Unwrapping Russian foreign policy.
Kent, Thomas J.R.
Russian Foreign Policy: The Return of Great Power Politics
Jeffrey Mankoff
(Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2009), 359 pages.
A typical outsider's concept of Russian foreign policy might
envisage Dmitry Medvedev and Vladimir Putin seated comfortably in the
Kremlin, deciding what they want to accomplish, then skillfully
selecting from an array of policy tools readily at their command: the
military and security services, Gazprom's collections department,
state-controlled media (i.e. drivers of public opinion), and state
businesses ready to ship arms and build nuclear power plants wherever
needed.
In his book Russian Foreign Policy, Jeffrey Mankoff, adjunct fellow
for Russia studies at the Council on Foreign Relations and associate
director of International Security Studies at Yale University,
challenges this image. He posits that Russia lacks a clear idea of its
foreign policy goals and questions whether or not Russian state and
state-influenced institutions follow leaders' interests rather than
having agendas or priorities of their own.
For Mankoff, Russian foreign policy is hardly a fixed idea
implemented by all-powerful figures in the Kremlin, but rather the
product of a constantly changing tableau of leadership intent, official
institutions' rival interests, and the ups-and-downs of the Russian
economy. The frequently mixed signals from western nations--sometimes
treating Moscow as an equal partner, sometimes warning that Russia still
needs to be encircled and contained--also impact Russia's behavior.
Mankoff captures the nuances of each of these factors in his book,
a tour d'horizon of the world as viewed from Moscow and of the
forces that shape Kremlin policy. Gazprom and companies that build
nuclear power stations emerge as international actors themselves,
interested in maximizing profits regardless of whether the issue is gas
supplies to Ukraine or a nuclear plant in Iran. The implications of
their actions for the European Union--concerned about Ukraine's
political independence-or the United States--worried by Iran's
nuclear program--are not their leading concern. Meanwhile, the Kremlin
cannot manipulate public opinion as easily as an outsider might think;
Mankoff describes the latter as more isolationist than elite opinion and
as a functioning restraint on Russian policy. The army and security
services, for their part, also have a significant voice in defining
policy.
Russia's basic political philosophy seems to be constantly
evolving. Mankoff describes pressures on top policymakers from Russian
nationalists, centrists, Eurasianists (whose beliefs, though varied, see
Russia as the center of a new Eurasian power that reunites the former
USSR and directly challenges the West), and liberal Atlanticists. At
times, Russia's government has acted to satisfy each group. For
instance, it has enforced tough action against illegal immigrants (a
policy sought by the nationalists); raised military spending and
intensified pressure on Ukraine and Georgia (a demand of the
Eurasianists); and moved toward WTO membership and stronger relations
with the United States after 9/11 (desired by liberals). Until Russia
settles on its political identity and foreign policy goals, its policy
will remain erratic and influenced by contradictory currents.
Mankoff traces the roots of foreign policy under Medvedev and Putin
to a key period--a decade earlier, under the presidency of Boris
Yeltsin. At that time, he states, "With Russia's own
instability and the West's inability to make a Russia after its own
image, Kremlin leaders began laying the foundation for Russia to return
to its accustomed international position as one pole in a system of
shifting, competitive states." (1) The prospect of Russia as an
integral part of the West was buried.
This world view persisted throughout the Putin presidency and is
likely to characterize the remainder of Medvedev's as well. Some
might challenge Mankoff's very idea of a Medvedev foreign policy
given Putin's role in determining Russia's actions. Mankoff
acknowledges that Medvedev's role, even in such a major decision as
sending Russian troops to Georgia, is unclear. He is careful, however,
not to make the leap of assuming Medvedev is some kind of Putin
marionetka. Although he doubts Medvedev is on the brink of proclaiming
any fundamentally new foreign policy, Mankoff holds open the possibility
that Medvedev may yet bring his own emphases.
The book contains relatively few references to Soviet history and
might well have benefited from more. The contradictions that comprise
Russian foreign policy today recall similar tensions during the Soviet
period. The Soviet Union's efforts to be a "reliable
partner" of the West in energy supplies while also being a Cold War
rival echo similar issues today. The contradictory actions of supporting
opposition movements in the Third World while stifling Soviet dissidents
required some deft propaganda footwork from the Soviets. Equivalents of
today's internal interest groups existed then as well. A longer
look at how Soviet policy managed to steer through these contradictions
could inform our predictions of how Russia will deal with its own
varying policy currents now.
Russian Foreign Policy is a well-organized book, beginning with the
internal factors affecting Russian policy and then moving on to detail
relations with the United States, Europe, and Asia. Along the way it
includes clear, extensive descriptions of the economic and mechanical
issues involved in delivering Russia's oil and natural gas; the
recent history of Russian relations with the "near abroad";
and Russia's diplomacy in the Far East, including the maneuverings
of Russia and China in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.
In his conclusion, Mankoff lays out avenues of diplomacy that might
prove fruitful in the West's relations with Russia. The United
States and the West, he argues, "Need to show Russia that it can
have what it most craves--respect, recognition and responsibility for
upholding order around the world--without having to resort to force or
threats of force to make itself heard." (2) At the same time, the
West must hold firmly to its principles of democracy and rule of law.
However nimble and wisely conceived the West's policies may
be, the book recognizes that a stable role for Russia in the world also
depends on Moscow's own still-unfolding process of defining its
national goals. It also depends on both sides trying to get past Cold
War thinking: "suspecting the other of expansionist designs and
responding in ways that contribute to mutual distrust." (3)
Professor Mankoff's book is a wide-ranging, thoughtful view of
Russian foreign policy today.
NOTES
(1) Jeffrey Mankoff, Russian Foriegn Policy: the Return of Great
Power Politics (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2009), 4
(2) Ibid., 305.
(3) Ibid., 402.