Iran: the adolescent revolution.

Sick, Gary

When Andre Malraux asked Chou En-lai for his evaluation of the French Revolution, the great Chinese revolutionary reportedly pondered for a moment and then replied, "It is too early to tell." The political and social effects of revolutions are measured not in years, but in generations, or even centuries. There are, in fact, only two iron laws that seem to apply to all major revolutions. First, they generate immense turmoil and suffering. Second, they confound the expectations of their founders and their enemies alike. As Charles Issawi liked to point out, "Revolutions revolve 360 degrees."(1)

It will be many years before we are able to make firm judgments about the meaning of the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran. We do know that its obituaries, which have appeared regularly ever since its birth, have been premature. The revolution is now a full-fledged teenager, having celebrated its 16th birthday on 11 February 1995. But we still do not know what will become of it when it grows up. The revolution qua rebellion is over, and the exultation of overthrowing the old regime is rapidly fading, but the hard work of defining the real meaning of these events has only just begun.

Any attempt to locate Iran within its regional and international setting must confront the bewildering contradictions that have characterized the revolutionary regime since its inception. Is Iran motivated by religion or by nationalism? Is it an expansionist state, or does it seek to maintain the status quo? Is it a military menace or a victim? Is it populist or autocratic? Does it seek to join the international system or to destroy it?

The answer most assuredly does not lie somewhere between these opposites. Rather, these contradictions were woven into the very fabric of the revolutionary system at its inception. The tension between the poles of this dialectic is the energy source that drives, and occasionally short-circuits, decisions and actions in Tehran.

Among the generation that made the revolution, factionalism was more personal than institutional, so the ubiquitous ideological groupings never coalesced into stable, identifiable associations. Instead, they have remained loosely defined coalitions whose members fluctuate according to the issue at hand. The revolution had different meanings for different people, and the contradictions that the revolution failed to resolve have only been exacerbated by the responsibilities and temptations of power. Revolutionary slogans, once the balm of ideological contention, appear increasingly quaint, as real decisions by real people in real positions of real power have real consequences.

It would be possible to construct a case supporting either view of Tehran's behavior, and Iran's friends and enemies busy themselves doing exactly that. In most international discourse, Iran is depicted as an aggressive center of terrorism, motivated by religious fanaticism and a determination to export its revolutionary ideas at all costs. Iran portrays itself - and often genuinely perceives itself - as the aggrieved victim of military and terrorist attacks by expansionist neighbors and implacable counter-revolutionary foes, supported and encouraged by the power brokers of the international system who are committed to the overthrow of the revolution and all it represents. Both images are correct, but neither is adequate without the other. That is the challenge for serious analysts and policy makers.

The prospects for and implications of Iranian post-revolutionary behavior might be examined by looking at virtually any aspect of Iran's domestic or foreign policy. There are three strands of that experience, however, that are particularly worrisome. The first of these is the revolutionary assertion of Muslim and Shi'i universalism, the so-called "export of the revolution." The second is Iran as an aggressive military power intent on regional hegemony. And the third is Iran's potential acquisition of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction.

To be understood properly, each of these major issues should be viewed in the context of developments that have occurred since 1979, and those events should in turn be related to Iran's domestic and international setting. Such an inquiry, if done comprehensively, would fill several books. As a consequence, the discussion that follows will be more suggestive than exhaustive.

Export of the Revolution

In the first flush of victory after the overthrow of the Shah, Iran was giddy with its own success and utterly confident that it could reshape the world in its own image. It rejected traditional diplomacy, traditional economics and even traditional ideology in the pursuit of its own vision of universal Islamic rule. The state supported terrorist groups, seized American hostages, rejected any hint of dependency on either East or West, thumbed its nose at the United Nations and earned a reputation as a maverick state.

This is a common experience for revolutionary societies. The toppling of an ancien rigime, which had seemed impossibly powerful and well entrenched, is typically regarded as a miraculous event. In this respect, the band of revolutionaries may be forgiven for believing that their doctrines of universal liberty, economic justice or, in the case of Iran, Islamic ascendance are destined to triumph everywhere.

Such visions are not entirely fanciful, for most genuine revolutions carry the seed of a new idea that transcends the locality and the parochial circumstances that first permitted it to take root and flourish. The appeal of the French, Russian, Chinese and Cuban revolutions extended far beyond the borders of a single state and spawned militant movements that were regional or international in scope.

In the end, however, when a transformation of the international system proves to be excessively difficult, dangerous or expensive, the proselytizing impulse usually wanes and is progressively subordinated to more traditional objectives. Thus, the actions of the revolutionary entity gradually come to resemble those of a conventional state.

This process may take a long time, however, and the revolutionary urge never vanishes entirely. As Chou En-lai suggested, the effects of the French Revolution continue to be felt two centuries after the event, and more recent revolutions continue to dominate national behavior even in those cases, such as in the former Soviet Union, where their results have been repudiated. Revolutionary slogans become national emblems and permeate the national consciousness. Because of the revolutionary experience, certain types of behavior attain a degree of legitimacy and institutional immortality that makes them difficult to eradicate even after they have outlived their usefulness.

Iran seems to be working its way through this process of subordinating universalism to nationalism more quickly than some other revolutionary societies have done. But the process is far from over, and is still capable of producing great mischief.

The behavior of revolutionary Iran, even more than that of most countries, is defined in the eye of the beholder. The concept of "export of the revolution" is particularly slippery and prone to radically different interpretations by observers both inside and outside Iran. One of the main problems is that Iran's words and deeds have changed in the 16 years since the overthrow of the Shah.

In the chaotic early years of revolutionary rule, almost anyone with some revolutionary or clerical credentials could assemble an organization and conduct his own foreign policy. The son of Ayatollah Montazeri, Khomeini's designated successor at the time, organized his own guerrilla band and preached armed intervention in support of the Islamic revolution in Lebanon and elsewhere. Liberation movements sprouted in the hothouse atmosphere of Islamic Iran and were able, in many cases, to get money, weapons and training for dissident elements attempting to overthrow the governments of neighboring states in the Persian Gulf. Some of these factions (almost certainly with government acquiescence if not outright collaboration) attempted to smuggle weapons into Saudi Arabia and to subvert the annual religious pilgrimage. Reflecting the tenor of those times, one of the missions of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, created as a revolutionary counterpart to the regular military, was described in the Iranian Constitution as "fighting to expand the rule of sharia (Islamic law) in the world."

Behind these expressions of militant export of the revolution lay a philosophical universalism, a quest for a just world order, that scholars have traced to Iran's pre-Islamic past.(2) Those views were enshrined in the constitution of the new Islamic Republic, which enjoins the government to "exert continuous efforts in order to realize the political, economic and cultural unity of the Islamic world."

Virtually every major figure in the Islamic Republic has at one time or another insisted that "export of the revolution" is not intended to be conducted by the sword. Instead, they assert, the power of the revolution is the appeal of its ideas, not the force of its weapons. Thus, President Rafsanjani said in a 1993 press conference, "The phrase 'exporting the revolution', if it is mentioned here, means that we introduce our revolution and [that] anyone who wishes to use our experience can do so. But interference and physically exporting [revolution] has never been our policy."(3)

In practice, however, it has never been so simple. Clearly, Iran has been willing at times to tolerate armed interventions in its neighbors' territories by radical factions, and the fiery rhetoric of dissident movements, often replayed through Iran's official media, could justifiably be perceived as intervention by nations on the receiving end of the invective. The ambiguity of Iran's experience can be illustrated by its relations with its tiny island neighbor Bahrain.

Iran and Bahrain

Iran has historically asserted a claim to the islands of the Bahrain archipelago. That claim was based, in part, on the fact that the population of Bahrain was predominantly Shi'i, including many individuals and families who had migrated to Bahrain from the Iranian mainland over the centuries. In 1971, as the British withdrew their military presence from the Gulf, the Shah of Iran unequivocally renounced Iran's territorial claims. This action was widely understood to be half of a bargain. The other half was Iran's occupation of the island of Abu Musa and two other small uninhabited islands known as Greater and Lesser Tunb, which occupy a strategic position across the shipping lanes at the mouth of the Gulf. Abu Musa and the Tunbs were claimed by emirates of the Trucial States, and Iran signed an agreement with the rulers of those states only days before they were incorporated into the new confederation of the United Arab Emirates (UAE). After the revolution, Iran reaffirmed its intention to maintain control over the islands, and a number of influential clergymen attempted to revive Iran's claims to Bahrain, threatening to launch a movement to establish an Islamic government on the Iranian model. Although the Iranian government officially declared its intention to respect the Shah's renunciation of claims on Bahrain, tensions ran high.(4)

In December 1981, the governments of Bahrain and Saudi Arabia announced the arrest of a group of individuals accused of plotting sabotage and subversion among the Shi'i populations in Bahrain and the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia. Iran reportedly had provided them with training, arms and assurances of support if the plot succeeded. The conspirators were followers of an Iranian cleric, Hadi Modaressi, who had lived in exile in Bahrain for many years but who had returned to Iran after the revolution and now used Iranian state radio to preach rebellion against the Al-Saud and Al-khalifah, the ruling families of Saudi Arabia and Bahrain.

After the 1981 rebellion collapsed, Modaressi was muzzled by the Iranians, although he continued to maintain contact with the Shi'i community in Bahrain. By the mid-1980s, Iran's attention was focused entirely on the war with Iraq and particularly on the escalating "tanker war," in which Iraq conducted air and missile attacks against Iranian oil tankers while Iran attempted to retaliate by using speedboats and small arms to attack Arab shipping in the Persian Gulf. In 1985, the Iranian deputy foreign minister visited Bahrain on a good-will tour of the Gulf states, offering Iranian restraint in return for a cessation of Arab support for Iraqi maritime attacks. But Iran was unable to drive wedges between Iraq and the Arab Gulf states. Instead, the tanker war continued to rage, and Bahrain began to cooperate more actively with the United States as it built up its military presence in the Gulf.

By 1987 Iran found itself isolated and under attack from all sides. Iran had virtually no support from the United Nations Security Council, which was attempting to impose a pro-Iraqi settlement of the Iran-Iraq War, and its land offensives sputtered out with huge casualties. Meanwhile, the United States had agreed to provide escorts for Kuwaiti tankers, leading to a new and dangerous confrontation between the United States and Iran.(5)

At the annual pilgrimage in Mecca, Iranian pilgrims started a political demonstration that led to clashes and riots in which more than 400 people were killed, including 324 Iranians. By mid-year President Khamenei was led to comment that, "I do not recall a period when the angry and wrathful face of arrogance was so obvious as it is today ... We have never experienced this situation since the beginning of the revolution."(6) Ayatollah Khomeini, himself in failing health, added, "Today we face a lot of difficulties, a mountain of difficulties. The entire world has risen against Islam."(7)

Iran struck back by planting floating mines, some of which struck the reflagged tankers, and by firing Silkworm missiles from captured Iraqi territory at tankers sitting in Kuwaiti waters. United States forces captured and sank an Iranian amphibious ship laying mines at night just north of Bahrain, and U.S. ships bombarded an Iranian oil platform in the Gulf. In September 1987, U.S. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, during a visit to Bahrain, was quoted as saying, "There must be a totally different kind of government in Iran, because we cannot deal with the irrational, fanatical government of the kind they now have."(8)

Immediately thereafter Iran again began broadcasting reports of anti-regime activities in Bahrain and hosted a meeting of Middle East liberation movements that included representatives of Shi'i opposition movements in Bahrain. Three months later, Bahrain reported the breaking up of a secret cell of Iranian-trained members of Hadi Modaressi's "Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain" who were allegedly planning to "sabotage economic installations."

In April 1988, a Kuwaiti airliner was hijacked by a radical group in an effort to force the release of Lebanese militants being held in Kuwait. At least one Bahraini national was involved in the hijacking, and some reports claimed that the hijackers were part of a group under the command of Taqi Modaressi, Hadi's brother and a former representative of Ayatollah Khomeini in Bahrain.9 This event came at a time when discussions were underway about a possible summit between Iran and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) to negotiate an end to the Persian Gulf War. That meeting, however, never materialized. But in July 1988, Iran, facing massive losses on the battlefield, formally accepted U.N. Resolution 598, which established a cease-fire and brought the war to a close after eight years of fighting.

Ten months after the death of Ayatollah Khomeini in 1989, Iran launched a new initiative to repair relations with the Arab Gulf states. Newly elected Iranian President Rafsanjani sent a personal message to the Emir of Bahrain calling for better relations, and, now that the war was over, there were signs that the Arab Gulf states were prepared to consider improved ties with Iran.

This new climate of cooperation blossomed after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990. Suddenly Iraq, which had been the ally of the Arab Gulf states, emerged as their most dangerous enemy, and Iran, which remained neutral and refused to assist Iraq, became a valuable political and military asset. Bahrain's foreign minister visited Tehran in November 1990. After a meeting with Rafsanjani, both sides agreed to maintain existing boundaries in the Persian Gulf region, thereby beginning "a new page" in Bahrain-Iran relations. Shortly thereafter, Iran and Bahrain announced the formation of a joint shipping line between the two countries, and Iran's foreign minister visited Bahrain for the first time since the Iranian Revolution. Bahrain's decision to sign a security pact with the United States was allowed to pass almost without comment from Iran.

This new atmosphere was disrupted in August 1992, when Iran began to assert its control over the island of Abu Musa. Rafsanjani had paid a brief visit to the island in February, and in April local officials began to tighten their administrative control by expelling some residents and requiring entry permits from non-UAE visitors and workers. This unprecedented assertion of administrative control caused consternation in the UAE and set off an emotional confrontation between Iran and the GCC states.

Iran attempted without success to downplay the significance of these actions. Iranian Foreign Minister Velayati claimed publicly that this new policy was due to the actions of "junior Iranian officials," but the issue concerning the islands came to dominate the political discourse between Iran and its Arab neighbors.(10) One Arab paper commented that, "The Iranian action ... evokes memories of a phase in Arab-Iranian relations in the time of the deposed Shah of Iran, who tried to assert his control over the region in its entirety."(11) An Iranian scholar retorted, "This is not the Shah's policy, it is Iran's national interest and a matter of Iranian sovereignty. Whether it is a monarchy or a republic or any other type of regime is irrelevant. The Shah did not come from Mars, he was an Iranian."(12)

As the war of words escalated, one newspaper in Iran, in a burst of chauvinist zeal, issued a call for Iran to revive its claim to Bahrain, but this was dismissed by both capitals.(13) The Iranian foreign minister again visited Bahrain in May 1993 as part of a tour of Gulf capitals and proclaimed that a new chapter in Iran's relations with its Arab neighbors was beginning.

Relations remained essentially stable and businesslike through mid-1994. Bahrain hosted several Iranian delegations for discussions of possible cooperation on economic development matters. At the same time, Bahrain deepened its relations with the United States and continued to serve as the regional headquarters for the United States Naval Forces Central Command.

Bahrain and Iran again found themselves on opposite sides of a political controversy in June 1994, when a civil war broke out in Yemen. Bahrain, siding with Saudi Arabia and the other GCC states (except Qatar), supported the breakaway faction of the former South Yemen, while Iran strongly supported the "unity" government in the north. Also, after Israel signed political agreements with the Palestine Liberation Organization and Jordan, Bahrain began to express cautious interest in normalizing diplomatic relations with Israel, a trend that Iran vociferously opposed.(14) Iran, in turn, sided with Qatar in its long-running territorial dispute with Bahrain over the Hawar Islands, which lie between the two small states.

Bahrain was the host of the GCC summit meeting on 19 December 1994. In the run-up to the meeting, Iran delivered some decidedly mixed political messages to Bahrain. Iranian president Rafsanjani dispatched his brother, Mohammed Hashemi, to Bahrain in early December 1994 with a personal message to the emir, declaring that Iran's "respect for national sovereignty and the territorial integrity of all the countries in the region" was an "unchanging principle of the Islamic Republic of Iran."(15) Hashemi went on to call for a climate of cooperation and solidarity among the countries of the region as a necessary prerequisite to lasting peace and security.

The Iranian message, though diplomatically subtle, was quite clear: Iran was prepared to recognize the existing borders and territorial sovereignty in the Gulf on the condition that no other territorial issues were reopened (i.e., the ownership of Abu Musa and the Tunbs). Iran would reaffirm its renunciation of territorial claims against Bahrain, but only if the GCC states respected Iran's control of the three islands.

At the same time that Mohammed Hashemi was delivering his brother's message to the emir, a very different set of events was taking place. Two days before Hashemi's arrival in Bahrain, Bahraini security forces arrested a young Shi'i clergyman, Ali Salman Ahmad Salman, for inciting demonstrations against the government. The demonstrations apparently began with a clash between police and spectators during a marathon on 25 November in which two policemen were injured. The riots spread and became fairly severe during the week prior to the GCC summit. The United States issued a travel advisory warning visitors to avoid crowds and exercise caution.(16) On the night before the summit, Bahraini security forces went house to house in Shi'i areas, arresting large numbers of individuals, including 11 Shi'i clerics.(17)

Bahraini authorities claimed that the demonstrations were part of a plan to destabilize the region, and that Iran was behind them.(18) Suspicions of Iranian involvement were exacerbated by the Iranian media. The Tehran Times, which often reflects Rafsanjani's views, said that the Bahrain demonstrations reflected a widespread popular demand for democratic rights. "With the exception of Kuwait, these states are ruled by oligarchies that have no respect for the will of the people," the article commented.(19) Dr. Fathi al-Shiqaqi, an Iranian ally and secretary-general of the Islamic Jihad Movement for the Liberation of Palestine, gave a blistering interview in which he drew attention to the continued British role in Bahrain's security forces and asserted that Arab nations in the Gulf had the right to "rise, revolt and stage a mutiny" against such remnants of colonialism.(20)

The GCC summit proceeded as planned. Its final communique "noted with great concern the phenomenon of extremism and fanaticism leading to acts of violence and terrorism and expressed their total rejection and condemnation of these practices in all forms and motives." The communique also reaffirmed the GCC view that the islands of Abu Musa and the Tunbs "belong to the UAE," and called on Iran to submit the dispute to the International Court of Justice.(21) Three days later, Bahrain recalled its ambassador in Tehran for consultations.

The Evolution of Iran's Bahrain Policies

This brief review of Iran's shifting relations with Bahrain provides some useful insights into the evolution of the concept of the "export of the revolution" over the first sixteen years of clerical rule in Iran. Iran's policies were sporadic, seemingly contradictory at times, and notably unsuccessful. The period began with an apparent attempt by Iran to assert revolutionary Shi'ism in Bahrain and the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia. It is not clear whether this was a government-sponsored attempt to overthrow the Bahraini government. In fact, the very nature of "government" in Iran was so tenuous and chaotic in those early days of the revolution that it was often difficult to distinguish between official policies and the impromptu activities of various revolutionary groups.

In this case, however, the distinction may be largely academic. Tehran did not disavow the plotters. It made broadcast facilities available to them. Further, the actions of the Modaressi brothers and the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain appeared to be consistent with the revolutionary regime's own statements denouncing sheikhly rule in the Arab Gulf states and calling for revolutionary uprisings based on the Iranian model. In short, this appeared to be a classic example of militant export of the revolution beyond Iran's borders.

After the collapse of this operation, Iran seemed to have second thoughts, and took steps to stifle the more militant anti-Bahrain elements within its borders. Tehran also became increasingly preoccupied with the Iran-Iraq War, as well as with the problems of defending its oil lines of communication, and it had insufficient time, energy and resources to devote to costly ideological crusades.

As the confrontation with the United States intensified, and as Bahrain increasingly associated itself with U.S. military efforts, Iran once again seemed prepared to unleash the Modaressi brothers and their liberation movement. Unlike the first instance, however, in this case these subversive tactics appeared to have no significant ideological content. On the contrary, the limited campaign against Bahrain appeared to be motivated almost entirely by national security interests. The Islamic regime in Iran was isolated and fighting for its very existence; subversion was a means of striking back at the enemy, not of converting him.

After the end of the Iran-Iraq War, both Iran and Bahrain moved toward reconciliation, and these efforts were accelerated after Iraq attacked Kuwait in 1990. Iran's clumsy assertion of authority over Abu Musa complicated, but did not rupture, this process, although it led to hints that Iran might be prepared to use its putative claim to Bahrain to counter Arab claims to Abu Musa and the Tunbs.

Bahrain accused Iran of inciting the riots and demonstrations that began in November 1994. The evidence, however, suggests that these incidents were largely domestic in origin and were closely related to the extremely high rate of unemployment in Bahrain, particularly among the Shi'i, who are relegated to the status of second-class citizens despite (or perhaps because of) the fact that they comprise a clear majority of the population.(22) Nevertheless, the inflammatory rhetoric emanating from Iranian sources lent credibility to the Bahraini charges.

State vs. Revolution

This abbreviated case study suggests that in the early years of the revolution, Iran was prepared to foment and support subversive movements in the Gulf, particularly among the Shi'i communities, in the name of exporting the revolution. Although Iran may still be prepared to encourage regional opposition movements in the 1990s, the motivation appears to be far less ideological and much more closely related to traditional national interests.

The distinction is important. The ideological impulse that fueled Iran's frantic and often haphazard interventions in the 1980s was, or at least appeared to be, immune to traditional calculations of power and diplomacy. Iran's interventions in the 1990s are more cautious, more calculated and more susceptible to conventional methods of calculation of state interests.

It is not surprising that this distinction is usually overlooked, since Iran itself perpetuates the myth of a rampaging, ideologically crazy state. In a telling moment of candor, Rafsanjani described the dilemma. In one of his weekly public addresses, he complained that Iran always seemed to be blamed for any radical activity anywhere in the world:

Everywhere there is a movement, the name of Islam and Iran is mentioned. The enemies even mention Iran's name where Iran is not present ... In many events we really are not involved; yet, they point to Iran.

Then he paused for a moment and added, "Of course we accept it and take pride in the fact that the root of all this lies in the Islamic revolution. Iran is the mother of Islamic nations."(23)

The Iranian state, which is attempting to pursue its own interests in the world of international politics and trade, is frustrated and angry when its efforts are thwarted by suspicions of Iranian involvement in subversive or terrorist attacks. But the Iranian revolution, which sees itself as the vanguard of Islamic activism, thrives on its reputation as the source and center of radical opposition to the Western-dominated state system.

These two tendencies are in constant tension both inside Iran, where appeals for stability and reform are often drowned out by the raucous voices of zealotry, and in Iran's foreign policy, where the pursuit of traditional national goals frequently sinks beneath the weight of unbridled rhetoric and periodic acts of cruel vindictiveness. Although the extreme manifestations of these contradictory tendencies are associated with competing factions in Iran, the popular pastime of categorizing Iranian leaders as "moderates" or "radicals" is as pointless as it is misleading. Rather, as indicated by Rafsanjani's statement above, these contradictory impulses can and do, exist side by side in the same individuals.

Consequently, policy analysis and policy formulation concerning Iran must make allowances for exceptional levels of ambiguity and uncertainty. The trend line, however, is clear. As demonstrated by its policies toward Bahrain, Iran's behavior toward its neighbors in the 1990s tends to be less ideologically motivated and more observant of diplomatic niceties than in the 1980s. It is also evident that Iran's Gulf policies, even when perceived as stiff-necked and arrogant (as in the case of the islands dispute), more closely resemble the policies of the Shah than the unruly millenarianism of the early Khomeini period. That may be of little comfort to Iran's neighbors, who had their problems with the Shah, but it does represent a significant change in approach.

Arms and the Shah

The reversion to nationalism is also apparent in Iran's military reconstruction and its pursuit of a nuclear strategy. For anyone who watched Iran's military buildup in the 1970s under the Shah, the broad outlines of Iran's present strategy have a strong element of deja vu.

At the time of the revolution, Iran's air force was one of the most capable in the Third World. It was, however, decimated by the eight years of conflict with Iraq and by the lack of access to U.S. equipment and spare parts. Iran's purchases since the end of the war have been far more modest than those of the Shah, due partly to lack of money and partly to the limitations of the market, since western sources, for the most part, continue to be denied to the Islamic Republic. However, Iran's aircraft purchases have been thoroughly conventional and apparently intended to reestablish, within the limitations of money and access, an air force comparable to that of the monarchy.

Even more evocative is Iran's purchase of submarines. President Rafsanjani addressed Iran's motivations in a press conference:

The purchase of submarines goes back to before the revolution. It has nothing to do with this period. Before the revolution, the previous regime purchased a number of submarines from Germany and America, and they had started to build bases for them. With the revolution, Germany and America stopped the contracts and our claim is still outstanding. After the revolution, we proceeded along the same line, except through Russia ... [S]ubmarines are a part of present-day naval defences. If you take that link out of the chain, the defensive chain would become weak.(24)

Despite Rafsanjani's claim of military necessity, the Shah's goal of a long-range, blue-water navy was regarded by most analysts as an attempt to elevate Iran into the position of a major regional power in the Indian Ocean, comparable to India or Australia. The fact that the present regime has unblushingly embraced that strategy is remarkable.

Iran's interest in missile technology and its approach to acquiring such technology is also reminiscent of the Shah's policies. The Islamic Republic has negotiated first with China and then with North Korea to gain access to ballistic missile technology. Reportedly, Iran is helping to fund the costs of missile research and development in North Korea, presumably in return for eventual access to the weapons systems that are produced there.

The Shah used exactly the same technique. He provided large quantities of oil to Israel as part of a clandestine project to produce a surface-to-surface missile with nuclear warhead capabilities, with the test firings to be conducted in Iran. Such a delivery system had been denied to both Israel and Iran by the United States, so the two countries secretly agreed to pursue the proto-nuclear option on their own, without informing their American allies.(25)

The revolution intervened, and in the end Iran got nothing from its rather substantial investment with Israel. The final payment of $260 million worth of oil was made shortly before the Shah's regime collapsed, and the files were shipped to Israel on one of the last El Al flights out of Tehran.(26) So when the revolutionaries took over the government, they learned the broad outline of the program but none of its details. However, they have since pursued an identical strategy, substituting North Korea for Israel.

In light of its attempts to reconstruct its military, the bottom line for ran is sobering. Iran's military capabilities in 1995 are only one-half to one-third of what they were at the time of the revolution. Its military procurement program is extremely modest in comparison to its much smaller neighbors. Iraq, despite its military defeat and international sanctions, is still superior to Iran in all major weapons systems capabilities. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia, with a population that is a fraction of Iran's, has ore combat aircraft. The overall military balance in the region has shifted dramatically away from Iran since the revolution, and the trend lines indicate that Iran's relative position is unlikely to improve significantly over the next decade.(27)

Nuclear Developments(28)

Since the end of the Iran-Iraq War in 1988, Iran has undertaken a comprehensive program of nuclear development. This program also resembles the policies pursued by the Shah in the years prior to the revolution. Immediately after the revolution, Iran displayed no particular interest in nuclear development. However, in recent years, and possibly as a result of its sobering experience with Iraq, Iran has returned to the Shah's programs, and has been conducting an extensive international effort to purchase nuclear-related technology.

Iran's nuclear program has attracted a great deal of international attention, much of it focused on estimates of how much time would be required for Iran to acquire a nuclear weapon. In early 1992 Robert Gates, then director of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, estimated that Iran could have a nuclear weapon as early as the year 2000.(29) A year later his successor, James Woolsey, warned that Iran could have a nuclear weapon within eight to ten years.(30) Two years later, in January 1995, sources in Israel and the United States asserted that this schedule had been reduced to two to five years.(31) A few days later, after talks in Israel, U.S. Secretary of Defense William Perry and Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin said they believed Iran could build a nuclear bomb within 7 to 15 years, though that time period could be shortened if Iran could buy plutonium or highly enriched uranium from another country.(32)

Iran's interest in acquiring nuclear technology is not in doubt. Iran has a small research reactor that it purchased from the United States more than 20 years ago. It signed a contract with China in 1993 for two 330-megawatt nuclear power stations, and with Russia for a VVER-440-213 (440-megawatt) nuclear power station with two pressurized water reactors. Iran has purchased a mini-calutron and an electronic isotope-separation unit from China. Iran also attempted to acquire more capable research reactors from Argentina and China, but the United States intervened to squelch both deals. Iran is attempting to persuade its exiled nuclear scientists to return home, and Iranian delegations have visited nuclear production sites in Russia and the other former Soviet republics.

In January 1995, Russia signed an $800 million agreement with Iran to complete work on a nuclear power plant at the port city of Bushehr. The plant had been under construction by the German firm Siemens at the time of the revolution. The partially completed facility was bombed on several occasions by Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war, leaving it largely destroyed. After the war, Iran attempted to engage the Germans to resume construction, but Germany refused. According to the agreement with Russia, the first unit of the plant was to be completed within four years.(33)

Iran is a signatory of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and a thorough inspection of its known nuclear facilities in April 1994 resulted in a clean bill of health from the International Atomic Energy Agency. Iran's government adamantly denies the existence of any nuclear weapons program, claiming that its interests are purely peaceful and oriented toward nuclear power production. However, Iran's reserves of natural gas are, in fact, sufficient to meet its domestic power needs for centuries. President Hashemi Rafsanjani, in his periodic reviews of Iran's energy policies, has never referred to plans for domestic nuclear power generation. The world is right to treat Iran's behavior with suspicion.(34)

The estimates of a time frame for Iran's actual production of a nuclear device, however, are extremely speculative and appear to be motivated more by politics than by a sober assessment of the facts. The nuclear power reactors that Iran is purchasing from Russia and China will take at least eight years to build, and they will not produce any irradiated nuclear fuel until after about 10 years of operation, if ever. These light-water nuclear plants are roughly comparable to those being offered cost-free to North Korea in return for its agreement to give up its current graphite reactor technology. Iran has declared its willingness to return the nuclear waste produced by its plants to the exporting countries.(35) Even if it retained these nuclear products, Iran has no reprocessing plant to produce weapons-grade plutonium from the spent fuel. Hence, all of the estimates about Iran's development of a nuclear weapon depend on its ability to evade an elaborate array of safeguards and/or to acquire plutonium or highly enriched uranium from some outside source. The prospects of Iran's imminent acquisition of nuclear weapons are exaggerated.

Nevertheless, after recent sobering experiences with North Korea and Iraq and earlier experiences with Pakistan, India, South Africa and Israel, intelligence agencies and political leaders are understandably inclined to err on the side of caution. Iranian intentions are in themselves grounds for concern by regional and external powers alike. Even if Iran is ultimately unsuccessful in building a nuclear weapon, the mere act of trying could trigger fears and possible counteractions in the region.

Iran and the NPT

Much of the attention devoted to the Iranian nuclear question has been associated with the negotiations surrounding the proposed extension of the NPT. As a signatory, Iran raised a series of troublesome questions that the chief U.S. negotiator characterized as "disruptive behavior."(36) Iran's amendments to the treaty were all directed toward strict compliance with the terms of the treaty. Iran argued that the five acknowledged nuclear powers (the United States, Russia, Britain, France and China) had not fulfilled their treaty obligations to reduce their own nuclear stockpiles.

Iran also objected to U.S. efforts to bar the sale of peaceful nuclear technology, e.g., power reactors, to Iran. Article 4 of the treaty expressly promises that signatory countries in compliance with the treaty (i.e., Iran) will be given access to such technology. Article 4 was one of the principal inducements that were offered to persuade countries to renounce nuclear weapon development by signing the NPT. Iran argued that this provision should not be selectively applied.

Finally, Iran joined with a number of other Middle Eastern states, including Egypt, to demand that Israel - which is not a signatory - take steps towards bringing itself into compliance with the treaty, either by opening its nuclear facilities to international inspection or by agreeing to a schedule of denuclearization. Iran took the lead in promoting a proposal for a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East - a plan, Iran stressed, that it had originally introduced at the United Nations in 1974 under the Shah. Israel announced that it would not sign the NPT and that it was premature to talk about a Middle East nuclear-free zone.

In February 1995, Iran formally announced that it would sign the NPT despite the flaws in the treaty, "because [it] did not wish to be comparable to Israel's usurper government."(37)

Contemplating Iran

It is never easy to deal with revolutionary regimes, and Iran is no exception to that rule. Iran's Islamic government is experiencing a prolonged identity crisis as it makes the transition from its radical origins to a more sober understanding of both its strengths and its limitations. This process is far from complete, and its eventual outcome is anything but certain. In the meantime, Iran's behavior is likely to be marked by ambiguities, contradictions and perhaps unexpected surprises.

There are, however, a few lessons that can be drawn from the experience of the past 16 years of Islamic rule in Iran, some of which were suggested above. First, the Iran of 1995 is less of a threat to its neighbors and to the international system than was the Iran of 1979. Ideologically, much of the early boisterousness of the revolution was eroded by war, the relentless pressure of economic realities and the unforgiving demands of governing a large country with severe problems. Today, Iran is much less likely to undertake adventurous and costly interventions in the affairs of its neighbors than it was in the 1980s. It will, however, continue to associate itself, at least rhetorically, with those forces that it identifies as sympathetic to its own world view, thereby earning for itself the blame - or credit - for the actions of any or all political movements challenging the status quo.

Second, even if Iran wanted to interfere regionally, its capabilities are substantially reduced. Iran is still a power to be reckoned with in the Gulf, but its economic and military strength relative to that of its neighbors is an order of magnitude lower than in pre-revolutionary days. It has not lost the capacity to make mischief, but it is likely to do so with much greater caution and with a greater awareness of the potential costs than was the case immediately after the revolution.

Third, Iran has begun a process of reviving many of the policies and programs of the Shah, particularly in the areas of defense and national security. The fact that Iran's leaders apparently have no compunction about associating themselves openly with the policies of the ancien regime is an extraordinary change from the early days of the revolution. It is too early to draw any conclusions about this new approach, but it appears to signal a shift away from the sweeping, ideological goals of the Khomeini period in favor of a relatively unimpassioned assessment of Iran's national interests. It remains to be seen whether Iran will be able to sustain such a policy in view of contending voices within its domestic decision-making elite, and whether it will prove to be a greater or lesser danger to its neighbors as it pursues a more narrowly nationalistic foreign policy.

These new trends in Iranian foreign policy are part of the general evolution of Iran from its revolutionary origins toward an uncertain future. They are not immutable or irreversible. In fact, they may be important primarily as evidence that Iran is capable of change, and that it is not locked permanently into a cycle of hostility and messianic ambitions. They suggest that Iran is susceptible to reason and appeals to its own national interest, like any other state, and that diplomatic contact is not a pointless exercise. This is the interpretation of a number of high-level officials and political observers in the Gulf, particularly in Kuwait, Qatar and Oman.

Over the past several years, Iran has demonstrated a capacity to sustain a modest, constructive and consistent foreign policy in certain areas, most notably in its relations with the new republics of the former Soviet Union on its northern borders. This contrasts sharply with Iran's posturing and blustering on the Palestinian-Israeli peace process, which it continues to view almost exclusively through the prism of ideology.

It is in the interests of Iran's neighbors to acknowledge and reward its constructive actions, while opposing and penalizing behavior that is militantly disruptive. It is regrettable that the United States has rejected such a policy in favor of a one-dimensional "containment" policy that routinely demonizes Iran and encourages other states to do the same.

The rule in the Islamic Republic seems to be a variant on Parkinson's Law: Contention expands to fill the space available. Some of this may be explained simply as an Iranian penchant for controversy and dissension, but the more serious explanation is Iran's failure thus far to resolve its own identity crisis. Does Iran want to join the international community and gain the benefits of foreign investment, international credits and the political and financial clout that go with stability and reliability? Or does Iran wish to hold on to its revolutionary rhetoric and the legacy of Khomeinism at all costs?

The answer from Tehran appears to be "yes" on both counts. The ruling circles in Tehran must come to understand that they cannot have it both ways. (1) This quote is from conversations between the author and Charles Issawi. (2) See R.K. Ramazani, "Iran's Export of the Revolution: Politics, Ends, and Means," and Farhang Rajaee, "Iranian ideology and Worldview: The Cultural Export of Revolution," in The Iranian Revolution: Its Global Impact, ed. John L. Esposito (Miami: Florida International University Press, 1990) pp. 45-50, 70-1. (3) Press conference (31 January 1993), broadcast by Vision of the Islamic Republic of Iran and published in The British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) Summary of World Broadcasts, 3-4 February 1993. (4) For an analysis of Iran's early efforts to export its revolution and its actions regarding Bahrain and the three islands, see R.K. Ramazani, Revolutionary Iran: Challenge and Response in the Middle East (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986) especially Chapter 3. (5) For a detailed examination of this period, see Gary Sick, "Slouching Toward Settlement: The Internationalization of the Iran-Iraq War, 1987-88," in Neither East Nor West: Iran, the Soviet Union, and the United States, ed. Nikki Keddie and Mark Gasiorowski (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1990) pp. 21946; and "Trial by Error: Reflections on the Iran-Iraq War," in Iran's Revolution: The Search for Consensus, ed. R.K. Ramazani (Bloomington, IN: Indiana Univ Press, 1989) pp. 104-24. (6) Speech, 16 August 1987, Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), Daily Report: Near East and South Asia, 19 August 1984. (7) Khomeini speech to Friday imams, 29 September 1987, FBIS, Daily Report: Near East and South Asia, 29 September 1987. (8) New York Times, 28 September 1987, p. 3. This comment, openly calling for the overthrow of the government in Tehran, went well beyond official U.S. policy. It has never been forgotten by Iran and continues to be mentioned in official speeches as indicative of the "true" U.S. policy toward Iran, regardless of policy statements to the contrary. Unguarded comments by U.S. officials have continued to feed this suspicion. Thus, Secretary of State Warren Christopher stated in an interview in 1995, "We must isolate Iraq and Iran until there is a change in their governments, a change in their leadership." (Interview with Trude B. Feldman, "Christopher: Mideast gains will hold," Washington Times, 18 January 1995, p. 1.) (9) See the report in Al-Qabas, 11 April 1988, p. 1. Al-Qabas claimed that the operation was sponsored by hard-line elements in Tehran in order to embarrass Rafsanjani and discredit his efforts to improve relations with the Arab Gulf states. (10) Nora Boustany, "Iran Seeks Wider Mideast Role; Foreign Minister Warns Neighbors Against Excluding Tehran," Washington Post, 11 October 1992, p. 1. (11) A front-page editorial in the Sharjah-based newspaper Al-Khaleej, cited in Reuters, 5 August 1992. (12) Farhang Rajaee, a political scientist at Tehran University, quoted in Boustany, "Iran Seeks Wider Mideast Role." (13) See Reuters wire service report of 30 December 1992, citing the newspaper Jomhuri-ye Eslami. Jomhuri-ye Eslami reflected the views of hardliners opposed to Rafsanjani's policies, and this article was probably intended to embarrass Rafsanjani and the foreign ministry for not being sufficiently tough. (14) In October 1994, Bahrain hosted one of the Arab-Israeli multilateral meetings on environmental issues, and the Bahraini foreign minister took advantage of the presence of the first Israeli delegation ever to visit the country to hold a well-publicized meeting with the head of the Israeli delegation. (15) Voice of the Islamic Republic, 7 December 1994, as reported in BBC, Summary of World Broadcasts, 9 February 1995. (16) The most comprehensive reporting on these disturbances can be found in Reuters, 17-19 December 1994. (17) Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 20 December 1994. (18) The Emir of Bahrain, Sheikh Isa bin Salman al-Khalifah, told Asharq al-Awsat newspaper on 24 January 1995: "There are foreign groups, which we all know, backing the painful events in Bahrain. But regretfully we are not alone. There are also foreign groups supporting the regrettable events in some Arab countries like Algeria, Egypt and others." (Cited in Reuters, 24 January 1995.) Bahrain's prime minister, Sheikh Khalifa bin Salman al-Khalifa, in an interview with the Kuwait daily al-Seyassah and the Arab Times, clearly pointed the finger at Iran: "The leaders (of the unrest) stated in their confessions that they represent the policy of that particular country which aims at exporting its ideology to its neighbours .... What happened was an act of extremism backed by foreign hands and we have the proof." (Cited in Reuters, 23 February 1995. (19) Reuters, 21 December 1994. (20) Radio of Islam - Voice of the Oppressed, Ba'labakk, in Arabic, 19 December 1994, as reported in BBC, Summary of World Broadcasts, 21 December 1994. (21) Final communique of the GCC summit in Manama, Kuwait Satellite Channel TV in Arabic, 21 December 1994, reported in BBC, Summary of World Broadcasts, 23 December 1994. The suggestion of resorting to the World Court was more than a little hypocritical, since both Bahrain and Saudi Arabia had just rejected such a solution for their own border disputes. (22) This observation is based on the author's discussions with a wide range of political observers in the Gulf during a visit in January 1995. The respected Financial Times of London commented on 16 March 1995 that, "diplomats and businessmen [in the Gulf] are unanimous, Tehran has played no direct part in the recent unrest and Iran's economic and political state is not one that offers any lure to Bahrainis. The causes lie rather in a profound malaise affecting Bahrain ... Unemployment is put at 15 percent of the total national population, but twice that among the Shia who make up 65 percent of the national population." ("Militants jolt complacent Bahraini rulers: Deep economic and social malaise has fuelled an outbreak of violence," Financial Times of London, 16 March 1995, p. 4.) (23) Friday prayer sermon at Tehran University, 19 March 1993, as reported in BBC, Summary of World Broadcasts, 22 March 1993. (24) Press conference with international correspondents, 31 January 1993, broadcast by the Voice and Vision of the Islamic Republic of Iran, as reported in BBC, Summary of World Broadcasts, 3 February 1993. (25) The notes of the meetings in July 1977 between General Hassan Toufanian, the head of military procurement under the Shah, and Israeli Defense Minister Ezer Weizman concerning this plan were published in Volume 19 of the "Documents from the Den of Spies" (documents taken from the U.S. Embassy in Tehran in 1979). The documents were reported in "Documents Detail Israeli Missile Deal with the Shah," New York Times, 1 April 1986, p. 17. See also Samuel Segev, The Iranian Triangle (New York: The Free Press, 1988) p. 95. (26) Interview with General Toufanian, 10 July 1990. (27) For a detailed analysis of Iran's military developments since the revolution, see Shahram Chubin, Iran's National Security Policy: Capabilities, Intentions & Impact (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1994). (28) For an earlier, abbreviated version of the information that follows, see Gary Sick, "Perspective On Nuclear Proliferation: Iran Is Ripe For A Peaceful Overture," Los Angeles Times, 17 November 1994, p. 7. (29) Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, 27 March 1992, cited in "Gates Warns of Iranian Arms Drive," Washington Post, 28 March 1992, p. 1. (30) Testimony before the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, in Federal News Service, 24 February 1993. (31) New York Times, 6 January 1995, p. 1. (32) Joint press conference, 9 January 199,7, as reported in Reuters. (33) This agreement was widely reported in the media. See, for example, The Washington Post, 8 January 1995, p. 1. (34) A colleague has reminded me that, despite its gas reserves, Iran has an active program of developing alternative energy sources, including wind and thermal, suggesting that Iran's claims may not be entirely fanciful. Interestingly, these projects are under the supervision of the Iranian Atomic Energy Organization. (Private communication from W. Scott Harrop of the University of Virginia, 23 January 1995.) (35) See the statement by Engineer Mansur Haji Azim, deputy head in charge of nuclear safety at Iran's Atomic Energy Organization, on Iranian television, 19 January 1995, as reported in BBC, Summary of World Broadcasts, 21 January 1995. (36) Ambassador Thomas Graham, speaking to reporters after an NPT preparatory session (24 January 1995), cited in Reuters of the same date. In a subsequent press conference, Ambassador Graham commented: "The United States believes that Iran has taken a decision to pursue a nuclear weapons option, even though they are a party to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. Right now, Iran is fully in compliance with all of its NPT obligations. It is their intentions that concern us, not their current compliance with NPT obligations." (Cited in Reuters, 26 January 1995.) (37) Reza Amrollahi, head of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization, in an interview with Iran News, Reuters, 6 February 1995.