Impeachable Defenses.
MCGINNIS, JOHN O.
MOMENTOUS PUBLIC ISSUES, like impeachment, have at least this
virtue: They promote political accountability by forcing citizens to
take positions that will be remembered. Such public reasoning carries
with it the risk of public exposure. During President Clinton's
impeachment, certain feminists became poster girls for hypocrisy because
their support for Clinton conflicted with their previous positions, such
as their attacks on Clarence Thomas. But there is a second kind of
exposure that can be equally important. Under outside scrutiny, some
groups - particularly intellectuals - forsake the style of reasoning
they apply regularly in the seclusion of their own salons. This
divergence between private and public intellectual persona can reveal
the frailty of the ideas by which such groups make an academic living.
As a law professor who testified before the House Judiciary
Committee on the subject of impeachment, I had firsthand knowledge of
the incongruity of most law professors' approach to this issue. Of
course, I was not surprised that my colleagues almost universally
opposed the impeachment of the president. Just as it was said in the
late nineteenth century that the Anglican Church was the Conservative
Party at prayer, our universities today are the Democratic party at
play. Indeed, the more than 6 to 1 statistical imbalance in the legal
academy between Democrats and Republicans may not fully capture the
vigor of its commitment to this president because law professors are
most passionate on the subjects of abortion on demand and racial and
ethnic preferences - the two issues on which Clinton is most reliably
left-wing.
What was curious about my colleagues' presentations was not
their bottom line but their methodology. In their academic writings,
most professors of constitutional law deploy a signature theory of
constitutional interpretation of their own devising, usually some
iteration of what are amusingly called "non-interpretative"
theories of interpretation. For modern constitutional theorists, the
current meaning of the Constitution must be divined through liberal
moral theory, or generated by a close study of watershed elections, or
grasped by "translating" the Framers' commands to a new
code appropriate to our era.
For instance, Laurence Tribe, one of those who argued against
impeachment at the hearing, defends Roe v. Wade in his constitutional
law treatise on the grounds that the Constitution must be construed to
protect fundamental rights even if these rights are not enumerated in
the Constitution. He then contends that the right to an abortion is
fundamental on the basis of a farrago of value judgments also nowhere
implied by the Constitution, such as the claim that legal restrictions
on abortion "subordinate women to men." Ronald Dworkin,
perhaps the most celebrated legal theorist alive today and a signer of
the law professors' letter opposing impeachment, is able to
discover abortion rights in the Constitution even without appeal to
unenumerated rights.
For him, the Constitution consists of a set of moral principles so
broad as to permit the Supreme Court to set itself up as a commission of
moral inquisition on all legislation. To condemn the constitutionality
of abortion regulations, he musters moral judgments similar to those of
Professor Tribe - judgments that are incontestable only in the sense
that an overwhelming majority in the academy would never dare question
them.
In contrast to the popularity of "non-interpretative"
theories, like those of Dworkin or Tribe, the legal academy almost
universally derides originalism - the view that the Constitution should
be interpreted according to its original meaning - as a dead hand
constraining social progress. For instance, to an originalist the
Constitution itself suggests that capital punishment must be permissible
under at least some circumstances, because it provides that, "No
one shall be held to answer for a capital crime unless on a presentment
or indictment of a Grand Jury" and that, "no one shall be
deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law."
Dworkin, however, argues that the Eighth Amendment can still prohibit
capital punishment because the ban on "cruel and unusual
punishment" reflects our evolving standards of decency. According
to the professor, the content of these new standards can be intuited by
judges and professors even if their intuitions conflict with those of
the overwhelming majority of people, who support the death penalty.
The disdain for originalism carries over from the constitutional
questions involving rights to those involving the structure of the
government. Many of those who signed the letter opposing impeachment
have also argued that the Supreme Court was correct to have discarded
the original understanding of federalism. For instance, Professor
Lawrence Lessig of Harvard, yet another signer, has argued that
federalism must be "translated" so as to be compatible with a
more centralized state, which, in his view, is necessary to regulate
modern society.
In their writings on impeachment, however, law professors became,
mirabile dictu, originalists themselves. Without so much as an
explanation, let alone an apology, for their transformation, they wove their arguments almost exclusively from text and history.
Of course, being rusty at the mere carpentry of legal analysis,
they often misused the most elementary of tools of the originalist
method.
The professors misconstrued language. For instance, their letter
against impeachment argued that the phrase "high Crimes and
Misdemeanors" was wholly or largely directed to acts committed in a
public capacity, because the adjoining words in the clause governing
impeachment, "Bribery" and "Treason," defined acts
necessarily committed in the public capacity. This was obviously an
error of interpretation. If an executive branch official passed money to
influence a judge for a private matter, his act would nevertheless
constitute bribery. As for treason, tell the Rosenbergs that it is a
crime that can only be committed in a public capacity.
The professors also failed to consider very pertinent evidence from
the era of the Framing about the gravity with which perjury was
regarded.
John Jay, the first chief justice of the United States, said of
perjury flatly, "there is no crime more extensively pernicious to
society" because it undermines the system of justice at the heart
of a civic republic.
As hypocrisy is the tribute that vice pays to virtue, so a faulty
reading of text and feeble historical research became the tribute that
these liberal law professors paid to originalism. But why did such
professors, in their testimony and op-eds and endless media appearances,
remain faithful to originalist methodology at all, when they ridicule it
in their scholarship?
Since it was clearly not by choice, it must have been a decision
forced by circumstance. If they had placed their arguments about
impeachment in the context of their own often conflicting theories of
constitutional interpretation, they themselves would have been ridiculed
by members of Congress, because their theories would have been so
obviously at odds with common sense. Impeachment was unlike academic
debates and even judicial proceedings in one salient and salutary
respect: The public was actually paying some attention; therefore,
arguments that flew in the face of our common pool of reasoning would
have been heavily penalized.
The impeachment hearings are not an isolated example of legal
theorists abandoning their own theories in public forums. For instance,
Bruce Ackerman, the Yale constitutional theorist, has long contended
that the Constitution can be amended outside of the formal process
spelled out in the document. In the professor's view, we can
dispense with the fusty process of requiring two-thirds majorities in
the Congress and ratification by three-fifths of the states. Instead, we
can amend by arriving at a revolutionary "constitutional
moment," at which time Congress and the president act in a way that
was previously unconstitutional and their action is subsequently
ratified by their reelection.
In the Harvard Law Review, Ackerman contended that the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) could be given effect by ordinary
legislation instead of requiring ratification by two-thirds of the
Senate, because the treaty ratification requirement had been made a dead
letter by a previous "constitutional moment" earlier in this
century.
Appearing before Congress, however, he did not advance under his
own academic coat of arms but made instead a weak textual argument on
behalf of NAFTA's constitutionality. The reason for his reticence
is clear: Many senators and reporters would have recognized that
Professor Ackerman's endorsement of ad hoc populist revisions of
our founding document discards constitutional restraints when they are
most needed - in moments of popular passion. The whole point of a
Constitution is, in the memorable words of Justice David Brewer, to have
"Philip sober control Philip drunk."
The impeachment-hearing conversion of law professors has many
lessons.
The most obvious is that, despite the consensus against originalism
in the legal academy, it reigns supreme in the public mind. The
Constitution is a recipe for government, and the common man, unschooled
in the intricacies of theory, understands that to follow a recipe you
need to understand it according to the meaning it had to those who
formulated it. Otherwise you may get an utterly different dish - one
prepared to the perhaps eccentric taste of the cooks. One further
argument intuitively understood is that originalism is the only possible
default rule for interpretation. Without originalism, our law professors
could have spent the entire debate in fruitless disagreement about which
of their many "non-interpretative" theories to choose.
But there are also larger lessons about the ability of public
attention to act as a counterweight to the bizarre flights of fancy that
are now pandemic in the legal academy. Recently one prominent left-wing
scholar denied that conservatives face discrimination in the legal
academy because they are conservatives. Instead, he contended that
conservatives were disfavored because they keep working on the boring
theory of originalism in constitutional law and textualism in statutory
interpretation rather than working to formulate new,
"cutting-edge" theories.
This professor was inadvertently revealing what motivates many
legal academics - the taste for novelty rather than the love of truth.
It is of no consequence to those ensconced in tenure that each novel
theory has itself been shown wanting. Indeed, these flaws present an
opportunity for further critique and yet another parlor game. The public
may not be experts but they recognize that more is at stake in legal
analysis than the opportunity to amuse and dazzle your friends. Many of
the theories offered in the academy are so patently dangerous to legal
regularity that they dare not speak their name in public.
THE PUBLIC ARENA ALSO makes it difficult for other kinds of
academics to spout nonsense. For instance, academic history today is
affected by all sorts of fads, but only academics who eschew such
theories can make a lasting impression on the public imagination. David
Fromkin's recent book, The Way of the World (Knopf, 1998), presents
a history of the entire progress of mankind in some 222 pages. He
proceeds on a theory of human motivations and environmental influences
that would have been immediately recognizable to the reader of Gibbon,
Tacitus, or Thucydides. While The Way of the World offers a deeper
explanation of a much vaster swath of human enterprise than most readers
could likely provide if asked to do so, the book resonates with our
experience and comports with the kind of explanations we give for
contemporary events around us. Fromkin is thus able to advance a
narrative and persuade us to take the time to read it in a mere couple
hundred pages.
In contrast, a feminist theory of history proceeds on claims of
patriarchy and conspiracy that we do not apply in daily life. Such
histories do not move the general public or sustain a comprehensive
narrative. It is hard to imagine a feminist interpretation of human
progress that covers the same terrain as Fromkin in the same 222 pages.
There would be too much explaining to do; events and actions that
could be readily understood as straightforward would have to be tortured
into yielding esoteric meaning. This is the reason those caught up in
the academic fashion of the moment choose obscure subjects and are
published only by the academic press. It is a sad truth that much of
what is written in our universities today is based on the occult ideas
of such narrow sects that they could never attract the slightest amount
of public interest.
Of course, it is not only academics whose practices might be
improved by the periodic glare of publicity. Unchecked self-interest
encourages many professions to use government and non-profit
institutions in ways that are contrary to the public interest. For
instance, ordinary lawyers have a tendency to prefer an unsound legal
methodology - one that preserves discretionary authority in the courts.
If the judiciary is not constrained by clear rules, lawyers become more
powerful and command higher fees because they are positioned to guide
the perplexed through the exercise of this discretion. As a result of
this self-seeking will of the legal class, law has become much less
fixed, certain, and constraining, making it a less efficient method of
resolving human disputes.
Lawyers and judges are able to transform jurisprudence to meet
their needs, rather than the needs of society, because most of the time
society simply isn't paying much more attention to them than to
academics. Thus, televising judicial proceedings, including those of the
Supreme Court, would serve as a useful counterweight to the interest
that lawyers as a group have in distorting the law.
In short, the spectacle of law professors being forced to speak a
common language of common sense rather than their usual peculiarly
self-interested jargon should make us think more broadly about the need
for public accountability in our society. If all professions are, at
least in part, conspiracies against the laity, a central issue for
political science is how to structure government so that these
conspiracies are periodically exposed. Only in this way can we avoid a
society that sinks under the weight of the barnacles of false ideas and
corrupt institutions that interest groups, like academics and lawyers,
generate over time.
We will face several difficult hurdles in building such structures.
First, public attention by its very nature is at best intermittent.
While some liberals advocate a democracy in which all people spend
much of their time reviewing and discussing public policy, this dream is
both a fantasy and a nightmare. Individuals will largely pursue their
private endeavors, and we should be grateful for this intractable fact
of social life, because such enterprises, and not endless chattering
about public life, are the ultimate source of wealth and meaning in our
lives.
Moreover, politics commands even less attention than it once did
because of the growth of other sources of entertainment. Even Abraham
Lincoln and Stephen Douglas would not have attracted the crowds they did
if a hundred channels of other fare were on offer.
Second, we must recognize that some subjects demand such expertise
that they require more than ordinary insulation from the dangers of
public error and mass hysteria. Judgments in physics and biology and
even in some kinds of economics may be unfathomable to those unschooled
in those disciplines. Nevertheless, even here scientists may acquire
interests not shared by the public at large - perhaps, for instance, in
complete liberty for experimentation, whatever the social costs. We
cannot therefore exempt any group from the sudden glare of harsh
scrutiny.
Instead we need to shape our structures of governance and social
norms to fit the nature of the subject matter we want the public to
monitor.
The need for purgation can be met in part by legal mechanisms that
are already in place. First, the Constitution pits the branches against
one another in other lustral struggles besides impeachment. For
instance, the Appointments Clause requires the Senate to confirm the
president's key nominees. The contests over such nominations have
helped us understand the deep principles animating an administration.
The debate over Lani Guinier's demands for racial representation in
the political process revealed the separatism that was implicit in
Clinton's breezy promise to make his administration "look like
America."
Congressional hearings are another way of calling to account not
only the administration, but many sectors of society that seek
insulation from scrutiny. It is a mistake to think that the most
important product of these hearings is legislation. More important, the
hearings may force groups to take positions and expound their principles
in a way that shows consistency (or lack of consistency) with the
principles that are necessary to sustain a free society in the long run.
The spirit of such hearings should not be solely that of accommodation;
sometimes only conflict can reveal the essentials. The wisdom of
cloning, for example, cannot be resolved by the expertise that has
created its possibility.
Instead cloning forces us to go back to the fundamental questions
of the nature of freedom and control over others. It thus cannot but
release passionate disagreement as its implications are more broadly
disseminated.
THE NECESSITY for periodic disinfection of the corners of society -
particularly those, unlike the market for example, that are not subject
to self-cleansing processes - is not a new problem in political
philosophy. In his Discourses on Livy, Machiavelli recommended that the
government be structured so that its contending elements - the monarch,
the aristocracy, and the plebes - come periodically into sharp conflict
so that the nation would be forced back to first principles, thereby
scrubbing away the grime accumulated by parochial priorities and petty
events. In his Histories of Florence he provides a powerful metaphor for
this political ablution - fires burning away the pestilential air of the
swamps in order to permit men to live together in that greatest of all
Renaissance cities.
The Machiavellian perspective is a reason to welcome the
impeachment of President Clinton, regardless of one's views on his
acquittal. Far from being a distraction from the real business of
government, it was the fundamental business - laying bare the fault
lines of society that, if unrevealed, would eventually become an even
greater threat to the Republic.
First, groups that had previously been seen as disinterested were
unmasked as groups focused only on their own narrow interests.
Academics, for instance, in lining up on one side of the issue and
relying on legal theories that they denigrate in the rest of their work,
showed themselves as a group whose work is result-driven rather than
principled. The professed concern of newspapers, like the New York
Times, for the highest standards of ethics in government was exposed as
a sham. These papers harshly criticized Clinton - right up until it
seemed he might lose office to a cause supported by the religious right.
In defending Clinton, their chauvinist provider, certain feminists
gave a whole new meaning to the old slogan "the personal is
political": Their professed concern for the personal was simply a
means of gaining political power.
Other truths about our society and its institutions also shimmered
at least for a moment. It became more widely recognized that the
capacity for dissimulation that marks a master politician of the welfare
state, who can promise benefits to all, corrodes not only himself but
society.
The Senate was seen as an institution whose concern for its dignity
can sometimes outweigh concern for the merits of an issue. In the glow
of impeachment, the costs of moral permissiveness on a whole generation
were uncovered. The list could go on: Impeachment was a flame that
illuminated much of what various elites and interest groups try to keep
secret.
Thus in the aftermath of impeachment, we should not be thinking
about how to avoid such contests in the future, but about how to build
more of them into our system. The notion of catharsis through contained
conflict is as necessary as it was in Machiavelli's day - perhaps
more necessary as our greater wealth makes it easier for us to ignore
danger ahead. Our society, however, has many more than three
identifiable elements about which Machiavelli wrote. Therefore, we may
need a far more reticulate social structure, with many more
intersections of conflict, if we are to purge our own pestilential air.
For primitive man, the central question was how to make controlled use
of fire to sustain human flourishing. It remains an enduring problem of
human governance.
John O. McGinnis is professor at Cardozo School of Law.
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