Jihadism in Pakistan: the expanding frontier.

Siddiqa, Ayesha

Winning the war on terror will depend as much on the resilience and willingness of Afghanistan and Pakistan as it will on the capability and stamina of American and NATO militaries. In the case of Pakistan, many believe the government now has a renewed will to aid the fight. This optimism is based on the military's initiation of anti-Taliban operations in the Swat Valley and Waziristan and on growing civilian resentment of the Taliban. This article argues, however, that there is no direct linkage between these factors and Pakistan's desire or capacity to fight the war on terror. (1) In order to sustain its achievements in the Swat Valley, much depends on the country's internal political dynamics. These include the retention of a civilian government in power, the status of Pakistan-U.S. relations and the impact of American strategy in Afghanistan on Islamabad's strategic interests. More importantly, the continued trust deficit between Pakistan and the United States and the divergence in strategic policy between the two countries will continue to pose a major challenge to winning the war on terror.

THE WAR ON TERROR AFTER SWAT

There is an emerging perception that Pakistan's state and society have become better prepared to fight the Taliban and, more broadly, terrorism. This shift in opinion seems to have occurred after the army's allegedly successful operation against Taliban forces in Swat. Alternatively, other observers, such as British Prime Minister Gordon Brown, believe that success in Swat was achieved in part due to preexisting public support for the operations throughout Pakistan. (2) International perception of a change in Pakistani attitudes may also be influenced by reading the results of Pakistani opinion polls, such as the one conducted by the American organization International Republican Institute (IRI) showing increasing support of Pakistan-U.S. military cooperation leading up to the operations in Swat. (3) The attitude of many Pakistanis toward Taliban forces underwent further change after war broke out between the latter and the state. (4) Following major bombings in the country's urban centers and increasingly frequent suicide bombings, many Pakistanis lost any sympathy they once had with the Taliban. This also served to exacerbate the long-standing ethnic conflict between Pashtuns and non-Pashtuns, who saw Pashtuns as the main perpetrators of violence. (5)

Such apparent shifts in attitude, however, need careful interpretation, as they do not necessarily indicate a substantive change either in Pakistan's general policy or in public attitude toward the war on terror. It is therefore important to ask: has public opinion on the war on terror truly changed, resulting in a greater willingness of the state to root out extremism in all shapes and forms?

Analysis of Pakistan's attitude and state policy toward terrorism must look beyond the Taliban. While the Taliban may have been pushed back in Pakistan, there are other religious warriors that persist. Furthermore, shifts in public attitude toward the Taliban do not necessarily depict the state of mind of both the state and society toward the war on terror or terrorism. It can even be argued that there has been no major shift in public attitudes since the military operation in Swat as the bulk of people in the direct line of fire, especially in Swat, were always against the Taliban. Consequently, it can be argued that the local population rendered support to state forces as soon as they appeared ready to fight the terrorists.

According to political artist-activist Fauzia Minallah, people have not vociferously opposed the Taliban until now due to the high personal cost of such opposition. (6) Similarly, human rights activist Samar Minallah notes that there were many people who were constantly trying to bring to light the plight of ordinary people, even prior to Swat, especially women in Taliban strongholds. (7) Most of the time those who spoke out against the Taliban were ultimately killed, instilling fear amongst citizens in Taliban strongholds. (8) Thus people exposed their disenchantment with the Taliban once they felt safe enough to do so; this occurred only after the army carried out an operation against the jihadis in the Swat Valley.

Support for military operations against the Taliban, however, does not necessarily translate into sympathy for the war on terror. In addition, abhorrence of the Taliban does not necessarily mean rejection of the conservative or puritanical religious values that often provide moral justification for terrorism. In fact, responses to a recent survey from the Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS) show that many students who shunned the Taliban did not actually abandon their suspicions against the West or fondness for Shariah law. (9) A basic attitudinal shift has not taken place.

Though resentful of the Taliban, Pakistanis can be equally skeptical toward American activities in the country. According to the New York Times, roughly 25 percent of Pakistanis believe that Washington's only interest in Pakistan is to find Osama bin Laden, with little afterthought to the cost in civilian Pakistani lives it might incur. (10) Mistrust of the United States has only increased since its intrusion into Iraq. As long as the war on terror is seen as an American war, there is little possibility for it to become popular with the ordinary people. For this reason, it is believed by some that Taliban forces or those sympathetic to the Swati Taliban will likely resurface after the situation has calmed down in Swat. (11) Sources claim that some of the internally displaced persons (IDPs) who have returned to Swat continue to be sympathetic to the Taliban, and that the area has not been completely cleaned of religious warriors. (12) The deep-rooted popularity of the Taliban's ideology among some segments of the population will continue to contribute to its strength.

Regardless of whether attitudes toward the Taliban have shifted, the news of a successful military operation in Swat is no guarantee of a permanent change in the situation on the ground. (13) The jihadis have not been completely rooted out. For example, many senior Taliban leaders, including Mullah Fazlullah, have managed to escape and hide in the hills. (14) Given this incomplete removal of the Taliban, highlighted by the killing of sixteen police cadets in a suicide attack in Swat on 30 August 2009, the local Swati population may not maintain its confidence to speak out against them. (15) Residents in Peshawar, the capital city of the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), complain that the covert presence of the Taliban in the city makes life difficult and threatening. (16) The current situation in Swat, the NWFP and the tribal areas has not changed as much as the military would suppose; there has been no end to Talibanization in the region. Despite the military successes, many Taliban leaders such as Mullah Nazir, Hafiz Gul Bahadur and Sirajuddin Haqqani not only survive but continue to fight U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan. These three leaders operate in Pakistan's tribal areas and cooperate with the Afghan Taliban led by Mullah Omar whom they recognize as their Ameer-ul-Momineen (chief religious and military leader).

Tariq Pervez, Chairman of Pakistan's National Counter-Terrorism Authority (NCA), however, does not believe that remaining groups such as the Taliban Movement of Pakistan, or Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), will be a long-term problem given emerging friction amongst the TTP leadership that could seriously weaken the terrorist network. (17) Even so, weakening leadership does not ensure victory without a sustained willingness by the military to fight. Pressure from Western leadership may help, given concerns by countries such as the UK that terrorists operating inside Pakistan's tribal belt will target them. There is no guarantee, however, that the army will keep its commitment to its Western allies. (18)

Matters have been further complicated by worsening friction between President Asif All Zardari and army chief General Ashfaq Pervez Kiyani. (19) Journalist Afzal Khan believes that one of the major issues between these two men is the army chief's discomfort with the president's compromises with India and the United States. Zardari's frustration, on the other hand, emanates from having an army chief who is less than totally compliant. General Kiyani was allegedly upset with the President's eagerness in offering to dispatch the chief of Pakistan's primary intelligence agency, Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), to India after the 2008 Mumbai attacks. (20) More importantly, Zardari seems to interfere with the national security agenda, considered the primary domain of the Pakistani army. Therefore, it is believed by some political observers that the government is divided into two camps: (1) President Zardari and his coterie of close friends; and (2) the Prime Minister's office in collaboration with the Foreign Ministry and the Army's General Headquarters (GHQ).

It seems that the President is keener than General Kiyani to help with the war and so eagerly commits Pakistani assistance to the United States and its allies regarding future military operations. For example, Zardari committed to an offensive against the Taliban in Waziristan during a visit to the UK in August 2009. (21)

It is important to consider why the military and the government do not always move against the spread of jihadism in other parts of the country, especially in the more settled and populous areas of Pakistan. Jihadism and extremism are no longer problems that can be identified with a certain class or creed of people, nor are they limited to one part of the country. While the tribal areas and the adjoining NWFP have turned into a battlefield, other provinces such as Baluchistan, Punjab and Sindh are highly threatened by other kinds of terrorists and extremist forces (see Figure 1). For instance, the Afghan Taliban have long had influence in Baluchistan near the Afghanistan border. Suleman Khan Kakar, executive director of the Institute for Democracy and Human Rights, claims that Afghan Taliban are ever present in Quetta, the capital of Baluchistan. (22) Furthermore, jihadi groups are strengthening in Punjab and Sindh, the two most populous provinces, where militant and non-militant outfits work independently toward a common goal of converting people to a particular mindset, which in turn provokes a segment of the population toward puritanical religious ideology and holy war.

The growth of jihadism in Pakistan is mainly due to the absence of a holistic strategy for pursuing the war on terror. American, NATO and Pakistani forces tend to focus primarily on Afghanistan and the tribal areas as hubs of extremism and jihadism. The biggest flaw in the American policy on terrorism lies in its inability to fully comprehend the nature of the threat. Al Qaeda and the Taliban are not organizations, but rather networks of diverse connections. Unless all other forms of extremism and terrorism are rooted out, or at least curbed, Al Qaeda and the Taliban will continue to attract supporters.

In Pakistan's case there is duplicity in dealing with the problem of terrorism. Notwithstanding the fact that Pakistan's intelligence agencies continue to have links with the Taliban and other jihadists, there is general confusion in the country regarding the exact definition of the threat. (23) Popularly, people view Talibanization as a behavior linked with the Pashtun culture. For instance, a popular perception in Karachi, the capital of Sindh province, is that the migration of Pashtuns into the city after the military operation in Swat will increase the threat of the Taliban in the country. (24) Such a perception is erroneous because it does not take into account the organic growth of jihadism and terrorism in the rest of Pakistan. The term Taliban or Talibanization does not explain the larger phenomena of extremism and jihadism in Pakistan, which seem to grow unabated. Even if it were possible to remove Pashtun influence from Pakistan, perhaps all the country would experience is a change in the pace of expansion of jihadism rather than its elimination. Even Al Qaeda has reportedly begun to move into Punjab. Its presence can now be felt in Punjabi districts that border the NWFP, such as Attock. (25) This change is not surprising, as an increase in American and NATO forces in Afghanistan, drone attacks in Pakistan's tribal areas and the military operation in Swat all seem to have pushed Al Qaeda and its allies away from their traditional havens to search for safety. The possibility of seeking refuge in populated urban centers or deep inside Sindh or Punjab is quite high. Furthermore, Al Qaeda has naturally crept into areas where its allies operate and have a reliably strong ideological base.

Punjab has been a hub of terrorist organizations since the 1980s. These organizations are now popularly identified as Punjabi Taliban. The correct term for these terrorist groups that operate beyond the tribal areas, however, is Salafist jihadists. (26) This is a combination of two terms. Salafists are those that follow Salafism as an ideology, which espouses a return to Islam's perfection in the days of Prophet Mohammad and the rule of the four Caliphs of Islam: Abu Bakr, Umar, Usman and Ali. Salafists do not accommodate other cultures or modernized interpretations of Islam. According to Muslim scholar Khaled Abou El Fadl, such Muslim fanatics "display an intolerant exclusiveness and belligerent supremacy vis-a-vis the other." (27) The Salafist jihadists, on the other hand, represent a group of people that wage holy war to bring about a life followed in the earliest days of Islam. The ideology is derived from the Turkish-Arab theologian Ibn Taimiyya (1263-1368) and aims at enforcing Islamic puritanical norms upon society. Salafist jihadists stipulate the mandatory waging of violent jihad against non-Muslims and those Muslims that do not follow puritanical religious interpretation. Drawing on the philosophy of Egyptian scholar Sayyid Qutb and Pakistani religious scholar Abul ala Maududi, the Salafist jihadist ideology recognizes military conflict as a superior form of jihad and limits the interpretation of the Koran and Sunnah according to the norms of nomadic Arabs. The Salafist jihadist ideology does not believe in limiting itself to a territory, but rather extends itself globally.

[FIGURE 1 OMITTED]

Such distinction is necessary to comprehend the extent of the threat posed by jihadism in Pakistan and the region at large as well as to differentiate the various people and groups from the religious ideology and nationalism that motivates the Afghan Taliban. Canadian journalist Kathy Gannon argues that the Afghan Taliban began as a non-expansionist movement by local mullahs in response to political chaos following the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. (28) As argued by Pakistani author Ahmed Rashid, the Taliban were assisted by the Pakistani ISI and remain confined to Afghanistan. (29) Yet jihadis operating in mainland Pakistan are far more rabid than the Afghan Taliban, as they are driven by religious ideology and the belief that they must extend the writ of their faith across boundaries. This group of people is also more lethal due to its ability to apply an anti-imperialist discourse, which sells well amongst ordinary people throughout the Muslim world. It is not rare to come across seemingly liberal people who believe that eventually it is the jihadis who will force U.S. troops out of Afghanistan and the region. (30)

Broadly speaking, there are three types of forces operating in Pakistan (see Figure 2). First, the Pashtun Salafist jihadists have ethnic links with the Afghan Taliban and popularly represent the TTP. While they sympathize with the Afghan Taliban and consider Mullah Omar as their primary leader, they operate mainly in Pakistan in the areas bordering Afghanistan. Most of the leaders of the groups operating on Pakistan's side came to prominence in the late 1990s and the period after 9/11. All of the Taliban leaders mentioned earlier, as well as Baitullah Mehsud, are products of the Afghan war and its later extension to Pakistan's tribal areas. They all follow Sunni Deobandi ideology, which presents a broadly similar worldview to that of Salafism.

Second, there are the three main Sunni Deobandi jihadi groups operating in the rest of Pakistan, with heavy concentrations in Punjab and Sindh. The three groups are: Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) and Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM). (31) Operating in south Punjab, all three have served as a factory from which jihadis are exported to Afghanistan and the tribal areas. One of the groups, JeM, operates in the southern province of Sindh and especially in the port city of Karachi.

Finally, there is Lashkar-e-Taiba (LET), the only major Wahabi/Ahl-e-Hadith jihadi outfit, which was created during 1989 and 1990 in Afghanistan's Kunar Province. It has become increasingly recognized for its attacks in India. Though headquartered in Muridke in central Punjab, the LeT also has a major presence in south Punjab and in rural areas of Sindh. These Punjab-based groups are considered dangerous because they are driven primarily by religious ideology. This is considered more dangerous than groups with ethnic connections to the Pashtun tribal areas, as their violent actions are driven primarily by tribal traditions to avenge the death of friends and family. The Punjab-based groups have been attempting to impress their lethality upon people. (32) It is therefore not surprising that Owais Ghani, governor of the NWFP, claims that the warriors from Punjab are far more brutal and difficult to crack than the Pushtun. (33)

In any case, all of these outfits have close operational links with the Afghan Taliban and Al Qaeda as well as with each other. The capacity for large-scale violence of the Punjab-based outfits is understandable since these organizations are headed by more educated men. Most of the top and mid-ranking leaders have received both secular education and religious education. (34) The existence of large numbers of jihadists from south Punjab (3,000 to 8,000 from Punjab are fighting in Afghanistan and the tribal areas) likely vouches for the capability of the jihadi leadership. (35)

Besides the four major jihadi groups operating in Punjab, there is the phenomenon of freelance jihadists with direct connections to the Pashtun jihadists and, through them, Al Qaeda. Punjab has become increasingly critical in the fight against terrorism. According to Tariq Pervez, veteran Punjabi jihadists are a critical link between Al Qaeda, led by terrorists of Arab/Egyptian origin who provide ideas, resources and recruits for martyrdom, most of whom come from southern Punjab. (36) Hence Senator Rehman Malik, Pakistan's Interior Minister, warned that south Punjab could become another Swat. (37) He was, however, immediately contradicted by his subordinates. Tariq Saleem Dogar, the inspector general of the Punjab Police, claimed that the argument regarding terrorism in Punjab was an exaggeration aimed at maligning the state. Mushtaq Sukhera, regional police officer of Bahawalpur, said, "No part of the province is ready to fall into the lap of the militants." (38) These comments were made despite the fact that the Bahawalpur district is the headquarters of JeM. (39) Perhaps the denial was aimed more at contradicting a story in the New York Times that highlighted the growing strength of the jihadists/terrorists in south Punjab. (40) The story drew intense reaction from various segments of the state and society. Many people saw the story as part of an American conspiracy to destabilize Pakistan. There is a tendency amongst many Pakistanis to see any mention of terrorism in any part of Punjab as part of a larger conspiracy to destabilize the country with the ultimate objective of forcibly gaining control of Pakistan's nuclear assets. (41) There is a concerted effort by Pakistani political leaders to convince the population of a threat to Pakistan's security--especially its nuclear weapons--with the goal of changing the public's perspective on the jihadists and terrorists. (42)

[FIGURE 2 OMITTED]

Containing terrorism in Pakistan has become increasingly problematic due to confusion at the level of both the state and society regarding how best to deal with the jihadists. Society seems largely confused due to propaganda suggesting that foreign governments and their agencies are creating the terrorist networks. Popularly, the Taliban and the overall jihadist threat are linked to the United States and India. (43) Even in the case of jihadism in the populous areas of Punjab, government sources purport that the increased terrorist influence is the work of external powers. (44)

The absence of common patterns has confused the general populace, who have failed to notice growing terrorism and extremism in Punjab and Sindh. Unlike the Pashtun jihadists, the jihadists in Punjab and Sindh do not always disrupt the day-to-day happenings of ordinary people. For instance, Punjabi jihadists do not destroy shrines of Sufi saints or relics of popular Islam as was done in NWFP, where the mausoleum of the Sufi saint and poet Rahman Baba was bombed. (45) Nor have there been visible signs of the conflict seen in NWFE The only three major incidents pertain to the suicide attack by JeM on a church in Bahawalpur in 2003, followed by an attack by SSP on Christians in Gojra on 31 July 2009, and an accidental blast in Mian Channu, which exposed the terrorist activities of LeT. (46) Little do the people realize that Punjabi jihadism has always been as lethal as the Afghan jihadism of the 1980s.

Ordinary Pakistanis have failed to notice the threat of terrorism and extremism because they do not necessarily equate sectarian violence, a hallmark of Punjabi groups, with growing jihadism. The underlying ideology of the Deobandi outfits such as SSP, LeJ and JeM is anti-Shiite. In fact, the two main Deobandi organizations, SSP and LeJ, were established during the 1980s and 1990s to fight Shiite politics and militancy in Pakistan. Saudi Arabia helped Pakistan's military regime to fight Iranian-sponsored Shiite outfits. Since the creation of these outfits, there have been many Shiite killings in Pakistan, including high value targets such as the murder of an Iranian diplomat in Multan in 1997.

These outfits did not limit their activities to sectarian politics. They went beyond anti-Shiite activities to connect with Al Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban through links with other "hybrid" outfits such as Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HuJI), Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HUM) and Harkat-ul-Ansar (HuA). The SSP was involved in fighting the war in Afghanistan since its inception in 1985 and 1986. Ramzi Yousef, who was involved in the plot to blow up the World Trade Center in 1993, was linked with the SSP. (47) Similarly, these outfits also have deep links with Al Qaeda. The LeJ, responsible for several terrorist attacks in Pakistan including the Marriot bombing and other similar incidents, has links with prominent Al Qaeda leaders such as Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi. The JeM began in 2002 with funding and assistance from Osama bin Laden.

Most of these outfits have deep links with Al Qaeda and Arab sources, as many were established with financial help from Middle Eastern and Gulf Arab states. Experts are of the view that the leadership of these outfits, which belonged to south Punjab, had access to the rulers of the Gulf States that have established bases in that area for hunting and recreation. This connection is not odd since some Al Qaeda leaders were also known for their anti-Shiite activities. (48) Some outfits, such as JeM and LeT, later dedicated themselves predominantly to the war in Kashmir. While this may have given the impression that they were created mainly to fight India in Kashmir, all the outfits were involved with Afghanistan, sectarian violence and India at the same time.

These multiple linkages make it difficult for the Pakistani government to control these outfits. Additionally, internal fighting within these groups has resulted in the formation of many newer, more belligerent groups with the support of Al Qaeda. Al Furqan, which was allegedly involved with the second assassination attempt of President Musharraf's, broke off from JeM. (49) In LeT, a splinter group including Major Haroon Ashiq and others who were allegedly responsible for carrying out the Mumbai attacks, seems to have emerged. Pakistani journalist Saleem Shehzad was of the opinion that LeT, the group that eventually executed the 2008 Mumbai attacks, had come under Al Qaeda's influence. As a result, it carried out an attack of a greater scale than initially envisaged by LeT's official patrons in Pakistan. (50) Other experts, however, tend to challenge the assertion that there is a clear-cut operational division within the outfits. For instance, Amir Rand, Pakistan's expert on terrorism and militant organizations, believes that LeT was always involved in Afghanistan. According to Rand, a decision made in 2004 gave operational responsibility for Kashmir and India--critical areas for raising funds and human resources--to Zaki-ur-Rehman Lakhvi, and gave operational responsibility for Afghanistan to Hafiz Saeed, a more prominent face of LeT. Similarly, from Pakistan's Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) are of the view that all of these outfits are operationally interconnected, including Al Qaeda, the Pashtun jihadists and the Afghan Taliban. (51) Thus any particular terrorist incident is difficult to trace since it has the marks of several organizations. According to one source, terrorism in this region and country does not depend on an organization but on a network of resources. Any incident depends on which particular network is available at a given time. Omar Saeed Sheikh had used the LeJ's network, available at that time, to deliver the Wall Street/Journal reporter Daniel Pearl to the final assassins from Al Qaeda. (52)

The inability to capture these terrorists, however, may also lie with the military establishment, which seems undecided on the question of winding up its contacts with jihadi outfits. The links between jihadi outfits and the military's intelligence agencies, especially the ISI, is not a hidden secret. Although some analysts believe that the links between the ISI and the three Deobandi outfits are over, available evidence in south Punjab does not support such a view. (53) Training camps run by JeM have reportedly been established in the desert area of south Punjab. (54) Pakistani journalist and author Arif Jamal notes that various jihadi organizations have grown in strength since 2008, especially those linked with Kashmir and India. (55) But it is not possible to de-link one organization from the other--they seek assistance from each other and are operationally connected. Nevertheless, the state agencies continue to hold on to some of these strategic assets to prepare for future emergencies. According to a senior source in the government, this is called the middle-of-the-road approach, whereby the jihad industry is restructured instead of eliminated to improve the state's control of the organizations. (56) This tactic would serve to reduce threats posed by uncontrolled outfits and allow the military to preserve control of other outfits as a contingency plan.

THE WAY AHEAD

The situation described above does not bode well for the war on terror. It is vital for states and societies, especially in battlefield areas, to abandon support for terrorists of all kinds. From Pakistan's perspective there are two broad issues. First, Pakistan must convince civil society that none of the jihadi outfits will benefit the country. This is indeed a complex matter due to the linkage between the peculiar socioeconomic conditions in Pakistan (and Afghanistan) and growing jihadism. Many who join the religious war, particularly in mainland Pakistan, are compelled to do so by their poor socioeconomic conditions. (57) Jihadi organizations, and jihad in general, give the youth from poor neighborhoods a sense of purpose and social mobility that they cannot hope to receive through other means. The poor governance in the country, exacerbated by rampant corruption, does nothing to address the problem.

The poor, however, are not the only demographic that subscribes to jihad. Many civilians from the middle classes, especially the trader-merchant class from small towns, villages and larger urban centers, contribute to jihad. This class plays a vital role in funding both jihad and religious seminaries that serve as the backbone for Salafist thinking in Pakistani society. In fact, a few of the key entrepreneurs in the country also support madrassahs. (58) These people are possibly driven toward jihadi outfits due to their inherent social and religious conservatism or their concern for religious piety, which they believe would either endear them to others or save them from the wrath of the dispossessed were there ever an Islamic revolution in the country. (59) This behavior reflects a lack of understanding of the linkages between Salafism and jihadism promoted by religious seminaries, especially in Punjab and Sindh. People do not understand that Salafism preached in religious seminaries can often lead to jihadism, which, in turn, could threaten the state and society. Politicians fail to make this same connection.

Second, extremism and jihadism will continue to flourish in Pakistan so long as the state does not fundamentally alter its perspective on them. In fact, the lack of change in society's thinking in some ways reflects the attitude of the state. The state must admit that there is a problem of jihadism throughout the country. The government seems to approach the jihadi problem in a disconcerted and politically expedient fashion, with an absence of a coherent policy. While there is a tendency to fight jihadism in areas where the jihadists have confronted the state and society, as was the case in Swat, the government tends to ignore other areas used to export terrorists.

Moreover, there is no coordination between the federal and provincial governments on the issue. Nawaz Sharif, whose party runs the Punjab government, is of the view that the terrorists can be dealt with in the same cautious manner as the British sorted out the IRA. (60) Such a comment does not, however, account for ideological differences between the Salafist jihadists in Pakistan and the IRA, as the Salafist jihadists have an expansionist agenda, whereas the IRA limited its aims to the unification of Ireland. The politicians in Pakistan need to understand that neither engagement with the jihadis nor dividing them into "good" or "bad" solves the problem. Rather, they must eliminate the terrorists, in part by creating social networks that engage society and deter them from adhering to religious extremism. Strengthening the socioeconomic network and improving delivery of services to the people is a major part of the solution.

Yet the jihadists will not vanish as long as the army and the intelligence agencies continue to view them as potential assets. In the event of an American withdrawal from Afghanistan, one of the major concerns is that India--Pakistan's main rival-will have much influence there. For example, some of India's development work in Afghanistan seems to challenge Pakistan's security interests. Pakistani intelligence agencies argue that such influence can only be neutralized by building links with elements that counter an India-friendly Kabul. Such thinking does not help combat terrorism in Afghanistan or the entire region. Although some might take Pakistan's security concerns as a ruse for Islamabad's expansionist designs, it is necessary for the United States to assuage its ally's fears. (61) On the assumption that Pakistan is worried about an Indian presence in Afghanistan, American intervention between the two traditional rivals on the issue can help build the institutional support so badly needed for peace and stability in Afghanistan. American and NATO forces cannot afford to leave without building a robust government capable of handling these regional security concerns in Afghanistan.

Regional and extra-regional states must understand the stakes in letting Taliban forces and their allies gain strength in the region. Until a concerted effort is begun by both the state and society in Pakistan, supported by its Western allies, South Asia and the world will remain at peril from extremists and terrorists.

NOTES

(1) Imtiaz Gul, "Four Reasons for Optimism in Pakistan," Foreign Policy, 16 September 2009.

(2) "Britain reiterates $1 billion aid pledge: Brown praises consensus in Pakistan against Taliban," Daily Times, 29 August 2009.

(3) "Support for Pak-US Cooperation on Terror up from 9% to 37%: Survey," Daily Times, 12 May 2009. The article is referring to the IRI Survey of Pakistan Public Opinion, 7-9 March 2009.

(4) Sabrina Tavernise, "Taliban Stir Rising Anger of Pakistanis," New York Times, 4 June 2009.

(5) Selig S. Harrison, "Pakistan's Ethnic Fault Line," Washington Post, 11 May 2009.

(6) Fauzia Minallah, discussion with the author, 17 August 2009.

(7) Samar Minallah, interview by the author, 19 August 2009.

(8) Members of Swat's civil society, interview by the author, 7 April 2009.

(9) "Radicalization among Educated Pakistani Youth," Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS) survey, 3 March 2009.

(10) Helene Cooper, "U.S. Officials Get a Taste of Pakistanis' Anger at America," New York Times, 20 August 2009.

(11) Huma Baqai, interview by the author, 14 August 2009.

(12) Zahid Hussain, "Swat--it's too early to declare victory," Dawn, 27 July 2009.

(13) Ibid.

(14) Ibid.

(15) "Suicide Bomber Kills 16 Police Cadets in Swat," Dawn, 31 August 2009.

(16) Group of bankers from Peshawar, interview by the author, 29 July 2009.

(17) Tariq Pervez, interview with the author, 31 August 2009.

(18) Asif Mehmood, "Zardari assured Waziristan action: Brown," The Nation, 5 September 2009.

(19) Interview with Afzal Khan, 5 September 2009.

(20) Ibid.

(21) Mehmood, "Zardari assured Waziristan action: Brown."

(22) Suleman Khan Kakar (Executive Director of the Institute for Democracy and Human Rights), interview with the author, 18 August 2009.

(23) "The Terrorism Index," Foreign Policy 162 (September/October 2007), 64.

(24) Sabrina Tavernise, "Organized Crime in Pakistan Feeds Taliban," New York Times, 29 August 2009.

(25) Anonymous source from the ISI, in discussion with the author, 14 April 2009.

(26) The term was coined by Gilles Kepel. See Bruce Livesey, "The Salafist Movement," PBS Frontline. Wahabism, the hallmark of Wahabi Islam and also found in Pakistan, is an extension of Salafism.

(27) Khaled Abou El Fadl, The Place of Tolerance in Islam (Boston: Beacon Press, 2002), 4.

(28) Kathy Gannon, I is for Infidel: From Holy War to Holy Terror in Afghanistan (New York: Public-Affairs, 2005), 24-5.

(29) Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia (London: I. B. Tauris, 2000), 26-29.

(30) Anonymous university professor and judge, in discussions with the author, 27 July 2009 and 16 August 2009.

(31) U.S. Department of State, "Terrorism in South Asia," 2004.

(32) Mathew Rosenberg, "Taliban Wages War on Police In Its New Front in Pakistan," Wall Street Journal, 29 May 2009.

(33) Owais Ghani, interview with the author, Peshawar, 22 November 2008.

(34) Center for Policing Terrorism, "The Sipah-e-Sahaba Dossier," 4 May 2005.

(35) There are three estimates: (a) 2,000 warriors (Hassan Abbas, "Defining the Punjabi Taliban Network," CTC Sentinel, 2, Iss. 4 (April 2009), 3); (b) jihadist sources that give an estimate of 5,0008,000. This figure is subscribed to by the political government of the Awami National Party (ANP) in the North-West Frontier Province; and (c) 200 jihadists (Ghani).

(36) Ibid.

(37) "South Punjab May be Next Swat: Malik," Daily Times, 27 June 2009.

(38) "South Punjab peaceful, terror threat exaggerated: IG," Dawn, 20 August 2009; Nasir Jamal, "South Punjab sees Taliban connection as stigma--II," Dawn, 26 May 2009.

(39) Rosenberg, "Taliban Wages War."

(40) The article mentioned is Sabrina Tavernise, Richard A. Oppel Jr., Eric Schmitt, "United Militants Threaten Pakistan's Populous Heart," New York Times, 13 April 2009.

(41) Robert Mackey, "A Grand Conspiracy Theory From Pakistan," The Lede: The New York Times News Blog, 12 May 2009; Jeremy R. Hammond, "Ex-ISI Chief Says Purpose of New Afghan Intelligence Agency RAMA Is 'to destabilize Pakistan'," Foreign Policy Journal, 12 August 2009.

(42) David E. Sanger, "Strife in Pakistan Raises U.S. Doubts Over U.S. Arms," The New York Times, 3 May 2009.

(43) For an example, see Hammond, "Ex-ISI Chief."

(44) Anonymous government officials and south Punjab and Peshawar citizens, interviews with the author, Bahawalpur, 22 August 2009; DG Khan, 23 August 2009; and Peshawar, 22 November 2008.

(45) Shaheen Buneri, "Militants Bomb Mausoleum of Legendary Pashtun Poet," Pashtun Post, 5 March 2009.

(46) "Banned outfits behind Gojra incident: HRCP," The Nation (Pakistan), 5 August 2009; "Blast kills twelve in Mian Channu," Dawn, 14 July 2009. All of these sites are located in Punjab.

(47) The Center for Policing Terrorism, The SSP Dossier, 12.

(48) Bruce Riedel, The Search for Al-Qaeda: Its Leadership, Ideology, and Future. (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2008).

(49) Anonymous official in Punjab Criminal Investigation Department, interview with the author, 10 June 2009.

(50) Saleem Shehzad, interview with the author, 15 August 2009.

(51) Anonymous senior official from the Federal Investigation Agency, interview with the author, Islamabad, 15 July 2009.

(52) Ibid.

(53) On analysts that believe that the links between the ISI and Deobandi groups have ended, see Zahid Hussain, author of "Frontline Pakistan," discussion with the author, 5 May 2009.

(54) PTI, "JeM setting up huge training base in Pak's Punjab: report," Mumbai Mirror, 14 September 2009.

(55) Arif Jamal, Shadow War: The Untold Story of Jihad in Kashmir (New York: Melville Press, 2009), 271.

(56) Anonymous senior official of the Interior Ministry of Pakistan, interview with the author, 15 August 2009.

(57) Ayesha Siddiqa, "Terror's Training Ground," Newsline, September 2009.

(58) For instance, Malik Riaz, one of the most important real estate magnates in the country, supports over 30 madrassahs around Islamabad and has played an important role looking after the mullahs linked with the Red Mosque. Malik Riaz, interview with the author, 22 August 2009.

(59) Ibid.

(60) Nawaz Sharif, interview with the author, 18 August 2009.

(61) Praveen Swami, Indian journalist, interview with the author, 12 August 2009.