Toward a realist ethics of intervention.

Wesley, Michael

Most considerations of the ethics of intervention in international relations attempt to reconcile within a common moral framework claims of humanitarian obligation, sovereign rights, international order, and the just use of coercive force. (1) The obvious normative intent of much of this writing is to contribute to the establishment of a compelling case for the provision of assistance, often in the face of physical resistance and legal objections, to humans who are suffering. Yet a survey of the incidence and progress of force-backed interventions over the past decade would suggest that the efforts of these scholars and jurists have had little traction either within most foreign ministries or on the ground among populations subject to humanitarian concern. Convincing moral cases for a general obligation to intervene have had little effect on the rising tide of postintervention peace-building fatigue that has resulted from ongoing obligations to ensure stability after various interventions. Regimes in Pyongyang, Moscow, Beijing, Tehran, and Harare have likewise been unmoved by powerful moral-legal arguments about sovereignty being conditional on a government's respect for the well-being of its citizens (2)--as has the UN Security Council. And as postconflict peacekeepers in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq remain powerless to resolve deep communal hatreds, gratitude for the initial interventions among local populations has begun to ebb away. Despite the euphoric claims made about the new moral framework for humanitarian intervention after NATO's Operation Allied Force in Kosovo, considerations of interest, viability, and partiality continue to drive the pattern of interventions.

If ethical inquiry about intervention is to have practical impact, it must range further than purely conceptual discussions of obligations, rights, order, and just war. It must, in short, learn from realism, taking into account considerations that resonate within foreign ministries and on the ground in societies in distress. My intention in this article is to approach the ethics of humanitarian intervention from a more empirical standpoint by presenting a history of humanitarian intervention as a process of evolution through successive stages featuring different dominant rationales and forms. I argue that humanitarian intervention should be discussed in a broader and different historical context than is typical. This context is the rise of developed states' concerns about the domestic institutions and practices of developing states after the 1970s. This "new" interventionism--different from traditional interventionism that was based primarily on considerations of strategic advantage (3)--raised to new prominence in international relations a set of ethical issues concerning political community and obligation. (4) The forces driving the evolution of humanitarian intervention through successive dominant forms have been the internal normative contradictions of each stage and the persistence of concerns about the internal workings of postcolonial, and, later, post-communist states.

My empirical-historical approach to the ethics of humanitarian intervention leads to a conviction that a different set of moral issues, informed by realist considerations, needs to be addressed in creating an effective normative framework for intervention. After outlining this alternative set of moral issues in the next section, I use the following four sections to demonstrate that each "phase" of humanitarian intervention--which I term economic, political, human rights, and governance interventionism--has suffered from an inability to reconcile these normative issues in a way that directly impacts on interventions' effectiveness. In the conclusion I suggest that the current phase of concern with transnational security, if powerful enough to drive a general realignment of conceptions of interests and obligations, presents us with the best chance to construct a common normative framework under-girding humanitarian interventions.

REALIST ETHICS AND INTERVENTION

Many understand realism to be either amoral or immoral, the favored position of those wishing to deny the relevance of normative frameworks. This popular conception relies on a caricature, which at times has been used by realists themselves for dramatic effect. Realism's approach to ethics derives from a philosophical tradition that has long discussed the relationship between ethical frameworks and effective political action and association. Thomas Hobbes and David Hume sought to demonstrate why rational individuals living in political society had an interest in acting in accordance with moral rules. (5) In arguing that effective political action often requires acting outside of the conventions of common morality, Niccolo Machiavelli nevertheless affirmed the existence and importance of shared systems of motivation and justification--whether "moral" or "political"--between peoples and those ruling them. (6) More recently, participants in the debate over what Michael Walzer termed "the problem of dirty hands" have argued that even politically justified but morally dubious actions carry a "moral residue" demanding that their authors feel guilt and atone for these acts. (7)

Realism takes from this tradition of inquiry an acknowledgment that effective political action is best pursued within a common moral community. In the absence of such a common moral community, the utility of force rises and that of ethical appeal declines, while what can be achieved by politics alone becomes much more limited. (8) The tradition of Carl Schmitt, transmitted through Hans Morgenthau, saw the existence of bounded moral communities among which competition reigned as the essence of the realm of the political. (9) It is a consequence of the division of humanity into bounded moral communities that they will contend for necessarily limited and rival goods. The essence of realist ethics is that political leaders have an overriding moral obligation to advance the interests of their own, bounded moral communities against the interests of other moral communities. And, of course, this moral obligation is reinforced by the logic of political representation within states. So the basic component of any realist ethics must be the consideration of the motivation for political action, based on a government's obligations to protect and advance the interests of its own constituents.

For realists, to propose that a government should act in accord with general moral interests rather than state interests is to propose an absurdity, a diplomatic counterpart to Prince Myshkin in Dostoyevsky's The Idiot. Even states that proclaim an "ethical" foreign policy rarely stray far from the dictates of self-interest. But this is not to endorse the caricature of realism: that extreme immorality brings the greatest rewards in international relations. Careful realists have always recognized that the "id" of state self-interest must conform to a "superego" of general normative principles of state behavior in order for the state to function effectively and avoid destruction. (10) Particularly in the postwar era, states have become increasingly sensitive to perceptions of the legitimacy of their actions, (11) and commentators have attempted to demonstrate the folly of state actions that pay little attention to international perceptions. (12) Foreign policy actions that are rhetorically justified according to a structure of normative principles shared by all those affected by the action will be less costly and more enduring. So a second component of a realist ethical framework must be the consideration of the justification for an action, or whether it is seen to be legitimate to all those affected by it.

In addition to considerations of interest and legitimacy, states are also highly attentive to the principles of international order. Proposals and principles deemed too corrosive to the ongoing viability of a stable international society have generally remained just that--proposals and principles. (13) It is in relation to this consideration that many of the inquiries into the ethics of intervention have occurred. (14) For realists, the principles of international order serve as an overarching normative structure that is vital to both the motivation and justification for foreign policy actions. (15) International order principles function as the framework within which state actions occur, and are added to and reinforced by state actions. Realists see the principles of international order as necessarily evolving and as generally compatible with viable and effective political outcomes, while independently valid of particular exigencies. So the third component of a realist ethical framework must be its validity in terms of the general principles of international order.

A realist system of ethics determines that just actions in international relations must align these three principles: motivation according to states' interests, justification in terms of principles of legitimate action, and validity by reference to the principles of international order. The 1991 Gulf War is often hailed as such an occasion. (16) Humanitarian interventions, because they seek a lasting transformation of the domestic practices of other societies, need to be especially attentive to aligning these realist ethical principles. Interventions motivated by general moral justifications or conceptual appeals to the validity of international order will either fail to occur or will succumb to halfhearted commitments (as the cases of Rwanda and Somalia showed). Interventions based on self-interested motivation alone (as some argued was the case with the 2003 invasion of Iraq), will strike resistance on the ground and incur great costs in morale, materiel, and diplomatic capital.

I define "humanitarian" intervention as the provision of prescriptive advice about, or the direct manipulation of, a state's domestic processes and institutions of government, backed by the threat or use of coercive measures or conditions on assistance, by external states or international agencies. This distinguishes broadly "humanitarian" interventions--those professing concern for the people of the state in question from earlier forms of great-power interventions concerned with the adjustment or tending of spheres of influence or balances of power. Humanitarian intervention, because it seeks to accomplish a lasting change in another jurisdiction, relies implicitly on a common normative framework simultaneously reconciling the motivations of the intervening states, the justifications provided to the society subject to intervention, and general understandings of international order and acceptable state conduct. The following sections demonstrate that the four phases of humanitarian intervention since the 1970s have lacked such a framework, which contributed directly to their poor rates of success.

ECONOMIC INTERVENTIONISM

The rise of humanitarian interventionism in the 1970s needs to be seen against the historical context of decolonization and postcolonial politics in international relations. As colonies graduated to statehood, the metropolitan powers accepted that the new states would be constituted on the basis of what Robert Jackson calls "negative sovereignty"--that is, the international assurance of their juridical existence and status. The exclusive focus on the international form of these new states led the former colonial powers to ignore questions of "positive sovereignty"--that is, whether new states possessed sufficient internal control and resources to form viable states. (17) Negative sovereignty, postcolonial sensitivities, and Cold War geopolitics coincided to produce a disinclination on the part of Western states to criticize or even examine too closely the domestic affairs of postcolonial states. (18) Between the developed and the developing worlds, the ambit of moral evaluation and judgment narrowed significantly, as the remit of tolerance, agnosticism, and negative comity widened. (19) Where established and new states were compared explicitly was over broad disparities in economic development, and to a lesser extent in political maturity. Developing states were able to tie their underdevelopment to colonialism and the unfair structure of the global economy in a way that conferred an obligation on the developed world to provide them with development assistance. Meanwhile, in developed nations, particularly the United States, the ascendancy of "modernization theory" assumed that the progress of economic development and political maturity in the developing world were inevitable given the requisite aid and advice, and would unfold along predictable, well-trodden trajectories.

While developed states generally accepted the obligation to assist postcolonial states economically through aid and advice, it was an obligation never taken particularly seriously. Levels of aid provided by most states have never even approached the 0.7 percent of GNP suggested as a basic level of obligation, while many wealthy countries have manipulated their aid transfers to secure benefits for national economies and producers. (20) The providers of economic assistance were, in the early postwar decades, wary of intervening too closely in determining how developing states would use the aid payments. A comparison that is rarely made in this context is with U.S. Marshall Plan in Europe, which saw large aid transfers accompanied by extensive involvement by the U.S. government and civil society organizations in the restructuring and rebuilding of war-torn European societies. The presumption of the Marshall Plan was that economic development required deep and ongoing commitment on the part of donors to the domestic governance of the recipient states. (21) In the case of development aid to the developing world, the provision of technical advice was left largely to the UN, the World Bank, and the regional development banks. (22)

Two issues arose in the early 1980s to unsettle the West's relative neglect: the "Third World" debt crisis and the aid paradox. Many developing countries' spiraling indebtedness and worsening economic performance despite decades of aid and assistance focused attention on their domestic economic structures. The aid paradox both raised the concern of developed state governments about the use of aid money and tempered feelings of sympathy for developing countries. The focus of blame for underdevelopment shifted from disadvantages arising from the unfair structure of the global economy--for example, the harms of colonization and underdevelopment imposed by economic "dependency"--to inadequacies in economic management. Following the postwar ascendancy of state-led development strategies, which had emphasized the problem of market failures that needed to be corrected through state interventions, (23) developing states' internal economic policies and institutions came under close scrutiny. The lack of development in many states, despite decades of aid payments, led to mounting concern about developing states' economic management capacities, particularly concentrating on state intervention in the economy, corruption, and distributional inefficiencies. The rising tide of neoliberal economic doctrine was soon applied to development economics as the development banks, the IMF, and individual states began advocating a mixture of macrostability, liberalization, and privatization for the domestic economic policy of developing states. (24)

The neoliberal economic interventionism that arose in the 1980s was enforced mainly through conditionality: the practice of attaching conditions of policy behavior to economic assistance from the major development banks. But the arm's-length nature of this new economic interventionism betrayed the weakness of developed states' motivations to address effectively underdevelopment in the developing world. Developing states that had become reliant on external financial assistance often had little option but to accept the conditionality of the new aid. Neoliberal economic doctrine was also injected into developing countries through the dispatch of advisors from the development banks and through the training of economists from developing countries in Western universities, where many economics departments had succumbed to the neoliberal economic revolution.

A recent study has revealed a very mixed rate of success for the 958 "structural adjustment programs" that were implemented in developing countries between 1980 and 1998 by the Bretton Woods institutions. (25) Francis Fukuyama has recently observed that neoliberal interventions in many countries had an adverse impact on their capacity to develop the economic and other attributes of positive sovereignty, writing:

 The relative emphasis in this period lay very
 heavily on the reduction of state activity, which
 could often be confused or deliberately misconstrued
 as an effort to cut back state capacity
 across the board.... The result was that liberalizing
 economic reform failed to deliver on its
 promise in many countries. In some countries,
 indeed, absence of a proper institutional framework
 left them worse off after liberalization than
 they would have been in its absence. (26)

Developed countries' general concern with economic governance was an insufficient motivation to drive their comprehensive engagement with the diverse problems of underdevelopment in the developing world, leading to low rates of success for economic interventionism.

Despite such damning critiques, the urgency of economic interventionism increased in the late 1990s. New reasons arose for attention to economic governance, which were related to concerns about the transnational effects of economic weakness. The Asian financial crisis caused many, such as former IMF managing director Michel Camdessus, to see developing countries' domestic economic policies and institutions as dangerous to regional and global financial stability:

 Crises can now become systemic through contagion.
 Domestic economic policy must take
 into account its potential worldwide impact; a
 duty of universal responsibility is incumbent,
 making each country responsible for the stability
 and quality of world growth. (27)

Many commentators argue that the IMF and the development banks have made marginal modifications to their economic intervention strategies, while continuing to push the neoliberal "Washington consen sus" agenda on developing countries. (28) Economic interventionism failed to allay nagging concerns in the developed world about shortfalls in developing states' positive sovereignty. By the beginning of the 1990s, this led to the rise of a new form of interventionism, complete with its own motivations, justifications, and validity claims, but ultimately, also, flawed.

POLITICAL INTERVENTIONISM

For most of the postwar period, Western states have been little concerned about the domestic political makeup of postcolonial states, in terms of the presence or absence of functioning democracies. Interventions occurred when, irrespective of the presence or absence of democracy, it appeared that a state was changing its foreign policy, and drifting from one Cold War bloc to another. (29) Indeed, Western states intervened on several occasions in the developing world when it appeared that a democratically elected government was adopting a more independent or pro-Soviet stance. (30) During the Cold War, the presence or absence of democracy was thought to be irrelevant in determining how developing states should be dealt with. The Reagan administration's ambassador to the UN, Jeane Kirkpatrick, had argued that there was no dilemma for the United States in befriending dictators in noncommunist countries because they were more likely eventually to become democracies. (31)

This lack of concern with regime type began to change by the mid-1980s, as the Reagan administration faced the prospect of losing the United States' strategic bases in the Philippines to the "people power" protests shaking the Marcos dictatorship. Washington's sudden withdrawal of support for Ferdinand Marcos and backing of Corazon Aquino saw the rise of a powerful conservative constituency convinced that democratization should be a central plank in U.S. foreign policy. (32) From that point, elements on both the Left and Right of politics in the United States provided strong adherence to what Walter Russell Mead calls the "Wilsonian" tradition of foreign policy, which seeks to export democracy to undemocratic states. (33) The strategic case for democratization had long been made by "democratic peace" scholars, who argued that democratic states were less likely to fight each other and more likely to subscribe to international norms. (34) The end of the Cold War provided further impetus to the democratization lobby, by demonstrating that some authoritarian regimes were vulnerable to popular demands for political freedoms and democratic rights. The use of American symbols of democracy by the Tiananmen protesters in China showed that the U.S. democratic example was a powerful motivating force. And when Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990, Saddam Hussein was immediately portrayed as an aggressive Hitler-style dictator, with the implication that authoritarian regimes were by their very nature a threat to international peace and security.

Democratization advocates had found a new rationale for intervention: that a government's clearly enunciated support for democracy and anti-authoritarianism would lead to long-term strategic advantages. The appeal to the political liberties of subject peoples provided ample justification, though not to authoritarian governments and their supporters. The problem occurred when there were overriding short-term strategic interests in favoring the status quo in various authoritarian states.

Commentators began making the case that democratization should become the focus of U.S. foreign policy after the end of the Cold War had deprived it of a central driving focus. (35) Fukuyama's widely read "end of history" thesis made the case that the progress of liberal democracy was inevitable; thus, in advocating democratization, it was argued that American foreign policy would be pushing at an opening door. (36) By September 1993, Anthony Lake, the national security adviser in the first Clinton administration, had given U.S. government endorsement to the focus on democratization:

 Throughout the Cold War we contained a
 global threat to market democracies; now we
 should seek to enlarge their reach, particularly
 in places of special significance to us ... we
 should help foster and consolidate new democracies
 ... especially in states of special significance. (37)

Democratization was seen not only as being in the interests of those who lived in autocracies, but also as a positive development for global stability, because it promised to reduce the number of dictators, who were seen as less trustworthy international partners and less inclined to respect international norms. In this, European states had a longer democratization tradition than the United States in their insistence that only democracies would be eligible for membership in the European Community.

This democratic political interventionism relied on certain assumptions about human aspirations and motivations. Democratization advocates assume that all humans possess a common drive toward free expression and entrepreneurialism, and that it is pathologies that arise within the domestic politics or societies of states that prevent these human qualities from flourishing. (38) This gives rise to further assumptions about the desirability, inevitability, and linearity of democratization, once these state-imposed impediments and pathologies are removed. (39) As Charles Call and Susan Cook have argued, "Despite protests to the contrary, democratization theory suffers from some of the flaws of modernization theory, including its tendency to view the West's experience as both a normative yardstick and an empirical expectation." (40)

The mechanisms of political intervention have been varied, and they are tied to diagnoses of what causes dictatorships to survive or collapse. An initial model was that embodied in the European Community's body of law, the acquis communautaire, which by clearly stating that only stable democracies will be considered for membership provides a considerable carrot to regional countries to institute human rights and democracy. More recently, the EU has applied this criterion to out-of-area involvements--for example, by refusing to take part in discussions to which undemocratic Burma is an invited party. After 1991, Iraq was subjected to sanctions and international opprobrium while opposition groups were actively supported, including by being provided with safe areas enforced by no-fly zones. North Korea and Zimbabwe were isolated and delegitimized also. In these cases, the strategy of intervention was premised on the assumed inherent fragility of dictatorships and the inherent appeal of democratization; yet in each of these countries, the autocrats proved highly skilled and ruthless in maintaining power. A significant part of the case for the invasion of Iraq in 2003 stemmed from assessments that Saddam Hussein had proved more than a match for more indirect methods of political intervention to overthrow his regime. (41) More recently, Western governments and NGOs have concentrated on providing direct advice and assistance to opposition parties in quasi-democratic states, such as Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan.

There is strong evidence that democratic political interventionism has as mixed a record of success as its neoliberal economic counterpart. Of the wave of democratization that has occurred since the end of the Cold War, very little can credibly be attributed to the direct intervention of outside actors. And in the above-listed cases of direct political pressure in favor of democratization, as well as situations in which UN missions have undertaken the task of democratic peace-building in postconflict societies, the record of success in constructing durable democracies is very poor. (42) For realists, the problems with political interventionism occurred at the levels of motivations and justifications. The overriding strategic importance of a Hosni Mubarak or a Pervez Musharraf regime inspires caution in the face of claims of long-term strategic gains. This leads to a partial implementation of the policy and thus a denial of the formal justice requirement to "treat like cases alike," opening its justifications up to accusations of cynicism and self-interest.

HUMAN RIGHTS INTERVENTIONISM

Between 1945 and the early 1990s, there was considerable reluctance on the part of Western states to critique the human rights performance of postcolonial states. During the colonial period, and particularly in the context of battling decolonization movements, all of the colonial powers had engaged in serious human rights abuses. Furthermore, the key human rights issue in the West in the 1950s and 1960s, racial equality, closely echoed anticolonial rhetoric, making Western leaders and commentators largely inattentive to humanitarian breaches in non-white-ruled countries.

The circumstances and conditions of decolonization made many postcolonial states reliant on repressive methods to control ethnically divided societies. In the context of decolonization, national self-determination referred only to a "negative right" not to be ruled by members of a different race. (43) Whichever ethnic group assumed power in the new state was entitled to expect the political allegiance of all ethnic groups that had been enclosed within the former colony's boundaries, and quite often assumed the right to repress rival ethnic groups in the name of state building. As a result, ethnic conflict has been endemic in many postcolonial and postcommunist states, and even democratic governments have resorted to widespread and systematic human rights abuses to safeguard the integrity of their states and the tenure of their regimes.

Human rights began to gain prominence as an issue in international relations in the context of the Cold War, particularly after the passing of the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe in 1975. (44) The inclusion of a declaration on common humanitarian principles in a document legitimating Cold War frontiers directed attention to the abuses of human rights carried out against not only high-level dissenters, such as Alexander Solzhenitsyn, but also the mass of ordinary people in the Soviet bloc. (45) It was not until after the Cold War, in the early 1990s, however, that humanitarian catastrophes surged to prominence as issues demanding direct preventive and corrective intervention by the international community. More than any other event, it was the conflict in the Balkans and the emergence of the practice of "ethnic cleansing," which recalled the Nazi Holocaust, that placed human rights intervention on the international agenda. (46) The agony of Bosnia was closely followed by a failed international intervention in Somalia to alleviate widespread starvation occurring as a consequence of an ongoing civil war, and then the failure of the UN to take timely action to prevent large-scale genocide in Rwanda. After the NATO alliance's forceful intervention in Serbia in 1999 to halt abuses against Muslims in Kosovo, an international commission of legal practitioners and scholars, responding to a challenge from UN secretary-general Kofi Annan, proposed that the international community has a "responsibility to protect" people subject to abuses by their own governments. (47)

The motivation toward human rights interventionism on the part of Western states came in response to several factors. One was that human rights outrages appeared incongruous in the light of the predominant "new world order" liberal internationalist euphoria prevailing at the end of the Cold War. Western public opinion, provided with immediate images of human suffering by the media, exerted very real pressure on governments to "do something" to help alleviate catastrophes. (48) This was a sentiment that was used by certain governments to shore up public support against pushing for too big a post-Cold War "peace dividend": "Humanitarian actions nurture the ... public's support for our engagement abroad." (49) But there were almost no states willing to subscribe to the doctrine proposed by scholars, jurists, and ethicists that a general duty of humanitarian intervention existed or should exist in international law. Indeed, every humanitarian intervention that has occurred since India's invasion of East Pakistan in 1971 has been justified primarily not by humanitarian concern, but by reference to the international destabilization caused by the conflict or its humanitarian impact. The security rationale has been the key to achieving the acquiescence of skeptical permanent members of the UN Security Council to humanitarian interventions, and to reassuring the rest of the international community that human rights interventions will not become a destabilizing general crusade.

The justifications for human rights intervention were much more problematic. Once again, humanitarian concern came face-to-face with strategic realities, as Chinese and Russian atrocities occurred and reoccurred with little cost--let alone full interventions. Beyond this, there seemed to be little consensus on how to compare types and circumstances of human suffering. And then the genocide in Rwanda occurred, leading to questions about whether the color of the victims' skin determines concern for human rights. Once again, the justification for humanitarian intervention suffered from shortfalls in formal justice. As Mohammed Ayoob has pointed out, the selectivity of human rights interventionism generates considerable cynicism in the postcolonial world, among populations to whom it appears that some humans' rights are more worthy of protection than others.' (50)

Each mechanism of human rights intervention has proved problematic, a record that has robbed the movement supporting humanitarian interventionism of some of its momentum. The mechanisms of rhetorical pressure, ranging from the U.S. State Department's annual report to the UN Commission on Human Rights, have had much of the impact of their shaming strategies negated by political maneuvering and name-calling. States such as China, regularly the subject of critique, have either neutralized UN processes or issued their own reports pointing out the human rights failings of their principal accusers. And the "Asian values" debate during the 1990s saw postcolonial states mount a vigorous pluralist defense of their human rights records in the face of the cosmopolitan-solidarist international human rights agenda. The use of direct sanctions has been discredited by the case of Iraq in the 1990s, where it became clear that the impact of sanctions was most directly and catastrophically felt by the weakest members of society. On the other hand, policies of "constructive engagement" with such countries as Burma are argued to bolster the power and legitimacy of brutal governments. And direct military intervention confronts the still-unresolved moral dilemma of doing harm in order to protect and the legal dilemma of using force against sovereign states.

The experiences of the 1990s show that in seeking to ensure adherence to human rights standards, the international community has been unwilling to contravene the basic principles of negative sovereignty and the current state system. Even the most ambitious and extensive human rights interventions, such as that in Kosovo, have not been willing to alter international territorial boundaries or challenge the negative sovereignty of states in pursuit of a durable solution. (51) This means that human rights interventions into ethnic conflicts by default have the objective of leaving behind functioning multiethnic states with strong guarantees of minority rights. (52) In practice, it has meant that human rights interventions often result in open-ended peacekeeping and peace-building obligations, which over time come to resemble international mandates. The sheer cost and commitment of too many open-ended mandates meant that by the end of the 1990s, direct military intervention in support of human rights had become a much less discussed and advocated policy by governments and most commentators.

GOVERNANCE INTERVENTIONISM

While economic, political, and human rights interventionism are all motivated by concern about the consequences of the domestic organization of postcolonial and postcommunist states, each of these three types of interventionism has directed its attention to the reform of processes. Thus, economic interventionism attempts to reorganize the processes of economic policymaking and regulation along neoliberal lines; political interventionism seeks to democratize the processes of government; and human rights interventionism promotes processes guaranteeing basic human rights to all citizens. The new phase of interventionism, focused on governance, which gained dominance after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, is less concerned about processes and more attentive to achieving an outcome: specifically, making states effective in controlling what occurs and arises from within their borders. Although the economic, political, and human rights intervention agendas continue to operate--and they often also inform the governance agenda--the single-minded focus on states' capacity to control the people and territory for which they are responsible has often overridden concern with democracy or human rights.

International interest with "governance" (53) and "failing states" had begun to rise in the early 1990s, in particular with the persistent chaos in Somalia. But until September 11, 2001, this concern had been related primarily to issues of international order and humanitarianism. After the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, governance and state failure became concerns of intense security self-interest to Western governments, such as the U.K.'s:

 [The terrorist attacks] confirmed the emergence
 of two linked threats to Britain's and the
 world's security: global terrorism and the
 dangers from "failed states" where the rule of
 law has broken down and chaos prevails. Terror
 and state failure had been with us for
 many years. But never before had they combined
 to such devastating effect. Al Qa'ida
 grew strong in a country where legitimate
 government had given way to force of arms
 and barbarism. (54)

As global security concern turned to transnational threats, including terrorism, organized crime, drug smuggling, pandemics, and weapons proliferation, the example of al-Qaeda and Afghanistan focused attention on failing states and governance. Almost overnight, international security had shifted its attention from the aggregation of power to zones of extreme powerlessness. The new security focus quickly generated its own geopolitics, with Fukuyama writing, "The end of the Cold War left a band of failed and weak states stretching from the Balkans through the Caucasus, the Middle East, Central Asia and South Asia." (55) Other commentators developed a new "domino theory" of state failure, arguing that the chaos from one failing state can easily spill over into adjacent states, thereby dragging neighbors into failure also. (56) The logic of this new geopolitics is clear: weak states must be strengthened before their internal chaos affects regional and global security. For the first time in recent history, the motivation for intervention became more aligned to traditional realist concerns of self-interest, as interventions were advocated as a form of forward or anticipatory defense against the transnational threats that could spill forth from weak states.

According to the new security paradigm, what makes the developed world so vulnerable to the effects of state weakness in the developing world is globalization. As Richard Haass describes:

 Besides providing tangible "goods," globalization
 facilitates the flow of numerous "bads."
 The same networks that channel billions of
 dollars in investment capital around the world
 every day can also transmit financial contagion.
 The same structure of global production
 that brings opportunity to poor regions can
 generate trans-boundary pollution. The same
 Internet that links continents can be used to
 coordinate criminal enterprises. The same
 flow of scientific expertise that enables medical
 breakthroughs can put the power to kill
 thousands in the hands of terrorists. (57)

Globalization, an unstoppable force, requires close attention to governance, according to the Australian government: "The quality of a country's governance is crucial in determining whether it gains or loses from globalization." (58) And Thomas Barnett argues that weak systems of governance that are ill equipped to handle the forces of globalization become the defining security challenge:

 In this century, disconnectedness [meaning a
 low level of integration into the processes of
 globalization] defines danger. Disconnectedness
 allows bad actors to flourish by keeping
 entire societies detached from the global community
 and under their control. Eradicating
 disconnectedness, therefore, becomes the
 defining security task of our age. (59)

The new concern with internal governance signifies a full-scale shift back to international concern with the conditions of positive sovereignty, or a state's possession of sufficient internal control over its population and territory. Justifications highlighting concern with the plight of people in failing states resonated with the humanitarian concerns driving economic, political, and human rights interventionism. The sense of urgency surrounding the issue of terrorism has created a new normative environment that has allowed postcolonial sensitivities to be brushed aside. Australian prime minister John Howard notes:

 There was a time not so long ago when sensitivities
 about alleged "neo-colonialism" perhaps
 caused Australia to err on the side of
 passivity in our approach. Those days are
 behind us as we work constructively to address
 the challenges faced by our immediate neighbourhood. (60)

And, in preparing the ground for a new phase of interventionism, negative sovereignty is hedged with a new form of conditionality, according to Haass:

 One of the most significant developments
 over the past decades [is] the emerging global
 consensus that sovereignty is not a blank
 check. Rather, sovereign status is contingent
 on the fulfillment by each state of certain
 fundamental obligations, both to its own citizens
 and the international community.
 When a regime fails to live up to these
 responsibilities or abuses its prerogatives, it
 risks forfeiting its sovereign privileges
 including, in extreme cases, its immunity
 from armed intervention. (61)

As governance has become "securitized," its meaning has changed. Originally, governance was understood as "the structures and processes that enable governmental and nongovernmental actors to coordinate their interdependent needs and interests through the making and implementation of policies in the absence of a unifying political authority." (62) As it has become linked to measures of state failure, governance has been redefined as the capacity of a state to provide certain public goods to its people. (63) Primary among these is security from the types of societal disorder that provide ideal conditions in which malevolent transnational forces can operate. The focus on transnational security threats has assuaged the likely opposition of such states as China and Russia, which would be deeply suspicious of a governance agenda that was not linked to effectiveness against transnational threats. (64)

The drive to ensure greater state capacity to eradicate conditions conducive to transnational threats has led the United States, as well as global and regional organizations, to pass a raft of resolutions and measures mandating state action against terrorism (by one count, twelve counter-terrorism protocols requiring specific state actions had been passed between 2001 and 2004), terrorist financing (specifically, the Financial Action Task Force requirements on terrorist financing), organized crime, documentation fraud, money laundering, drug production, and transport and trade security requirements. Many of these injunctions have been accompanied by threats that noncompliant states will face moratoriums on aid and other international eligibilities. The sheer number and scale of new internationally mandated governance requirements and the urgency dictated by the accompanying sanctions has led many small developing states to worry about their capacity to enact and enforce so much complex legislation in a short time. (65)

The series of governance interventions that have taken place since September 11, 2001--in Afghanistan, Haiti, Solomon Islands, Cote d'Ivoire, and Papua New Guinea--have made use of a variety of techniques and rationales. Different strategic theorists have conceptualized the interventions in various ways: Barnett, for example, refers to the developed world "exporting security" to failing states. (66) Hugh White talks of the application of "firm power," where military and police "hard power" pacification of violent societies is combined with "soft power" in the form of developed states' legal, administrative, and financial expertise to build strong institutions of governance. (67) In the case of Afghanistan, direct military intervention was used to topple a dangerous and misgoverning regime. A pacification force was inserted into Haiti to stabilize a society that had been driven to chaos by the misrule of a democratically elected government. The interventions into the Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea have had this objective, but have also taken on the role of helping to construct more robust systems of governance and public order.

But as with economic, political, and human rights intervention, governance intervention is fraught with difficulties. When governance interventions require not only the construction of robust institutions but the transformation of political systems, as in Afghanistan, they confront all of the problems of political interventions. Despite its shift in meaning, "governance" continues to refer not only to the existence of frameworks of order and regulation, but the willingness and capacity of society to be shaped by these frameworks--a conception close to Michel Fou cault's discussion of "governmentality." (68) And often when political systems and governance frameworks appear to be externally imposed, particularly after an armed invasion, the receptiveness of segments of society to the new systems is reduced. When governance interventions do not require or propose a change in the politics of the state, and confine themselves to technocratic tasks, such as in the Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea, other problems can arise. On the one hand, as Fukuyama has argued convincingly, history shows that technocratic solutions that work in one situation often fail in others, due to the advising technocrats' inattention to local variations. (69) On the other hand, such interventions' lack of attention to local political dynamics can mean that the technocratic solutions they propose will soon succumb to destabilizing political competition and violence. For instance, there are strong reasons to question how durable the institutions erected by the Australian-led governance intervention in the Solomon Islands will be, because the mission has no mandate to address the land rights issues that lie at the root of that country's present crisis. Indeed, given Australia's difficulty in addressing its own indigenous land rights issues, there is little hope that the current intervention will even begin to resolve the conflicts underlying the Solomon Islands' chronic state weakness.

TOWARD A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR INTERVENTION?

In examining the successive rise of different dominant phases of humanitarian intervention, it has been my intention to demonstrate that inattention to the considerations of realist ethical concerns leads to sporadic and inadequate interventions and to significant rates of failure. Two generic problems recur in each type of humanitarian intervention. The first is a commitment shortfall on behalf of intervening states, leading to a lack of dedication to long-term engagement and to accepting and working with local requirements. Such commitment shortfalls often derive from the lack of a compelling self-interest that drives many cases of humanitarian intervention: in such cases, the capacity of general humanitarian concern to maintain states' involvement evaporates quickly. The second is a receptivity shortfall within societies subject to intervention, meaning a lack of willingness and capacity on the part of local populations to accept the changes advocated. These receptivity shortfalls demonstrate that even though the normative regime against interference in the domestic affairs of developing states is being eroded internationally, post-colonial sensitivities, particularly over perceptions of "civilizational" gaps, are strongly felt domestically. Furthermore, receptivity shortfalls lead to a range of intervention pathologies--ranging from damaging failures to mission creep and open-ended, mandate-like commitments--that in turn result in reluctance of the international community to intervene in states in genuine need of help. This reluctance has led to an extreme caution in developed countries, dictating that interventions are considered from within the prism of national self-interest. This in turn leads to cynicism within the developing world about the motives of intervention, which further extends receptivity shortfalls.

Despite its failings so far, the dynamic driving governance interventionism offers the best chance of aligning the motivations, justifications, and validity underpinning humanitarian intervention. With the rise of the transnational security agenda, pathologies in the domestic governance of developing states have become central to the self-interest of developed states. Two attributes of modernity may intensify this alignment: globalization and, to borrow Emile Durkheim's term, the increasing organicism of society. (70) Just as globalization can transmit the effects of state weakness and social disorder across borders more rapidly and extensively than ever before, the greater organicism of modern societies--meaning the advancing interdependence and greater functional specialization of actors and institutions--has led to huge increases in the vulnerability of modern societies to catastrophic disruption. (71) Thus, just as states have become increasingly alert to attacks on their infrastructure by other states, they have also become more sensitive to the types of international heterogeneity that can transmit the dangerous consequences of state weakness toward their own societal and infrastructural vulnerabilities.

For this reason, the trend of greater interventionism by developed states, oriented toward protecting their vulnerabilities but at least partly bound up in humanitarian concern, will likely continue. Interventionism may change as developed states' perceptions of their vulnerabilities change--for example, the next phase of interventionism may be "biosocial" aimed at changing the environmental, social, and agricultural practices of societies that give rise to dangerous zoonotic diseases, such as SARS and avian flu--but it will likely continue. Transnational threats--from terrorism to pandemics--have conceptually linked the functionality of separate societies as never before on a global scale in international relations. With each new terrorist attack, wave of narcotics, or pandemic outbreak, governments and societies grow increasingly aware of their vulnerability to transnational networks deriving their potency from their ability to arbitrage different levels of governance internationally. (72)

If concern with transnational threats continues and broadens past the current focus on terrorism, it will offer an opportunity to develop a shared framework of domestic and international order that may align the three components of a realist ethics of intervention: motivation, justification, and validity. The lack of alignment among these components has led to the commitment shortfalls and receptivity shortfalls that have plagued each form of intervention. The central tension that needs to be resolved in such an alignment is between the central requirement of motivation--the self-interest of intervening states--and one of the key conditions of viable justification--formal justice, or the need to treat like cases alike. Concern with transnational threats, if it can be translated into an internationally agreed framework of state effectiveness, offers a chance to resolve this tension. If developed states' perceptions of insecurity can be linked to state failure everywhere, rather than just in some regions, poor governance may continue to furnish motivations for intervention. Prioritizing interventions on the basis of objective, general performance indicators measuring a state's provision of security and welfare to its people would bolster the justification for interventions. States falling short on such indicators would need to demonstrate a marked record of improvement to avoid triggering targeted, calibrated interventions at certain thresholds. Intervention in most cases should involve a long-term commitment to help build state capacity and institutions of governance, further strengthening justifications and claims to validity. Ironically, and unfortunately, it may only be through the increasing insecurity of developed societies that a realist normative framework for humanitarian intervention can gain traction.

(1) See, e.g., Simon Chesterman, Just War or Just Peace? Humanitarian Intervention and International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); Deen K. Chatterjee and Don E. Scheid, eds., Ethics and Foreign Intervention (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Stanley Hoffmann, The Ethics and Politics of Humanitarian Intervention (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1997); J. L. Holzgrefe and Robert O. Keohane, eds., Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal, and Political Dilemmas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); and Pierre Laberge, "Humanitarian Intervention: Three Ethical Positions," Ethics & International Affairs 9 (1995), pp. 15-36.

(2) See, e.g., Nicholas J. Wheeler, Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).

(3) The 2003 invasion of Iraq, even though partially justified by concern for the Iraqi people and committed to reconstructing Iraq's institutions of governance, was undertaken for predominantly strategic reasons.

(4) Although Andrew Linklater, in his Men and Citizens in the Theory of International Relations (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1990), points out that jurists and philosophers have discussed such issues since the early modern period.

(5) See Thomas Hobbes, The Elements of Law, Natural and Politic (London: Cass, 1969), Part I; and David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), Book III.

(6) Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince, trans. W. K. Marriott (London: Dent, 1958).

(7) See Michael Walzer, "Political Action: The Problem of Dirty Hands," Philosophy & Public Affairs 2, no. 2 (1973), pp. 163-64; Gerald F. Gaus, "Dirty Hands," in R. G. Frey and Christopher Heath Wellman, eds., A Companion to Applied Ethics (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003), pp. 167-79; C. A. J. Coady, "Politics and the Problem of Dirty Hands," in Peter Singer, ed., A Companion to Ethics (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), pp. 373-83; and Martin Hollis, "Dirty Hands," British Journal of Political Science 12 (1982), pp. 385-98.

(8) Martin Wight, Systems of States (London: Leicester University Press, 1977).

(9) Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, trans. George Schwab (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996).

(10) See, e.g., Arnold Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962), pp. 47-65.

(11) Inis L. Claude, Jr., "Collective Legitimization as a Political Function of the United Nations," International Organization 20, no. 3 (1966), pp. 367-79.

(12) Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (Washington, D.C.: PublicAffairs, 2004). (13) Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society (London: Macmillan, 1977). Bull and his followers distinguish an attentiveness to principles of international order from the "Hobbesian" realist position in international relations, yet fail to provide any convincing evidence that realists have little regard for these issues.

(14) See Hedley Bull, ed., Intervention in World Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984); and Wheeler, Saving Strangers.

(15) See Georg Schwarzenberger, Power Politics: A Study of International Society (London: Stevens and Sons, 1951), pp. 218-32.

(16) Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh, The Gulf Conflict 1990-1991: Diplomacy and War in the New World Order (London: Faber and Faber, 1993).

(17) Robert H. Jackson, Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

(18) The exception, of course, was France, which continued to consider itself bound by ongoing responsibilities toward its former colonies, especially in West Africa, and to intervene in their affairs.

(19) Jackson, Quasi-States, p. 196.

(20) See Stephen Krasner, "Power Structures and Regional Development Banks," International Organization 35, no. 2 (1981), pp. 303-28.

(21) Michael J. Hogan, The Marshall Plan: America, Britain and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947-1952 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987).

(22) A minor exception is the rise of government-funded programs, such as the Peace Corps, and civil society organizations, such as Oxfam, but these have never matched the scale or impact of Marshall Plan involvement.

(23) World Bank, Worm Development Report 1997 (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1997).

(24) John Toye, Dilemmas of Development (Oxford: Black well, 1987).

(25) William Easterly, "The Lost Decades: Developing Countries' Stagnation in Spite of Policy Reform" Journal of Economic Growth 6, no. 2 (2001), pp. 135-57.

(26) Francis Fukuyama, State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004), p. 5.

(27) Michel Camdessus, "The IMF at the Beginning of the Twenty-First Century: Can We Establish a Humanized Globalization?" Global Governance 7, no. 4 (1997), p. 364.

(28) See Ray Kiely, "Neoliberalism Revised? A Critical Account of World Bank Concepts of Good Governance and Market Friendly Intervention," Capital and Class 64 (Spring 1998), pp. 63-88; and Susanne Soederberg, "The Emperor's New Suit: The New International Financial Architecture as a Reinvention of the Washington Consensus," Global Governance 7, no. 4 (2001), pp. 453-67.

(29) John Lewis Gaddis, The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987).

(30) Examples include Iran in 1953, Chile in 1973, and Nicaragua in 1979.

(31) Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, Dictatorships and Double Standards: Rationalism and Reason in Politics (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1982).

(32) See James Mann, The Rise of the Vulcans (New York: Penguin Books, 2004), ch. 8, for an account of the development of concern for democracy and human rights as part of the conservative agenda in the United States.

(33) Walter Russell Mead, Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How It Changed the World (New York: Routledge, 2002).

(34) See Michael W. Doyle, "Liberalism and World Poli tics," American Political Science Review 80, no. 4 (1986), pp. 1151-69.

(35) See, e.g., Joshua Muravchik, Exporting Democracy: Fulfilling America's Destiny (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute Press, 1991).

(36) See John C. Hulsman, A Paradigm for the New World Order (Basingstoke, U.K.: Palgrave Macmillan, 1997).

(37) Anthony Lake, "From Containment to Enlargement," Vital Speeches of the Day 60, no. 1 (1993), p. 17. (38) See, e.g., Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (London: Penguin Books, 1992); and Muravchik, Exporting Democracy.

(39) See Robert Packenham, Liberal America and the Third World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973).

(40) Charles T. Call and Susan E. Cook, "On Democratization and Peacebuilding," Global Governance 9, no. 2 (2003), p. 235.

(41) See Bob Woodward, Plan of Attack (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004).

(42) See Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996).

(43) Jackson, Quasi-States, p. 152.

(44) Jack Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989).

(45) R. J. Vincent, Human Rights and International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986).

(46) Roy Gutman, A Witness to Genocide (Shaftsbury, U.K.: Element, 1993); and Salahi Ramadan Sonyel, The Muslims of Bosnia: The Genocide of a People (Markfield, U.K.: The Islamic Foundation, 1994).

(47) International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect (Ottawa: IDRC, 2001).

(48) Michael Wesley, Casualties of the New World Order: The Causes of Failure of UN Missions to Civil Wars (Basingstoke, U.K.: Macmillan, 1997).

(49) Lake, "From Containment to Enlargement," p. 17.

(50) Mohammed Ayoob, "Third World Perspectives on Humanitarian Intervention and International Administration," Global Governance 10, no. 1 (2004), pp. 99-118.

(51) Kosovo's effective independence from Serbia under the autonomy framework of the Rambouillet Accords is unlikely ever to be transformed into statehood; in the case of East Timor, the UN intervention occurred after the formal vote for independence from Indonesia.

(52) A good example of this can be seen by tracing the history of the various international peace plans for Bosnia and the Dayton Accords, all of which insisted that Bosnia would be reconstituted as a functioning multiethnic democracy; see Wesley, Casualties of the New World Order.

(53) See, e.g., World Bank, World Development Report 1997; and James N. Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel, eds., Governance without Government: Order and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).

(54) United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office, "Foreign and Commonwealth Office Departmental Report," London, U.K., May 2003, p. 3.

(55) Fukuyama, State Building, p. xi.

(56) See, e.g., Elsina Wainwright, "Responding to State Failure: The Case of Australia and the Solomon Islands," Australian Journal of International Affairs 57, no. 3 (2003), p. 489.

(57) Richard N. Haass, "The Changing Nature of Sovereignty," speech given to the School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C., January 14, 2003. (58) Government of Australia, "Advancing the National Interest: Australia's Foreign and Trade Policy White Paper," Canberra, April 2003.

(59) Thomas P. M. Barnett, The Pentagon's New Map (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 2004), p. 8.

(60) John Howard, speech given to the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Sydney, Australia, June 18, 2004; available at www.pm.gov.au/news/speeches/speech921. html.

(61) Haass, "The Changing Nature of Sovereignty."

(62) Elke Krahmann, "National, Regional and Global Governance: One Phenomenon or Many?" Global Governance 9, no. 3 (2003), p. 327.

(63) See Robert I. Rotberg, "Strengthening Governance: Ranking Countries Would Help," Washington Quarterly 28, no. 1 (2004/05), pp. 71-81.

(64) China and Russia reacted to September 11, 2001, not by focusing on governance but by emphasizing the great powers' common struggle against radical pan-Islamism; see Ariel Cohen, "Russia, Islam, and the War on Terrorism: An Uneasy Future," Demokratizatsiya 10, no. 4 (2002), pp. 556-67; and Ahmad Lutfi, "China's Islamic Awakening," China Brief 4, no. 10 (2004); available at www.jamestown.org/images/pdf/cb_004_010.pdf.

(65) Several South Pacific governments, for example, have expressed concern that their legal and bureaucratic systems will be unable to design and enact the required legislation by the deadlines set.

(66) Barnett, The Pentagon's New Map, pp. 230-33.

(67) Hugh White, "Not Hard Cop, Not Soft Cop, But Still Firmly into PNG," Sydney Morning Herald, September 23, 2003; available at www.smh.com.au/articles/2003/09/ 22/1064082927285.html?from=storyrhs&onedick=true.

(68) Foucault saw government as one possible modality of the exercise of power. His discussions of governmentality focus on the reciprocal relationship between governments that specify certain types of behavior and subjects that are variously willing to constitute themselves (as certain "subjectivities") in ways that complement government preferences. See The Essential Works of Foucault, 1954-1984, Volume 111: Power, ed. James D. Faubion, trans. Robert Hurley (London: Penguin Press, 1994).

(69) Fukuyama, in State Building, draws attention to the cases of Russia and Argentina, which took technocratic advice on economic restructuring only to fall prey to catastrophic financial failures and long-term economic decline.

(70) Emile Durkheim, The Division of Labor in Society (New York: Free Press, 1984).

(71) For example, the almost total dependence of modern societies on information infrastructure and "just-in-time" inventory and production systems is leading to an exponential growth in their exposure to losses should all or a part of their vital infrastructure fail; see, e.g., Stephen J. Lukasik, Seymour E. Goodman, and David W. Longhurst, "Protecting Critical Infrastructures Against Cyber-Attack" Adelphi Paper no. 359 (London: IISS, 2003). This problem has been somewhat more polemically discussed in Ulrich Beck, Risk Society, Towards a New Modernity, trans. Mark Ritter (London: Sage Publications, 1992). My thanks to an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion.

(72) Here I emphasize that transnational networks don't only rely on weak governance--transnational criminals and terrorists prefer to route their finances through states with stable institutions of financial governance but low reporting requirements.

Michael Wesley, My thanks to Will Alker for research assistance and to Marc Williams, Tiziana Torresi, Dirk Moses, CY, Paige Arthur, and an anonymous reviewer for their comments on successive drafts of this article; however, I am responsible for any mistakes or misinterpretations in this essay.