RtoP alive and well after Libya.
Weiss, Thomas G.
With the exception of Raphael Lemkin's efforts on behalf of
the 1948 Genocide Convention, no idea has moved faster in the
international normative arena than "the responsibility to
protect" (RtoP), which was formulated in zorn by the International
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS). (1) Friends
and foes have pointed to the commission's conceptual contribution
to reframing sovereignty as contingent rather than absolute, and to
establishing a framework for forestalling or stopping mass atrocities
via a three-pronged responsibility--to prevent, to react, and to
rebuild. But until the international military action against Libya in
March 201l, the sharp end of the RtoP stick--the use of military
force--had been replaced by evasiveness and skittishness from diplomats,
scholars, and policy analysts.
The increasing and, at times, virtually exclusive emphasis on
prevention in the interpretation of RtoP was politically correct but
counterproductive. Libya changed that. Security Council Resolution i973
authorized prompt, robust, and effective international action to protect
Libya's people from the kind of murderous harm that Muammar
el-Qaddafi inflicted on unarmed civilians early in March 2011 and that
he has continued to use against the "cockroaches" who oppose
him (his description eerily echoing the term used in 1994 by
Rwanda's murderous regime).
Mustering cross-cultural political will to protect civilians is
never going to be easy, but Libya may be pivotal. As the situation in
Tripoli and across the wider Middle East unfolds, acute dilemmas will
remain for decision-makers and humanitarians. (2) If the Libyan
intervention goes well, it will put teeth in the fledgling RtoP
doctrine. Yet, if it goes badly, critics will redouble their opposition,
and future decisions will be made more difficult--for one thing, because
the decibel level of claims by contrarians about RtoP's potential
to backfire through "moral hazard" will increase. (3) For the
moment, however, the usual spoilers are on the defensive.
While the ICISS certainly did not consider the
"prevention" prong of RtoP an afterthought, readers of Ethics
& International Affairs should nonetheless recall the Canadian
government's primary motivation for convening the group: to break
new ground about how to react effectively in the face of a
conscience-shocking situation. The commission's comparative
advantage, at least in relation to other blue-ribbon groups, was its
narrow focus on what everyone routinely used to call "humanitarian
intervention" prior to the coining of the "responsibility to
protect." (4) Widespread receptivity to the ICISS's
recommendations reflected its demand-driven character, not just the
supply of idealism from like-minded normative entrepreneurs. States
sought guidance about intervening across borders to protect and assist
war victims. The inconsistent and incondusive military humanitarianism
of the 1990s was hotly debated, as readers of these pages will recall.
The ICISS sandwiched military force between the sliced white bread
of prevention and postconflict peacebuilding. With its more popular
elements on either end of the RtoP continuum, the option of military
intervention to protect human lives became somewhat more palatable than
it had been, especially in the global South. Nonetheless, sovereignty
remained paramount, and the deployment of military force was
objectionable to many critics. RtoP remained contested.
As he has done on too many issues, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon
sought to avoid controversy. His January 2009 report emphasized
"three pillars" for RtoP--state responsibility, capacity
building, and international responses--a formula that aimed to finesse
the third pillar, which includes using or threatening to use military
force to stop mass atrocities. (5) This evasiveness continued in his
July 2010 report on early warning (6)--as if better information and the
establishment of a joint office were the real challenges or the real
solution to making the words "never again" more than a slogan.
The need for greater prevention is indisputable, but it is hard to
fathom why UN officials and some scholars--such as Alex Bellamy in the
pages of this journal--find it "reasonable" to view RtoP
"as a policy agenda in need of implementation rather than as a
'red flag' to galvanize the world into action." (7)
Moreover, as William Zartman points out, it is curious that
"discussions of prevention continually return to the need for
early-warning systems, when the real need is for an authoritative list
of proximate triplines and for a determination to act upon them."
(8) Indeed. As James Pattison has pointedly reminded us,
"humanitarian intervention is only one part of the doctrine of the
responsibility to protect, but ... it is part of the responsibility to
protect." (9)
Over the last decade, we have witnessed not too much but rather too
little armed force to protect human lives. Since Kosovo in 1999, other
than a small British deployment in Sierra Leone in 2000 and a smaller
essentially French one in eastern Congo in 2003, there has been no
substantial multinational effort to protect a people from their own
government until Security Council Resolution 1973 authorized "all
necessary measures" against Libya to enforce a no-fly zone and to
protect civilians. Except for the bullish but as yet unused Article 4(h)
of the African Union's Constitutive Act, the hard edge of RtoP has
been ignored. (10)
The anguished hue and cry about RtoP being a ruse for Western
imperialism is disingenuous but resonant in parts of the global South.
The result, as Simon Chesterman summarized some time ago, is "the
overwhelming prevalence of inhumanitarian nonintervention." (11)
Will Libya be an aberration? Is the assertive liberal interventionism of
the 1990s ancient history? At that time "sovereign equality looked
and smelled reactionary," wrote Jennifer Welsh in this journal a
year ago. "But as the liberal moment recedes, and the distribution
of power shifts globally, the principle of sovereign equality may enjoy
a comeback." (12) Let us hope that Libya proves her wrong. At the
very least, the current military effort reinforces Jarat Chopra's
and my assertion in a 1992 article in this journal that
"sovereignty is no longer sacrosanct." (13)
In order for preventive measures to be considered credible,
negotiations to be successful, and the ultimate safety of civilians to
be ensured, military force is occasionally necessary--and always the
threat to use it. Indeed, the mere consideration of military action in
Libya undoubtedly made the initial decision on other Chapter VII
measures easier: Security Council Resolution 1970 included an arms
embargo, assets freeze, and travel bans, and referred the case to the
International Criminal Court. These compromises were robust (for the UN
at least) and were agreed to immediately and unanimously in late
February 2011. Simultaneously, for the first time the Human Rights
Council referred to the responsibility to protect, in Resolution S-15/1,
which led to General Assembly Resolution 65/60 suspending Libya from
that council.
Despite widespread opprobrium and numerous UN resolutions, the
collective hesitancy in 2010-2011 to oust Laurent Gbagbo and install
Alassane Ouattara in Cote d'Ivoire provides a contrast to Libya and
illustrates what happens in the absence of a serious military option.
The departure of Gbagbo in April followed a half year of dawdling as
Cote d'Ivoire's unspeakable disaster unfolded. Three times in
March 2011 alone the Security Council menaced the loser of the November
2010 elections and repeated its authorization to "use all necessary
means to carry out its mandate to protect civilians." But the UN
soldiers on the ground did little until the early-April 2011 action led
by the 1,650-strong French Licorne force. The international
unwillingness to use significant armed force abetted Gbagbo's
intransigence. Was it really necessary to allow war crimes, crimes
against humanity, a million refugees, and a ravaged economy to continue
so long? Could and should international military action not have taken
place much earlier?
Military humanitarianism is a necessary, albeit insufficient,
component of the responsibility to protect. Those seeking to make
"never again" more than an aspirational slogan should consider
the demonstrated limits of moral outrage and diplomacy not just in Cote
d'Ivoire but also in Darfur, the Democratic Republic of the Congo
(DRC), and Zimbabwe. (14) In the face of massive murder and displacement
in Darfur, the Security Council's dithering since early 2003
mirrors its inability to address the even longer-running woes and the
millions of dead in the DRC. Mediocre mediation in Zimbabwe reflects the
disparity between lofty multilateral rhetoric and the lack of meaningful
international political will to prevent or halt atrocities.
Let us be clear: Military force is not a panacea, and its use is
not a cause for celebration. However, in situations of ongoing mass
atrocities it is a crucial option, as the ICISS recognized. Despite the
original conceptualization of the responsibility to protect, armed force
was absent from the international RtoP agenda until Libya. This fact
substantiates the evaluation by the Overseas Development Institute that
the 2005 World Summit "set a high-water mark of rhetorical concern
... but opinion is highly divided on what responsibility this actually
implies for international actors." (15) Or as Gary Bass has put it,
"We are all atrocitarians now--but so far only in words, and not
yet in deeds." (16)
Is it possible to rediscover the rhetorical passion and commitment
to humanitarianism that followed our collective mea culpa after the
tragedy in Rwanda? Washington's and London's disingenuous
"humanitarian" justifications for the Iraq war were almost a
conversation stopper for RtoP. In addition, the former practice among
senior UN officials of mounting the bully pulpit even before major
powers and regional organizations have pronounced themselves on a crisis
issue has all but disappeared. As a result, the view that there was
insufficient military action undertaken to halt the murder of some
800,000 Rwandans became unfashionable. Many states and the diplomatic
context at the United Nations shifted in favor of the critics of the
so-called new militarism--a minority in the global South who condemned
RtoP as the Trojan Horse of Western neoimperialism. In reality, however,
until the international action in Libya, RtoP often constituted an alibi
for avoiding military force for human protection.
Clausewitz is the usual point of departure for those who argue that
diplomats should step aside when negotiations fail and let soldiers
pursue politics by other means. However, the responsibility to protect
requires that diplomats succeed in securing agreement either on
preventive measures or on the deployment of military force. In the
latter case, diplomats stand aside after they have succeeded, and
soldiers do what diplomats cannot--halt mass atrocities. Today, the main
challenge facing the responsibility to protect is how to act, not how to
build normative consensus. The shibboleth of Western imperialism is a
distraction when there are foundations across the global South on which
to build a case for robust humanitarian action; (17) in this regard, the
support of the Arab League and the African Union for outside
intervention in Libya is noteworthy and perhaps a harbinger.
Perhaps Libya will make policy- and decision-makers realize that
between 1999 and 2oll we witnessed not too much military intervention to
protect human beings but rather not nearly enough. The international
action against Libya was not about bombing for democracy, sending
messages to Iran, implementing regime change, keeping oil prices low, or
pursuing narrow interests. These may result from such action, but the
dominant motivation for using military force was to protect civilians. A
collateral benefit is that the (to date) encouraging nonviolent and
democratic revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt may have greater traction.
Now that the Arab world is no longer a democracy-free and human
rights-free zone, Qaddafi's "model" for repression will
no longer be interpreted as an acceptable policy option by other
autocratic regimes.
Speaking in Brazil shortly after imposing the no-fly zone for
Libya, U.S. President Barack Obama saw no contradiction between
authorizing military action and his Nobel Peace Prize: one can be in
favor of peace but still authorize force to halt the butchering of
civilians. Later, when addressing the U.S. public, Obama defended this
decision, which provided no political advantage but prevented massacres
that would have "stained the conscience of the world." Libya
suggests that we can say no more Holocausts, Cambodias, and Rwandas--and
occasionally mean it.
doi: 10.1017/S0892679411000220
NOTES
(1) International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty,
The Responsibility to Protect (Ottawa: International Development
Research Centre, 200l). See also Thomas G. Weiss and Don Hubert, The
Responsibility to Protect: Research, Bibliography, Background (Ottawa:
International Development Research Centre, 200l).
(2) See Michael Barnett and Thomas G. Weiss, Humanitarianism
Contested: Where Angels Fear to Tread (London: Routledge, 2011).
(3) See Alan J. Kuperman, "Mitigating the Moral Hazard of
Humanitarian Intervention: Lessons from Economics," Global
Governance 14, no. 2 (2008), pp. 219-40; Alan J. Kuperman, "The
Moral Hazard of Humanitarian Intervention: Lessons from the
Balkans," International Studies Quarterly 52 (2008), pp. 49-80; and
Alan J. Kuperman, "Darfur: Strategic Victimhood Strikes
Again?" Genocide Studies and Prevention 4, no. 3 (2009), pp.
281-303.
(4) The author's version is Thomas G. Weiss, Humanitarian
Intervention: Ideas in Action (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007).
(5) Ban Ki-moon, "Implementing the Responsibility to Protect:
Report from the Secretary-General," UN document A/63/677, January
12, 2009.
(6) Ban Ki-moon, "Early Warning, Assessment and the
Responsibility to Protect: Report of the Secretary-General," UN
document A/64/864, July 14, 2010.
(7) Alex J. Bellamy, "The Responsibility to Protect--Five
Years On," Ethics & International Affairs 24, no. 2 (2010), p.
166.
(8) I. William Zartman, "Preventing Identity Conflicts Leading
to Genocide and Mass Killings," International Peace Institute,
2010, p. 4.
(9) James Pattison, Humanitarian Intervention and the
Responsibility to Protect: Who Should Intervene? (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2010), p. 250, emphasis in original.
(10) Kwame Akonor, "Assessing the African Union's Right
of Humanitarian Intervention," Criminal Justice Ethics 29, no. 2
(2010), pp. 157-73.
(11) Simon Chesterman, "Hard Cases Make Bad Law: Law, Ethics,
and Politics in Humanitarian Intervention," in Anthony F. Lang,
Jr., ed., Just Intervention (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University
Press, 2003), p. 54.
(12) Jennifer Welsh, "Implementing the Responsibility to
Protect: Where Expectations Meet Reality," Ethics &
International Affairs 24, no. 4 (2010), p. 428.
(13) Jarat Chopra and Thomas G. Weiss, "Sovereignty Is No
Longer Sacrosanct: Codifying Humanitarian Intervention," Ethics
& International Affairs 6 (1992), pp. 95-117.
(14) See Thomas G. Weiss, "Politics, the UN, and Halting Mass
Atrocities," in Adam and Ernesto Verdeja, eds., The International
Politics of Genocide (Boulder, Co.: Lynne Rienner, forthcoming).
(15) Sarah Collinson et al., Realising Protection: The Uncertain
Benefits of Civilian, Refugee and IDP Status (London: Overseas
Development Institute, 2009), HPG Report 28, p. 3.
(16) Gary J. Bass, Freedoms Battle: The Origins of Humanitarian
Intervention (New York: Knopf, 2008), p. 382.
(17) Rama Mani and Thomas G. Weiss, eds., The Responsibility to
Protect: Cultural Perspectives in the Global South (London: Routledge,
2011).