Militarization of U.S. Foreign Policy?
Handley, John M.
Mission Creep: The Militarization of US Foreign Policy? Edited by
Gordon Adams and Shoon Murray, Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University
Press, 2014. ISBN 13: 978-1-62616-114-6, pp. 264 (end-notes plus
references, notes on contributors, and an index), $49.95 Hardcover.
The book is divided into three sections, starting with the five
chapters under "The Institutional and Political Context"
followed by six chapters in "Observing the Militarizing Trend"
and concluding with two chapters under "Implications of
Militarism." The organization of the material reflects the
editors' theme: the military is encroaching on Foreign Service
missions, to the detriment of U.S. foreign policy and relations with the
international community. In addition to the two editors (Gordon Adams
and Shoon Murray), both professors at the School of International
Service, the book appears to be a collection of papers or presentations
by six additional academicians (Derek Reveron, Charles Cushman, G.
William Anderson, Connie Veillette, Sharon Weiner, and Nina Serafino)
plus four former career State Department practitioners (Ambassadors
James Dobbins, Brian Carlson, Ed Marks, and Tony Quainton, all of whom
also have their own academic credentials).
The introductory chapter by Adams and Murray summarizes the
subsequent chapters (2 through 12), while the last chapter by Adams
summarizes the recommendations gleaned from the previous chapters. All
of the contributors of DOD accepting and accomplishing missions
previously assigned to DOS, in Chapter 7, only Nina Serafino, who works
for the Congressional Research Service, questions whether the Department
of Defense (DOD) actively sought an expansion of its mission and she
reminds readers to consider Congress's role in civilian oversight
of U.S. activities and operations abroad. In 1961, Congress passed the
Foreign Assistance Act (FAA), which makes the Secretary of State
responsible for the supervision of all overseas assistance to include
military assistance. This law remains in effect today, supplemented in
1976 when Congress charged the Secretary of State with the
responsibility "for continuous supervision and general
direction" (p. 122) of military education, training, and civic
action. Serafino and her researchers came up with some very interesting
comparisons: (1) for security assistance from 2001 to 2010 Department of
State (DOS) accounts grew 65% while DOD accounts grew 32%; (2) for
counterterrorism, peacekeeping, demining, and rule-of -law training DOS
accounts grew 168% to DOD's 20%; and (3) in two DOD accounts,
demining and nonproliferation, DOD accounts decreased while similar DOS
accounts grew substantially (p. 131). In addition to the still current
FAA, Congress required DOS concurrence for almost all of the post 9/11
legislation dealing with Iraq and Afghanistan, expanding DOS concurrence
in 2004 to all Special Operations support overseas, and transferring DOD
monies to DOS for stabilization and security assistance, including
funding the Pakistan Security Forces (p. 139). As Serafino points out,
DOS has the authority to approve and supervise all U.S. activity on
foreign soil to include spending funds allocated to DOD for projects DOS
deems appropriate.
In Chapter 9, former ambassador Tony Quainton and Shoon Murray
address the perceptional problem of any of the five regional combatant
commanders entering an ambassador's area of responsibility and
engaging in some sort of project the ambassador believes unhelpful. The
authors, using interviews with ambassadors and other anecdotal evidence,
basically lay this perception to rest (with the possible exception of
Jordan) and conclude that combatant commanders are considerably more
helpful than hurtful to an ambassador by providing funds the ambassador
needs to get projects done that DOS cannot afford. There is one major
exception-SOCOM. Special Operations Command, unlike a regional combatant
commander, has a global mission to fight terrorism thanks to an
Executive Order signed by President Bush and re-instituted by President
Obama. Because SOCOM considers just about everything it does classified,
SOCOM operators often elect not to inform an embassy of their arrival
in-country (and thus not to request country clearance). A lack of
SOCOM-DOS coordination will surely continue until the current Executive
Order is withdrawn or amended.
The concluding chapter (13), as mentioned above, contains a list of
recommendations extracted from previous chapters but gives little
credence, in my opinion, to the three major recommendations from
Ambassador Marks, found chapter 12. Marks presents a
"whole-of-government" approach which seems reasonable to me;
however, I suspect his recommendations would require such a major shift
in the DOS and DOD organizations, as well as in their cultures, that
they are probably not "doable." First, Marks wants career
foreign service officers to fill at least five positions: one of the
deputy secretaries of state, the under sectary for management, counselor
of the department, director-general of the foreign service, and director
of the Foreign Service Institute (with the last three positions mandated
for fixed terms). Second, he suggests creating an intermediate
management level at the under- or assistant secretary level of DOS
giving these operational managers the oversight authority to coordinate
policy down to the country team. The result would be to reorganize the
DOS into the Department of Foreign Affairs Coordination. Marks'
last recommendation requires a DOD reorganization that leaves war
planning and fighting in the hands of combatant commanders but takes all
the other missions (security, terrorism, narcotics, smuggling, criminal
networks, etc.) and places them in a multi-agency coordinating
organization with representatives from all the pertinent players, with
DOS oversight.
Although DOD is considerably larger in personnel than DOS and DOD
has a significantly larger budget with a vast clientele, one has to keep
in mind that DOS has the most important client of all-the President of
the United States. Ambassadors, not military commanders, represent the
Office of the President as well as the United States Government to
foreign heads of state. Additionally, the Secretary of State maintains
supervisory authority over all U.S. activity on foreign soil unless the
country is in a state of war. With the president declaring the wars over
in both Iraq and Afghanistan, the only "territorial" war in
which the U.S. is currently engaged is with North Korea, which remains
in a state of armistice. [Although perhaps not true today, when I served
in South Korea in the early 1970s, the U.S. Army Eighth Army Commander
headed the country team, not the ambassador, due to the armistice.]
Most of the contributors complained that DOD has taken over
traditional DOS missions in nation building to include development,
governance, and humanitarian assistance. In this sense "mission
creep" is a fact. However, did DOD ask for these missions? No. Did
DOD want these missions? No. Why did the executive branch and Congress
task DOD with these missions? Because, the DOS either could not or would
not undertake them. These nation-building missions were integrated into
military training and doctrine in 2005 after Congress and the President
tasked the military to undertake them. Even so, the 1961 Foreign
Assistance Act, amended in 1976, gives the Secretary of State sole
authority over all U.S. assistance overseas-civilian and military.