"More normal than welfare": the Mincome experiment, stigma, and community experience.
Calnitsky, David
IN THE 1960S AND 1970S, both the American and Canadian governments
launched among the most innovative and large-scale social experiments
ever attempted. Five separate guaranteed annual income (GAI) experiments
were implemented to test the mechanics of a revolutionized social policy
that ensured a basic standard of living to all. The field studies
involved huge expenditures of money, time, and human energy. This
expense--particularly in the Canadian experiment--must be considered
that much greater next to the somewhat limited contribution to knowledge
they produced. Much was learned about the labor supply response (for
summaries of the experiments, and the typically modest reductions in
work effort, see Burtless 1986; Hum and Simpson 1993; Keeley 1981;
Levine et al. 2005; Widerquist 2005) and to a lesser extent about
marital dissolution (Cain 1986; Cain and Wissoker 1990; Hannan and Tuma
1990). More recently, Evelyn Forget (2010, 2011) has examined the health
effects of the GAI in the Canadian context (Forget, Peden, and Strobel
2013). However, the original research agenda was cast in fairly narrow
terms (Haveman 1997; Rossi and Lyall 1976). (1) Questions concerning
social inclusion, social solidarity, and the well-being of communities
were sidelined by researchers, as were considerations of the extent to
which "welfare's" social stigma was reproduced under a
universalistic social policy. (2) In other words, there was little
interest in what John Rawls (2009) called "the social bases of
self-respect" (p. 54). It is natural that a program distributing
large amounts of money to diverse groups of people without work
requirements would forefront the effects on work. However, achieving a
decent standard of living might affect people in significant and subtle
ways that are poorly summarized by their propensity to reduce work hours
by a few percentage points.
The labor supply results are important but tell us little about the
actual people populating these studies, how they understood the program,
how it impacted their experience of community life, and whether
participation came with social-psychological costs. Most of the GAI
studies did not collect much information on the motivations and
experiences of the human subjects involved. As Lee Rainwater (1986)
pointed out in the wake of the American experiments, there is a major
"black box" element to these studies. We often know what goes
in and what comes out, but it is never clear what was actually going on
in between. We do not know how the guaranteed income was perceived in
the context of community life, what motivated participants to join, and
how community members and participants interpreted it relative to
traditional means-tested social assistance. We do not know whether it
provided benefits without stigma, as was often hoped and hypothesized
(Adams et al. 1971; Canada 1971a; Moynihan 1973; Offe 1992; Tobin 1966).
Perhaps a reflection of the methodological preferences and prejudices of
the time, the most rudimentary forms of qualitative description were
largely absent from the GAI data. A descriptive account of experiences
of individuals can put flesh on the bones of statistical findings.
Moreover, the consideration of community experiences and the moral
interpretation of social policy bear on the question of political
feasibility, which is sometimes absent from the overall feasibility
analyses of social policy alternatives (i.e., Munnell 1986). In the name
of economic feasibility, social policies may impose stigma costs on
recipients. However, these policies may also be self-defeating if their
unpopularity undermines their political feasibility. "Welfare"
in North America is the paradigmatic case of a stigmatizing program
whose overall social and moral reception may have undermined its
long-run sustainability. Both in Canada and the United States, welfare
programs had shrunk and acquired more-stringent conditions by the late
1990s (Danziger 2010; Peck 2001). Social policies that spotlight the
moral quality of the poor, ones that hinge on the worthiness or
unworthiness of recipients, may be less likely to be endorsed by the
public. There is evidence that people's perception of the moral
virtue of the poor (rather than class position alone) is a good
predictor of their support for generous forms of redistribution (Fong
2001; Moffitt, Ribar, and Wilhelm 1998; Williamson 1974). Policies that
take the question of the motivations and morality of the poor off the
table may be more robust. Human beings, after all, are moral creatures.
(3) As such, understanding the political feasibility of policies such as
the GAI involves a consideration of the moral aspects of economic
policy.
It is often argued that universalistic social policy produces
solidarity and resilience, where income-tested or targeted social
programs produce stigma and fragility (i.e., Brady and Bostic 2015;
Korpi and Palme 1998). However, concrete social policies, including the
GAI, do not always fit well into this dichotomy. I reframe the
hypothesis using qualitative survey data from the Manitoba Basic Annual
Income Experiment (Mincome), a threeyear (1975 to 1977) (4) experimental
GAI, which included a "saturation" site, the town of Dauphin,
Manitoba, where all town residents had the option to collect payments.
(5) Mincome was technically an income-tested program--to collect
payments one's income must fall below a certain threshold--though
it is best described by Theda Skocpol's (1991) expression,
"targeting within universalism," because it had strongly
universalistic features: if anyone's income fell below the
threshold for whatever reason, they were eligible for payments.
Instead of emphasizing universalism per se, this paper argues that
the moral reception of social programs pivots on (1) the degree to which
groups are treated differently or similarly, (2) the degree to which
payments are automatic or open to discretion, and (3) the program's
semi-independent moral framing. First, Mincome's design meant that
typically separated groups were treated under a unified scheme, thereby
facilitating a universalistic ethos and a broad appeal. Particularly
salient was the absence of special rules for special categories of
people--especially regarding work--that ultimately exclude some from the
mainstream activities of life. By blurring lines of demarcation among
low-wage workers, unemployed workers, and social assistance recipients,
the guaranteed income was less likely to be interpreted as a program for
"other" people. The program's broad applicability
provided a kind of ideological cover to participants, allowing them to
sidestep typical constructions of social assistance receipt. This
breadth facilitated a range of explanations to choose from when people
explained their participation. Second, Mincome improved people's
incomes somewhat automatically, without subjecting them to invasive and
degrading caseworker discretion. Finally, Mincome's ideological
framing by official sources impacted its social reception: the program
tended to be framed as a contribution to science and as a program
beneficial to "all Canadians." This weakened the archetypal
portrayal of social assistance as a form of "dependence" that
encourages moral deficiency, low motivation, or cheating (Canada 1971b;
Fraser and Gordon 1994; Rainwater 1982; Yoo 2008).
Together, these features reduced the social-psychological costs of
social assistance. The program was, according to one participant,
"more normal than welfare." In stark contrast to comments from
welfare participants, Mincome's framing and design made it easy for
participants to cite a variety of casual, pragmatic, or seemingly
incidental reasons for participation--often failing to mention any
actual or potential material benefits at all. Explanations frequently
refer to "curiosity" or a desire "to help with
research."
I argue that the basic material benefits and design of the scheme
facilitate and interact with ideological (or nonmaterial) factors to
explain why Mincome participants enrolled, and likewise, why they felt
it was superior to welfare, which the majority resolutely refused to
consider joining. Finally, I show that the social meaning of Mincome was
powerful enough that even participants who themselves had particularly
negative attitudes toward social assistance--people who opposed welfare
on moral grounds, who saw welfare recipients in a negative light, and
who believed strongly in the principle of earning one's own
living--felt able to collect Mincome payments without a sense of
contradiction. A man who wrote, "Welfare to me was accepting
something for nothing," joined Mincome because it "would be a
benefit to me at some time." Although it was a government
assistance program, which targeted income disproportionately to the
poor, survey respondents typically viewed payments in a pragmatic rather
than a moralistic light. This paper examines the material and
ideological factors behind people's participation in Mincome in
order to locate the sources of this distinctive social meaning.
A BRIEF HISTORY OF AN UNUSUAL EXPERIMENT
The early GAI debates in Canada were shaped by influential reports
from the Economic Council of Canada (Canada 1968) and Department of
National Health and Welfare (Canada 1970), which addressed, perhaps for
the first time, the multidimensional problem of poverty. They made
appeals to evaluate the merits of a national GAI program. The Economic
Council report (Canada 1968) cautioned that an exclusive focus on groups
in the deepest poverty would fail to deal adequately with the problem;
this would "neglect unduly the very considerable group whose
poverty problems are associated not with an absence of earnings, but
with an insufficiency of earnings" (p. 113). The discussion came to
center on the income security of the working poor and the objective of
extending welfare to new groups (Leman 1980; Smith 1965).
Between 1968 and 1973 the guaranteed income was ubiquitous in
Canadian policy debates (Haddow 1993). Senator David Croll conducted an
influential inquiry into poverty in Canada in 1971, concluding with a
call for a comprehensive guaranteed income to supplant means-tested
social assistance. Several staff members defected in protest from the
committee, believing the chair to be insufficiently radical (see
McCormack 1972). They produced their own Real Poverty Report (Adams et
al. 1971) later that year. The Croll Report defined poverty as income
deficiency, while the "renegade report" defined poverty as
deprivations in power and status, but both ultimately recommended a
sweeping transformation of income maintenance policy pivoting on a
guaranteed income for all. A sufficiently generous GAI could solve
deficits in income as well as deficits in status.
It was in this context that Manitoba's New Democratic Party
Premier Edward Schreyer announced that "the Government of Manitoba
is explicitly dedicated to try to provide greater equality in conditions
of life to the individual citizens of our province" (Schreyer
1971:1-2). Schreyer (1971) linked the goal of extending welfare to the
old problem of dividing up the poor into separate social categories:
"If we can get around the legal--and psychological--barriers which
so rigidly separates the employed from those on welfare ... then surely
we have made a solid step forward" (p. 4). The historic gulf
between the deserving and undeserving poor is what motivated
Schreyer's (1971) comment that "the time has come to give out
welfare at the unemployment office" (p. 1).
In an interview that summer, Schreyer declared, "we feel that
a GAI is necessary and inevitable" (Green, Mardon, and Werier
1971:16). The Mincome experiment, publicly announced in February 1974
(Manitoba 1974), was a means to locate any "difficulties in small
scale" (Green et al. 1971:16). Due to considerable interest in
understanding the administrative aspects of a GAI (Atkinson, Cutt, and
Stevenson 1973; Hikel, Powell, and Laub 1974) as well as some interest
early on in the "impact on the community," an important aspect
of the project would be conducted in a "contiguous area"
(rather than an exclusively randomized control trial format), eventually
Dauphin (Schreyer 1971:8).
Dauphinites were offered guaranteed incomes equivalent to $19,500
for a four-person household (the guarantee varied by household size).
(6) People earning no labor market income, for whatever reason, could
access the full guarantee, which was about 38 percent of median family
income (a measure that excludes relatively low-income "nonfamily
persons") or 49 percent of median household income in 1976. At a
negative income tax rate of 50 percent, people could always increase
their incomes by working. Every dollar of labor market earnings reduced
the guarantee by 50 cents; this meant that payments phased out once
earnings reached $39,000. Positive tax liabilities were rebated too; the
rebate faded to zero once market earnings reached around $43,400.
According to the 1971 Census, real median household income for
Dauphin and its rural municipality was only $24,758 and median family
income was $39,166. By the middle of the experiment in 1976, I estimate
that real median household and family incomes were $39,382 and $51,055,
respectively. Though the program itself affects 1976 data, these figures
illustrate the accessibility of benefits to diverse social segments.
In a town with a population of 8,885, along with a 3,165-person
rural municipality, at least 18 percent--2,128 individuals or 706
households--received benefits at some point throughout the program (this
is a lower bound because available data exclude late-joining farm
families; an estimate of this group increases the participant count to
2,457, or 20 percent of the population). Mincome staff knocked on the
door of every home in Dauphin to introduce the experiment with an
initial interview. After the interview, prospective participants would
mail an application form and income statement to the Mincome office. The
entire procedure could be completed through the mail. Income was
reported by mail each month, and on that basis, checks were sent to
homes (see Hum, Laub, and Powell 1979; Sabourin et al. 1979). Welfare,
by contrast, was characterized by highly visible and special treatment.
It involved frequent contact with staff who held considerable
discretionary power, conducted searching investigations of
recipients' resources, and sometimes made unexpected home visits.
Welfare recipients normally collected payments in person. They were
often referred through doctors and counselors, used vouchers, and had
services paid for by the welfare office (Barber 1972; Canada 1971b;
Ryant 1983). In all, Mincome was less visible, was more automatic,
involved less individual discretion, and could benefit diverse social
groups. As I discuss in the next section, these features helped shape
Mincome's social meaning.
RETHINKING UNIVERSALISM AND SELECTIVITY
There is a large literature which argues that universal programs
will be internalized as natural rights of citizenship, while programs
targeted to small groups of people will be fragile (Esping-Andersen
1990; Korpi and Palme 1998; Larsen 2008; Moene and Wallerstein 2001).
Where broad-based programs weaken divisions between the deserving and
undeserving poor, highly targeted programs are said to be actively
stigmatizing. In the former case, an expanded sense of community and
social inclusion are at the explanatory core of the apparent association
between the universality of a program and its resilience. In the latter
case, targeting and income-testing requires the poor to stand up and
self-identify as poor. This spotlights a stigmatized population and
leaves programs vulnerable to funding cuts (Titmuss 1968).
However, the path from targeting to stigma to program
unsustainability is not straightforward. Kenworthy (2011) studied total
government transfer incomes in 10 countries and found universal programs
to be no more robust than targeted ones. Brady and Bostic (2015) found
that while transfer share is positively associated with universalism, it
is not negatively associated with targeting. Marx, Salanauskaite, and
Verbist (2013) found that targeting is associated with higher levels of
spending. Stigmatizing programs may be vulnerable; however, targeted
programs need not always attach stigma to participants. The thesis needs
to be refined: it is not targeting as such that generates stigma and
potentially weakens programs. Various examples clarify the point: The
income-tested Earned Income Tax Credit in the United States does not
appear to be stigmatizing (Sykes et al. 2015) and has steadily grown in
recent years, even inspiring similar programs in Canada (the Working
Income Tax Credit) and elsewhere.
The purported theoretical link between the targeting of a program
and its fragility operates through the negative subjective experience of
participants and moralistic evaluation of nonparticipant neighbors.
Though the GAI is technically income tested, the typical evaluation of
income-tested programs does not map onto it easily. I identify three
ways an income-tested or targeted program can evade these dynamics. What
is at issue in a stigmatizing program is not so much whether it is
income tested per se but,
1. the degree to which typically divided groups are treated in a
uniform manner;
2. the degree to which payments are automatic rather than
determined case by case; and
3. the degree to which a program is framed as morally acceptable.
The first item suggests that uniform treatment reduces the chance
and severity of exclusionary practices. Programs directed to specific
groups of people may emphasize group differences. The process of
categorization may highlight some moral deviation, in turn giving rise
to special conditions. For example, from the standpoint of social
policy, do you happen not to work or are you tagged with a special
category identifying you as a "nonworker"? GAI proposals
constituted sweeping transformations of social policy primarily because
they dissolved the boundaries between the deserving and undeserving
poor; they weakened insider-outsider distinctions (see Katz 2013). To
this it could be added that a program will be less stigmatizing if there
is more participation from privileged groups. Patrick Moynihan, one of
the main planners of Nixon's Family Assistance Plan (see Moynihan
1973; Wiederspan, Rhodes, and Shaefer 2015)--a GAI proposal nearly
approved in the U.S. Congress in 1970--believed that the deserving
status of the working poor would purify the program of its negative
association with welfare policy (Steensland 2007).
The second consideration emphasizes the automaticity of program
delivery rather than the binary consideration of whether or not a
program is income tested. Income testing is often falsely conflated with
demeaning experiences with bureaucrats and caseworkers. Much of the
literature on social assistance interprets the income test as
characterized by demeaning application processes, punitive sanctions,
and intrusive caseworker discretion that reinforces damaging stereotypes
of welfare recipients (Handler and Hasenfeld 2007; Sandfort, Kalil, and
Gottschalk 1999; Stuber and Schlesinger 2006; Watkins-Hayes 2009).
However, income testing is not linked inherently to these experiences.
People undergo a uniform process of income testing when filing their
taxes annually. Likewise, the manifold targeted benefits delivered
automatically to different groups through the tax system are
self-evidently nonstigmatizing. The less of an ordeal is the procedure,
the more automatic and less discretionary, the less likely it is to be
accompanied by stigma.
The first two items are displayed as two dimensions in Figure 1. In
the upper left, typical North American welfare systems are distinguished
by high levels of caseworker discretion and by the special treatment
received by recipients. Various tax expenditures in the bottom left,
including the Earned Income Tax Credit, are marked by a degree of
automaticity alongside differential treatment. Judges' powers, in
the top right, exemplify the permutation of case-by-case discretion with
an abstract uniform set of rules applicable to all. Although I
characterize the GAI as a social policy that treats social groups in a
uniform fashion, there remain nonrecipient groups outside the umbrella
of the GAI. Unlike, say, a universal basic income--to the right of the
GAI in Figure 1--the fullest sense of uniformity in treatment is not a
feature of the typical GAI design. A universal basic income, which
operates without prior assessment of incomes, is also more automatic. It
lacks even an initial sign-up procedure and therefore also falls below
the GAI on Figure 1. Though the two programs can lead to identical
posttransfer income distributions (Groot 2004) and individual incentives
(Harvey 2006), they retain symbolic differences. Finally, this measure
of ambiguity in the GAI on the dimensions above makes the question of
framing more important and less deterministic than might obtain in, say,
a universal basic income. This leads us to the third point about the way
targeted programs might evade stigma.
Social programs can be framed in more or less morally acceptable
terms (Kahneman and Tversky 2000; Tversky and Kahneman 1981). Similar
benefits may, for example, be portrayed as earned or as charity (Skocpol
1991). These frames will shape interpretation in the community (Chong
and Druckman 2007; Gamson and Modigliani 1989; Nelson, Oxley, and
Clawson 1997; Slothuus 2007; Steensland 2008; Wiederspan et al. 2015).
There is no doubt that the ideological reception of a policy will be, in
part, a reflection of its underlying design and material impact. However
another part is somewhat unmoored and open to more-positive or
more-negative portrayals. The guaranteed income has certain aspects that
are open to both portrayals--unlike programs with the strongest forms of
discretion and group differentiation on the one hand or the strongest
forms of automaticity and uniform treatment on the other--so its framing
may be particularly consequential.
[FIGURE 1 OMITTED]
The Dauphin experiment, to some extent, satisfied the conditions
above where welfare did not. Mincome guaranteed incomes to a mixed group
of recipients in a fairly automatic fashion. It fostered an
idiosyncratic, largely positive framing. A relevant hypothesis expects
the program to generate subjective interpretations and community
experiences quite different from the stigma of welfare participation.
Before approaching these issues, the next section introduces the data
and methods.
SURVEY DATA AND METHODS
A nine-page "community experience" survey was issued to
every participating adult head in their homes once at the midpoint of
the experiment in August 1976. It included open-ended questions, as well
as yes/no and Likert-style questions concerning people's day-to-day
experience with the community and with Mincome itself. The survey was
self-administered by participants, although interviewers were directed
to explain instructions or define words when necessary. Interviewers
explained that the survey was strictly confidential, that it would be
unconnected to participants' names, and had no bearing on Mincome
payments. The survey was also optional; although interviewers encouraged
completion, they introduced the survey with the following statement:
This questionnaire will help us to gather information about the way
in which income assistance programs affect other areas of a
person's life, such as his daily activities and experiences with
others in the community. We are depending on your assistance in
filling out this questionnaire. This additional information will
make an important contribution to our study of how well different
types of assistance programs work.
The survey was completed by 407 Dauphinite household heads, roughly
65 percent of the adults enrolled at the time. Some files are incomplete
due to illiteracy or refusal. Of the completed surveys, 79 percent
provide at least some qualitative commentary on open-ended questions,
while Likert scale and yes/no questions were on average 97 percent
complete.
For purposes of comparison, I examine another 40 surveys completed
by Manitoba welfare recipients and 98 surveys completed by nonrecipient
"controls" from various small Manitoba towns. Nonparticipants
are a stratified random sample, rather than a fully random sample. This
means that they consist of families whose income falls into a range
where, in Dauphin, they could have been eligible for Mincome. This
allows for a partial control of class differences. The two comparison
surveys are virtually identical to the Mincome survey, substituting the
word "welfare" for "Mincome" or skipping questions
altogether where inappropriate.
The survey queries participants on time-use, difficulties with
various community members, experiences with Mincome's bureaucracy,
embarrassment related to being on Mincome, and comparisons of Mincome
and welfare. Data are held by the Library and Archives Canada. (7) The
surveys were photographed and transcribed into digital format. Rating
scale, multiple-choice, and yes/no questions (shown in Figures a
preexisting coding scheme, and percentage frequencies are presented on
the basis of original answer categories (i.e., yes, no, don't know,
only if necessary). In some cases, I report only one central answer
category in order to coherently present multiple question items in a
single figure (i.e., respondents saying "yes" or
"none"). In other figures, I combine answer categories (i.e.,
"occasionally," "often," and "always")
when the grouping scheme captures most of the category-by-category
variation. In cases of lists of similar items, I group persons who
report that they have experienced at least one item in the list (i.e., a
list of community positions) or answer yes to at least one in a set of
similar questions (i.e., credit-related questions). The survey's
open-ended questions (shown in Tables 1, 2, and 4) were inductively
coded into answer categories in two steps, following Corbin and Strauss
(2007) and Charmaz (2014). Line-by-line coding linked provisional
categories to fit the data. Next, "axial" or
"focused" coding involved a category-by-category examination.
Here categories were identified relative to each other, and certain
codes were identified as either core or provisional, where the latter
were subsumed into the former. (8)
WHY DID PEOPLE PARTICIPATE IN MINCOME?
Understanding people's motives to join Mincome sheds light on
its social meaning. As shown in Table 1, almost half of the respondents
said they joined for the "money." Quite simply, they needed
help. These answers varied from "I was financially desperate"
to "... it gives us the chance to pay a few bills ..."
Under the broad rationale of "money," Table 1
demonstrates a good amount of heterogeneity in people's
circumstances. Some families saw Mincome money as risk reduction, some
viewed it as supplementing insufficient incomes, and others saw it as
their only access to a standard of living. However, as an answer to why
a family would join Mincome, "money" obscures as much as it
reveals. Welfare also provided money, but was universally disliked.
Thus, money is a proximate cause and self-evident answer, but alone it
does not expose why money is needed or the conditions under which it can
be accepted. Beyond this undeniable material rationale for joining a GAI
program, there were a wide variety of other material factors offered,
including "insurance," disability {[John] had broken leg and
we needed help), unemployment {shortage of jobs), help in accessing
education {we have a chance to improve our educational level in order to
improve our income), and providing care for families {to look after
children while in school).
Putting "money" to the side, the modal
"material" response refers to insurance or security, and
typically refers to possible health problems--"to back up my
financial state in case of sickness"--or possible income
loss--"when I'm not working or let off it's nice to know
you can get help from Mincome for when you need it." One
participant joined Mincome because she was "uncertain of [her]
husband's earning abilities for [the] winter months as seasons
sometimes affects his earnings." A 50-year-old single woman joined
Mincome "for security in the event I lost my job for any
reason." She wrote, "... as long as I can work for a decent
wage I will do so. However it is nice to know that Mincome is available
to me if I ever need it ... I consider Mincome as an experiment which I
am taking part in, even though I don't know if I will ever need it.
I may want it someday."
The above quote emphasizes material circumstances, but provides an
additional key to the "ideological" aspects of Mincome's
reception. As Table 2 shows, the modal ideological response related to
"helping" the experiment. In fact, this response was more
common than the "security" rationale. One participant joined
"to contribute to the success of the program." Another joined
"in order to aid in an adequate cross-reference of the
community." The third cited "statistics regarding guaranteed
income, might help in studies."
It is necessary here to describe the portrayal of the guaranteed
income by Mincome and provincial officials. In the months before the
start of the program, potential participants received a short letter
from Canada's minister of Health and Welfare inviting families to
join the experiment. The letter refers to Mincome as "an
experiment" designed "to assist in our efforts to improve
Canada's social security system." It closes by stating,
"I consider that your participation will contribute substantially
to its success." The language used in press releases between 1971
and 1974 and additional letters from the Manitoba government were
virtually identical. One letter explained that the purpose of the
project is to "collect information" on a "representative
cross-section" of Manitobans. Finally, before joining, participants
read the same seven-page booklet introducing the Mincome experiment. On
the first page, it asks, "Why is a test necessary?" The
pamphlet explains:
... a Basic Annual Income would be an efficient way of making sure
that all Canadians have a reasonable and secure income, including
those who are working. But both governments felt that more advance
information was needed about what would happen if such a program
came into being. To test this, a small-scale study has been set up.
This framing by Mincome staff and both levels of government is
clearly reflected in the majority of contemporaneous articles and
editorials in the town's main newspaper, the Dauphin Herald. The
earliest reporting on the experiment began with four major articles in
1973. The themes considered were often technical, mirroring the language
of Mincome staff and government press releases. The articles discuss the
scientific nature of the experiment, the economic survey of the area,
the "computer" analysis to be used, the payments procedure,
and other details of the project's operation. In 1974, the year
running up to the experiment, there were 16 articles and editorials
about Mincome, typically emphasizing the scientific and experimental
nature of the project. Some highlight specific scientific developments
that Mincome will employ ("New computer techniques aid
Mincome," Dauphin Herald 1974c). Other articles discuss aspects of
the research design ("Mincome moves to its second phase,"
Dauphin Herald 1974b) or how Dauphin was selected ("Dauphin
considered best for Mincome experiment," Dauphin Herald 1974a). By
the end of the program, the paper's reporting had shifted emphasis
to the minutiae of daily operations, though it maintained its initial
framing ("Mincome, firstly, just an experiment," Dauphin
Herald 1978a). The only piece of explicitly negative reporting published
came out in 1978, after operations concluded ("Mincome no cure
all--Ritchie," Dauphin Herald 1978b).
Mincome planners framed the project as a "test" of a
program intended to help "all Canadians." Local coverage
reinforced this portrayal. Participants commonly accepted this frame,
interpreting participation as aid in research rather than accepting
public assistance. One participant had the following to say: "Have
always been a firm believer that surveys and statistical data are a
necessary program of our daily lives."
Although some of the "ideological" responses directly
reflect the framing of the project, others appear at first glance to be
so diverse as to be indecipherable. Some participants were simply
"curious" about the program, others joined because they were
"asked." One man joined for "no special reason. Wanted to
see what it was about." Another wrote, "It sounded like an
interesting experiment ... The sociological booklets were
fascinating." What the majority has in common--and what is absent
from responses of welfare recipients--is their banality. The portrayal
of Mincome--its framing as a "test ... to improve the income
security of Canadians"--provided a kind of ideological cover for
would-be participants. Mincome's relatively unstigmatizing social
meaning allowed recipients to evade the typical representations of
public assistance receipt. In fact, many happily neglected any mention
of actual or potential material benefits.
Mincome's portrayal facilitated a variety of casual and even
evasive seeming answers, never found among welfare recipients. When
asked why he joined Mincome, one participant claimed he "never
really thought about it before." This I argue is a consequence of
the program's social meaning. Only if a program is generally
perceived as nonstigmatizing will people join out of such prosaic
motives. Meanwhile, it is desperation, not curiosity, that typically
motivates participation in welfare.
Mincome allowed for a variety of personal justifications for
joining. Indeed, the lack of participation rules made it easier to find
socially legitimate reasons to join. Its flexibility in responding to
diverse social needs, working-class needs, the needs of the poor, people
at different life stages, and people facing various kinds of
uncertainty, bears on its appeal. That appeal, however, is also a
product of its portrayal. Its framing as an experimental, universalistic
program may have made participation easier. It provided leeway to
contrive morally acceptable reasons for participation. A program's
framing is critical even if a universalistic and nonstigmatizing
portrayal will consolidate more easily on a program whose technical
apparatus is somewhat flexible and inclusive. The interactions between a
program's framing and its basic design features are subtle;
although the Manitoba government attempted to frame the welfare system
in a positive light in the 1970s (Barber 1972; Manitoba 1972), the
underlying design may have made it less amenable to positive frames. I
pick up the issue of design in the next section, and compare the program
features of Mincome to those of welfare, in order to understand how they
affect the moral reception of the two programs.
THE STIGMA OF WELFARE, THE NORMALCY OF MINCOME
A combination of elements allowed residents, even ones with largely
negative attitudes toward social assistance, to comfortably participate
in Mincome. As shown in Figure 2, only a small minority (6 percent) of
Mincome participants reported willingness to join welfare (if it would
improve their incomes). The vast majority either refused or would only
join if necessary. By contrast, welfare participants were overwhelmingly
willing (70 percent) to join Mincome. Nonparticipating rural Manitobans
were also far more likely to consider joining Mincome (42 percent) than
welfare (5 percent).
[FIGURE 2 OMITTED]
Participant accounts reinforce the notion that these programs were
perceived quite differently. One 34-year-old married man joined Mincome
because he "needed extra money." Yet, he eschewed welfare,
saying, "I'll suffer instead." What explains this widely
divergent reception? What made Mincome more socially acceptable than
welfare? This section describes survey data in percentage frequency
graphs and then participant accounts to establish and explain perceived
differences between Mincome and welfare, and locate the sources of
social stigma.
However, before examining these survey data, it is important to
look at differences among our three comparison groups--Mincome
participants, welfare participants, and nonparticipant controls--in
order to appropriately interpret the data. Table 3 provides descriptive
statistics on familial status, presence of young children, age, and
education across groups at a "baseline" interview before the
experiment. Comparing the welfare and Mincome groups, the former has a
much higher portion of singles, and of those singles, the welfare groups
has a higher portion of single parents. The welfare group is also older
on average, somewhat more likely to have children under six, and much
less likely to have a high school graduate in the household. Table 3
shows differences between Mincome and Manitoba community nonparticipant
groups as well: nonparticipants include more married couples, fewer
single parents, more families with young children, and more families
with a high school graduate head. My discussion of the figures in the
next section attempts to take account of these demographic differences,
and provide interpretation in light of them. For example, to improve
comparability to the welfare group, where possible and most relevant I
include additional comparisons to Mincome participants with experience
in the welfare system in the two years prior to the experiment.
Moreover, in comparing the Mincome participants and community
nonparticipants I note that similarities in the figures below are
particularly suggestive in light of the baseline demographic
differences; similarities in outcomes between a more privileged and a
less privileged group only strengthen the suggestion of a community
effect.
Community Experiences and Social Stigma
Part of the argument in favor of broadly inclusive programs
suggests that they reduce the barriers to community building and, at
minimum, avoid exacerbating the potential social isolation of
participants. Below I describe evidence on social stigma and community
experience bearing on these hypotheses.
The community survey inquires into time-use, in order to discern
the extent to which people's spare time is spent alone or in social
contexts. Mincome participants and nonparticipating community members
were less likely than welfare participants to report spending no spare
time with friends, neighbors, relatives, or workmates (Figure 3). Both
groups were also less likely to spend time at home (Figure 4A) and more
likely to spend time at other people's homes (Figure 4B) than
welfare participants. More interesting than the divergence with welfare
recipients is that Mincome participants tend to have time-use patterns
not unlike Manitoban nonparticipating community members, a group with
higher average socioeconomic status. This suggests that one could
participate in Mincome without forfeiting certain community experiences.
Mincome may have escaped the strain and tension in the community
commonly accompanying welfare receipt. Mincome participants (98 percent)
were more likely than welfare participants (72 percent) to
"never" attribute any community difficulties to program
participation (Figure 5A). Mincome participants (92 percent) were also
more likely than welfare participants (65 percent) to report
"never" feeling embarrassed or uncomfortable when they were
with people not on the same program (Figure 5B). Note that Figure 5A and
5B (and onward through Figure 9) includes additional comparisons with
Mincome participants who have prior welfare experience. This group
provides a useful contrast, as they are more likely to have social and
class positions in common with welfare participants.
[FIGURE 3 OMITTED]
[FIGURE 4 OMITTED]
[FIGURE 5 OMITTED]
Another indicator of community participation concerns people's
interactions with banks and various community members. As shown in
Figure 6A, welfare participants (18 percent) were most likely to
experience one or more credit-related difficulty, community
nonparticipants (12 percent) less so, and interestingly, Mincome
participants (8 percent) were the least likely to experience these
problems. Mincome may have led to interactions with creditors that were
more positive than the norm. Dauphin banks may have seen Mincome as a
source of economic stability for participants; an increased confidence
of repayment on the part of banks might have increased the availability
of credit. Roughly similar patterns are found regarding community
difficulties participants attributed to their income (Figure 6B).
With respect to landlord-related difficulties (Figure 7A) and
difficulties with other community authorities (Figure 7B), Mincome
participants tend to report community experiences that are much the same
as those of nonparticipant controls. Similarly, Mincome participants and
community nonparticipants were equally likely, and more likely than
welfare participants to have held positions in at least one community
group (Figure 8). Finally, welfare participants are twice as likely as
Mincome participants to admit that they have attempted to hide
participation from workmates, friends, or stores (Figure 9).
[FIGURE 6 OMITTED]
[FIGURE 7 OMITTED]
Figure 6 onward includes additional comparisons with Mincome
participants who have prior welfare experience. In some cases, in
particular some data points in Figure 9, this comparison weakens the
overall argument. However, more often than not the comparison with this
subgroup strengthens the argument due to subgroup results that are
similar to results in the full Mincome sample. In all cases, it is hard
to argue that Mincome led to difficulties in the community in the way
that welfare did. In large part it appears that Mincome participation
was compatible with community experiences not unlike those experienced
by nonparticipating Manitobans. This is particularly striking given the
more "mainstream" demographic characteristics of the community
group. Absent the experimental treatment, theory would predict this
group to be less socially isolated and less stigmatized. Below, I
develop these findings with qualitative accounts.
[FIGURE 8 OMITTED]
[FIGURE 9 OMITTED]
Moralist on Welfare, Pragmatist on Mincome
Mincome participants who would not accept traditional social
assistance sometimes explicitly and more often implicitly argued that
the latter was stigmatizing. This did not mean that people did not need
assistance. However, accepting aid only became possible when stigma was
reduced: one man declined welfare, simply citing "status," but
joined Mincome for "extra income." A woman refused to join
welfare because "It would make me feel bad and think people may be
laughing at me." She joined Mincome "to help along with the
expenses." This subsection describes the consistently divergent
personal assessments shown in Table 4.
In the qualitative accounts of welfare participants, consciousness
of social stigma and its psychological cost was overwhelming. Various
studies have shown that welfare participants often share society's
negative attitudes toward them (Bullock 1999; Canada 1971b; Rainwater
1982). This is consistent with the 43 welfare participants in my sample.
One welfare participant wrote, "I dislike welfare, it is degrading
... Surely we are entitled to live in dignity." Another wrote,
"You never know what your proper place in [the] community is, as
some people think you seem to be inferior to them."
Among Mincome participants' accounts, it was common for
individuals who took strong moralistic positions against welfare to view
Mincome in pragmatic terms. One man opposed welfare stating,
"Welfare should be used only for those who require it not abused by
those who really don't need it." Regarding Mincome however, he
wrote that, "Extra income really helps when one gets it
today."
It was not uncommon to view traditional social assistance as a
program exclusively for people who were ill, disabled, "lazy,"
or in some sense marginal: "Welfare is only for needy or
bums." The welfare system aggravated distinctions between people
falling into different social categories. One man wrote, "I feel
that [welfare] is more for disabled or people which are too lazy to
work. It doesn't include us, we're both able and willing to
work but can't get a job due to the low employment rate." They
joined Mincome simply because they were "short of money."
Where it was easy to distance oneself from welfare recipients, Mincome
was not tarnished as a program for specific kinds of people. No
equivalent linkages are made between the program and particular,
undeserving groups. Rather, Mincome was practical support. As a
practical program, participation was less likely to signal a
person's moral worth.
Consistent with the discussion above, one could simultaneously view
welfare as stigmatizing and Mincome as an experiment, as an aid to
working people, and innocuous, more generally. "Other people abuse
families on welfare and talk about them," noted a woman who joined
Mincome "for the government experiment." A man who would not
join welfare because "it makes a bad image on the family,"
joined Mincome "... to take part in the Mincome experiment."
Participants want to retain their dignity and are open to a form of
social assistance program that has been reframed. When families are
asked to help, when their information is seen as valuable, it becomes
easier to join. A man who avoided welfare citing "pride,"
joined Mincome because he was "asked to." Another refused
welfare stating, "I wouldn't want to destroy my dignity and
pride." He joined Mincome because "Mincome picked our name and
asked us to be on the program."
Not all participants viewed Mincome as destigmatizing. At least
four participants expressed explicit concern that Dauphinites might take
"advantage" of Mincome. However, even these comments are
contradictory, typically blending criticism with positive assessments.
On the other side, some participants explicitly state that social stigma
was reduced under Mincome: "It trusts the Canadian people and
leaves a man or woman, their pride." One woman concluded,
"Mincome seems more normal than welfare."
Though welfare was a normal part of everyday life, Mincome might
have treated participants as "normal" people. Just after the
midpoint of the program the director of Mincome told the Dauphin Herald
that Mincome "appears to have become a natural part of the
community" ("Mincome payments made as usual," Dauphin
Herald 1976). One woman reported that she had "always been put at
ease" with interactions with Mincome staff. Some comments indicate
that Mincome had a mainstream character. One man suggested that Mincome
enabled his family to live at standards acceptable in the community. He
joined "to give my family a regular living standard, more in line
with the people around us." Another man may have observed the
"normal" qualities of the program. He asked, "Will
everyone in Manitoba soon be on Mincome?"
The Terms of Welfare, the Flexibility of Mincome
This final subsection argues that the sources of Mincome's
normalcy described above are linked to design features that allowed
recipients to participate in the normal activities of daily life,
especially work life. Recipients were not separated out to be assigned
special sets of rules. In particular, Mincome maintained incomes without
revoking the autonomy and independence enjoyed by better-off residents.
Survey participants give a variety of reasons for refusing welfare,
but the biggest portion (see Table 4) emphasize their desire to work and
support themselves. The desire to avoid welfare is not surprising, but
people who refused welfare because they prefer to work--or more
poignantly, because they prefer to earn their own incomes--often joined
Mincome precisely to obtain additional income. "Welfare to me was
accepting something for nothing," said a man who joined Mincome
because it "would be a benefit to me at some time." One
participant who avoided welfare, stating "I am able to support
myself," joined Mincome because "I might get some
assistance." A 22-year-old single man who refused welfare because
"I'm healthy and can be self-sufficient I feel" joined
Mincome because "it provided one with enough income to live
sufficiently." Working allowed him to feel
"self-sufficient," but Mincome allowed him to "live
sufficiently." Another welfare refuser said he "felt better
earning his own income," yet he noted that Mincome's
"added income" was "perhaps [the] best feature!" One
man refused welfare on moral grounds, saying "I believe if a person
is capable of working he should work instead of accepting charity";
he joined Mincome with his family for pragmatic reasons: "to
receive enough money to meet our needs."
It was not uncommon for people who wish to earn a living on their
own to simultaneously collect Mincome payments comfortably. Participants
appreciate the feeling of independence that comes from
"earning" a living, but often cannot earn sufficient
employment income. Work provided a sense of autonomy, Mincome helped
people actually achieve a decent standard of living. It could be
integrated into an already existing moral code of self-sufficiency and
meritocracy. When income maintenance policies required recipients to
violate mainstream values around work and autonomy, they were morally
unacceptable; when they sidestep confrontation with a mainstream work
ethic they were paid little heed.
The absence of regulation around the work lives of individuals
stands out as a key part of "feeling independent."
Mincome's smooth integration into work life and the sense of
autonomy it facilitated was a key feature separating it from the social
meaning of welfare. In one case, inclusion into the normal habits of
daily work life was possible, in the other, exclusion from mainstream
activities and special treatment was the rule. Mincome allowed
participants to retain a mainstream ideology of meritocracy. They were
not forced to question their place within broad community norms.
Beyond the regulation of work, there are myriad complaints about
the stipulations and conditions of welfare, which single out recipients.
Many of these conditions involve invasive and degrading procedures that
combine to nurture a pervasive sense of indignity. As Reich (1963) once
noted, welfare administrators exercise their discretionary power
"to impose standards of morality [on welfare recipients that are]
not imposed on the rest of the community" (p. 1359). More recent
analyses of welfare administration reveal the endurance of these
dynamics over time (Chunn and Gavigan 2004; Herd, Mitchell and Lightman
2005; Little and Morrison 1999).
Likewise, Mincome participants often object to the basic fact of
caseworker discretion. One former welfare recipient compared
Mincome's automatic delivery and flexibility to welfare's
conditionality:
It helps the below the average earning without having to go through
doctors etc. You can live where you want to. You can spend your
money when you need to and save for the next month when more will
be needed ... People feel more secure knowing that if they need
help it is there.
Another participant refused welfare reporting, "Welfare is
more uncertain. Workers are rude, incompetent." She joined Mincome
simply "for the money." She continued: "Mincome people
seem very considerate ... I like Mincome in that one is left alone,
never harassed or made to feel like you had to crawl to receive an
almighty dollar. I don't like the idea that it is intended to end
shortly, with nothing to replace it but that same lousy welfare."
The contrasting terms of welfare are stark. One welfare participant
wrote, "The thing I don't like is practically having to beg
for ... extra money for expenses and the idea that if they don't
like your attitude you can be cut off. This can be a very strong weapon
in some of the workers hands and creates bad feelings between people as
it seems to make some of them adopt a very snotty attitude towards
people unfortunate enough to be on welfare."
The assessment of welfare caseworkers as "rude" and
Mincome staff as "friendly," "nice," and "super
people" is a product of design details as much as anything else.
Welfare workers were tasked with home visits where various criteria,
much open to personal discretion, are used to determine continued
eligibility. By contrast, Mincome was relatively hands-off; the most
sustained interaction with Mincome staff came during interviews, which
were unrelated to actual payments. As emphasized in Figure 1 above the
absence of design features that treat one group of people in a separate
fashion and the substitution of automatic procedures for case-by-case
determination produces social policy less conducive to the emergence of
stigma.
CONCLUSION: BENEFITS WITHOUT BARRIERS
Though Mincome produced fewer solid conclusions than it should
have, the old questions of stigma and social inclusion are germane to a
full consideration of the lessons to be learned from the experiment.
Mincome bore a familial resemblance to welfare. It disproportionately
directed benefits to the poor, and retained distinctions between Mincome
recipients and nonrecipients. However, participants and other Manitobans
saw it as distinctly different from welfare, as a program providing
assistance without also imposing the costs of stigma.
The importance of the moral aspects of social policy should not be
underestimated. The most successful antipoverty effort over the past
century in North America, the growth in social insurance for the elderly
(Campbell 2003; Myles 2000), was effective in part because the elderly
are seen as morally deserving (Pettersen 1995; van Oorschot 2000, 2006).
Eliminating social stigma is important for its own sake; Rawls (2009)
argued that "self-respect and a sure confidence in the sense of
one's own worth is perhaps the most important primary good"
(p. 348). But it is also important for instrumental reasons: if
antipoverty tools are to be socially reproducible, if they are to
provide a base from which to mobilize for broader reforms, they must
consider the moral reasoning they foster.
Mincome did not single out groups to be treated in a manner that
accentuated their separation from others. Participants avoided the
special treatment of having their work and personal lives monitored and
regulated. It did not force participants to transgress mainstream norms
around work and meritocracy. Participants were treated, in sum, like
"all Canadians," and the program's portrayal reinforced
this image. As a consequence, the community's reception was
pragmatic, not moralistic. For these interacting reasons, Mincome
appeared "normal" in the eyes of participants. The bright line
dividing the deserving and undeserving poor turned fuzzy. The seeds of
Rawls' (2009:54) "social bases of self-respect" were
planted. (9)
If part of Mincome's positive reception can be attributed to
its framing, a contemporary variant might be equally compatible with a
variety of positive portrayals. In an age of precarity (Kalleberg 2009;
Standing 2011), a modern guaranteed income may make common cause with a
range of groups if portrayed as "insecurity insurance" or
"low-income insurance" (Hacker, Rehm, and Schlesinger 2013;
Paskov and Koster 2014). Pitched in these terms the guaranteed income
may be understood as a collective resource, one that benefits even those
people not drawing net benefits at any given moment (Sjoberg 2010).
These considerations take it for granted that political feasibility is
as significant as economic feasibility in the evaluation of income
maintenance policy. If desirable social arrangements are to be robust,
the political impact of their design details and framing ought to be at
the fore of discussions of the social reproduction of social policy.
Welfare systems in the United States and Canada have changed in
important ways since the 1970s. Apart from the shift to
"workfare" (Bashevkin 2002; Danziger 2010; Peck 2001), and
increasing barriers to eligibility (Kneebone and White 2009), some of
the most extreme intrusions into people's lives have been relaxed
(Boychuk 1998; Caputo 2011; Gustafson 2012). Yet the distinction between
the deserving and undeserving poor persists. The moral regulation of the
poor is an enduring feature of social assistance (Chunn and Gavigan
2004; Gazso 2012; Little and Marks 2006). One qualitative study of
female social assistance recipients' experiences with the welfare
system in Canada found that recipients "said they were belittled,
abused and treated as file numbers, and 'non-persons'"
(Reid 2009:135). Recent evaluations (Neysmith, Bezanson and
O'Connell 2005; Wallace, Klein, and Reitsma-Street 2006) conclude
that the social assistance system continues to be marked by deep social
stigmatization. In some cases there is evidence that the
"micro-regulation" of job search intentions and personal
behavior has expanded in the wake of welfare reform in the 1990s (Herd
et al. 2005). Social policies that destigmatize, ones that blur the
boundaries between the deserving and undeserving poor, remain as
relevant as ever.
Amartya Sen (2000) often refers to Adam Smith's conception of
deprivation as the inability to appear in public without shame. By
reducing social stigma, the guaranteed income helps achieve this object.
The question of whether a guaranteed income can actually enhance social
solidarity among poor and working people is harder to argue
persuasively. It achieves this end, in part, insofar as it provides
benefits without erecting barriers to social inclusion. By obscuring the
distinctions among low-wage workers, unemployed workers, and social
assistance recipients, universalistic income maintenance programs may
reduce the barriers to communication between otherwise separated people.
This does not quite equal the active nurturing of social solidarity, but
avoiding its obstruction is a meritorious goal nonetheless.
DAVID CALNITSKY
University of Wisconsin-Madison
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This work was supported by the National Science Foundation
(1333623) and Institute for Research on Poverty. I would like to thank
Ryan Courchene, David Horky, and, especially, David Cuthbert for
assistance navigating the Mincome accession at the Library and Archives
Canada. The survey referenced herein and other archival documents cited
are held at Library and Archives Canada (Winnipeg, MB); Department of
Health fonds including the former Department of National Health and
Welfare fonds, RG 29; and Policy, Planning and Information Branch
sous-fonds, branch accession number 2004-01167-X, "Operational
Files of Manitoba Basic Annual Income Project (Mincome)." Thanks
are also due to Stewart Deyell, Sabrina Kinsella, and the production
team at Statistics Canada for assistance in data construction and to
Evelyn Forget, Erik Olin Wright, Robert Freeland, Sarah Halpern-Meekin,
Tatiana Alfonso, Pilar Gonalons-Pons, Jonathan Latner, Aliza Luft, and
Madeleine Ritts for helpful comments on earlier drafts.
David Calnitsky, Department of Sociology, University of
Wisconsin-Madison, 1180 Observatory Drive, Madison, WI 53706. E-mail:
calnitsky@wisc.edu
(1.) Social consequences were often condensed into chapters
covering "Noneconomic Outcomes" (Hannan 1978),
"Non-labor-supply-responses" (Hanushek 1987), or
"Non-labor Supply Experimental Responses" (Rossi and Lyall
1976). However, final reports for the U.S. experiments did include
chapters reporting some small social psychological effects (Ladinsky and
Wells 1977; Middleton and Allen 1977).
(2.) I use the terms "welfare" and social assistance
interchangeably.
(3.) For summaries of the observational and experimental evidence
on the complex relationship between material interests and moral
sentiments, see papers in Gintis et al. (2006).
(4.) There is some ambiguity around these dates; while payments
were made between December 1974 and December 1977, Mincome staff began
interviewing families before this period and remained in place for some
time after.
(5.) Though no analysis of the Dauphin portion of Mincome was
completed in the wake of the experiment, recently Evelyn Forget (2011)
has renewed public interest in the Dauphin sample. Using Manitoba Health
data, Forget showed that relative to controls Dauphinites saw a
reduction in hospitalization rates during the Mincome years.
(6.) All figures are reported in 2014 constant dollars.
(7.) At the conclusion of the Mincome program, some of the
longitudinal survey data were collected into several data sets, used for
the handful of academic papers published on Mincome in the 1980s and
1990s (i.e., Hum and Choudhry 1992; Hum and Simpson 1993; Prescott,
Swidinsky, and Wilton 1986; Simpson and Hum 1991). However, due to
limited resources it was decided that most survey data would be
digitized for the Winnipeg site rather than the Dauphin and Manitoba
sites. In the wake of the experiment, the remaining raw data were left
somewhat unorganized and without a finding guide, until being organized
recently by Archives Canada.
(8.) Since people sometimes make multiple comments, some answers
are given more than one code.
(9.) Although these seeds may have been planted, it is possible
that the complete eradication of social stigma--in particular, the
stigma linked to "able-bodied" people outside the labor
market--is incompatible with robust, sustainable capitalist labor
markets. The conjecture here is that without stigmatizing those outside
the labor market, without making the alternative to work painful,
capitalists lose their negotiating power over those currently at work,
and this in turn makes the game of capitalism far less sustainable or
impossible over time. If this asymmetry in negotiating power is indeed
truly necessary to the social reproduction of capitalism, then one could
speculate that in a capitalist world with a generous guaranteed income,
the power of "the sack" (Kalecki 1943) comes not from the
deprivations of unemployment, but from the lingering pain of social
stigma. Differently put: if one accepts a functionalist explanation of
unemployment under capitalism (see debates in Berger and Offe 1982;
Cohen 1982; Elster 1982; van Parijs 1982), then "unemployment as
social stigma" may achieve the same functionality once achieved by
"unemployment as poverty," now off the table.
Table 1
"Material" Reasons to Join Mincome
Sample responses to question 1 ("Indicate the main reason why you
decided to go on the Mincome program") by "materialist" theme
Coding
category N Percentage Samples
Money/ 143 44 "For the money."
assistance "Need more income with the cost of
living now."
"I was not making enough wages."
"Business wasn't going good."
"Need more income with the cost
of living now."
"I needed more help to support the
boys."
"I was financially desperate."
"Didn't want to live off my
parents."
"No other income and found it very
successful and a very great deal
of help to my family."
"Thought that the little bit would
help a lot."
"Because it makes up for what you
don't earn."
"To make it easier for me to
support my family."
"To give my family a regular
living standard, more in line
with the people around us."
Security/ 20 6 "We don't receive any payments. I
if unable am self-employed and if I ever
to work/in did become ill, Mincome would
case of probably be paid to my family
illness and I."
"For security in the event I lost
my job for any reason ... I have
no wish to live without working
for my pay, and as long as I can
work for a decent wage I will do
so. However it is nice to know
that Mincome is available to me
if I ever need it ... I consider
"Mincome as an experiment which I
am taking part in, even though I
don't know if I will ever need
it. I may want it someday."
"Uncertain of husband's earning
abilities for [the] winter
months as seasons sometimes
affects his earnings.... If one
loses a job (or illness) I feel
Mincome gives families a little
more security and helps remove
some extra fears."
"Because if I ever got laid off
I could live."
"If for some reason I was unable
to work for a short while, I
would have a small income, until
I was able to work again."
"When I'm not working or let off
its nice to know you can get
help from Mincome for when you
need it."
"To back up my financial state
in case of sickness."
"Security reasons ... people
feel more secure knowing that if
they need help it is there."
"It gives me a good security
feeling in case I can't work....
All I can say [is] it is a
very good program. It certainly
helped me a great deal in fact
an awful lot when I lost my
husband for which I am very
grateful and I thank you."
"It helped me very much during
winter months when work was not
too plentiful.... I don't have
anything against Mincome. I
think it's a very good
program.... It has helped
me very much."
"It would be a guaranteed income
if anything happened to my
husband and he was unable to
work."
"I was on Mincome for three
months when it started ... I
think Mincome is good to people
who are in need of it, as long
as people do not take advantage
of it. When I was on Mincome two
years ago I was on a low wage
bracket and I needed it ... When
I got a better income I did not
file anymore even though
sometimes we could of used it."
Could not 12 4 "Shortage of jobs and my husband
find work was on the program."
"No permanent job when Mincome
was introduced."
"Lack of jobs."
"No work at the time, no income."
"I was pregnant and couldn't get
a job."
Could not 12 4 "We had no other choice as my
work/ husband is disabled and with my
disabled/ health and age, I am not able to
ill/ work full time ... If it wasn't
elderly for Mincome, I don't know how we
would survive as there would be
no income whatsoever."
"[John] had broken leg and we
needed help."
"From this stage on I believe I
can't work much longer if any.
Also I'm being laid off as my
employer too is going out of
business."
"We had no other choice as my
husband is disabled and with my
health and age, I am not able to
work full time."
"I felt it would help our
situation, and invalid husband
with no income."
To help 8 2 "My children were young and I felt
care for I was needed at home."
family "I wasn't eligible for welfare
and had to support my son
somehow."
"I have a child to take care of
and didn't want to go on welfare
... I don't really believe in
welfare."
"Spend a year at home with my
children."
"To look after children while in
school."
"Mincome did not provide "enough
money to look after myself and 2
children. I still have 2 years
left at University and it's
rather a hard row to be when
you're as poor as I am at this
point."
Help to go 7 2 "We have a chance to improve our
to school educational level in order to
improve our income."
"Mincome has helped a lot to
provide for my family and since
my husband is a student it was a
comfort to have the monthly
cheque to look forward to."
Better 3 1 "Husband was going to school."
than "Because [it offered] more
welfare independence with money
than welfare."
Total 322 "Welfare was unreasonable with
(Tables me."
1 and 2)
Table 2
"Ideological" Reasons to Join Mincome
Sample responses to question 1 ("Indicate the main reason why you
Decided to go on the Mincome program") by "ideological" theme
Coding
category N Percentage Samples
To help 39 12 "To contribute to the success
with of the program."
research/ "To help the program along."
project "Help in research."
"To help the government get
information."
"For the benefit of the government
study program."
"In order to aid in an adequate
cross-reference of the
community."
"Statistics regarding guaranteed
income, might help in studies."
"I feel they need all the help
they can get if the programme
is to succeed."
"Have always been a firm believer
that surveys and statistical
data are a necessary program
of our daily lives."
"If and when the total statistics
are formulated I would
appreciate a copy so that I
may continue a study on the
relationship of families on
Mincome and school performance."
We were 25 8 "Asked to."
asked "I was asked to and volunteered
to go on."
"Was asked to participate."
"Was approached by an
interviewer."
"I was asked to and volunteered
to go on."
"We were asked and we accepted."
"Mincome picked our name and asked
us to be on the program."
"No particular reason. Was just
asked and continued."
Curious/ 15 5 "No special reason. Wanted
wanted to to see what it was about."
see what "Thought it would be an
it was interesting experience."
about "See what it was all about."
"It sounded like an interesting
experiment ... The sociological
booklets were fascinating--we
thoroughly enjoyed them."
"Tried to find out how it works
out."
Curiosity.
Thought it 14 4 "Because I think it's good for
was a good the country-help the economy."
program/ "Because I think it is good for
helpful Canada."
for people "Decided to as I felt it was for
the cause."
"To contribute to the success of
the program."
"Because of the Dauphin
involvement and need of
an balanced program."
"[It is] an approach for some
form of betterment."
Because 11 3 "Everybody else was."
family/ "Just to be in it like others."
friends/ Husband: "My wife and mother-in-
others law both talked me into it."
were on it Wife: "My mother is on it and
has helped her considerably
and we also needed help."
"Friends told us about it."
Other 17 5 "Don't know why."
"No reason."
"I don't remember."
"Never really thought about
it before."
Total 322
(Tables
1 and 2)
Table 3
Descriptive Statistics at Baseline Interview
Manitoba community
nonparticipants
(N = 56
households)
Baseline characteristics N Percentage
Familial status
Married 43 76.8
Single 7 12.5
Single parents 3 5.4
Missing 6 10.7
Young children
No children under six 28 50.0
Any children under six 22 39.3
Missing 6 10.7
Age of individual heads
Mean age of male head 39.05 (N = 44)
Mean age of female head 35.65 (N = 49)
Education
No high school grad, in household 31 55.4
High school grad, (at least one head) 18 32.1
Missing or NA (i.e., under 21) 7 12.5
Dauphin
(N = 265
households)
Baseline characteristics N Percentage
Familial status
Married 156 58.9
Single 89 33.6
Single parents 42 15.9
Missing 20 7.6
Young children
No children under six 133 50.2
Any children under six 56 21.1
Missing 76 28.7
Age of individual heads
Mean age of male head 41.23 (N = 181)
Mean age of female head 38.00 (N = 223)
Education
No high school grad, in household 130 49.1
High school grad, (at least one head) 48 18.1
Missing or NA (i.e., under 21) 87 32.8
MB Welfare
(IV = 36
households)
Baseline characteristics N Percentage
Familial status
Married 8 22.2
Single 27 75.0
Single parents 19 52.8
Missing 1 2.8
Young children
No children under six 20 55.6
Any children under six 11 30.6
Missing 5 13.9
Age of individual heads
Mean age of male head 47.10 (N = 10)
Mean age of female head 43.00 (N = 33)
Education
No high school grad, in household 21 58.3
High school grad, (at least one head) 1 2.8
Missing or NA (i.e., under 21) 14 38.9
Notes: To generate this table, the community survey discussed in
this paper was merged with family ID numbers in "baseline" data on
participant families, available from Library and Archives Canada.
Missing data exist due to incomplete baseline information and
"walk-ins" (in Dauphin) during the first experimental months. In
order to fill in some missing data, I supplement the "baseline"
data with another data set containing information on actual
payments made. This fills in data on age and familial status when
missing in the baseline data but available in the payments data.
Supplementary payments data are unavailable for education and
children under six, and as such those items contain more missing
data. The observational unit in this table is the household rather
than the individual.
Table 4
Why Mincome Participants Would Not
Join Welfare; Why They Joined Mincome
Mincome participants who would NOT ... Corresponding
go on welfare (if it would improve subsample answers
their income), asked: "Why wouldn't (if available):
you?" "Why join
Mincome?"
Coding
category N Percentage Sample answers
Would 43 37 "Because I'd go ... "To back up my
rather crazy doing financial state
work/ nothing at home. in case of
support I feel more sickness etc."
myself useful working."
"I can make my own ... --
living."
"I would rather ... --
work if I could."
"I'd rather work ... "We were asked and
first." we accepted."
"I wouldn't go ... "I felt it would
on welfare help our
unless I was situation, and
extremely invalid husband
desperate. I with no income."
would like to
think of myself
as being
capable of
supporting
myself ... I
feel I could
find work
enough to keep
me off
welfare." She
joined Mincome
because "I felt
it would help
our situation,
and invalid
husband with no
income."
"Welfare to me ... "Would be a
was accepting benefit to me
something for at some time."
nothing."
"I am able to ... "I might get some
support myself." assistance."
"I'm healthy and ... "It provided one
can be self- with enough
sufficient income to live
I feel." sufficiently."
"Feel better ... "Statistics re:
earning own guaranteed
income." income might
help in studies
... added income
perhaps best
feature!"
"I believe if a ... "To receive enough
person is capable money to meet
of working he our needs."
should work
instead of
accepting
charity."
"I am capable of ... "Low income I
earning a living receive."
and feel no
reason to be
on welfare."
"Prefer to work for ... "To help in the
every dollar of survey."
income on my
own."
"I'm capable of ... "To help pay
working and I expenses that
believe every my salary did
able-bodied man not quite
should work." cover ... Being
on Mincome
helps to
stretch the pay
cheque a little
farther each
month. Which I
for one
appreciate."
Don't 19 16 "Don't need any." ... "No reason."
want to/ "There is no need ... "Test program."
need to to."
"Never would." ... "Short of money."
"No need of it." ... "Thought it was a
good program."
"Don't need welfare ... "As help when a
student and
for survey."
"I wouldn't." ... "Need more money
to make ends
meet."
"Because there ... "Because I think
is other ways it is good for
to make a Canada."
living. I went
along with
Mincome, since
I feel it's my
duty to Canada
to go along
with new social
programs."
"For myself, I ... "It helped me very
don't think I much during
would go on winter months
welfare." when work was
not too
plentiful."
The terms/ 14 12 "Welfare would take
conditions everything."
of welfare "Because we would ... "Because we mink
not have to forfeit ranch and the
acceptable all we own." money made from
mink ranch would
feed the mink
but not the
family."
"It is too long of ... "security
a story. I know reasons" ...
what it is to be "It helps the
on welfare and I below the
would never want average earning
to be on it without having
again." to go through
doctors etc.
You can live
where you want
to. You can
spend your
money when you
need to and
save for the
next month when
more will be
needed. There
are many more
things I think
Mincome is just
the thing for
the below the
average
earnings.
People feel
more secure
knowing that if
they need help
it is there. I
would need
pages to be
able to put
down why I
think Mincome
was a wonderful
way of helping
people out."
"Welfare is more ... "For the money"
uncertain. ... "Mincome
Workers are rude, people seem
incompetent, very
etc." considerate ...
I like Mincome
in that one is
left alone,
never harassed
or made to feel
like you had to
crawl to
receive an
almighty
dollar. I don't
like the idea
that it is
intended to end
shortly, with
nothing to
replace it but
that same lousy
welfare."
"Can't sit still." ... "For help."
"Because they are ... "No other income
too noisy and you and found it
always feel like very successful
they're watching and a very
you around the great deal of
corner." help to my
family."
"Because we were on ... "I don't know."
welfare when I
was at home and I
don't like the
way people treat
you."
The stigma 9 8 "Status." ... "Extra income."
of welfare "Pride." ... "Asked to."
not "I wouldn't want ... "Mincome picked
acceptable to destroy my our name and
dignity and asked us to be
pride." on the
program."
"It would make ... "To help along
me feel bad and with the
think people expenses."
may be laughing
at me."
"Other people ... "For government
abuse families experiment."
on welfare and
talk about
them."
"It makes a bad ... "I wanted to take
image on the part in the
family." Mincome
experiment."
"Because I have ... "Because I was
my pride. As approached and
long as I am thought it
able to work I would help the
will own my own average person
way." with my
information."
"Because we ... "I don't know."
were on welfare
when I was at
home and I
don't like the
way people
treat you."
"Because ... "We had no
Mincome seems other choice as
more normal my husband is
than welfare." disabled and
with my health
and age, I am
not able to
work full
time."
"I would like ... "Because of
to keep my cost of living
self-respect and to give my
which is lost family a
when on regular living
welfare." standard, more
in line with
the people
around us."
Welfare 9 8 "Welfare is only ... "Extra income."
is for for needy or
other bums."
people "Welfare is for ... "Why not?"
people not able
to work."
"I feel that ... "Short of money
[welfare] is to be able to
more for survive."
disabled or
people which
are too lazy to
work. It
doesn't include
us, we're both
able and
willing to work
but can't get a
job due to the
low employment
rate."
"Welfare is for ... "Research
people who assistance."
can't work. I'm
able to
work-even if
it's not
exactly the
type of work I
may prefer."
"I feel that is ... "Short of money
more for to be able to
disabled or survive."
people which
are too lazy to
work. It
doesn't include
us, we're both
able and
willing to work
but can't get a
job due to the
low employment
rate."
"Welfare is for ... "It sounded
people who like it was a
can't work." little fairer
than
unemployment
insurance."
Don't 9 8 "I believe in ... "To help assess
believe self-help and a proper rate
in it don't see why of income to
people should help people who
receive money require same."
by not trying
to earn it on
their own."
"I believe in ... "I was asked to."
working for
your money."
"Because I will ... "It helps us a
just cheat the little bit in
government and our family
the people who expenses."
are paying
their taxes to
support the
welfare."
"Welfare should ... "Extra income
be used only really helps
for those who when one gets
require it not it today."
abused by those
who really
don't need it."
"I don't ... "We were
believe in it. interviewed
Unless a when they
person really started with
has to." it."
"Don't believe ... "Help the
in it. Would program. Needed
get a better money."
job if I had
to."
"I feel there ... "It sounded
are far too like good
many able insurance."
bodied people
on welfare
now who should
or could be
working."
"I don't really ... "I have a child
believe in to take care
welfare." of and didn't
want to go on
welfare."
Mincome 4 3 "Mincome is ... "Because I need
is better better." the money."
Other 9 8 "Like the ... "Didn't want to
income system live off my
better." parents."
"Somebody has "Test."
to pay for the
welfare in
taxes. If only
the needy
received
welfare it
would be
alright, but
there are a lot
of
freeloader..."
"I'll suffer ... "Needed extra
instead." money."
"Why should I." ... "No reason."
Total 116 "I just wouldn't." ... "I thought it
was a good
program."