Beyond good offices? The role of regional organizations in conflict resolution. (Regional Perspectives).

Yen Nguyen, Thi Hai

"Both ASEAN and the OAS were active, flexible and effective in the peace processes in Cambodia and Haiti. Although the UN Security Council and major powers made the final settlement for both conflicts, the contributions of the two organizations were remarkable and make the case for a greater role for regional organizations in conflict prevention and resolution."

The proliferation of conflicts in many parts of the developing world and the overload of UN duties have prompted many to advocate a larger role for regional organizations in maintaining world peace and security. After all, regional organizations have a legal stake in conflict resolution and peacekeeping operations. Article 52 of the UN Charter states that local disputes should be settled regionally before referral to the United Nations and that resolution via the Security Council remains an option if regional efforts fail. (1) In addition, Article 53 of the Charter makes clear that the Security Council can utilize regional arrangements and agencies to enforce and maintain peace and security under its authority.

A brief analysis reveals, however, that regional organizations hardly fulfilled this legal role during the Cold War. Almost all conflicts during this period proliferated with the encouragement and contribution of either the United States or the Soviet Union, making each conflict the proxy confrontation of the two superpowers in a third venue. (2) Accordingly, the superpowers seldom promoted a role for regional organizations in conflict resolution. Moreover, as conflicts during the Cold War often took place between a regional organization's members, disputants were reluctant to use the organizations to resolve their conflicts for fear of other members' partiality. Consequently, regional organizations played only a marginal role, their efforts limited to making available their good offices to disputants. It is not an exaggeration to say that the United Nations enjoyed near-monopoly power in conflict settlement through mediation, peacekeeping or forceful military intervention. (3)

With the end of the Cold War, international relations were no longer based on the polarizing confrontation between two superpowers, giving regional organizations an opportunity to take a leading role in conflict resolution. Regional organizations participated in conflict resolution independently and in cooperation with the United Nations as the normative expectations of the international community increased and superpower intervention in regional conflicts decreased. (4) The most notable cases include the contribution of the Organization of American States (OAS) to the settlement of conflicts in Haiti and Nicaragua and between El Salvador and Honduras; the Organization for African Unity (OAU) in Burundi, Liberia, Somalia and Sierra Leone; the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in Cambodia; and NATO in the former Yugoslavia. The role of regional organizations in conflict settlement also went beyond simply providing disputants with good offices. ASEAN not only facilitated negotiations, it also acted as a third-party mediator; the OAS intervened in member states to protect human rights and restore democracy, while the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) undertook new responsibilities in preventing and settling regional conflicts. (5) Moreover, NATO, the OAU, the OAS and ECOWAS teamed up with the United Nations in joint peacekeeping, while NATO and the Western European Union acted under UN authorization in the former Yugoslavia from 1993 to 1996.

Among the above cases, ASEAN and the OAS were widely assessed as active and effective in resolving the conflicts in Cambodia and Haiti, respectively. Geographic proximity to the conflicts giving them strong incentives to re-establish peace and security in their regions, both ASEAN and the OAS intervened actively to help resolve them. The differences in the two organizations' sizes and capabilities and the varying nature and scope of each conflict led ASEAN and the OAS to choose different methods of conflict resolution. Yet each achieved its objective: self-determination for the Cambodian people through free and fair elections and the restoration of democracy in Haiti.

A comparative analysis of these two important cases provides insight into how regional organizations can contribute to the maintenance of world peace and security. Certain conditions are needed for regional organizations to be more effective in conflict resolution. An examination of the efforts and achievements of ASEAN and the OAS in settling the Cambodian and Haitian conflicts permits the formulation of recommendations on the future role of regional organizations.

CONDITIONS FOR EFFECTIVE REGIONAL ORGANIZATION PARTICIPATION

Four conditions are needed for regional organizations to play an active and effective role in conflict resolution: legitimacy, enforcement power, resources and cooperation with the United Nations and major powers.

Legitimacy

In conflict resolution, legitimacy means international recognition. Actions and behaviors of a third party intervening to resolve a conflict must be in accordance with the UN Charter, international law and norms, and diplomatic conventions. The charter encourages the role of regional arrangements and regional agencies in local conflict settlement. (6) However, the charter, along with international law and the charters of many regional organizations, prohibits intervention in other countries' affairs, dictating that the use of force, including economic sanctions, is illegitimate except for self-defense. (7)

The condition of legitimacy can be met if regional organizations have the mandate of the Security Council. According to the UN Charter, the Security Council has the sole authority to decide whether a situation requires intervention and whether coercive measures are necessary to maintain peace and security. (8) However, the decisionmaking process in the Security Council is often lengthy, given the veto power of its permanent members and their different perspectives on the role of regional organizations in conflict resolution. Thus, it is difficult for regional organizations to obtain the mandate they need to intervene and resolve intrastate conflicts in the early stages.

Enforcement Power

The second condition refers to an organization's ability to carry out its peace plans and to impose its decisions and will on the disputants. This may involve the use of coercive diplomacy methods such as embargoes, sanctions and blockades to isolate and weaken disputants. Enforcement power is needed throughout the process of conflict resolution to persuade disputants to compromise and cooperate in the initial stages and to ensure that parties comply with agreements and their responsibilities once the fighting has ended.

Unfortunately, it is rare for regional organizations to possess this capability. The United Nations supports the use of force by regional agencies or individual states acting under the auspices of regional arrangements only to the extent that the agencies serve as instruments of the Security Council. In addition, as regional organizations are often led by a dominant or hegemonic power, small members fear that decisions of major member states may hurt their interests. As a result, in most existing regional organizations, decisions either are made by consensus or are not binding upon member states. These contingencies clearly undermine a regional organization's enforcement capability, especially when it attempts to resolve conflicts where one or both of the disputants are not member states.

Resources

A regional organization that intervenes to resolve an intrastate conflict must often sponsor the peace process or bear most of the costs. Initially, resources are required for shuttle diplomacy and good offices. Once a political settlement is achieved, money and personnel are needed to carry out the peace agreement, facilitate and monitor elections and disarm the warring factions. In addition, large budgetary outlays are required for famine relief, to accommodate and repatriate refugees and to cover the costs of reconstruction and reconciliation programs. These efforts consume significant time and resources.

Cooperation

The final condition for effective regional action concerns the importance of cooperating closely with the United Nations and major powers. Experience during the Cold War shows that without major-power support, regional organizations play only a marginal role in conflict resolution. Although most regional organizations are willing, able and motivated to participate in conflict resolution, they are often constrained by the small size of their member states, the non-inclusive nature of their membership and the partiality of their coverage. (9) Cooperation with the United Nations and the major powers expands their available resources, helps legitimize their actions and strengthens their enforcement power and credibility. In addition, parties to a conflict often prefer the involvement of the United Nations or a major power because they have the material resources and the influence to help resolve their dispute. Thus, it is imperative for regional organizations to maintain close cooperation with major powers to increase leverage against the disputants, gain access to supplementary resources and give added weight to enforcement power.

Although legitimacy, enforcement, resources and cooperation are essential for active and effective conflict resolution, it is rare for regional organizations to meet all four conditions. Through the conflicts in Cambodia and Haiti, we can assess the extent to which ASEAN and the OAS met the above conditions and how this affected the two organizations' approaches, efforts and contributions to the settlement of the two conflicts.

ASEAN AND THE CONFLICT IN CAMBODIA

ASEAN was founded in 1967 to promote economic cooperation and peaceful settlement of conflicts among member states. Despite its mandate, ASEAN does not have a conflict resolution mechanism or enforcement powers. Nonetheless, with the ZOPFAN Declaration (10), member countries formally proclaimed ASEAN a "zone of peace, freedom and neutrality," committing themselves not to interfere in each other's or other countries' internal affairs. At the beginning of the conflicts in Cambodia, ASEAN was a small regional organization of five countries. Although the largest member state, Indonesia, was the fourthlargest country in the world in terms of population, its economic and military strength were not proportionate. Other ASEAN members (Singapore, the Philippines, Malaysia and Thailand) were small and medium-sized countries that, with the exception of Thailand, had gained independence only recently.

The Cambodian crisis escalated in late 1978 when Vietnamese troops, at the request of the Kampuchea United Front for National Salvation and in response to attacks by the Democratic Kampuchea (DK) along Vietnam's southwestern border, launched a full-scale offensive against the ruling Khmer Rouge. The Vietnamese took Phnom Penh after three weeks and helped establish the People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK). On the surface, the Cambodian conflict was an intrastate conflict that involved four domestic warring factions competing for central authority and international recognition. (11) It also resembled a proxy war in the sense that Vietnam and China supported the PRK and the Khmer Rouge, respectively, in the war over Cambodian soil. It is important to note that neither Cambodia, Vietnam nor China was a member state of ASEAN at the time of the conflict. Given the internal and external dynamics of the confrontation and the genocidal practices of the Khmer Rouge, which had killed up to 1.5 million Kampucheans between 1975 and 1978, the Cambodian conflict could not be solved by simply restoring the ruling party to power. Thus, resolving the conflict meant working out a formula on who would rule Cambodia after the fighting ended and negotiating a power-sharing agreement that would be acceptable to all warring factions and their foreign patrons.

OAS AND THE HAITIAN CONFLICT

Created in 1948, the OAS is a large association of countries in the Western hemisphere founded to promote military, economic, social and cultural cooperation among member states. Unlike ASEAN, the OAS has a number of institutional tools for conflict prevention and management. These include the Santiago Commitment to Democracy and the Renewal of the Inter-American System, issued by the 21 st General Assembly of the OAS and ratified by member states, and Resolution 1080. Both established procedures for the organization to react to threats to democracy in the Western hemisphere. (12) At the time of the Haitian conflict, the organization had 25 member states, including the powerful United States.

The Haitian conflict broke out when a military coup led by General Raoul Cedras, commander-in-chief of the Haitian armed forces, overthrew Haiti's president Jean-Bertrand Aristide on 29 September 1991. President Aristide, who had won 67 percent of the votes in Haiti's first democratic election, was forced to go into exile in Venezuela and later the United States. General Cedras assumed office and the military immediately returned to the pressure tactics of previous dictatorships. (13) The Haitian conflict was a true intrastate conflict because it involved General Cedras's military regime and exiled President Aristide's resistance movement. Unlike Cambodia, Haiti was a member of a regional organization at the time of Resolution 1080's passage and of the conflict's outbreak. For the international community, the solution to the Haitian conflict was to restore President Aristide to his democratically elected post.

EFFORTS IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND PEACEKEEPING

Both ASEAN and the OAS responded swiftly at the outbreak of the two conflicts. Without directly addressing Vietnam, ASEAN foreign ministers called for a withdrawal of all foreign troops from Cambodia and the dismantling of the Phnom Penh government so Cambodians could exercise their right of self-determination through elections. OAS ministers of foreign affairs condemned the coup within days of its execution, adopted a resolution denying diplomatic recognition to the new de facto government and called for the immediate reinstatement of President Aristide. (14)

After their initial actions, ASEAN and the OAS both intensified their conflict resolution efforts. ASEAN was determined to seek a comprehensive solution to the Cambodian conflict. Its solution included the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia, dismantling of the Vietnam-backed government in Phnom Penh, disarming of all warring factions under the supervision of a UN peacekeeping force and elections to choose the future government in Cambodia. (15) The OAS sought to restore the democratically elected government of President Aristide and to prevent human rights violations in Haiti.

ASEAN in Cambodia

ASEAN concentrated its diplomatic energies on the United Nations from the earliest stages of the conflict. (16) From 1979 to 1982, ASEAN included the Cambodian conflict in the agenda of every annual UN General Assembly session. In 1981, ASEAN won overwhelming support for a UN-sponsored international conference on Kampuchea, which concluded with the adoption of a declaration calling for a comprehensive negotiated political settlement. (17) Moreover, in both formal and informal meetings, ASEAN member states made joint resolutions or statements calling for the United Nations and the international community to assist in resolving the conflict in Cambodia. ASEAN's continuous pressure kept international attention focused on Cambodia for over a decade and illustrates a key part of its efforts to find a political solution to the conflict. (18) In addition, ASEAN prevented the PRK from obtaining the Cambodian seat at the United Nations and, thus, from becoming the legitimate government in Cambodia. In the 34th session of the General Assembly, ASEAN member states Thailand, Indonesia and Singapore played an important role in opposing India's proposal to leave the Cambodian seat vacant at the United Nations. Throughout UN sessions 34 to 37 (from 1979 to 1982), ASEAN succeeded in blocking India's motion, therefore ensuring that the Cambodian seat at the United Nations remained firmly with the DK. (19)

ASEAN also initiated and assisted with the unification of the three resistance factions in Cambodia to solidify their legitimacy and increase their leverage against the PRK. (20) In April 1981, the Singaporean government invited representatives from one of the factions to participate in talks concerning the creation of a coalition government. Concurrently, Thailand's foreign minister, Siddi Savetsila, the ASEAN standing committee chairman, visited Washington, DC, to seek support for the proposition. These efforts culminated in the formation of the coalition government of Democratic Kampuchea, which unified the three resistance factions on 4 September 1982. (21) The formation of the coalition government legitimized the DK's seat at the United Nations and made the PRK realize that the Cambodian conflict could only be settled through negotiations, not through force.

Due to Vietnam's presence in Cambodia and China's backing of the Khmer Rouge, the Cambodian conflict was the most complicated conflict in a third world country since the end of the Second World War. ASEAN played a partial role in changing the regional aspect of the conflict to facilitate the peace process. (22) To force Vietnam to pull out of Cambodia, ASEAN mobilized the international community and the Security Council to isolate the country both diplomatically and economically. (23) ASEAN member countries also sought to address Vietnam's concerns regarding the possible return to power of the Khmer Rouge. During the late 1980s, Indonesia, Singapore and Thailand actively attempted to improve their bilateral relations with China, (24) a country thought to have motives for prolonging Vietnam's presence in Cambodia. (25) Accordingly, China could hardly ignore ASEAN's interest in settling the Cambodian conflict, and the country eventually incorporated concerns regarding the potential domination of the Khmer Rouge in post-settlement Cambodia into its stated position. (26)

ASEAN was also remarkably successful as a third-party mediator. Given Vietnam's declaration that it would not meet with the resistance coalition before the warring factions met with one another, Indonesia proposed a two-round informal meeting, first among the four warring factions, then with Vietnam. These proximity talks led to the three Jakarta Informal Meetings (JIM). The first meeting, organized by Indonesia and held on 25 July 1988, made it possible for the four factions in Cambodia to sit together for the first time and discuss each other's concerns and interests. (27) This meeting was considered a psychological breakthrough in the peace process as the Khmer Rouge and the PRK set aside previous refusals to deal with one another.

In addition, ASEAN provided the disputants of the Cambodian conflict with good offices. At the second Jakarta Informal Meeting of 9-21 February 1989, chaired by Indonesia, the PRK government offered its own proposals for a negotiated settlement with all interested parties. (28) Having previously taken a non-negotiable stance, the PRK now agreed that elections would be a mechanism for determining the future government of Cambodia. (29)

ASEAN excelled in creating peace initiatives. At the third JIM (26 February-1 March 1990), Indonesia's foreign minister Ali Alatas proposed a plan for the creation of the Supreme National Council for Cambodia, in which all warring factions would be represented. This initiative helped the four parties overcome their disagreement over power-sharing.

Toward the end of the 1980s, the UN Security Council, along with Japan and Australia, took over the peace process in Cambodia. On 23 October 1991, four Cambodian factions and eighteen nations signed the Paris Peace Agreement, which created the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) to monitor the implementation of the peace agreement in Cambodia. Although the end game in the Cambodian conflict was dominated by the Security Council and several major powers, ASEAN had taken the lead role in advancing the peace process.

ASEAN continued to make contributions in the post-conflict settlement period in Cambodia. However, its efforts to facilitate the 1993 elections were both indirect and largely symbolic due to constraints on the organization's resources. When there were signs of ceasefire violations and the Khmer Rouge declared a boycott of the elections, ASEAN urged all parties in Cambodia to comply fully with their obligations as outlined in the peace agreement. ASEAN foreign ministers called on "all Cambodian parties to live up to the spirit of national reconciliation for the sake of Cambodia's sovereignty, independence, integrity and inviolability, neutrality and national unity. " (30)

ASEAN, however, contributed much more to the success of the 1998 elections. When the second prime minister, Hun Sen, ousted the first prime minister, Norodom Ranariddh, in July 1997, ASEAN responded decisively by suspending the admission of Cambodia into ASEAN until free and democratic elections could be held in Cambodia. In addition, an ASEAN troika led by the foreign ministers of Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand joined the "Friends of Cambodia" group to mediate between the Hun Sen government and the opposition to restore democratic legitimacy to the government. Several ASEAN countries also assisted Cambodia with technical preparation and monitored the elections. (31)

Although playing a lead role in resolving the Cambodian conflict, ASEAN provided only limited assistance for Cambodian refugees. At the outbreak of the conflict in Cambodia, ASEAN foreign ministers immediately called for the UNHCR to take charge of the situation and urged the international community to provide meaningful support to the UNHCR. Although ASEAN attempted to assist Cambodians, it focused more on expediting the departure of large numbers of refugees and securing a wide range of countries to offer permanent settlement opportunities for the displaced people.

The OAS in Haiti

The OAS, unlike ASEAN, acted to resolve the Haitian conflict independently. Yet, like ASEAN, the OAS exerted great efforts to prevent the military regime in Haiti from becoming the de facto government and from consolidating its power. From the onset of the conflict, OAS countries isolated Haiti diplomatically and economically: At their 3 October 1991 meeting, the OAS ministers of foreign affairs recommended that all member states suspend economic, financial and commercial links with Haiti. They also called for the suspension of all aid and technical assistance to the country with the exception of humanitarian aid. (32)

The OAS tried very hard to reach a political settlement for the Haitian conflict. On the one hand, the OAS constantly pressured the military regime to back down. It imposed an oil embargo on 8 October 1991, denying Haiti access to foreign oil, the country's sole source of energy and fuel. (33) OAS member countries also denied visas and froze assets of those individuals who had perpetrated and supported the coup. (34) On the other hand, the OAS sponsored a meeting between President Aristide and the heads of both houses of the Haitian legislature in Washington to increase the credibility of the exiled president. In addition, a delegation of the OAS secretary-general and six ministers of foreign affairs from the member countries traveled to Port-au-Prince to initiate negotiations for the restoration of democracy in Haiti. (35) The Haitian military, however, refused to negotiate with the commission.

Like ASEAN, the OAS countries provided good offices and offered valuable peace initiatives. With the assistance of the OAS, President Aristide and the heads of both houses of the Haitian legislature signed the Protocol of Washington, providing for the return to civilian government with a prime minister, designated by President Aristide, who would govern independently. It also called for the eventual reinstatement of President Aristide and a general amnesty for all those involved in the coup. (36) The coup leaders did not accept the Protocol, however, creating instead a Tripartite Commission represented by their appointed prime minister, Marc Bazin. (37)

The OAS was flexible in finding ways to end the Haitian conflict. In late 1992, the OAS realized that the oil embargo had failed to achieve its expected results. Weakened by the lack of a naval blockade and the violations of OAS members, including the United States and non-hemispheric parties, the embargo could neither bring down the de facto government in Haiti nor make it compromise. The OAS decided that international efforts were necessary to force a settlement. In December 1992, the OAS ministers took their case to the United Nations to request a universal embargo against Haiti and the approval of a possible military intervention. (38) This resulted in close cooperation between the OAS and the UN Security Council in carrying out a global oil and arms embargo. The global embargo, strengthened by the deployment of a US naval blockade and a ban imposed on the leaders and supporters of Cedras's military regime against entry into the United States, finally forced the coup leaders to sign a compromise pact--the Governors Island Agreement--on 3 July 1993. (39) Under the agreement, President Aristide would return to power on 30 October 1993 and would designate a prime minister. The commander-in-chief of the armed forces would take an early retirement and sanctions against Haiti would be lifted. (40)

Yet the signing of the accord and the lifting of sanctions did not bring peace and democracy. The military regime in Haiti sponsored acts of violence to prevent the new government from taking office. The OAS countries responded by joining forces with the UN Security Council and other UN member states to remove the military regime from Haiti so the agreement could be implemented. On 19 September 1994, approximately 22,000 US troops landed in Haiti; one month later, the military leaders finally backed down and President Aristide was peacefully restored to power.

In the post-conflict settlement period, the OAS was instrumental in organizing and monitoring Haitian elections. The OAS Council of Freely Elected Heads of Government named members to a provisional elections council (CEP) to monitor the elections, and a 300-person team, primarily made up of members of the OAS civilian mission in Haiti, formed the core of the main international observer mission for both the parliamentary elections in June and the presidential elections on 17 December. (41) Nonetheless, the results of the OAS efforts were controversial. Foreign observers from the Carter Center, a US-based NGO led by former US president Jimmy Carter, considered the CEP to be biased in favor of Aristide and his political allies. All credible opposition parties boycotted the presidential elections, leaving 1 4 largely unknown candidates to compete for the presidency. Voter turnout was less than 25 percent, and Rene Preval, President Aristide's choice for prime minister, won the election with a majority of votes that was based on an incomplete, "quick count" sample of ballots. (42)

Unlike ASEAN, the OAS as a whole actively worked to protect human rights and promote democracy in Haiti. Besides condemning the coup as an obvious violation of political rights and other basic freedoms recognized by the American Convention on Human Rights, the permanent council of the OAS issued the resolution "Program to Support the Promotion of Democracy." The resolution, signed in Washington, DC, by member states on 23 February 1992, was followed by an agreement for the deployment of an OAS civilian presence in Haiti to help restore democracy. From 1993 to 1994, the OAS deployed more than 1,000 human rights monitors throughout Haiti and established permanent human rights offices in each of Haiti's nine provinces. (43) Later, the OAS created a joint OAS/UN International Civilian Mission that provided on-site reports of human rights abuses and continued to promote respect for human rights and democracy after the restoration of President Aristide's government. (44)

LESSONS LEARNED

The experiences of ASEAN and the OAS show that regional organizations, to be legitimate and effective, must be recognized not only by the international community but also by all parties to the conflict. When ASEAN and the OAS first took action to resolve the conflicts in Cambodia and Haiti, neither organization had a mandate from the UN Security Council. Instead, the OAS used the Santiago Commitment to Democracy and the Renewal of the Inter-American System, as well as President Aristide's appeal to the organization, as legal grounds for action. Thus, the organization faced no opposition from the international community. The military regime in Haiti, however, refused to accept the role of the OAS. ASEAN gained international legitimacy by uniting the Cambodian resistance and receiving the support of major powers, namely the United States, France and Japan. Yet, without a UN mandate, the PRK still questioned the legitimacy of the organization. From 1979 to 1986, ASEAN employed almost all possible measures to involve the PRK in the peace process, from publicly condemning it and mobilizing the international community to isolate it, to repeatedly offering to serve as a mediator. The PRK would neither deal with ASEAN nor consider its peace initiatives, however. It also refused to enter into negotiations with the ASEAN-backed resistance coalition. Both the Cambodian and Haitian conflicts might have been shortened by years if ASEAN and the OAS had not faced problems of legitimacy.

With regard to enforcement power, the Cambodian and Haitian conflicts show that it is not proportional to the size of the organization. Cambodia's dependence on outside assistance allowed ASEAN, in cooperation with major powers, to leverage aid and persuade the warring factions to participate in and comply with the results of the peace process. Thus, ASEAN, a small organization, had relatively strong enforcement power. In comparison, the enforcement power of the OAS with its diverse membership of 25 countries including the powerful United States, was undermined by member states' differing levels of commitment to the organization's resolutions, as seen in the failure of the first embargo.

The OAS also had far greater resources than ASEAN to dedicate to the conflict resolution process. The organization's previous experience in democracy promotion and human rights protection gave it a comparative advantage over ASEAN in the post-conflict, settlement implementation period. The OAS countries could afford to send their own personnel to Haiti to help carry out elections and conduct human rights monitoring and on-site inspections, while ASEAN's role was marginalized after the peace agreement was reached. Yet, resources do not simply mean money, materials and personnel for peacekeeping or providing observers during elections. The case of ASEAN proves that expertise and human resources, including staff with good diplomatic skills and a good understanding of the conflict, disputants and political figures, are vital for negotiating a settlement.

Based on the experience of the OAS in Haiti, it is possible to conclude that close cooperation with the United Nations and major powers is the most important condition for achieving success. Despite being a strong regional organization, the OAS eventually had to ask the United Nations and western European powers to enact a universal embargo and provide stricter enforcement to force the military regime in Haiti to back down. In Cambodia, ASEAN worked closely with the United Nations and major powers throughout the peace process and received their support as well as resources and capabilities that it otherwise lacked.

CONCLUSION

Both ASEAN and the OAS were active, flexible and effective in the peace processes in Cambodia and Haiti. Although the UN Security Council and major powers made the final settlement for both conflicts, the contributions of the two organizations make the case for a greater role for regional organizations in conflict prevention and resolution.

Whether intrastate or interstate, conflicts often produce cross-border problems such as instability, refugee flows and guerrilla sanctuary. Regional actors, especially neighboring countries with strong incentives to encourage peace, may be more suitable than the United Nations or major states outside the region in preventing and resolving local conflicts. In addition, the countries in the region often share commonalities--economic interests, cultures and customs--that form the best kind of human resources and may leverage them in mediating with disputant states. Moreover, in cases where regional actors must intervene to make or keep peace, their proximity reduces logistical problems.

The numerous demands on the United Nations, as well as its strained capacity in maintaining international peace and security in the post-Cold War era, constitute further reasons to increase the role of regional organizations. The United Nations has been increasingly overstretched with engagements in peacekeeping, peacemaking and humanitarian affairs. Currently, it is involved in 15 peacekeeping operations, many of which began during the Cold War. At the same time, peacekeeping and peacemaking are costly in terms of both monetary and human resources, and the results achieved are not always in proportion to the efforts put forth. A more active role for regional organizations in conflict resolution can ease the budgetary and personnel constraints upon the world organization.

The ASEAN and OAS cases highlight the importance of close cooperation with the United Nations and major powers. Due to its small size, resource constraints and lack of enforcement power, ASEAN turned to the United Nations and major powers for assistance and mobilized their support throughout the peace process in Cambodia. In contrast, the OAS relied on its superior size and material resources but was initially ineffective. Only when it obtained the support of the United Nations and other major powers did it achieve its objectives. The difference in approach shows that close cooperation with the United Nations and major powers not only helps legitimize an organization's actions but also compensates for lack of resources. Moreover, as Security Council decisions are binding upon all members, close relations help to enforce coercive measures, such as diplomatic isolation and economic sanctions, that need the support of countries outside the region to be effective.

If regional organizations need to cooperate with the United Nations, the reverse also holds. As illustrated in the two case studies, the United Nations is no longer a universal peacemaker. It will have to partner closely with regional organizations to be more effective in global conflict resolution. Cooperation with regional organizations will help the United Nations deal with the rise of intrastate conflicts that have an ethnic dimension--an issue that the world organization was not created to handle.

Although there is general agreement about cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations in conflict resolution, there is still debate about the nature of the partnership. Conflicts differ in nature, scope and intensity, just as regional organizations vary in size, capability and interest. Thus, there cannot be one fixed formula for cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations in conflict resolution, and any cooperation should be on a case-by-case basis. Case studies such as ASEAN and the OAS suggest some general guidelines.

Conflicts are inevitably deadly, but conflicts are not inevitable. Regional organizations should be encouraged to play a lead role in conflict prevention. Specifically, they should try to prevent the emergence of violent conflicts between members, prevent ongoing conflicts from spreading or escalating and block the re-emergence of violence. There should also be consultation between the United Nations and regional organizations on a regular basis; regional organizations should provide the United Nations with early warnings about potential conflicts in their regions.

Once a conflict breaks out, the regional organization should be encouraged to carry out initial efforts to help resolve the conflict through mediation and negotiations. The United Nations does not need to be directly involved at this stage, but should join the regional organization in its diplomatic efforts and provide it with expertise and resources to increase the organization's leverage and effectiveness. With large-scale conflicts that require UN intervention, regional organizations should support the world organization with their own diplomatic efforts and personnel if required. When there is a need for peacekeeping or peacemaking, regional organizations should provide the United Nations with operational and logistical support or engage in joint operations. In some cases, one or more regional organizations can act under the auspices of the United Nations; however, actors need to accommodate one another to be effective, especially in post-conflict peacebuilding efforts that require a long-term commitment.

In summary, regional organizations have a potential role in conflict prevention and resolution. At the same time, they must maintain close cooperation with the United Nations and major powers to make the best use of such a role.

(1) Thomas G. Weiss, David P. Forsythe and Roger A. Coate, The United Nations and Changing World Politics (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994) p. 38.

(2) Lori Damrosch, Enforcing Restraints--Collective Intervention in Internal Conflicts (Washington, DC: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993) p. 350.

(3) Jenonne Walker, "International Mediation of Ethnic Conflict," Survival, 35, no. 1 (Spring 1993)p.102.

(4) Margaret Karns and Karen Mingst, "Peacekeeping and the Changing Role of the UN: Entering the Third Millennium," Thirteenth Annual Meeting, Academic Council on the United Nations System (ACUNS) (Oslo: June 2000) p. 6.

(5) Ibid.

(6) UN Charter, Articles 52-53.

(7) Ibid., Principles.

(8) Hilaire McCoubrey and Justin Morris, Regional Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era (Boston: Kluwer Law International, 2000) pp. 16-17.

(9) Thomas G. Weiss, David P. Forsythe and Roger A. Coate, The United Nations and Changing World Politics (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994) pp. 40-42.

(10) The original members--Singapore, the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand--signed the declaration in Kuala Lumpur in 1971.

(11) The four warring factions were the People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK), led by Hun Sen; the Democratic Kampuchea (DK)--commonly known as the Khmer Rouge--led by Pol Pot and later by Khieu Sam Phan; the Khmer People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF), led by Son Sann; and the National United Front for a Cooperative, Independent, Neutral and Peaceful Cambodia (FUNCIPEC), led by Norodom Sihanouk.

(12) The Santiago Commitment to Democracy and the Renewal of the Inter American System, together with Resolution 1080, established a mechanism for OAS countries to act promptly in the event of sudden or irregular interruptions to democratic political institutional processes in member states. For more information, visit <http://www.oas.org>.

(13) "A Case Study in Conflict," Evangelical Lutheran Church in America, at <www.elca.org/dcs/peace_study08.html>.

(14) Richard E. Hull, "Economic Sanctions Against Haiti (1991-1994)" in Imposing International Sanctions: Legal Aspects and Enforcement by the Military (Washington, DC: Institute for National Strategic Studies, 1997) p. 2.

(15) "Joint Statement of the Special Meeting of ASEAN Foreign Ministers on the Current Political Development in the South East Asian Region," Bangkok, 12 January 1979.

(16) Amitav Acharya, Pierre Lizee and Sorpong Peou, eds., Cambodia--The 1989 Paris Peace Conference: Background Analysis and Document (Millbank, NY: Kraus International Publications, 1991).

(17) Ramses Amer, Johan Saravanamuttu and Peter Wallensteen, The Cambodian Conflict, 1979-1991: From Intervention to Resolution (Uppsala: Penang Publications, 1996) p. 40.

(18) David Wurfel and Bruce Burton, eds., Southeast Asia in the New Worm Order: The Political Economy of a Dynamic Region (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996) pp. 40-43.

(19) Ibid.

(20) Simon Long, "China and Cambodia: Political Football in the Killing Field," The Pacific Review 2:2 (1 June 1989) p.155.

(21) Amer, Saravanamuttu and Wallensteen, (1996) pp. 42-43.

(22) It is important to note the changes in global and regional politics in the late 1980s: improvement of relations between the United States and the Soviet Union; normalization of relations between China and the Soviet Union as well as the rapprochement between China and Vietnam; adoption of the Doi Moi policy in Vietnam in 1986 and the implementation of that policy, which clearly affected the adjustments made by China and Vietnam on their respective positions in the Cambodian conflict. The impact of these changes on the settlement of the Cambodian conflict is outside the scope of this analysis.

(23) Chan Heng Chee, "The Interests and Role of ASEAN in the Indochina Conflict," International Conference on Indochina and Problems of Security and Stability in Southeast Asia (Bangkok: Chulalongkorn Univ., 19-21 June 1980) p. 12.

(24) Until 1988, Indonesia, a regional power of strategic and economic importance to China, had no ties with either China or Taiwan.

(25) China received many benefits from the ongoing Cambodian conflict. The conflict gave China a chance to act as the regional policeman, increase its leverage against the United States and the Soviet Union and expand its influence with the ASEAN countries. That China continued to support the Khmer Rouge heavily also suggested that it was in its interests to keep Vietnam in the Cambodian conflict to weaken the country economically and militarily. In fact, Chinese diplomats on many occasions openly claimed that China wanted to bleed Vietnam white even if it took a hundred years to do so. See Marlowe Hood and David Ablin, The Cambodian Agony (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1987) p. 1vii.

(26) Nayan Chanda, "Taking a Soft Line," Far Eastern Economic Review, 8 De cember 1988, p. 28.

(27) Long (1 June 1989).

(28) Tim Huxley, ASEAN and Indochina: A Study of Political Responses, 1975-81 (Canberra: Department. of International Relations, Australian National University, 1985) p. 86.

(29) Steven Ratner, The New UN Peacekeeping: Building Peace in Lands of Conflict after the Cold War (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995) pp. 4-5.

(30) "Statement by ASEAN Foreign Ministers on the Elections in Cambodia," Singapore, 18-19 May 1993, at <www.aseansec.org/view.asp?file=/politics/ stcme93.htm>.

(31) See <www.hrw.org/reports/1997/cambodia/Cambodia.htm>.

(32) Elizabeth D. Gibbons, Sanctions in Haiti: Human Rights and Democracy under Assault (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1999) p. 3.

(33) Dexter Boniface, "Defending Democracy in the Western Hemisphere: A Behavioral Analysis of the Organization of American States," International Studies Association's annual meeting (Washington, DC: 16 to 20 February 1999) at <www.ciaonet.org/isa/bod01/bod01.html > 5.

(34) Howard W. French, "Rival of Haiti's Ousted President Is Installed as the Prime Minister," New York Times, 20 June 1992, p. L-3.

(35) Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Haiti, MRE/RES.6/94, at <www.cidh.oas.org/countryrep/ EnHa93/eh93int.htm>, p. 5.

(36) Hull, p. 5.

(37) Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (MRE/RES.6/94).

(38) Boniface, p.6.

(39) Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (MRE/RES.6/94) p. 10.

(40) Boniface, p.6.

(41) Robert Pastor, Report on the Elections in Haiti, Mission to Haiti #3 (Atlanta: The Carter Center, 1995) at <www.ciaonet.org/wps/par03/index.html>, p. 8.

(42) Kevin J. Middlebrook ed., Electoral Observation and Democratic Transition in Latin America (San Diego: Center for US-Mexico Studies, 1998) p.5.

(43) Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (MRE/RES.6/94).

(44) Background notes to the Organization of American States at <www.state.gov/ www/background_notes/oas_0005_bgn.html>.

Thi Hai Yen Nguyen, The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not reflect the opinions of the institution that employs her.

Thi Hai Yen Nguyen is a junior lecturer and researcher at the Institute for International Relations in the Vietnamese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Her particular area of interest is security policy, with a focus on conflict resolution in Southeast Asia and the Middle East. Nguyen is currently writing a paper on national missile defense and its implications on Chinese foreign policy, especially its relations with neighbors. She holds a master's degree in international affairs from Columbia University.