industries (e) 4 4.0 0.33
IT-using industries (f) 26 57.3 0.71
Other industries 30 38.7 0.75
Reallocation of materials, -0.20
[-R.sup.M] (g)
Reallocation of hours, [R.sup.H] -0.34
Decomposition using industry real
value added per hour worked
Industry contribution 1.59
IT-producing industries 0.36
IT-using industries 0.48
Other industries 0.74
Reallocation of hours, [R.sup.H] -0.34
1995-2000
Share of Contri-
total bution
value to ALP
added (a) growth (b)
Item (%) (% pts)
Aggregates
Private industry aggregate (c] 2.24
Aggregated industries (d) 2.20
Decomposition using industry real
gross output per hour worked
Industry contribution 100.0 3.10
IT-producing industries (e) 5.0 0.50
IT-using industries (f) 58.6 1.99
Other industries 36.4 0.61
Reallocation of materials, -0.68
[-R.sup.M] (g)
Reallocation of hours, [R.sup.H] -0.21
Decomposition using industry real
value added per hour worked
Industry contribution 2.41
IT-producing industries 0.70
IT-using industries 1.31
Other industries 0.41
Reallocation of hours, [R.sup.H] -0.21
2000-2005
Share of Contri-
total bution
value to ALP
added (a) growth (b)
Item (%) (% pts)
Aggregates
Private industry aggregate (c] 2.52
Aggregated industries (d) 2.52
Decomposition using industry real
gross output per hour worked
Industry contribution 100.0 2.16
IT-producing industries (e) 4.5 0.25
IT-using industries (f) 59.1 1.54
Other industries 36.4 0.37
Reallocation of materials, 0.26
[-R.sup.M] (g)
Reallocation of hours, [R.sup.H] 0.10
Decomposition using industry real
value added per hour worked
Industry contribution 2.41
IT-producing industries 0.47
IT-using industries 1.54
Other industries 0.40
Reallocation of hours, [R.sup.H] 0.10
Change in
contribution
(percentage points)
1988-95 1995-2000
to to
Item 1995-2000 2000-05
Aggregates
Private industry aggregate (c] 0.99 0.28
Aggregated industries (d) 0.96 0.32
Decomposition using industry real
gross output per hour worked
Industry contribution 1.31 -0.94
IT-producing industries (e) 0.17 -0.25
IT-using industries (f) 1.28 -0.45
Other industries -0.14 -0.23
Reallocation of materials, -0.48 0.94
[-R.sup.M] (g)
Reallocation of hours, [R.sup.H] 0.13 0.31
Decomposition using industry real
value added per hour worked
Industry contribution 0.83 0.00
IT-producing industries 0.34 -0.23
IT-using industries 0.82 0.24
Other industries -0.33 0.00
Reallocation of hours, [R.sup.H] 0.13 0.31
Sources: Authors' calculations.
(a.) Nominal value added in indicated industries divided by aggregate
nominal value added for each period. multiplied by 100.
(b.) Growth of industry productivity, weighted by nominal value-added
shares in each year.
(c.) Based on BEA and BLS aggregate data from table 5.
(d.) Weighted aggregate of industry output and hours data.
(c.) Includes computer and electronics products, publishing including
software. information and data processing services, and computer
system design and related services, as defined by BEA.
(f.) Includes all non-IT-producing industries with a 1995 IT capital
services share above the 1995 median.
(g.) Reallocations are defined as in equations 19 and 20.
Table 7. Regressions Relating Labor Productivity Growth to IT
Calvital Intensity (a)
Regression (Dependent variable:
change in labor productivity
growth over indicated period)
Output measure and
independent variable 1988-95 to 1995-2000
Gross output
1995 IT dummy (b) 1.277 **
(0.585)
1995 IT share (c) 0.038 0.081 ***
(0.028) (0.027)
2000 IT dummy
2000 IT share
Constant 0.513 0.543 0.009
(0.438) (0.478) (0.478)
IT-producing industries No No Yes
included in sample?
[R.sup.2] 0.08 0.06 0.18
Value added
1995 IT dummy 1.904
(1.173)
1995 IT share 0.029 0.066
(0.044) (0.054)
2000 IT dummy
2000 IT share
Constant -0.709 -0.227 -0.828
(0.913) (0.915) (1.009)
IT-producing industries No No Yes
included in sample?
[R.sup.2] 0.04 0.01 0.03
Regression (Dependent variable:
change in labor productivity
growth over indicated period)
Output measure and
independent variable 1988-95 to 1995-2005
Gross output
1995 IT dummy (b) 1.478 ***
(0.491)
1995 IT share (c) 0.037 * 0.060 ***
(0.020) (0.019)
2000 IT dummy
2000 IT share
Constant 0.074 0.216 -0.04
(0.371) (0.401) (0.382)
IT-producing industries No No Yes
included in sample?
[R.sup.2] 0.14 0.07 0.12
Value added
1995 IT dummy 1.967 **
(0.893)
1995 IT share 0.051 * 0.048
(0.026) (0.035)
2000 IT dummy
2000 IT share
Constant -0.352 -0.198 -0.284
(0.709) (0.667) (0.725)
IT-producing industries No No Yes
included in sample?
[R.sup.2] 0.08 0.05 0.026
Regression (Dependent variable:
change in labor productivity
growth over indicated period)
Output measure and
independent variable 1995-2000 to 2000-05
Gross output
1995 IT dummy (b)
1995 IT share (c)
2000 IT dummy 0.156
(0.931)
2000 IT share 0.010 -0.031
(0.044) (0.048)
Constant -0.756 -0.865 -0.206
(0.480) (0.650) (0.651)
IT-producing industries No No Yes
included in sample?
[R.sup.2] 0.00 0.00 0.02
Value added
1995 IT dummy
1995 IT share
2000 IT dummy 0.095
(1.448)
2000 IT share 0.046 -0.041
(0.066) (0.055)
Constant 0.730 -0.056 1.225
(0.944) (1.149) (1.017)
IT-producing industries No No Yes
included in sample?
[R.sup.2] 0.00 0.02 0.01
Source: Authors' regressions.
(a.) Data are for the sixty industries listed in appendix table A-1
(fifty-six industries when the four IT-producing industries are
dropped). Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. Asterisks
indicate statistical significance at the *** 1 percent, ** 5 percent.
and * 10 percent level.
(b.) Dummy variable equal to 1 for industries with an IT capital share
above the median in the indicated year, and zero otherwise.
(c.) IT capital services as a share of nonresidential capital services
in the indicated year.
Table 8. Regressions Relating Growth in Inputs, Productivity, and
Output to Earlier Changes in the Profit Share,
Regression (Dependent variable:
average annual growth rate of
indicated input type)
Independent variable Hours
Change in profit share, 19.212 *** 16.413 *** 16.170 ***
(b) 1997-2001 (4.940) (5.126) (5.273)
Change in profit share, -0.115 13.389 *
2001-04 (6.159) (7.952)
Lagged dependent variable, 0.722 *** 0.782 ***
1997-2001 (0.155) (0.128)
IT service share, (c] 2001 -0.089 *** -0.069 ***
(0.027) (0.025)
Change in profit share, -0.444 **
1997-2001 x IT service (0.173)
share, 2001
Constant -1.175 ** 0.239 -0.193
(0.459) (0.478) (0.463)
[R.sup.2] 0.17 0.51 0.57
Regression (Dependent variable:
average annual growth rate of
indicated input type)
Independent variable Intermediate inputs
Change in profit share, -0.069 1.864 1.502
(b) 1997-2001 (10.339) (10.789) (11.398)
Change in profit share, 8.244 22.546
2001-04 (12.592) (22.270)
Lagged dependent variable, 0.255 0.280
1997-2001 (0.165) (0.168)
IT service share, (c] 2001 -0.032 -0.009
(0.064) (0.067)
Change in profit share, -0.474
1997-2001 x IT service (0.522)
share, 2001
Constant 0.533 0.104 -0.459
(0.733) (1.076) (1.499)
[R.sup.2] 0.00 0.10 0.12
Regression (Dependent variable:
average annual growth rate of
labor productivity)
Value added
Change in profit share, -38.487 *** -40.655 *** -39.835 ***
1997-2001 (11.253) (14.067) (14.230)
Change in profit share, 5.703 0.563
2001-04 (11.962) (15.520)
Lagged dependent variable, -0.055 -0.041
1997-2001 (0.186) (0.195)
Regression (Dependent variable:
average annual growth rate of
labor productivity)
Gross output
Change in profit share, -28.456 *** -20.929 *** -20.851 ***
1997-2001 (6.437) (7.116) (7.379)
Change in profit share, 7.013 4.655
2001-04 (8.705) (8.353)
Lagged dependent variable, 0.169 0.176
1997-2001 (0.168) (0.178)
Regression (Dependent variable:
average annual growth rate of
indicated input type)
Hours
IT service share, 2001 -0.008 -0.018
(0.035) (0.041)
Change in profit share, 0.177
1997-2001 x IT service (0.297)
share, 2001
Constant 3.283 *** 3.332 *** 3.540 ***
(0.745) (0.882) (0.871)
[R.sup.2] 0.26 0.27 0.28
Regression (Dependent variable:
average annual growth rate of
indicated input type)
Intermediate inputs
IT service share, 2001 0.030 0.025
(0.028) (0.037)
Change in profit share, 0.077
1997-2001 x IT service (0.294)
share, 2001
Constant 2.279 *** 1.319 ** 1.404 **
(0.341) (0.522) (0.555)
[R.sup.2] 0.37 0.44 0.44
Regression (Dependent variable:
average annual growth rate of output)
Value added
Change in profit share, -19.274 ** -19.781 * -19.826 *
1997-2001 (9.511) (10.820) (10.794)
Change in profit share, 10.770 11.472
2001-04 (11.257) (17.752)
Lagged dependent variable, -0.043 -0.044
1997-2001 (1.150) (0.152)
IT service share, 2001 -0.006 -0.005
(0.028) (0.034)
Change in profit share, -0.023
1997-2001 x IT service (0.290)
share, 2001
Constant 2.108 *** 2.058 *** 2.029 **
(0.679) (1.680) (0.780)
[R.sup.2] 0.11 0.15 0.15
Regression (Dependent variable:
average annual growth rate of output)
Gross output
Change in profit share, -9.243 -0.785 -0.707
1997-2001 (6.933) (7.645) (7.729)
Change in profit share, 10.342 16.689
2001-04 (10.943) (16.531)
Lagged dependent variable, 0.294 0.300
1997-2001 (0.211) (0.216)
IT service share, 2001 -0.014 -0.002
(0.041) (0.040)
Change in profit share, -0.203
1997-2001 x IT service (0.356)
share, 2001
Constant 1.105 ** 0.529 0.281
(0.486) (0.552) (0.867)
[R.sup.2] 0.04 0.22 0.23
Source: Authors' regressions.
(a.) Growth rates of inputs. labor productivity, and output are from
2001 to 2004. Each regression has sixty industry observations. Numbers
in parentheses are robust standard errors. Asterisks indicate
statistical significance at the *** 1 percent, ** 5 percent, and
* 10 percent level.
(b.) Profit share is defined throughout as the ratio of gross
operating surplus to value added.
(c.) Share of IT capital services in nonresidential capital services.
Table 9. Effects of Data Revisions and Data for Additional Years on
Measured Growth of Labor Productivity (a)
Period covered by the data
Vintage of data 1995-2000 2000-03 2000-04 2000-05 2000-06
March 2004 2.4 3.8
August 2004 2.5 3.7
March 2005 2.5 3.7 3.7
August 2005 2.5 3.4 3.4
March 2006 2.5 3.4 3.4 3.3
August 2006 2.5 3.4 3.3 3.1
March 2007 2.5 3.4 3.3 3.0 2.8
Source: Authors' calculations using BLS data.
(a.) Measured as 100 times the average log difference over the
indicated period, based on annual average data.
Table 10. Growth of Labor Productivity: Long-Period Averages (a)
Private economy or Nonfarm
Period business sector (b) business sector
1909-1928 1.4
1928-1950 2.5
1950-1973 2.9 2.6
1973-1995 1.5 1.4
1995-2006 2.8 2.7
1909-2006 2.2
1950-2006 2.3 2.1
Source: Authors' calculations using BLS data.
(a.) Measured as 100 times the average log difference over the
indicated period based on annual average data.
(b.) Data before 19.47 pertain to the private economy (defined as gross
national product less general government), whereas data for 1947 and
later years pertain to the business sector.
Table 11. Growth of Labor Productivity: Steady-State Results (a)
Using Using
lower-bound upper-bound
Item parameters parameters
Growth of labor productivity in the 1.46 3.09
nonfarm business sector (percent a year)
Contributions from (percentage points):
Induced capital deepening 0.75 1.39
Improvement in labor quality 0.15 0.15
Growth of MFP 0.56 1.55
Memorandum: MFP growth, other nonfarm 0.19 0.98
business (percent a year)
Source: Authors' calculations.
(a.) Calculated front equation 23 in the text. Values for the
parameters that appear in equation 23 are listed in the appendix to
Oliner, Sichel, and Stiroh (2007).
Table 12. Alternative Estimates of Future Growth in Labor Productivity
Percent a year
Date of
Source projection Estimate
This paper: steady-state analysis March 2007 1.5 to 3.1
This paper: Kalman filter analysis March 2007 1.3 to 3.2
Robert Gordon March 2007 2.0
Survey of Professional Forecasters (a) February 2007 2.2
Global Insight March 2007 2.2
Macroeconomic Advisers March 2007 2.2
Congressional Budget Office January 2007 2.3
Dale Jorgenson, Mun Ho, and
Kevin Stiroh (b) October 2006 2.5
James Kahn and Robert Rich March 2007 2.5
Council of Economic Advisers January 2007 2.6
Sources: Gordon (2007, slide 24); Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia,
Survey of Profesional Forecasters, February 13, 2007; Global Insight,
U.S. Executive Summary, March 2007, p. 6; Macroeconomic Advisers,
Macro Fecus, March 22, 2007, p. 11; Congressional Budget Office (2007a,
table 2-2): Jorgenson, He, and Stitch (2007, table 3): Kahn and Rich
(2006), updated to March 2007 based on the productivity model update
posted at www.newyorkfed.org/research/national economy/richkahn_
prodmod.pdf; Economic Report of the president 2007, table 1-2.
(a.) Median of the thirty-eight forecasts in the survey.
(b.) "Base-case" projection.