Think tanks, funding, and the politics of policy knowledge in Canada.
McLevey, John
HOW FUNDING INFLUENCES knowledge production in think tanks has been
at the center of scholarly debate and public discourse since think tanks
first emerged on the American political and intellectual scenes. Money
is at the heart of how think tanks are classified by insiders and
outsiders, and is a common heuristic for judging credibility and broad
political "allegiances."
Knowledge of think tank funding has been shaped by pluralist,
elite, and, most recently, field theory. Each depicts think tanks, and
the environments they operate in, in fundamentally different ways.
Pluralists emphasize diversity of interests at the institutional and
organizational levels, often depicting think tanks as representatives of
many social groups competing over governance (Polsby 1983). Elite
theorists, on the other hand, see think tanks as tools for advancing the
interests of an integrated corporate-political elite (e.g., Domhoff
2010). In field theory, think tanks operate in complex environments
where they have to manage relationships with their more economically and
politically powerful sponsors (Medvetz 2012).
These theories have mostly been developed in the context of the
United States, where funding is dominated by private donations (Medvetz
2012; Rich 2004; Smith 1993). In other countries, think tanks rely less
on donations and more on the state, on collaborative (if often strained)
relationships with universities, and on foreign donors (on Canada, see
Abelson 2009; on transnational elite policy groups, see Carroll 2007;
Carroll and Carson 2003). Yet considering other countries has mostly led
researchers to loosen their restrictive definitions of "think
tank" (see cases in Stone and Denham 2004), rather than
systematically and empirically examine how the politics of policy
knowledge is shaped by different funding environments.
In this article, I begin by considering how the case of think tanks
differs from other research in the sociology of knowledge that addresses
funding and resources. I then outline elite, pluralist, and field
theories of think tanks and funding. I discuss predictions derived from
these theories, which I evaluate using data collected from the Canada
Revenue Agency (CRA) for 30 organizations over 11 years. I use
Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) to identify think tank funding
models, and Correspondence Analysis to map out the think tank funding
environment.
My findings provide only qualified support for predictions based on
elite and pluralist theories. Instead, in support of predictions based
on field theory, I find evidence that the think tank funding environment
is increasingly divided between centrists funded by the state, and
conservatives funded by private donors. Conservative think tanks have
been increasingly funded by private donors since 2005, while centrists
have turned toward self-generated revenue and interest and investments
to offset reduced support from the state. There is little evidence that
think tanks are the representatives of many interest groups or the tools
of an integrated corporate-policy elite. Rather, think tanks face
amplified versions of common organizational problems, such as resource
dependencies and conflicting institutional logics, in uncertain
environments with limited diversity. To raise funds, they promote
themselves as certain types of organizations that cater to types of
funders with shared interests.
LITERATURE AND THEORY
Funding in Knowledge Production
There is extensive research on funding and knowledge-production in
academic settings--for example, on intellectual reward structures (e.g.,
Merton 1973; Rossiter 1993; Siler and McLaughlin 2008), evaluative
processes in decisions about the allocation of centralized resources
(e.g., Cole 1992; Lamont 2009), and on how specific organizational
configurations shape scientific work (e.g., Fuchs 1992; Whitley 1984).
Other research examines commercialization in the higher education sector
(e.g., Berman 2011; Slaughter and Leslie 1997), or the distribution of
unique forms of capital in intellectual fields (Bourdieu 1990).
Organizational theories have been the most direct in addressing the
links between funding and knowledge-production. For example, Whitley
(1984) differentiated between types of dependence in scientific work,
including degrees of control over economic resources and variations in
how scientists allocate rewards and recognition. Building on
Whitley's "task uncertainty," "mutual
dependence," and "reputational autonomy," Fuchs (1992)
developed a theory of how organizational configurations produce levels
of cognitive integration or fragmentation in intellectual fields.
Appropriately, most of this research focuses on comparisons within
academic fields. Research on funding outside of academia generally
examines the consequences of market logics on science (Evans 2010;
Mirowski and van Horn 2005; Murray 2010; Owen-Smith 2003), or broadly
considers commercial and academic cultures (Baber 2001; Kleinman and
Vallas 2001).
Think tanks differ from the usual cases in theoretically
interesting ways. First, in the most general sense, research funding is
not awarded to individuals on the basis of intellectual merit recognized
via peer evaluation but, rather, is raised by the executive members of
organizations that employ policy researchers. Think tanks do not control
the allocation of resources among themselves, and the academic system of
"organized skepticism" (Merton 1973) does not apply. Most of
the time, think tanks do not compete for resources in ways familiar to
academic researchers. Finally, although think tanks may be funded in
part through donations from corporations, they do not contribute to the
development of products for a market. How corporate funding influences
think tank work will be different from how it influences work in the
natural sciences and engineering (e.g., see Evans 2010; Kleinman 2003).
Think Tanks and Funding
Elite and pluralist theory traditions have strongly shaped research
on think tanks by defining them as (i) the intellectual pawns of an
integrated corporate-political elite, or (ii) a diverse set of
organizations that reflect the interests of many groups competing over
"who governs." In recent field theory, (1) the focus is not on
whether think tanks are the pawns of elites or representative on larger
groups, but rather on (iii) the complicated organizational and political
environments in which they operate, and the underlying dependencies on
powerful sponsors.
Peschek (1987), Dye (2001), and Domhoff (2010) have developed elite
and power-structure theories in the tradition of Mills (1959) and Hunter
(1969), and have examined interorganizational networks of elites and
corporate funding (Domhoff 2009) to argue that think tanks plan policy
to further their class interests. Carroll and Carson (2003) make a
similar argument at a global scale, maintaining that corporate-policy
interlocks are part of a project of international elite integration and
consolidation of corporate capital. In short, right-wing think tanks are
"neoliberalism's organic intellectuals," furthering the
interests of the most powerful (Carroll 2007). Similar arguments can be
found in general-audience books on think tanks and economic elites
(e.g., Gutstein 2009; McQuaig and Brooks 2010).
In response to elite theory, pluralists depict think tanks as a
diverse set of organizations promoting the interests of many groups
competing to set policy agendas (see Polsby 1983; on pluralism
generally, see Alford and Friedland 1985; Dahl 1974, 1989; Lukes 2004).
In short, the think tank community is diverse because the political
world is diverse. Think tanks themselves downplay their allegiances to
larger groups in an effort to promote their intellectual independence
(for a discussion of pluralist claims advanced by think tanks, see
Medvetz 2012). Some think tank researchers have furthered this idea by
incorporating formal independence in their operationalization of
"think tank" (Rich 2004; Stone 2000; Weaver 1989). They often
use a one- or two-year snapshot of total revenue to compare the relative
size of think tanks that qualify for their organizational set.
Discussions of where money comes from are usually included in
descriptive profiles of specific organizations, rather than in
examinations of the links between politics and funding environments.
In his field analysis of American think tanks, Medvetz (2012)
recasts think tanks as hybrid organizations operating in the space
between the political, economic, academic, and media fields. Building on
Bourdieu (e.g., 1990), he argues that think tanks are unique in their
ability to draw on the "capitals" defining those fields and to
put them to work in novel ways and new contexts. Rather than defining
think tanks as the tools of elite or nonelite interest groups, this
reframes think tanks as dependent on a wide range of external actors,
and emphasizes the meanings and strategies they develop around the
resources they accumulate.
Economic capital is perhaps the most consequential and symbolically
powerful form of capital for think tanks. To general audiences, they
must present themselves as independent, while at the same time signaling
their dependence to potential funders in a "market of
donations" (Medvetz 2012). This introduces questions that
organizational scholars have long focused on, including: How do
environments constrain organizational autonomy through resource
dependencies (Burt 1980; Emerson 1962; Pfeffer 1978); what challenges
and opportunities are presented by conflicting institutional logics
(Binder 2007; Evans and Kay 2008; Friedland and Alford 1991; Murray
2010; Quirke 2013; Thorton, Ocasio, and Lounsbry 2012); and how do
institutional entrepreneurs and "challengers" interpret and
respond to these environments (DiMaggio 1991; Fligstein and McAdam 2012;
Rao, Monin, and Durand 2003)?
This article takes a broad look at the relationship between funding
and the politics of policy knowledge for think tanks in Canada. To
access whether or not think tanks are supported by transnational
interest groups, I examine the extent to which conservative, centrist,
and left-progressive organizations are supported by foreign donations. I
then evaluate predictions about funding and the politics of policy
knowledge by analyzing funding data with two formal comparative and
relational methods. Does the availability of substantial funding from
both the state and private donors create an environment where
organizations are sponsored by both the state and private donors at the
same time (i.e., integrated elite), or a divided environment with
private donors and the state supporting different think tanks? If the
environment is divided, do conservatives, centrists, and progressives
tend to be funded in similar ways? Finally, focusing on a subset of
cases, are the best-funded think tanks supported by both the state and
private donors, or by one or the other?
Predictions
Elite theories propose that think tanks are part of an integrated
group of political and economic elites advancing their common class
interests. We would expect to see conservative think tanks advancing
those causes to be well funded by both the state and private donors.
Think tanks not advancing those interests would be outside of the
corporate-policy elite. Rather than pluralistic diversity, this suggests
exclusion and marginality. We would expect think tanks aligned with
nonelite publics to be less well funded.
In pluralist theory, think tanks are part of larger coalitions of
actors with shared interests and objectives. Therefore, we would expect
to find distinct clusters of politically similar think tanks around
interest groups that can afford to sponsor them rather than one cluster
of think tanks around an integrated elite and a collection of poorly
funded think tanks promoting nonelite causes. The more clusters of think
tanks there are, the more support for pluralist theories. In particular,
we would expect to see multiple clusters of think tanks with private
donor funding, because different types of donors would support different
types of think tanks.
From a field-theory perspective--and organizational theory
generally--think tanks operate with strong dependencies in uncertain
environments shaped by conflicting institutional logics. Think tanks
catering to the same types of funders would be expected to have common
political ideologies. One of the key ways this differs from pluralist
theory is the emphasis on dependencies and catering to funders rather
than simply representing elite or nonelite interest groups. It stresses
that there are delicate balancing acts, tenuous and difficult
relationships, and images to be maintained. Rather than finding that
think tank funding is shaped by an integrated elite or by pluralistic
struggles among many different interest groups, we would expect to see
limited diversity. Think tanks cater to powerful economic and political
elites, as well as the more powerful social movements and unions. The
more powerful the sponsor, the more we would expect them to imprint the
funding environment for think tanks.
Elite and field theories would both predict that the most
economically successful think tanks would be those effectively drawing
on the resources of both the state and private donors. While elite
theorists would attribute this to their membership in the
corporate-policy elite, field theorists would interpret this as
effectively catering to the common interests of key sponsors. (2) While
elite theorists would cast the rest of the field as marginalized
outsiders, field theorists would predict that they are oriented to other
powerful sponsors.
DATA AND METHODS
Data
Canadian think tanks have to file annual T3010 Information Returns
with the CRA to maintain their tax-exempt charitable status. The returns
are available in a searchable database, making it is possible to look up
information for specific organizations at specific times. To evaluate
claims about funding and political orientations, I collected financial
data from 2000 to 2011, or from founding date to latest filing, for 30
think tanks. To automate the collection process and eliminate human
error, I used a Perl script to scrape data from the charities listings
for each organization and create a data set of all publicly available
information. (3)
The case-selection process was inclusive. I compiled a list of
think tanks mentioned by interviewees, from the literature, news stories
and op-eds, and public lists and rankings (e.g., McGann 2010). I
excluded university-based institutes, consulting firms, some very small
single-issue think tanks, and one nonprofit think tank without
charitable status. (4) Finally, I included two organizations whose
activities are more extensive than others in the analysis: the David
Suzuki Foundation and the Institute of Marriage and Family.
Coding
Under "Section E: Financial Information" of the
Information Returns, I combined municipal, provincial, and federal
funding into "state funding," and I classified rental income,
memberships, dues, fees, and sale of goods and services (except to
government) as "self-generated revenue." I combined entries
for tax-receipted and non-tax-receipted gifts, and gifts from other
registered charities, as "private donations."
To evaluate claims about think tank funding and political
orientations, I coded think tanks as "conservative,"
"centrist," or "left/progressive." These coding
decisions were informed by substantive knowledge gained as part of a
larger study of think tanks in Canada. I conducted 53 semi-structured
interviews with think tank directors, rank-and-file researchers,
communications specialists, and academic economists and political
scientists who have worked with think tanks. Following Small's
(2009a, 2009b) work on sequential interviewing and best practices for
elite interviews (Hochschild 2005; Spector 1980), I recruited and
interviewed people for their position in the think tank field. The
interview schedule was adapted for different types of participants to
improve data quality by focusing on their unique knowledge, but most
addressed issues directly related to funding. Interviews generally
lasted between 45 and 90 minutes and were analyzed thematically and
comparatively (Miles and Huberman 1994) using TAMS Analyzer 4 (Weinstein
2006). In addition to this, I drew on a range of documentary materials,
(5) discussions in the literature (e.g., Abelson 2009), their general
reputation in the policy community, and by reading opinion pieces and
publications.
Of these codes, "conservative" captures the most
variation (in part because there are so many of them), from politicized
economic libertarians and social conservatives to those closer to the
center-right. "Centrist" is less varied, but includes think
tanks that promote both center-right and center-left positions on a
range of policy issues. Compared to others, their employees tend to be
more politically diverse. The "left/progressive" code includes
the social democratic Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, the
liberal-left Caledon Institute of Social Policy, and the
environmentalist David Suzuki Foundation. The research design requires
setting aside more nuanced political distinctions, but these general
political orientations enable us to look at patterns across a larger
number of cases, which is an analytically useful trade-off.
Qualitative Comparative and Correspondence Analyses
I used crisp set QCA (Amenta et al. 2009; Ragin 1987; Rihoux 2006;
Rihoux and Ragin 2008) to simplify and formalize the analysis of think
tank funding. I created a data set of binary variables indicating the
"presence" or "absence" of each funding source in
each organization's total funding. To determine the relative
importance of each funding source for each think tank, I calculated the
percentage of total funding it contributed to each year. I coded funding
sources as "1" if a think tank made 20 percent or more of
their total revenue from that source, and "0" if it
contributed less than 20 percent. (6) In most cases, the funding models
were consistent across every year, enabling me to simply code each
source with an overall "1" or "0." When there were
changes over the years, I considered each case individually, looking at
the percentage of revenue generated by each source. Each time, it was
easy to determine whether an overall "1" or a "0"
was most appropriate.
The truth table algorithm generates a list of all the logically
possible combinations of funding sources and then matches them to
empirical cases in the data set. (7) Logically possible funding models
without empirical matches were dropped from the analysis. This enabled
me to inductively identify how think tanks are actually funded, and to
compare across organizational cases.
I also used correspondence analysis (Breiger 2000; Greenacre 2010)
to examine how politics and funding shape the social space think tanks
operate in. While QCA's configurational approach enables some
balance between holistic case analysis and generality across a moderate
number of cases, correspondence analysis is a method for examining the
associations of categorical variables relationally in a multidimensional
space (Le Roux and Rouanet 2004). Bourdieu used it extensively in his
field analyses (e.g., Bourdieu 1984, 1990), and it is increasingly used
in relational cultural analyses (Mohr 1998). The two methods are
complementary (Breiger 2000, 2009; O'Neil 2008). For the analysis,
I created a data matrix with each think tank occupying a row, and each
column representing a major funding source: donors, the state,
self-generated, and interest/investments. Each cell contained the
percentage of total revenue the source accounted for. I used the ca
package for R (Nenadic and Greenacre 2003) to map the underlying
structure (Le Roux and Rouanet 2004) of think tank funding and politics.
FINDINGS
Foreign Donations and Transnational Elites
Table 1 reports on all foreign donations to think tanks in 2009 and
2010. It shows that foreign donations almost always go to conservative
organizations, but that it is not an especially important funding source
overall. Notably, at just under 4 million, the Fraser Institute made
more from international donors in 2009 and 2010 than most Canadian think
tanks made from all of their funding sources combined (see Table 3 for
context). However, it accounts for only 14 percent of their total
funding. Foreign donations also contribute a meaningful amount of money
to the social conservative think tank Cardus and the free-market
conservative think tank the MacDonald-Laurier Institute. In the bigger
picture, however, it is a relatively small amount of money going to
mostly small think tanks. The funding environment for Canadian think
tanks is mostly domestic, and arguments about think tanks as supported
by transnational elites may be overstated.
State and Private Donor Funding: Integrated or Divided ?
Table 2 reports the results of the QCA. Combinations of funding
sources are represented with an asterisk (logical "and"). The
rows show the number and names of cases matching each funding model. The
comparative analysis identifies 15 different ways that think tanks
combine individual revenue sources into broader funding models. They are
not all equally common. Twenty organizations use the same five models,
and the remaining cases tend to be variations on a common theme: Think
tanks are funded by either private donors or the state, often
supplemented by more minor amounts of money from other sources. Only
four of the cases combined private donors and state funding.
Of the four cases that do combine state and private donor funding,
the Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI) stands out.
(8) First, unlike other think tanks that have received a lot of private
donations, donations to CIGI have come from philanthropists with a
vision for a state-of-the-art global think tank with a nonpartisan
intellectual culture. (9) The same philanthropists--primarily Jim
Balsillie and Mike Lazaridis, formerly of Research in Motion (now
BlackBerry)--founded and help support the Balsillie School of
International Affairs, which offers PhDs and MAs in international
relations, and the Perimeter Institute for Theoretical Physics. In some
years, their donations have been matched by the Government of Ontario,
with other support from the City of Waterloo and the federal government.
In addition to these funding sources, they have grants from federal
agencies (such as the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council,
Environment Canada, the Department of Foreign Affairs and International
Trade, and Industry Canada) and from foundations and corporations.
Table 2 shows that the most common funding model is to rely on
donations alone. With the exception of the Public Policy Forum, these
are all think tanks with strong political reputations. The David Suzuki
Foundation is environmentalist, and the others are conservative. The
second most common model partners state funding with self-generated
revenue. Think tanks using this model include the Conference Board of
Canada and Social Research and Demonstration Corporation, both of which
make a considerable amount of money with contract research for a range
of clients. Unlike those making money almost exclusively from donations,
none of these think tanks have strong political reputations on the right
or the left. With the exception of the now defunct Canadian Policy
Research Networks, no think tanks rely on the state for more than 80
percent of their funding.
State and private donor funding are politicized within the think
tank community, with both types of funding sending signals about what
funders can expect and how outsiders should perceive the legitimacy of
funding relationships. Interviewees from think tanks receiving
government contracts, for example, argue that they are an effective way
of placing limits on supporters who feel they have a license to
influence what the think tank does in general. Contractual relationships
reduce the pressure to be "beholden" to key donors and to be
politically consistent. (10) On the other hand, think tanks not involved
in contract research routinely dismiss those who are "not real
think tanks." They argue that contracts signal accountability to a
funder, compromising their control over research and communication. When
potential funders want to offer a contract or a grant, these think tanks
encourage them to give their money in the form of a donation or as
support for an event instead. (11)
Political Patterns in the Funding Environment
The QCA identifies the combinations of funding sources supporting
think tanks, but it does not reveal their overall importance
relationally. This is accomplished with correspondence analysis, which
reveals the structure of the funding environment by mapping the
associations of funding sources across cases. The results are presented
in Figures 1 and 2, which differentiate between "centrists"
(labeled in standard font), "conservatives" (italics), and
"left/progressives think tanks" (monospaced font enclosed in
braces). The closer organizations are to one another, the more similar
they are. Funding sources are represented by triangles. Full names of
the organizations are listed in the Appendix.
Figure 1 reveals that the think tank funding environment is
structured by an opposition between donor-funded think tanks and
non-donor-funded think tanks from 2000 to 2005. Non-donor-funded think
tanks tend to supplement state funding with self-generated revenue, or
are funded almost exclusively by interest and investments. This
opposition accounts for 49 percent of the variance.
Some donor-funded think tanks also generate some of their own
revenue and are minimally oriented toward the state (e.g., Canadian
Institute of Strategic Studies, Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives,
Canadian International Council, Conference of Defense Associations
Institute). An additional 35 percent of the variance is accounted for by
the opposition between (i) think tanks funded by the state and
self-generated funding, and (ii) those funded by interest and
investments. The fact that the funding sources are positioned so far
apart, and away from the intersection of the axes, indicates that
combinations of funding sources tend to be heavily weighted toward one
source, not equally shared.
With few exceptions, the cluster of think tanks funded by private
donors are conservative, and those not funded by private donors are
almost all centrist. The two most well-known left/progressive think
tanks (the David Suzuki Foundation and the Canadian Centre for Policy
Alternatives) resemble conservative think tanks more closely than
centrists. CIGI is also supported primarily by private donors from 2000
to 2005 but, as previously discussed, it has a unique relationship with
major Canadian philanthropists, making it different from other
donor-funded think tanks. From a pluralist perspective, these are
examples of think tanks being supported by interest groups outside the
corporate-political elite. However, the diversity is limited.
[FIGURE 1 OMITTED]
The fact that most think tanks funded by the state are centrist
does not necessarily mean that the state favors centrists. Because
funding models strongly shape what think tanks do, and because they are
difficult to change, state-funded think tanks have to be able to appeal
to whoever is in power. Although this does not necessarily prevent them
from criticizing the government or advocating unpopular policies (which
may contribute to their credibility), it does mean that they will avoid
becoming an organization that a government would be interested in
defunding, or simply not consider worthy of the "investment."
Think tanks relying on private donors do not have the same concerns
about swift changes in their sponsors' political ideologies.
Instead, they can focus on catering to their political and intellectual
preferences.
[FIGURE 2 OMITTED]
Recently, the Conservative federal government has controversially
defunded or reduced support for many governmental and nonprofit
organizations. Just as the scientific and social scientific communities
are struggling with reduced resources and protesting censorship, some
think tanks have found themselves with much less support from the state.
Figure 2 shows the shift in the funding environment from 2005 to 2010.
After 2005, the cluster of conservative think tanks funded by
donors became more tightly knit, while the cluster of centrist think
tanks funded by the state started finding ways of generating their own
revenue and relying on interest and investments. Overall, the opposition
between donor funded and non-donor-funded think tanks has become
stronger (from explaining 49 percent of the variance to 56 percent), and
the opposition of (i) state- and self-funded versus (b) interest and
investment (35 percent) has realigned to a weaker opposition between
state funding, self-generated funding, and interest and investments (31
percent).
In sum, the correspondence analysis reveals a politically patterned
structural opposition between conservative think tanks funded by donors
and centrist think tanks that are not funded by private donors. In the
early 2000s, centrists were funded primarily by the state, but recently
they have been generating more of their own funds and collecting revenue
from interest and investments.
These findings challenge a key prediction derived from elite
theory, namely that think tanks promote the common interests of an
integrated corporate-political elite. If there were an integrated elite,
the state and private donors would be positioned closely together in
Figures 1 and 2 and would share political positions--whether centrist or
conservative. Think tanks facing reduced funding from the state could
turn to private donors for support. The findings also challenge
pluralist theory, in which the think tank community represents a wide
range of interest groups. Instead, there is evidence of only limited
diversity.
Size Matters: Funding and Politics
So far, well-funded and resource-hungry think tanks have been
treated the same. Do the patterns identified, considering all 30 think
tanks, hold equally for those that are the best-funded? Table 3 lists
think tanks by politics and average annual revenue from 2005 to 2010,
showing that think tanks in Canada fall into five funding categories.
Relative to one another, there are a couple of exceptionally well-funded
think tanks operating with more than 25 million dollars a year, and a
well-funded group working with between 8 million and 12 million dollars.
While the general pattern is separation of state and private
donors, there are some well-funded exceptions. In 2005 to 2010, CIGI and
the Conference Board effectively combined funding from both major
sources. Elite theorists could claim this as evidence that these two
think tanks are the true elites while the other think tanks are not. In
response, pluralists could point to the existence of clusters as
evidence that think tanks serve the interests of multiple interest
groups, not integrated elites.
The two "largest" think tanks in Canada--the Conference
Board of Canada and CIGI--have different funding models, but share some
important similarities relative to the other think tanks in the
analysis. CIGI, discussed earlier, is one of only a few organizations
that have been repeatedly successful in getting funding from both
private donors and the state. (12) However, it has done so in part by
breaking out of the network of donors that supports many conservative
think tanks, catering instead to the shared interests of key
philanthropists, bureaucratic organizations (e.g., the Social Sciences
and Humanities Research Council), and corporate sponsors. The Conference
Board has also had some success in catering to government and private
interests simultaneously, but rather than relying on donors--whom they
have avoided in the traditional sense--they offer extensive contract
research services, consulting, and corporate leadership training.
The next tier of highly funded think tanks has strong ties to
political movements and is funded almost exclusively by private donors.
The Fraser Institute is one of the primary intellectual wings of the
conservative movement in Canada and has partnered with conservatives in
the United States and around the world to advocate for "economic
freedom." This includes offering rewards to think tanks in
developing countries for their advocacy of free market policies. (13)
The Institute for Marriage and Family is complicated because it is
formally part of Focus on the Family Canada (they share a budget). The
David Suzuki Foundation--working with a few million less than the Fraser
Institute and the Institute of Marriage and Family Canada--is a
nonprofit that engages in a wider range of activities than organizations
that see themselves strictly as policy institutes. In short, the second
tier of highly funded think tanks keeps with the pattern of not
combining state and private donor funding.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
This article addressed questions at the core of pluralist, elite,
and field theories of think tank funding and the politics of policy
knowledge. First, I showed that foreign funding goes almost exclusively
to conservatives, but is more limited than claims about transnational
elite policy groups imply. Second, the think tank funding environment is
structured by an opposition between conservatives funded primarily by
private donors, and centrists funded primarily by the state. That
separation became stronger after 2005, even as the state reduced support
for centrists. Finally, the most highly funded think tanks tend to
either deviate from the general pattern by combining state and donor
funding in unique ways (centrists), or are well funded exclusively by
private donors (conservatives and left/progressive).
Given the strong separation of state- and donor-funded think tanks,
these findings challenge theories that emphasize elite integration. The
think tanks most aggressively pursuing the interests of corporate elites
are often well funded by private donors but not by the state.
Additionally, they are not the most economically successful, and there
are many that are struggling economically despite their strong advocacy
of corporate interests. Based on these findings, elite theorists could
argue that CIGI and the Conference Board are Canada's
"corporate-policy elite" and other organizations are not.
However, this argument sidesteps empirical challenges to its validity by
emphasizing organizations that fit the explanation and excluding those
that do not (as critiqued in Medvetz 2012). There is little evidence
that the rest of Canada's think tanks are marginalized outsiders,
since many are well funded without catering to both private donors and
the state.
The funding environment is sharply divided, but it is hardly an
open space where many different social groups weigh in on policy
discussion and attempt to influence governance. Although there is some
variation among think tanks with similar funders, there are strong
clusters with shared politics, and the largest think tanks tend to cater
to the most powerful sponsors. If elite theorists have overstated
integration, pluralists have overstated diversity.
Taken together, these findings suggest a more complicated reality
where think tanks in Canada are neither the pawns of corporate-political
donors nor representatives of many competing interest groups. Building
on Medvetz (2012), a more accurate assessment of funding and the
politics of policy knowledge would be that think tanks operate in an
uncertain environment where they have to protect themselves from the
changing passions of their sponsors. They have to make themselves
appealing to groups of funders who share common interests; in the
process, they become unappealing to other potentially generous funders.
In this divided context, think tanks face amplified versions of common
organizational problems such as resource dependencies and conflicting
institutional logics.
Conventional wisdom to "follow the money" in single cases
places blame on individual donors, as if switching out current donors
for new ones would resolve larger conflict-of-interest issues. This
obscures broader field dynamics and the considerable "money
work" think tanks do as they cultivate relationships with funders,
ensure donations "look right" on paper, manage public images,
and keep doors open despite yearly fluctuations in funding. Further
research should comparatively examine how think tanks actually manage
funding relationships (as opposed to how we assume they do). We need
further research on the institutional dynamics that shape think tank
funding, making specific criteria more or less important to different
sets of funders. And of course, there is work to be done to pull these
broad patterns down to finer comparisons of fewer cases.
Finally, as granting agencies are renewing their strategic plans,
as more research is being conducted outside of universities, and as the
federal government is downsizing its research capacity, we need to take
an empirical approach to debating models for funding research. This
should include an examination of (i) how funding sources structure
fields to the advantage of some and the disadvantage of others; (ii) how
they promote homogeneous or pluralistic knowledge bases around social,
political, and economic problems; and (iii) how the introduction of new
interests complicates the process of developing sophisticated
explanations and interpretations. Such an approach might help foster a
more realistic debate about the consequences of pushing more think tanks
toward private funding.
Appendix
MMS, Atlantic Institute for Market Studies
CCPA, Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives
CCSD, Canadian Council on Social Development
CDM, Conference of Defense Associations Institute
CIC, Canadian International Council
CIGI, Centre for International Governance Innovation
CISS, Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies
CPRN, Canadian Policy Research Network
CSLS, The Centre for the Study of Living Standards
CTF, Canadian Tax Foundation
CWF, Canada West Foundation
IMF, Institute of Marriage and Family Canada
IOG, Institute on Governance
IRPP, Institute for Research on Public Policy
MEI, Montreal Economic Institute
MLI, MacDonald-Laurier Institute
NSI, North-South Institute
PPF, Public Policy Forum
SRDC, Social Research and Demonstration Corporation
References
Abelson, D. 2009. Do Think Tanks Matter? Assessing the Impact of
Public Policy Institutes. Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's
University Press.
Alford, R. and R. Friedland. 1985. Powers of Theory: Capitalism,
the State, and Democracy. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
Amenta, E., N. Caren, S.J. Olasky and J. Stobaugh. 2009. "All
the Movements Fit to Print: Who, What, When, where, and Why SMO Families
Appeared in the New York Times in the Twentieth Century." American
Sociological Review 74:636-56.
Baber, Z. 2001. "Globalization and Scientific Research: The
Emerging Triple Helix of State-Industry-University Relations in Japan
and Singapore." Bulletin of Science, Technology & Society
21(5):401-408.
Berman, E.P. 2011. Creating the Market University: How Academic
Science Became an Economic Engine. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press.
Binder, A. 2007. "For Love and Money: Organizations'
Creative Responses to Multiple Environmental Logics." Theory and
Society 36:547-71.
Bourdieu, P. 1984. Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgment
of Taste. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Bourdieu, P. 1990. Homo Academicus. Stanford, CA: Stanford
University Press.
Breiger, R. 2000. "A Tool-Kit for Practice Theory."
Poetics 27:91-115.
Breiger, R. 2009. "On the Duality of Cases and Variables:
Correspondence Analysis (CA) and Qualitative Comparative Analysis
(QCA)." Pp. 243-59 in The SAGE Handbook of Case-Based Methods,
edited by D. Byrne and C. Ragin. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications.
Burt, R. 1980. "Cooptive Corporate Actor Networks: A
Reconsideration of Interlocking Directorates Involving American
Manufacturing." Administrative Science Quarterly 25:557-58.
Carroll, W. 2007. "Hegemony and Counter-Hegemony in a Global
Field." Social Studies in Social Justice 1(1):36-66.
Carroll, W. and C. Carson. 2003. "The Network of Global
Corporations and Elite Policy Groups: A Structure for Transnational
Capitalist Class Formation." Global Networks 3:29-57.
Cole, S. 1992. Making Science. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press.
Dahl, R.A. 1974. Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American
City. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Dahl, R.A. 1989. Democracy and Its Critics. New Haven, CT: Yale.
DiMaggio, P. 1991. "Constructing an Organizational Field as a
Professional Project: US Art Museums, 1920-1940." Pp. 267-92 in The
New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis, edited by P. DiMaggio
and W. Powell. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Domhoff, W. 2009. "The Power Elite and Their
Challengers." American Behavioral Scientist 52(7):955-73.
Domhoff, W. 2010. Who Rules America? Challenges to Corporate and
Class Dominance. 6th ed. Boston, MA: McGraw-Hill.
Dye, T. 2001. Top Down Policy Making. New York, NY: Chatham House
Publishers.
Emerson, R. 1962. "Power-Depedence Relations." American
Sociological Review 27:31-41.
Evans, J. 2010. "Industry Induces Academic Science to Know
Less about More." American Journal of Sociology 116(2):389-452.
Evans, R. and T. Kay. 2008. "How Environmentalists
'Greened' Trade Policy: Strategic Action and the Architecture
of Field Overlap." American Sociological Review 73(6):970-91.
Fligstein, N. and D. McAdam. 2012. A Theory of Fields. New York,
NY: Oxford University Press.
Friedland, R. and R. Alford. 1991. "Bringing Society Back In:
Symbols, Practices, and Institutional Contradictions." Pp. 232-63
in The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis, edited by P.
DiMaggio and W. Powell. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Fuchs, S. 1992. The Professional Quest for Truth: A Social Theory
of Science and Knowledge. Albany, NY: SUNY Press.
Greenacre, M. 2010. Correspondence Analysis in Practice. Boca
Raton, FL: Chapman & Hall/CRC.
Gutstein, D. 2009. Not a Conspiracy Theory: How Business Propaganda
Hijacks Democracy. Toronto, ON: Key Porter.
Hochschild, J. 2005. "Conducting Intensive Interviews and
Elite Interviews." Workshop on Interdisciplinary Standards for
Systematic Qualitative Research. Report prepared for the National
Science Foundation.
Hunter, F. 1969. Community Power Structure: A Study of Decision
Makers. Chapel Hill, NC: UNC Press.
Kleimnan, D.L. 2003. Impure Cultures: University Biology and the
World of Commerce. Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press.
Kleinman, D.L. and S. Vallas. 2001. "Science, Capitalism, and
the Rise of the 'Knowledge Worker:' The Changing Structure of
Knowledge Production in the United States." Theory and Society
30(4):451-92.
Lamont, M. 2009. How Professors Think: Inside the Curious World of
Academic Judgment. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Le Roux, B. and H. Rouanet. 2004. Geometric Data Analysis: From
Correspondence Analysis to Structured Dara Analysis. New York, NY
Springer.
Lukes, S. 2004. Power: A Radical View. 2d ed. New York, NY:
Palgrave MacMillan.
McGann, J. 2010. "The Global 'Go-To Think Tanks,'
2010." The Think Tank and Civil Society Program, University of
Pennsylvania.
McQuaig, L. and N. Brooks. 2010. The Trouble with Billionaires.
Toronto, ON: Viking Canada.
Medvetz, T. 2012. Think Tanks in America. Chicago, IL: University
of Chicago Press.
Merton, R. 1973. The Sociology of Science: Theoretical and
Empirical Investigations. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Miles, M. and M. Huberman. 1994. Qualitative Data Analysis: An
Expanded Sourcebook. 2nd ed. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
Mills, C.W. 1959. The Power Elite. London: Oxford University Press.
Mirowski, P. and R. van Horn. 2005. "The Contract Research
Organization and the Commercialization of Scientific Research."
Social Studies of Science 35(4):50348.
Mohr, J. 1998. "Measuring Meaning Structures." Annual
Review of Saciology 24:345-70.
Murray, F. 2010. "The Oncomouse that Roared: Hybrid Exchange
Strategies as a Source of Distinction at the Boundary of Overlapping
Institutions." American Journal of Sociology 116(2):341-88.
Nenadic, O. and M. Greenacre. 2003. "Correspondence Analysis
in R, with Two and Three Dimensional Graphics: The ca Package."
Journal of Statistical Software 20:1-13.
O'Neil, K. 2008. "Bringing Art to Market: The Diversity
of Pricing Styles in a Local Art Market." Poetics 36(1):94-113.
Owen-Smith, J. 2003. "From Separate Systems to a Hybrid Order:
Accumulative Advantage across Public and Private Science at Research One
Universities." Research Policy 32(6):1081-1104.
Peschek, J. 1987. Policy-Planning Organizations: Elite Agendas and
America's Rightward Turn. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University
Press.
Pfeffer, J. 1978. The External Control of Organizations: A Resource
Dependence Perspective. New York, NY: Harper and Row.
Polsby, N. 1983. "Tanks, but No Tanks." Public Opinion
6:14-16.
Quirke, L. 2013. "Rogue Resistance: Sidestepping Isomorphic
Pressures in a Patchy Institutional Field." Organization Studies
34:1675-99.
Ragin, C. 1987. The Comparative Method: Moving Beyond Qualitative
and Quantitative Strategies. Berkeley, CA: University of California
Press.
Rao, H., P. Monin and R. Durand. 2003. "Institutional Change
in Toque Ville: Nouvelle Cuisine as an Identity Movement in French
Gastronomy." American Journal of Sociology 108(4):795-843.
Rich, A. 2004. Think Tanks, Public Policy, and the Politics of
Expertise. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.
Rihoux, B. 2006. "Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) and
Related Systematic Comparative Methods: Recent Advances and Remaining
Challenges for Social Science Research." International Sociology
21:679-706.
Rihoux, B. and C. Ragin. 2008. Configurational Comparative Methods:
Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) and Related Techniques. Thousand
Oaks, CA: SAGE.
Rossiter, M. 1993. "The Matilda Effect in Science."
Social Studies of Science 34:325-41.
Scott, R. 1998. Organizations: Rational, Natural, and Open Systems.
Englewoods Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Siler, K. and N. McLaughlin. 2008. "The Canada Research Chairs
Program and Social Science Reward Structures." Canadian Review of
Sociology/Revue canadienne de sociologie 45(1):93-119.
Slaughter, S. and L. Leslie. 1997. Academic Capitalism: Politics,
Policies, and the Entrepreneurial University. Baltimore, MD: Johns
Hopkins Press.
Small, M.L. 2009a. "How Many Cases Do I Need? On Science and
the Logic of Case Selection in Field-Based Research." Ethnography
10(1):5-38.
Small, M.L. 2009b. Unanticipated Gains: Origins of Network
Inequality in Everyday Life. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Smith, J. 1993. The Idea Brokers: Think Tanks and the Rise of the
New Policy Elite. New York, NY: Free Press.
Spector, M. 1980. "Learning to Study Public Figures." Pp.
45-56 in Fieldwork Experience: Qualitative Approaches to Social
Research, edited by W. Shaffir, R. Stebbins and A. Turowetz. New York,
NY: St. Martin's.
Stone, D. 2000. "Non-Governmental Policy Transfer: The
Strategies of Independent Policy Institutes." Governance 13:45-70.
Stone, D., and A. Denham, eds. 2004. Think Tank Traditions: Policy
Research and the Politics of Ideas. Manchester: Manchester University
Press.
Thiem, A. and A. Dusa. 2013. Qualitative Comparative Analysis with
R: A User's Guide. New York, NY: Springer.
Thorton, P., W. Ocasio and M. Lounsbry. 2012. The Institutional
Logic Perspective: A New Approach to Culture, Structure, and Process.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Weaver, K. 1989. "The Changing World of Think Tanks." PS:
Political Science and Politics 22(2):563-78.
Weinstein, M. 2006. "TAMS Analyzer: Anthropology as Cultural
Critique in a Digital Age." Social Science Computer Review
24:68-77.
Whitley, R. 1984. The Intellectual and Social Organization of the
Sciences. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
John McLevey
University of Waterloo
(1.) By field theory, I do not only mean the version initially
developed by Bourdieu (e.g., 1984). I am also referring to the variety
of field theories in organizational sociology (see Scott 1998) and the
social movements literature (for a general theory of fields, see
Fligstein and McAdam 2012).
(2.) This is important in Canada, where corporations do not have
the same incentives to fund think tanks as they do in the United States.
In the United States, the presidential political system provides
incentives for think tanks to lobby specific members of congress.
(3.) Andrew Osmond wrote the Perl script, and I am very grateful
for his expertise.
(4.) The CRA does not regulate or collect data on university-based
policy research institutes. Even if it did, university institutes have
different funding and organizational structures. As previously
discussed, there is a debate in the think tank literature about what
organizations count as think tanks. Although this analysis focuses
mostly on organizations that fit the most restrictive definitions, my
methodological choice is not meant as a stance in that debate.
(5.) Including annual reports, publications, speeches,
organizational histories, communication reports (three, confidential),
strategic plans (three, confidential), and opinion pieces and news
stories by or mentioning Canadian think tanks.
(6.) If a think tank did not make at least 20 percent of their
funding from a source, there tended to be a steep drop-off.
(7.) I used the QCA package for R developed by Thiem and Dusa
(2013).
(8.) Funding for the Canada West Foundation and the Centre for
Cultural Renewal is strongly weighted toward private donations. From
2000 to 2005, the Caledon Institute was primarily funded by the state,
but from 2005 to 2010 it was funded by private donors.
(9.) Whether or not it lives up to that vision is another matter.
(10.) Among others, Glen Hodgson, an executive member of the
Conference Board of Canada, made this argument in an interview.
(11.) Among others, Bill Robson, the president and CEO of the CD
Howe Institute, made this argument in an interview.
(12.) Counting the Institute for Research on Public Policy in the
1970s, which falls outside the window of this analysis.
(13.) See www.freetheworld.com.
The author thanks Neff McLaughlin, Allyson Stokes, Tina Fetner,
Scott Davies, Andrew Osmond, Heidi Reynolds-Stenson, Meghan Hollett,
Johanne J. Jean-Pierre, and the anonymous reviewers.
John McLevey, Centre for Knowledge Integration and the Department
of Sociology and Legal Studies, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, ON N2L
3G1, Canada. E-mail: john.mclevey@uwaterloo.ca
Table 1
International Funding for Canadian Think Tanks
(2009-2010 Combined)
Percentage
Think tanks Politics Amount of total
Cardus Conservative $638,749 22
Fraser Institute Conservative $3,816,662 14
MacDonald Laurier Conservative $105,374 15
Institute
Suzuki Foundation Left/progressive $973,756 5
Centre for Cultural Conservative $8,604 3
Renewal
Asia Pacific Foundation Centrist $83,048 3
Centre for the Study of Centrist $25,786 2
Living Standards
Institute for Marriage Conservative $229,567 <1
and Family
Institute on Governance Centrist $13,868 <1
Canadian Centre for Left/progressive $5,414 <1
Policy Alternatives
Table 2
How Think Tanks are Funded in Canada
Funding models n Cases
Donor 8 Fraser, CD Howe, Suzuki, Frontier,
Institute of Marriage and Family
Canada, Montreal Economic Institute,
Institut Economique de Montreal,
MacDonald-Laurier
Institute, Public Policy Forum
Donor * Self 3 Cardus, Canadian International Council,
Canadian Institute of Strategic
Studies
Donor * Self * Other 1 Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives
Donor * Other 1 Atlantic Institute for Market Studies
Donor * Interest 1 Mackenzie Institute
State * Self 5 Conference Board, Social Research and
Demonstration Corporation, North-South
Institute, Canadian Council on Social
Development, Institute on Governance
State * Interest 1 Asia Pacific Foundation
State * Self * Interest 1 The Centre for the Study of Living
Standards
State 1 Canadian Policy Research Network
Donor * State 3 Centre for International Governance
Innovation, Canada West Foundation,
Centre for Cultural Renewal
Donor * State * Other 1 Caledon Institute
Self * Interest * Other 1 Change Foundation
Self 1 Canadian Tax Foundation
Interest 1 Institute for Research on Public Policy
Other 1 Conference of Defense Associations
Institute
* A combination of funding sources.
Table 3
Think Tanks by Politics and Average Annual Revenue, 2005 to
2010
Average
Think tank Politics funding
Conference Board of Canada Centrist $27,517,825.00
Centre for International Governance
Innovation Centrist $26,981,214.00
Fraser Institute Conservative $11,563,259.17
Institute of Marriage and Family
Canada/FF Conservative $10,916,416.00
David Suzuki Foundation Left $8,418,011.17
Social Research and Demonstration
Corporation Centrist $6,754,165.17
Canadian Tax Foundation Conservative $5,241,500.00
Change Foundation Centrist $5,224,422.17
Canadian Centre for Policy
Alternatives Left $3,940,422.17
CD Howe Institute Conservative $3,795,843.50
Institute for Research on Public
Policy Centrist $3,662,959.83
North South Institute Centrist $3,089,387.17
Canada West Foundation Conservative $3,006,783.33
Asia Pacific Foundation Centrist $2,947,026.40
Canadian Policy Research Networks
(defunct) Centrist $2,779,504.20
Institute on Governance Centrist $1,868,853.17
Canadian International Council Centrist $1,846,010.00
Canadian Council on Social
Development Centrist $1,639,883.67
Montreal Economic Institute Conservative $1,307,289.33
Frontier Centre for Public Policy Conservative $1,132,945.67
Cardus Conservative $1,127,639.83
Atlantic Institute for Market Studies Conservative $1,033,730.00
Caledon Institute Left $856,511.67
MacDonald-Laurier Institute Conservative $516,032.33
The Centre for the Study of Living
Standards Centrist $464,282.17
Conference of Defense Associations
Institute Conservative $354,644.83
MacKenzie Institute Conservative $206,505.50
Canadian Institute of Strategic
Studies Centrist $66,796.00
Public Policy Forum Centrist $13,938.33
