Conventional arms exports and stability in the Middle East.

Neumann, Robert G.

It is commonly accepted that the Middle East is awash in conventional arms, with pressure for the delivery of ever more exotic, lethal equipment. It is also commonly asserted that such supplies are basically destabilizing and hence that some means or mechanism must be found to control, or at least to reduce, these massive arms sales. While these facts are true, I find the conclusions less than compelling. The overall arms-import problem in the Middle East, now and for the foreseeable future, is a consequence of relations among Israel, the Arab states and Iran, with Turkey as an uneasy but politically marginal player. The export of conventional weapons is, and will remain, dependent on supply and demand rather than on arms-control agreements.

Supply of Arms to the Middle East

It is an indisputable fact that the United States is the world's largest arms producer and exporter. A recent summary article states that U.S. arms sales amounted to $34 billion in the last fiscal year (FY 1994), although they are expected to decline to $13 billion in the current fiscal year (FY 1996) due to budget cuts and stretched-out production schedules in the U.S., as in many other countries.(1) While global figures vary, it is estimated that the U.S. accounts for 70 percent of the world market, with Russia and Germany ranking second and third, respectively.(2) The end of the Cold War has only exacerbated the drive by all producers and exporters to keep old customers and gain new ones.

Not only is there a rising demand for the quantity of weapons sold, but the quality of these weapons exports is also increasing steadily.(3) For example, cruise missiles of several types are especially in demand due to their accuracy and indetectability. Furthermore, it is argued with some plausibility that, had Iran and Iraq succeeded in obtaining additional diesel submarines, such acquisitions could have made a significant difference in the outcome of both the Iran-Iraq War and the Gulf War. William Hartung, in a new book, claims that indiscriminate sales to widely different and politically opposed countries demonstrate that profits and jobs, rather than ideological motives, spur this trade.(4) U.S. domestic politics also are involved as parts for these weapons are made in numerous states represented by powerful politicians. Georgia, the home state of powerful Democratic Senator Sam Nunn and the new Republican Speaker of the House of Representatives, Newt Gingrich, is an obvious beneficiary.

The arms trade is enormously complicated by the involvement of national and international interests and players. Few countries can buy these increasingly costly weapons without various types of offsets.(5) For instance, Israel, an important customer, has an enormous number of offset and co-production agreements with the U.S. that could not easily be upset or drastically reduced without producing significant political fallout in both countries.

Budget constraints in all purchaser countries, including the United States since the end of the Cold War, and the disappearance of the single most dangerous potential enemy of the U.S., the Soviet Union, have resulted in military budget cuts in the U.S. and other nations and a consequent reduction in funds at the disposal of arms industries in each country. Nevertheless, the production and export of such weapons remain highly significant to both the U.S. and Russian economies. Although deliberate efforts have been made, both in the U.S. and elsewhere, to disperse production over as wide an area as possible for demographic and economic reasons, the arms industry in the U.S. remains highly concentrated. In states like California, the economic and political effects of declining arms production are felt strongly. This is true to an even greater extent in Russia, where employment in the St. Petersburg area is highly dependent on weapons-industry exports.

Sophisticated weapons systems often require many years for design and development. Production lines for airplanes and tanks, once closed down, are neither quickly nor easily reopened. When private enterprise carries the brunt of such production shifts, the reopening of such lines (once threat perceptions change) cannot be undertaken without enormous government subsidies. Hence all producer countries, especially Russia and the U.S., but increasingly China and other growing secondary producers such as Brazil and India, have a strong political interest in keeping the arms market going.

Although waves of moral indignation against weapons exports rise quite high in the U.S. at certain times, the consequences of unilateral control efforts can be very drastic - and negative. In 1985, Congressional opposition to the sale of F- 15 planes to Saudi Arabia was demonstrated largely by supporters of Israel who professed to see a danger to the Jewish state. The Saudis, always irritated by the often rude Congressional debate, decided to buy British Tornado planes instead.(6) The result was the loss of a considerable number of jobs in the U.S., while security for Israel became even more tenuous. While the Saudis would have accepted some, though not all, downgrading of the F-15s, the Tornados were delivered by Britain without any downgrading or restrictions on their use.(7)

As far as Russia is concerned, its need for hard currency from foreign sales is so great that a voluntary reduction of its weapons exports is quite unlikely for the next 20 or 30 years. It is not entirely true that Russia has nothing to export except weapons; although the low standards of Russian quality control and other technical and managerial shortcomings are considerable, recent experience has shown that when Western investors or partners demand strict quality control, Russia is quite capable of competing on the world, and even the U.S., market. Russian weapons exports, especially fighter planes, have improved considerably since the last days of the Cold War and especially thereafter. What still hampers Russian weapons exports is a well-deserved reputation for poor servicing and unreliable follow-up, which puts off buyers. Also, the chaotic situation in Russia raises the question of the future reliability of sales and the availability of spare parts. Nevertheless, Russian arms sales are burgeoning, including to the Middle East.

There is little that can be done to stem the export of conventional arms. The idea that any country would long restrain its own exports while others do not is not likely to prevail. Certainly, in the U.S. the new Republican majority is even less inclined to reduce arms sales than were its Democratic predecessors, and an experience similar to the F-15 sale to Saudi Arabia is not likely to be repeated.(8)

One possible opportunity for the application of more rigorous arms control is in the field of information. Information exchange was the task of the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM), but COCOM was designed primarily to supervise technology transfers and the export of weapons to the Soviet Union, and therefore lost its raison d'etre at the end of the Cold War.(9)

A more recent effort called Perm (referring to the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council) is designed to coordinate exports from the United States, Russia, Germany, China, Great Britain and France. But this committee does not meet very often and has little practical effect - it is little more than a registry for mutual information on weapons exports undertaken or approved by its members.(10)

Under the Clinton administration's leadership, an effort has been made to report weapons purchases by countries in the Middle East. A December 1994 meeting, held in Tunis, of representatives from 15 countries on the working level made some progress. In February 1995, the Clinton Administration issued a new policy, in the form of a Presidential Decision Directive, concerning the future of U.S. arms sales. Although originally designed to clarify the U.S.'s arms policy, the directive was generally viewed as a concession to the U.S. arms industry. The new policy assures "continued sales of major conventional weapons systems to key U.S. allies and friendly nations around the globe."(11) Therefore, U.S. arms sales to the Middle East and other regions are not likely to decline as a result of the implementation of this new policy. But even before the Democrats' electoral disaster of November 1994, the administration was tom between the "different ways of satisfying the anti-proliferation people on the one hand ... and keeping the arms industry happy on the other."(12) Little is likely to happen, at least until 1996, as a Republican majority forges ahead with its domestic reforms while an irresolute and divided administration catches up as well as it can. It is therefore safe to predict that no policies will be forthcoming that may cost jobs in the U.S.

The extent of the threat from a proliferation of Russian arms sales is difficult to measure in numerical terms. Although the quantity of Russian arms sales has certainly increased, the quality and effectiveness of these weapons remains questionable. The Russians, the chief military suppliers to Iraq, have maintained that incompetent Iraqi training and handling of Russian equipment was the main cause of the Iraqi defeat by the U.S.-led U.N. forces during the Gulf War. Similar arguments were made, with less vehemence, to explain Syria's defeat by Israel in 1973. Naturally, such "explanations" have to be viewed in relation to the natural desire of suppliers to explain away their clients' failure, even though they are not necessarily without foundation.

The highly centralized Soviet command-and-control system was well-suited to the authoritarian regimes of the Arab countries, but made for slower reaction time in crises and numerous glitches, so that even minor decisions had to be sent up to the very top command. However, it was not necessarily efficiency that was lacking. Rather, the dictators involved, who in both the Iraqi and the Syrian cases were the scions of minority groups (Takritis and Alawites, respectively), could not afford to delegate very much if they were to protect their own security and survival. Thus, this extensive centralization and the varying levels of technical education make it difficult to draw generalized conclusions about the effective use of hightech equipment by Arab nations.(13)

Demand for Arms in the Middle East

The demand for arms in Middle Eastern markets, requiring more and increasingly sophisticated supplies, is a consequence of important regional dynamics. First, there are the security problems arising from the Arab-Israeli tension. Second, there are the "rogue states," especially Iran and Iraq, but also Sudan, which are viewed as threats throughout the area. Third, there is now an increasingly "robust," or more nationalistic, Russian policy, as most recently demonstrated in break-away Chechnya, a region mostly inhabited by Muslims (whatever the depth of their faith). Finally, there is the quite different threat of Islamic radicalism, misnamed fundamentalism, which might be considered the most imminent threat to regional stability in the Middle East.(14) Islamic radicalism constitutes a special category, because it is both internal and supranational, and arms proliferation plays only a limited role. Such radicalism also feeds on popular frustrations caused by fiscal constraints, which tend to force governments to reduce arms purchases but which also result in cuts in social, health and educational expenditures. All of the areas of potential regional conflict argue for more, not less, conventional arms sales and make the already dim prospects for arms control even dimmer. Many such conflicts remain while further sources of instability are increasing all around the former Soviet Union.

Setting aside the intrinsic desirability of controlling arms exports to the Middle East, what is, realistically, the relationship between such exports and threats to stability in the region? In my opinion, it is only marginal, and in terms of the Israeli-Palestinian relations and negotiations, there is none. Efforts to control arms exports to the Middle East do, of course, have a considerable impact on relations between Israel and the Arab states. The Arab-Israeli peace process would have to go much further and deeper than can presently be foreseen before arms-export controls could succeed. Not only would firm peace treaties have to be concluded, but the various Arab states and Israel would have to become interwoven in a manner comparable to the European Union before the fear of conflict could be banished.

Arab-Israeli War and Peace

The Arab-Israeli conflict is the oldest of the aforementioned crisis areas and is frequently regarded as the most complex. Whether this is still true in view of the current peace process is to be examined. If one's emphasis is on arms control, there are some hopeful signs (such as progress made in the establishment of information exchanges on arms contracts), but it remains to be seen whether these hopeful signs will ultimately become reality.

Without going over well-travelled ground and repeating old arguments, one should bear in mind that this conflict consists of two interwoven strands: (1) the hostility toward Israel by the surrounding Arab states; and (2) the torturous conflict between Israelis and Palestinians, which follows a different logic - one grounded in the fact that the two parties fear and detest each other but practically cannot live without one another. The potential for conventional arms control has little bearing on the Israeli-Palestinian dispute, but a great deal on that between Israel and its Arabstate neighbors.

In the absence of a Palestinian army, threats to Israel from the Palestinians, both in Israel proper and from the occupied, but perhaps soon-to-be self-administered territories, are threats of terrorism (carried out by small groups or by suicide bombers) and are therefore typically police problems (although in this case they are dealt with by the Israeli Army).(15) Neither side needs substantial weapons imports to carry out such missions. By contrast, real or potential threats to Israel from the Arab states center on regular, established armed forces. It is here that all sides try to enhance their military potential and that the ensuing arms race undercuts security on all sides.

As these lines are written, there is not yet a Palestinian state, although developments clearly point in that direction. The Israeli argument that there should be no separate Palestinian state, vented with greater vehemence by the Likud opposition, is clearly a tactical-political maneuver and not a feasible solution if peace is to be realized. The Israeli-PLO negotiations clearly envisage increasing areas of self-government in the predominantly Arab-inhabited areas of the occupied territories. In other words, with every step forward in those talks, increasingly state-like structures and functions for Palestine are clearly anticipated by both sides.

Security is obviously a very serious concern for both Israelis and Palestinians. It is clearly in Israel's interest that the fledgling Palestinian police force function as well as possible in order to curb terrorism and attacks against both Israelis and moderate Palestinians. But arms for these relatively small forces do not seem to be a problem. Furthermore, that the Palestinian authority would even consider organizing an army and an air force in addition to the police would seem clearly fantastic, and the very suggestion would arouse the worst fears of Israel's ever-watchful security forces. An independent Palestine - when it comes into existence - would almost certainly have to be demilitarized, and this has long been conceded by PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat in many conversations, including with this author. No doubt, at some time during Palestine's evolution toward independent statehood, the question of an army as a symbol of sovereignty will arise. But some small states are better off and more stable without an army (as Costa Rica has demonstrated). Therefore, arms sales and arms control are not necessarily a problem in the evolution of Israeli-Palestinian relations. But to the extent that they are an issue at all, arms sales should be included in the ongoing Israeli-PLO negotiations and as Palestinian autonomy approaches Palestinian statehood.

However, the prospect of reaching an Israeli-Palestinian agreement does significantly affect the conflict between Israel and neighboring Arab states - and hence the feasibility of limiting arms exports. The Madrid Conference, at which Arab-Israeli peace talks were initiated in 1991, has already shown the emergence of wider participation by Arab states, including Saudi Arabia and Syria." Although the spectacular White House signing ceremony of the Declaration of Principles on 13 September 1993 accelerated the regional movement toward ending the Arab-Israeli conflict, the slowing down of the Israeli-PLO talks has had an adverse impact on the negotiations on overall Arab-Israeli relations.

Syria, in particular, does not want to be isolated. The closer an Israeli-PLO agreement appears, the more pressure there is on Syria's president Hafiz al-Assad to come off his perch of extreme caution. However, the Israeli-PLO talks currently seem to be in a particularly delicate state, and a general breakdown, while still unlikely, is now possible. Hence there is less motivation for Syria to move forward, despite the fact that the inclusion of ranking military officers from both Syria and Israel appears to be giving those talks more impetus. But on the Syrian side, Assad is still the only one to make decisions.

The personal hostility between Assad and Arafat is well-known. Surely Assad sees no reason to help Arafat. But whether the prospect of a breakdown in Israeli-PLO talks and the likelihood of Arafat's humiliation would give Assad renewed motivation to move forward or not is hard to say. In this author's opinion, the chance for Assad to appear again as the most important Arab leader might appear irresistible, especially as Assad's always delicate health may make this his last chance for triumph. The opportunity for Syrian leadership is further limited by the fact that there appears to be no clear candidate to succeed Assad. Admittedly, the case for limited assistance or detrimental actions taken by Assad or another Syrian leader can also be made. It has been said, and too often, that Assad keeps his cards close to his vest, and reading Assad's mind - which is more tactical than strategic - is often a losing proposition.

In sum, I conclude - albeit somewhat cautiously - that the movement toward Arab-Israeli peace, however glacial, is probably irreversible. At any rate, this is what several Arab states have also concluded, and they have acted accordingly. Among these is certainly Jordan, which is the second Arab country (after Egypt) to conclude a full peace with Israel. If Yasir Arafat were to fail, Jordan, with its large Palestinian population, would stand to gain some advantages, including the firming up of its position on Jerusalem.(17) Even if the Rabin government were to collapse, the Likud party would, in its place, continue to have relatively few quarrels with Jordan.

However, in such an uneasy position, Jordan would want to strengthen its armed forces. This would be less directed against Israel - because Ariel Sharon's propaganda that "Jordan is Palestine" has not taken hold in Israel. Moreover, there is no way in which Jordan could come close to Israel's military power. Yet, if as a result of a breakdown in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process the general situation in the Middle East deteriorated, Jordan would feel threatened by radical Arab governments and movements. Jordan's army is still one of the best in the region, though certainly not the largest. Jordan's King Hussein, therefore, undoubtedly hopes for military aid, primarily from the U.S., in the event peace with Israel is fully implemented.

A growing number of Gulf countries is also slowly and more or less furtively moving toward normalizing relations with Israel. The latest to enter this process is Oman. Even ever-cautious Saudi Arabia has taken some positive steps in this direction. Yet Syrian diplomacy has succeeded in mobilizing both Egyptian and Saudi Arabian support for Assad's firm demands that Israel totally withdraw from the Golan Heights as a prerequisite to progress in the Syrian-Israeli peace talks.

The relationship between Israel and the Arab states is quite different from the Israeli-Palestinian problem, although, as discussed, it is not wholly unconnected therewith. All these states have military establishments which, together or separately, are capable of posing a security problem for Israel, and Israel, in turn, is viewed as a security threat by these Arab states. In addition, all these states have external and internal security problems quite apart from those posed by Israel.

Israeli Concerns

Israel's armed forces are obliged by territorial concerns as well as by their limited manpower to rely on a relatively small professional army, augmented in times of need by rapidly mobilized reserves. Israel's highly technical education system, together with the elite status of the armed services, makes the system work very efficiently. Even more than in the Arab experience, the Israeli armed forces enjoy a high social status. Personal initiatives taken even by small unit commanders are encouraged and rewarded.

Even so, the passage of time has not left the Israeli armed forces unaffected. Long years of occupation duty, especially since the beginning of the intifadah (uprising) of Arab youth in 1987, have been a strain on Israeli military morale and training. It is unlikely, however, that the quality of its armed forces has suffered sufficiently to substantially reduce its qualitative superiority over the forces of Arab countries.

More important for Middle East security are political considerations. The reality of U.S. domestic politics dictates the continuation of the very high level of U.S. assistance to Israel. Even though the new Republican majority in Congress may try to reduce the overall level of U.S. foreign assistance, the quantity and sophistication of U.S. arms exports to Israel are not likely to suffer greatly in the foreseeable future. The Israeli military doctrine requires that Israel remain qualitatively superior not only to its individual Arab neighbors, but to any combination of Arab states, and this is unlikely to change.

In view of these considerations, a war between some or all Arab states and Israel has now become a practical and rational improbability. Even irrational attacks, in light of such odds, are most unlikely, unless suicidal policies are to be assumed." Of course wars are not always started to be won. Anwar al-Sadat began his war against Israel in 1973 without any expectation of victory in the usually accepted form. He hoped for tactical, if not strategic, surprise - which he achieved - and he aimed at shaking up both the Israeli and the U.S. establishments. The eventual result was the Camp David Agreement. Today such a situation is unlikely.(19) Yet the arms race in conventional weapons is bound to continue for other reasons.

Israel's preoccupation with security is unlikely to diminish anytime soon. This need is psychological more than it is physical, but that does not make it any less real. A need to feel secure is profoundly understandable for a people that came close to extinction in the Holocaust and who have lived, ever since the creation of the Jewish state, surrounded by enemies, that have attacked or posed a serious threat to them several times. Israel's drive for security has developed a quasi-religious, certainly political, character. Security concerns are argued, time and again, in "worst-case" terms, constantly creating in Israel's complex, multi-party political scene demands for more Arab concessions than can be supported by political realities and which, therefore, can never be fulfilled (even if one leaves out Israel's possession of weapons of mass destruction).

There are several additional corollaries to this situation. One is the consequence of the Camp David Accords (1979), which made concrete the proposition that 50 percent of U.S. foreign assistance goes to Israel and Egypt. Add to this the fact that large conventional weapons deliveries feed into a very large number of co-production schemes, especially with Israel, whose high technological and scientific knowledge is well-adapted to such intricate plans. Under these circumstances, realistic chances for workable conventional arms-control agreements are not exactly bright.

But that is not all. The general argument of the arms-control proponents is that conventional arms exports to volatile regions like the Middle East are dangerously destabilizing. This is possibly true, but the opposite is also true, up to a point. Although the infusion of more and more military material into the region may heighten interstate tension, it also contributes to the stability of each regime. Even in democratic Israel, the accusation that military preparedness had been allowed to suffer would invariably undermine the stability of the government.

Arab Concerns

All Arab regimes, with the exception of Lebanon, are essentially authoritarian regimes whose quests for internal stability require that their armed forces be well-treated, well-equipped and privileged. Sophisticated, high-tech equipment is only one solution. The dazzling display of such weapons on the world's television screens has greatly enhanced the demand for them by Arab governments despite the fact that the level of training and technical sophistication required to operate them makes their usefulness debatable. To varying degrees, most Arab governments prefer to avoid the accusation that they are willing to leave their militaries defenseless, so they strain their budgets and the arms rare continues. To this is added the fact that increasingly sophisticated co-production schemes are capable of creating varying elements of local arms industries, which of course add to the pressure for market incentives and unrestrained arms exports.

For arms exporters - especially the largest among them, the U.S. and its Middle East clients - another advantage arises. Selling arms includes sending sizeable training teams to the region as well as providing training in the home country. For the U.S. this means a considerable and fairly constant infiltration of manpower into the countries concerned. To be sure, such a foreign presence, with its possibly destabilizing effects, can be irritating to conservative Islamic elements. Fortunately, U.S. contingents are well-trained for such delicate missions, as the minimal incidences during the Gulf War demonstrated. More important to the host countries, however, has been the visible evidence of lasting U.S. involvement, which may well do more for the respective countries' feeling of security than the actual equipment. These military liaison teams also provide an additional channel of information and a means by which concerns and apprehensions can be expressed by either side when normal diplomatic channels are considered too hidebound or otherwise slow or unresponsive. In the Middle East, where numerous intrigues are constantly boiling, these extra channels provide additional battlegrounds for the martialing of support by the various local factions. Obviously, there is the danger that U.S. or other foreign involvement in these intrigues could embroil such nations more than their limited ability to extricate themselves would permit, but the process is almost certainly inevitable and needs to be carefully monitored.

As long as the success of the overall peace process is threatened by the hesitant policies of the Rabin government and its razor-thin majority is constantly threatened by the intrigues of the smaller parties in the Knesset, the possibility of the Likud Party returning to power cannot be excluded, and with it a rapidly cooling relationship between Israel and the Arabs. Even in that case, however, U.S. support of Israel's military superiority remains a given well into the next century. Hence, all Arab regimes and their military establishments will find it necessary to acquire ever more sophisticated armaments, however hopeless may be the actual application of that equipment in a renewed Arab-Israeli conflict. And, however remote the flare-up of a renewed Arab-Israeli military conflict is, actual arms control agreements seem unlikely in view of the fact that any such pact would constitute the contractual acceptance by the Arab states of Israel's continued and guaranteed superiority.

Iran and Iraq

If the de facto security threat resulting from the Arab-Israeli conflict has declined, so has the threat of an Iraqi and/or Iranian incursion against surrounding states. The U.S. policy of "dual containment" toward these two rogue states gives the impression that both states are equally dangerous. But there are people in the State Department and the White House who know better.(20)

The threat to Middle Eastern stability from both countries has historical and cultural roots that antedate the rise of the regimes of the Ayatollah Khomeini and Saddam Hussein. No Iraqi government, even before full independence was achieved in 1961, had accepted Kuwait's independence or the British-designated Iraq-Kuwait frontier. British intervention was required more than once to preserve order. After the ascension of Saddam Hussein in 1979, the Kuwaiti border and the issue of independence came to the fore with increasing frequency, even though the same Saddam Hussein had proclaimed that the invasion of one Arab country by another was impermissible and that other Arab states would have the right to combine forces against the perpetrator.

What had earlier seemed like a simple border dispute, together with Iraq's grievance against borders drawn so as to exclude Iraq's free access to the Shatt al-Arab and the Persian Gulf, was perceived by the U.S. government and its allies as a wider threat of Iraqi domination over the Gulf and directed especially against Saudi Arabia, the main oil-producing country. Even after Iraq's crushing defeat in the Gulf War in 1991, Saddam Hussein survived in power, from time to time obstructed the work of U.N. inspection teams and in 1994 once again moved sizeable troop contingents toward the Kuwaiti border. It became clear that as long as he remained in power, there would be no stability in the region. This was evidently the conclusion drawn by Saudi Arabia, which accelerated its arms imports despite its financial constraints and even implemented conscription for the Saudi armed forces (a step never before taken and one regarded by Riyadh as politically risky). Iraq's history gives no guarantee that any Iraqi successor regime would be substantially different. Hence, long-term defense planning by Saudi and Gulf leaders anticipates the continued need for U.S. partnership.

The Iranian threat to Gulf stability is in many respects even more serious and complex than that presented by Iraq. With almost 60 million inhabitants, Iran represents a sizably larger threat than Iraq with its 20 million. Moreover, Iran's historically imperial pretensions and perceived arrogance have made for sometimes tense and always difficult Arab-Iranian relations, even in the days of the Shah. Shi'i domination of Iran is regarded as dangerous and threatening by Sunni Arab countries like Saudi Arabia (whose Shi'i minorities of about 800,000 live primarily in the oil-rich Eastern Provinces), and even Iraq, which actually has a numerical Shi'i majority (although under Sunni control).

To this add the consistent claim by the Iranians that their government represents an authentic "Islamic" regime. This particularly jars Saudi Arabia, whose ruler bears the title of "Protector of the Two (holiest) Shrines" in Islam (Mecca and Medina) and which experiences, virtually every year during the annual hajj (the pilgrimage of all Muslims to Mecca), constant, well-organized attempts by Iranian "pilgrims" to disrupt the event.

It is not an exaggeration to say that all Arab Muslim regimes (which are mostly Sunni) are nervous about Iran's constant attempts to support indigenous radical groups, while Iran's official propaganda treats all Arab regimes (except Syria's) with disdain and contempt. This situation has improved somewhat under Hashemi Rafsanjani, but clearly Rafsanjani does not enjoy the total control that Khomeini possessed during his lifetime.

The Gulf countries have tried to confront Iran in various ways, largely due to their differences in size and resources. The United Arab Emirates (UAE), especially Dubai (where many Iranians have settled), rely largely on trade and economic inducements, which flourished even during the Iran-Iraq War. There is also an ongoing territorial dispute between the UAE - especially its Sharjah province - and Iran over the two Tunb Islands and over Abu Musa. Efforts by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) to organize a GCC-wide defense system have failed; even attempts to devise a compatible air-security system have failed. An Omani proposal for a force larger than the 10,000 Peninsula Shield was rejected. Hence, dependence on the U.S. for arms sales continues unabated.(21)

Islamic Radicalism

The greatest single cause of instability in the Middle East is the rise of Islamic radicalism. However, Islamic radicalism has only an indirect and tangential impact on the arms trade.

Islamic radicalism results from domestic protest movements that use religion as a platform for mobilization. It takes different forms in different countries, as circumstances direct. It is not the result of an international conspiracy directed from a central source such as Iran. Though it is true that Iran, as well as the Iranian-influenced Hizbollah movement in southern Lebanon, has attempted to aid and influence national Islamist movements, they have, by and large, remained marginal thereto.

Another aspect of this phenomenon can be found in Afghanistan, where the anti-Communist and later anti-Russian popular opposition (Mujahedin) organized itself under the unifying Islamic banner. But after having done so, Islamism developed a life of its own and anti-Russian fighters in turn sent some of their adherents to other parts of the world, where (for quite different reasons) Islam appeared to be in danger, such as in North Africa. This phenomenon still does not provide evidence of an "Islamist International," as some have argued. Rather, radical Islamism remains a series of internal movements augmented by relatively small groups of foreign Islamic militants. The movements fight by the familiar methods of domestic insurrection and are met by the equally familiar efforts of the national army and police to suppress them. The insurgents are in no position to acquire sizeable weapons through importation, nor are the armies trying to suppress them in need of sophisticated imports. Yet it is not Islam that is destabilizing - Islam has existed in all the regions concerned for hundreds of years. It is the fusion between often quite legitimate socio-political demands and religiously inspired absolutism that makes for destabilization. The potential danger of Islamic radicalism is therefore not a subject for arms-control measures in the usual sense.

The Russian Factor

A quite different potential threat of the spread of destabilizing Islamism lies in the republics of the former Soviet Union whose populations are largely Muslim (i.e., Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan). These areas had all been conquered by Russia's Tsarist regime, which, like its Communist successors, governed them in a strictly centralized fashion from Moscow. They have known numerous rebellions against Russian overlordship and were brutally repressed by both Tsars and Bolsheviks. These were all basically nationalist uprisings, and 70 years of communism and its repression of religion made these regions rather secularist. Few of the younger generations remember much of Islam. While the repression of (mostly Orthodox) Christianity worked reasonably well because of the destruction or incorporation of the Russian Orthodox clergy into the communist regime, this recipe could not be so easily imposed on the Muslim areas. This is because Islam, especially Sunni Islam, has no full clergy. Still, Islam seemed to exist under communism as a relatively ineffective creed, made more so by the communist authorities' appointment of religious mullahs and imams, chosen among clergy with dubious religious credentials but supposed attachment to the Communist Party.

After the breakup of the Soviet Union, there was a keen rivalry between Iran and Turkey over influence in the several new Muslim republics. Both sponsored religious and cultural institutions, but neither achieved much success. Even in Azerbaijan, where there is linguistic affinity with Iran, the Khomeini regime did not serve as a role model. This is partly the result of the secularization in Azerbaijan, which had taken place during the communist regime, and partly of the Shi'i character of Iran, which, however de-emphasized by the Khomeinists, did not hold much attraction for the Azerbaijanis. Nor did Turkey, with its limited means and its secular Kemalism, make much progress.

With the breakup of the Soviet regime, primarily nationalist, separatist leaders appeared, at first competing for hotly contested positions of leadership. But Islam as a unifying force and as a "mobilization platform" (as we have seen earlier in the Middle East proper) emerged and became more clearly and publicly emphasized as a unifying force, frequently opposed to Moscow's growing attempts to reacquire, in one way or another, its former possessions in what has been called the "Near Abroad." This Russian endeavor also squared with the growing priority that the Russian foreign ministry under Yeltsin gave to its "traditional" interests in the Middle East.

However, there are other, more long-range threats that could come from the North. Boris Yeltsin's leadership of the Russian Federation is highly uncertain, and the possibility of succession by a nationalist-militarist regime with expansionist tendencies cannot be excluded. Both imperial Russia and the Soviet regime had strong interests in the Middle East, and, even under the Gorbachev and Yeltsin regimes, Russia's foreign policy has shown activism in the region (as both the 1990 Primakov and 1993-94 Kozyrev visits to Baghdad revealed). What form these ambitions might take under a post-yeltsin, nationalist regime is difficult to say at this time, as Yeltsin has suffered a severe setback in all the adjacent Muslim areas through his military attack on the largely Muslim population of dissident Chechnya. But a drive by Moscow to strengthen its hand in the Muslim republics would have strong nationalist appeal in Russia and could exacerbate tensions throughout the Middle East.

Conclusion

The continuation and, in some places, the expansion of the aforementioned conflicts in the Middle East and adjacent areas decrees the continuance for the foreseeable future of tensions and suspicions, and limits the realistic prospect for a conventional arms-control agreement. To be sure, hopes for Israeli-Palestinian and more general Arab-israeli peace have increased since the Madrid Conference and especially since the Israeli-Palestinian accord of 13 September 1993. But progress has been agonizingly slow, and the originally envisaged Israeli withdrawal and Palestinian election agreement are now at least one year behind schedule.

These and other events (including the disputes within the governing Israeli Labor Party) conjure up the possibility of a Likud Party victory in Israel, after which further progress in the peace process would become exceedingly doubtful unless the Likud Party were to change its policies (which seems unlikely). That alone would halt or reverse progress in overall relations between Israel and its neighboring Arab states. Arab regimes would also then suffer the consequences of their seemingly misplaced confidence in better Arab-Israeli relations, through the growth of domestic disappointment and an increase of internal Islamic radicalism. Even if they survive this shock, they could hardly afford to disregard the clamor of their military establishments for more and better equipment.

Under these circumstances, what future is likely for continued efforts to devise and negotiate agreements for the control and reduction of conventional arms deliveries? In the opinion of this author, there is little room for optimism. To be sure, the moral and political agenda of the "merchants of death" will continue to have its appeal, although economic realities and political change have tended to diminish the ardor of these advocates. Nevertheless, not only politics but also congressional desire to micromanage these efforts and to be able to pose as "peace-advocates" before their voters will help to keep arms-control efforts alive. And why not? Although arms-control efforts are bound to be slow because of their complexity and level of technological sophistication, there is always the possibility - however remote at the moment - that political conditions may change. In that case it would be better to have the experience and negotiating processes in place, rather than to have to start the process over and possibly get bogged down in its initial stages.

The Arab states have, in the absence of a continuously aggressive Russian policy to match U.S. supplies to Israel, for all practical purposes given up on attempts to match Israel militarily. An aggressive military policy by Arab states did not work well when the USSR was in full command of its policies and arms exports; it is even less likely to work now, even if a brutally nationalistic government were to take the reins in Moscow.

Also, the financial ability of the Arab states to muster an all-out arms race has diminished considerably, especially as a result of reduced oil income. The richest among them, Saudi Arabia, has been forced to pull back and stretch out its arms purchases, while making some cautious moves toward eventually improving relations with Israel. In any event, as long as U.S. administrations remain determined to support Israel's qualitative military edge, there is simply no contest, and the Arabs are well aware of this.

The situation is, of course, different with regard to Iran and Iraq. Some European countries, especially Germany, always carefully consider to what extent it is safe to open the Iranian market. But Germany, France, Italy, Spain and other European suppliers have responsible governments and are not inclined to permit a limitless arms race in favor of Iran. The U.S., of course, will have to consistently monitor the quality and quantity of arms acquired by Iran. But U.S. action (furthered by as much information as possible and gleaned through the aforementioned multilateral information devices, including the work of our own intelligence services) ought to be up to this task. As long as the present Khomeinist regime lasts (and that may be quite a while), the danger to the Arab countries, especially those of the Gulf, will continue. In this sense, the interests of Israel and the Arab Gulf countries run on delicate, parallel tracks. To a lesser degree, this is also true of Iraq. Saddam Hussein's departure - when it comes - may not produce a less brutal regime, but it is likely to at least bring a less adventurous regime, once the burden on the Iraqi people of Saddam's policies becomes intolerable.

Finally, let me repeat that the greatest present and foreseeable danger to Middle East stability does not come from states, nor even from Iran, but from internal combustion for which radical Islamism is the foremost ingredient. But, as stated, the chance of such movements coming to power has nothing to do with weapons exports; for the kind of warfare that now characterizes Islamic radicalism (as in Algeria), there always seem to be enough weapons around. The purchase of necessary weaponry and sophisticated security equipment and the like by the embattled governments of Algeria, Egypt and others will continue despite arms-control efforts by the U.S. and others.

But efforts by the U.S. government in support of negotiations with the opposition movements in these countries will also continue on the diplomatic front. There is another side to arms-control negotiations of which the public at large is not aware and in which the media - constantly searching for more dramatic "breakthroughs" or "failures" - is not interested. Negotiations, especially the multilateral track of the many Middle East negotiations now in process, do indeed increase the exchange of information and, to some admittedly limited degree, the amount of mutual trust. This is also true of other, unofficial and informal negotiations between Russia and the U.S., of which the "Dartmouth Process" is an outstanding example.(22) As these talks often involve the same individuals on all sides and go on for many years, the participants come to know one another to the extent that their conduct becomes more predictable. This is a form of "trust," though not as trust is commonly understood. It often facilitates broader agreements, though not necessarily on the subject on which the original negotiations were based. Hence, arms-control negotiations, especially of the multilateral type, have their own value even where arms control agreements remain elusive.

What, then, is the future of efforts to control conventional weapons exports to the Middle East? The answer, according to this writer, is that there is simply not much that can realistically be done. The popular "merchants of death" argument will continue. However, continued monitoring of exports is necessary, and diplomatic efforts at exchanging information among weapons-exporting states will continue to be useful, whatever their limitations and the always dubious veracity of figures in this murky trade.

The concern of arms-control proponents and their appeal for undertaking massive studies on arms proliferation will not visibly diminish, whatever the lopsided relationship between cause and effect in the conventional arms trade. But, for all practical purposes, the export of conventional weapons in the foreseeable future will continue to be governed by market forces and not by political agreements. (1) Leslie Alan Horvitz, "Cold War's End has Little Effect on Arms Sales; Proliferation Foes Seek Curbs on U.S.-dominated Industry," Washington Times, Special Report, 7 December 1994, p. A10. (2) Ian Anthony, et al., "Arms Production and Arms Trade," SIPRI Yearbook 1994 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994) p. 484. (3) All this refers, of course, only to conventional weapons production and exports, not to nuclear and other weaponry of mass destruction, which are not the subject of this article. Still, even "conventional" explosives have now reached a high degree of destructiveness, as demonstrated at the World Trade Center in New York and most recently in Oklahoma City. The ingredients of these explosives will be difficult to control. (4) William Hartung, And Weapons for All (New York: Harper Collins, 1994). (5) Offset agreements are designed to produce income for the purchaser in order to lighten the financial burden. Co-production is a cooperative agreement among different countries (primarily involving the eventual purchaser of the finished product) to produce different parts or to conduct related research, and so on. In addition, offset agreements may have little or nothing to do with the product to be purchased and can vary greatly by industry, ranging from agriculture to textiles. The offset system is particularly intricate because it consists of both direct and indirect types: direct agreements through licensing and co-production systems and indirect agreements through loans and grants. (6) The central role played by Saudi Arabia's ambassador to Washington, Prince Bandar bin Sultan, in the Tornado contract underscores the highly political nature of such deals. (7) See David Pike, "U.S. Returns as Top Arms Supplier," Middle East Economic Digest (28 September 1990) p. 8; Donald Neff, "U.S. Arms and the Arabs: Why They Shop Elsewhere," Middle East International (22 July 1988) pp. 17-18. (8) Of course there are exceptions, such as Republican Senator Mark O. Hatfield of Oregon, an ideologically firm opponent of all weapons sales. But Oregon is not a prime weapons producer, and Senator Hatfield preserves his ideological purity by voting against all sales when Congressional assent is required and lets it go at that. His new, powerful position as chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee is not likely to turn Senator Hatfield into more of a crusader than he is already. (9) On COCOM, see Michael Mastanduno, "What is COCOM and How Does it Work?," in The Post-Containment Handbook: Key Issues in U.S.-Soviet Economic Relations, ed. Robert Cullen, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990); Gary Bertsch and Richard Cupitt "Nonproliferation in the 1990s: Enhancing International Cooperation on Export Controls," The Washington Quarterly, 16, no. 4 (Autumn 1993) pp. 53-70. (10) This group was last convened in May 1992. See Leslie Alan Horvitz, "The World Gorges at the Arms Cornupia," Washington Times, 12 December 1994, p. 6. On the failure of this attempt to control arms sales, see Thomas Friedman, "Selling Arms to Keep Jobs: The Signals It Sends Abroad," New York Times, 20 September 1990, p. E4; James Adams, "The Perpetual Arms Machine," Washington Post, 16 March 1992, p. C1. (11) See R. Jeffrey Smith, "Clinton Rejects Bid to Rein in Arms Sales; Weapons Export Policy to Stress Flexibility, Washington Post, 17 February 1995, p. A9. (12) See Horvitz, "Cold War's End." (13) The degree of individual initiative is another factor, made more important by the split-second decisions that modern warfare requires. This was highlighted by the experiences U.S. and Western European troops had in cooperation with allied Arab armies during the Gulf War. (14) "Fundamentalism" is a Christian ten-n signifying the literal acceptance of Biblical texts. But this does not characterize all Christians. This term also does not apply to Islam, which considers the entire text of the Koran as the literal words of God, as dictated to the Prophet Mohammed through the Archangel Gabriel. (15) The Gaza Strip and Jericho were made semi-autonomous in 1994. (16) SIPRI Yearbook 1994, p. 101. (17) Jordan has numerous legal and treaty rights in Jerusalem. (18) Israel is hugely superior militarily to every Arab state or combination thereof This is due not to the quantity of equipment but rather to the quality of equipment education and training and the presence of Israeli nuclear weapons, as well as the assurance of U.S. support. (19) In my view, a military surprise attack by Egypt or another Arab country is unlikely because the Israelis are now well aware of their 1973 blunders. Also, any agglomeration of men and material of the 1973 type would be quickly detected by the much-improved surveillance equipment and satellite intelligence of the Israeli and U.S. militaries. (20) This lack of sophistication in the "dual containment" concept is likely to be gradually refined, since Martin Indyk, the architect of "dual containment," left the White House staff in March 1995 to become Ambassador to Israel. (21) On the Omani proposal to create a 100,000 GCC defense force, see Michael Collins Dunn, "The GCC at 11, Part II: The Common Defense," The Estimate, 31 December 1992; and Francis Tusa, "Waiting for the GCC to Defend Itself," Middle East Economic Digest (10 December 1993) p. 9; for comments by Sultan Qaboos himself, see the interview in Defense News (7-13 June 1993) p. 54. (22) The "Dartmouth Process," so named after its initial meeting place at Dartmouth College, New Hampshire, sprang from an idea of President Dwight D. Eisenhower, who believed that full-time diplomats were too rigid and loathe to give up negotiating positions once taken. To remedy this, Eisenhower suggested a "parallel track" diplomacy by non-official personalities on both sides, composed of experienced and responsible people, who would have good contacts with their respective govemments, but who would not be bound by instructions and could then try out different positions without committing their govemments to them. The "Dartmouth Proress," sponsored by the Kettering Foundation, has made a significant contribution to the solution of several problems, especially with regard to the eventual withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan. It continues to be used today. This author has been a member of its Regional Conflict Task Force for the last 14 years.