Corruption in modern-day Africa: a possible remedy.
Wong, Alfred ; Gomes, Roxanne
Introduction
Terra terram accusat--attributed to Aurelius Ambrosius (ca. 370 CE)
in Codex Egberti (980-993 CE) (1)
Corruption (2) is not inherently endemic in any particular society.
Corruption has often been cited to be a major cause of stalled social
and economic advancement in Africa (Bunting, 2005; Clements et al.,
2004). Africa receives frequent lecturing from Europe, USA, Australia
and Canada (EUSAC) (3) about (among other things) the evil of corruption
and the need for transparency (see, for example, Clements et al., 2004;
Bunting, 2005; Commission for Africa, 2005; Easterly, 2006). This
continual badgering does nothing to address the underlying economic
causes of corruption. In particular, African governments are invariably
blamed for corruption as a pretext to discontinue or to throttle
economic aid to economically-deprived communities in Africa (see, for
example, Talbot, 2000; Nelson, 2007).
EUSAC is blatantly hypocritical in its focus on Africa as the
pervasiveness of corruption. Recent highly-publicized examples of EUSAC
corruption include dossiers on British Aerospace and Saudi Arabia
(Anon., 2011), the concessionary financial transactions of former
President Wulff of Germany (Dahmann, 2012), and the extraordinary
political influence of the News of the World in the UK (Halliday, 2012).
The respective EUSAC governments were deeply involved in these
publicly-exposed corruption cases. Indeed, corruption is everywhere,
especially when there is considerable amount of money at stake. And
recently the European Commission, the executive unit of the European
Union (EU), an economic and political union of 28 member states
primarily located in Europe has finally admitted that there is
persistent widespread corruption within the public sector of many of its
member states as well as in the Commission itself (European Commission,
2014).
In general, there are two basic forms of corruption. First, there
is grand corruption which embodies greed and lust for power by those who
already posses considerable wealth and power, and thus, large sums of
money is typically involved in triggering grand corruption. And second,
there is petty corruption which arises largely from economic necessity
among middle ranking government and business officials (Wong, 2012).
Hence, there is a continuum between the two forms of corruption which
requires the participation of at least two parties. In Africa, the
counter-party is often a foreign company which has a profit-driven need
to secure contracts for the supply of raw materials such as minerals,
petroleum, wood and other natural resources, and/or foreign governments
which have certain geopolitical interest, and of course, a local
collaborator is often the other party of importance in this arrangement.
During the past few decades, considerable anti-corruption funding
has been provided by EUSAC ostensibly, to train African government
officials (using well-paid EUSAC contractors) about public
administration, governance, transparency, legal statutes, law
enforcement, institution building, etc., and thus, the business of
anti-corruption training and education has grown to become a thriving
industry in the EUSAC.
And to date, EUSAC-sponsored activities have not appeared to have
rectified the pervasiveness of corruption appreciably, and to a large
extent, the underlying goal of these anti-corruption activities was to
re-make Africa economically in the image of EUSAC. Del Bonido (2012) has
noted the obvious double standards of the EU in its promotion of
democratic principles in Africa south of the Sahara wherein in the EU
vision, commercial self-interest trumps any professed democratic
principles. Second, major reports issued by the UK (Commission for
Africa, 2005) and the UN Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA, 2008)
have provided little or no guidance on an effective means of stemming
corruption, and in fact, the Commission for Africa report devoted just
two sentences in its comments on the impact of the business of human
slavery, missionaries or colonialism in African, although the legacy of
brutal colonialism has shaped the present-day dismal socio-economic
status of Africa (Cabral, 1966).
Over the past decades, the adverse of corruption in Africa have
been studied by various international agencies such as the World Bank
and the International Monetary Fund via an acute paucity of quantitative
analysis of the causes of corruption in Africa and elsewhere in the
world, with no definitive solutions to end the practice. Considering
this failure, this study was undertaken to examine the underlying
quantitative cause of corruption in Africa and to devise a practicable
approach to correcting this problem. Thus, the continent of Africa forms
the basis of this study in contrast to country-specific analysis which
would not be appropriate for a discovery of the broad patterns of
corruption in Africa. Hence, two internationally-recognized social
indices, viz. Human Development Index and Corruption Perception Index
were used extensively in this study to analyze the quantitative
relationship between human well-being and corruption as we also
recognize that other corruption indices with adequate quality standards
of statistics could have been used. In unity, the latest 2008 data on
health expenditure reported by the World Health Organization (2010;
2011) were deployed and per capita gross national income was used to
substitute per capital gross national product (GDP) whenever GDP data
were not available, and thus these two conceptually-different parameters
in this study are considered to be numerically equal, for illustrative
purposes.
Specifically, for clarification, the Human Development Index (HDI)
was first introduced by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) in
1990 to measure development by combining indicators of life expectancy,
educational attainment (including primary, secondary and tertiary school
enrolment, and adult literacy) and GDP with each indicator is considered
to be an independent variable, and in 2011, per capita gross national
income (including foreign remittances) replaced GDP as the "cash
availability" indicator. Hence, in briefly, each of three
sub-indices is calculated in consideration of the highest and lowest
values reported for the specific indicator; the HDI is then calculated
as the geometric means of the three sub-indices (UNDP, 2012).
Yet, the HDI of a country does not change substantially from year
to year because two of the three sub-indices, viz., life expectancy and
educational attainment, change only very slowly, and moreover, it was
developed and constructed from a free-market capitalistic societal
perspective which does not consider the importance of the continuation
or preservation of cultural tradition of people as an important element
of human development, although in recent years, adjustment for unequal
distribution of wealth was added for the computation of
inequality-adjusted HDI, but inequality-adjusted HDI still does not
fully consider the gross income disparity and systemic
disenfranchisement of selected groups of people within a nation. For
example, the large population of "guest workers" with de facto
permanent residency in many Persian Gulf states is not counted
intentionally for political reasons. The social-economic status of this
segment of the society which is kept largely in the state of servitude
is not reflected in the national statistics for HDI calculations. And
notwithstanding, nations like Cuba and the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea are routinely omitted from UNDP's computation of
HDI because "per capita gross national income" has no meaning
in non free-market economy (nevertheless, standard HDI subindices, i.e.,
without inequality adjustment, were used in this report, because of the
availability of the larger pool of "standard" survey data, and
HDI remains the most widely recognized means of quantifying the state of
human well-beings in different countries).
Second, for clarification is the Corruption Perception Index (CPI),
an index published annually by Transparency International (TI), a
non-profit Berlin-based organization designed to measure the degree to
which corruption (abuse of entrusted power for private gain) is
perceived to exist among public officials and politicians (TI, 2012),
which in 2011 survey covered 180 countries. Hence, CPI is a subjective
assessment of public perception as assessed by "experts" drawn
largely from business people which does not characterize how the public
and business officials of "less corrupted" countries are using
corrupted means to win contracts and other concessions from those of
"corrupted countries" or distinguish between grand corruption
(theft involving large sums of money, and petty corruption, extortion of
small amount of money at "the street level"), and ironically,
it (CPI) is not weighted to account for the different size of the
economy of a targeted country. Yet, CPI remains the best-available
measure of the relative corruption of government officials, politicians
as well as business persons in a particular country (a high score of CPI
denotes low level of corruption), although there is presently no
quantitative means to identify some elements of corruption, often
characterize by greed, and a lust for power.
An Etiology of Corruption
Corruption in the governance of Africa has two inter-related
components, the historical and the social-economic. In the historical
context, it is generally recognized that the socialization of Africa via
various ethnic groups has been progressing very slowly for millennia,
prior to the arrival of Europeans.
Figure 1 illustrates Africa political entities at the eve of
European partition of the continent (political entities ca. 1800 in
Africa relation to present day national boundaries with present
political boundaries are shown in dashed lines; the map is intended as
an illustration, not as a comprehensive description of pre-colonial
polities). Note the difference between the pre-colonial and present-day
national boundaries. Massive changes began when the Congress of Vienna
(a conference of ambassadors of European states) was convened in 1815,
after the Napoleonic war (1792-1815), for the establishment of a
"New Imperial Order" (Chapman, 1998).
[FIGURE 1 OMITTED]
Although the abolition of the enterprise of slavery was agreed upon
by participating colonial countries at the 1815 Vienna Congress, the
destruction of Africa continued by other means, and thus, the formal
division of the continent was largely codified during the Berlin
Conference, also known in German as the Kongokonferenz of 1884-1885
(Chamberlain, 2010), called by Portugal and organized by the Chancellor
of Germany which regulated European colonization, business and
imperialism which ended or overrode most forms of African autonomy and
self-governance placing more than 90% of Africa under European control
by 1902 (Chamberlain, 2000). And thus, in the division of Africa, ethnic
entities were consolidated or divided involuntarily for the convenience
of the European powers. A notable example was the formation of Cameroon
by Germany in 1884 and the subsequent division between British and
French colonial powers after 1918 with the British creation of Gambia
from a strip of land along the banks of the Gambia River inside the
territorial boundary of the then French colony of Senegal in the
mid-1800s.
In the wanton exploitation of natural resources by the European
colonial powers, massive changes in adaptive subsistence of the people
were imposed. The traditional African societies and their structure were
effectively destroyed within a short time span. In the perpetuation of
EUSAC hegemony, new political institutions were imposed for the
re-making of Africa in the EUSAC image, particularly the free-market
mercantile model. The philosophical foundation of this approach is
classical colonial arrogance. Ever since the decolonialization period of
the late 1950s, modern-day political leaders in Africa have been
fighting largely over the EUSACaffixed political boundaries continually
and ever more bitterly (Patnaik, 2006). Many of the present-day armed
conflicts in Africa are abetted to a large extent by EUSAC as a part of
the geo-political contest of global domination, and the promotion of
EUSAC style democracy and governance in Africa is thus of minor
importance. And within this environment, there are many apologists who
still maintain the proposition that former colonial powers could and
should intervene to provide superior governance and less corruption to
present-day African societies (See, for example, Ferguson, 2002: 307,
311).
Was there a failure of historic and contemporary political
leadership in Africa to cause present-day corruption? In the
pre-decolonization era, EUSAC routinely used bribery, extortion and
murder as an effective means of a "divide and rule" strategy
to achieve hegemony (Mamdani, 2012). Thus, ardent local collaborators of
EUSAC were (and still are) routinely recruited to advance EUSAC national
and economic objectives in Africa. For example, the 18th century human
enslavement process between West Africa and the Americas could not have
flourished without the active cui bono participation of local African
chieftains, because of the fundamental fact that there were too few
Europeans in Africa to capture a large number of African residents to
ensure that they would be loaded on waiting slave ship, and processed
for chattel slavery in the Western Hemisphere.
Did wholesale emulation of EUSAC culture and polity by modern-day
African leaders decrease the pervasiveness of corruption? In the
pre-decolonization and post-colonial periods, there was (and still is) a
class of leaders who placed their trust in "prosperity under the
aegis of the fading colonial empire" with attendant good
governance. Ardent Francophiles such as Leopold Senghor (Senegal) and
Felix Houphouet-Boigny (Cote d'Ivoire) were notable advocates of
this approach (Meredith, 2006: 58-71). Post-colonial French creation of
Union Frangaise, Afrique Occidentale Frangaise and various successor
Afrique noire organizations heartily endorsed by Senghor and
Houphouet-Boigny had not resulted in improving the life of people of
Senegal or Cote d'Ivoire in a substantiel way, hence; they are
still mired in the low Human Development Index group with a
correspondingly high degree of corruption.
Despite the highly-touted Republique frangaise motto of
"Liberte, egalite, fraternite" originating in the heady days
of the French Revolution in the late 18th century, there is no basis to
believe that an African emulating all the essential French cultural
features could ever become "one of them to be less corrupt".
Perhaps Senghor, Cesaire and others may have been grossly mistaken to
believe that negritude could ever become an integral part of the French
identity. The works of Fanon (1952; 1964) and Braudel (1986) are
particularly pertinent in this assessment. Both Senghor and
Houphouet-Boigny had coincidentally enjoyed the luxuries and perks of
being deputes in the Assemblee nationale frangaise. It is interesting to
note that the unreserved embracing of the French culture had also
awarded Senghor a membership in the august Academie frangaise. In the
context of Africa and other French overseas colonies, francisation (4)
has been a tool to propagate French hegemony to the detriment of
indigenous culture.
In contrast, progressive independentistes such as Patrice Lumumba
(Congo), Sekou Toure (Guinee), Mathieu Kerekou (Benin) and Thomas
Sankara (Burkina Faso), have met a different fate in the post-colonial
period (see for example, Meredith, 2006: 58-71; Le Vine, 2007). These
political leaders were often undermined, deposed and/or eliminated by
EUSAC collaborators because of their alternative political and economic
policies, including the pursuit of independent social justice policies
and the stoppage of corruption perpetuated by EUSAC interest.
The outlook for the elimination of grand corruption is not good as
long as EUSAC continues to bribe, threaten and dispose political regimes
for advancing their commercial and geo-political self interest, and
thus, corruption continues.
Socio-Economic Dimensions
There is no clear evidence that more transparency in public
financial management as lectured by the Commission for Africa (2005)
would correct the widespread corruption problem. The critical issue of
corruption that has been ignored is whether theft is driven by economic
necessity. If civil servants with meager salaries have considerable
difficulties in providing the adequate necessities of life for their
families, then there is an economic-survival motive to steal from the
public treasury when the opportunity arises (the same analogous
situation would also apply to employees of private enterprises).
Intuitively, such petty corruption can be expected to be most widespread
in the poorest countries, coupled with the unintended consequence of
economic deprivation and social de-structuring in Africa in the
uncontrollable mass migration of Africans to Europe (Wong and Gomes,
2012).
[FIGURE 2 OMITTED]
Figure 2 shows that corruption (as depicted by CPI) is related
closely with the status of human development (as represented by HDI).
Note that African states are clustered at the low end of the HDI scale
with correspondingly low CPI ranking. Is corruption especially prevalent
to Africa? Does the legacy of historic human enslavement affect
present-day corruption? There are certainly numerous non-African
countries, e.g., Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Laos, Nepal, etc. in the same
grouping of low HDIs and low CPIs, thus, this observation suggests
corruption to be independent of Africa and/or the historic trade
(enslavement) of human beings.
The least corrupt (i.e., with high CPI ranking) Nordic countries
have high HDIs. Singapore is a particularly interesting case (Quah,
2001). It emerged from British colonial rule in late 1950s, at about the
same time as the dawn of modern-day de-colonization in Africa. Today
Singapore has a high HDI (0.866) and is generally considered to be one
of the least corrupted states (CPI at 9.2) in the world. It might also
be noted that the anti-corruption initiatives taken by the Singapore
political leadership over several decades have resulted in well-paid
civil servants, including low-ranking police officers, and thus,
economic necessity has been eliminated as an underlying cause of petty
corruption. Hence, it is recognized that correlation does not always
imply the existence of a causal relationship to suggest that if HDI
could be raised substantially, corruption would be reduced
concomitantly. However, it is instructive to assess which sub-indices of
HDI, if not all, could be increased to afford the desired substantial
increase in CPI, i.e., less corruption.
Life Expectancy (LE)
"Life Expectancy" epitomizes the end state of health of a
population, and thus, this component of HDI could be improved only
slowly; even through there may have been a substantial rapid improvement
in health care over a short period of time. Intuitively, improvements in
the supply and accessibility of nutritious food might also have an
equally positive impact on life expectancy statistics. It follows that
prioritization of indigenous food security through revised agriculture
practices (Garrity et al., 2010) and policies (Madeley, 2000) would be
an effective "preventive health" strategy. It is interesting
to note that the widely used Gini coefficient, a measure of statistical
dispersion intended to represent the income distribution of a
nation's residents, most commonly used measure of inequality on
reported income distribution (Gini, 1912) does not fully account for
poverty arising from the unequal access to affordable foods by a
low-income segment of a national population, because it (the Gini
coefficient) only characterizes the proportional distribution of
reported gross national income.
Does money buy better health care which results in higher life
expectancy? Figure 3 attempts to answer this question as it shows the
correlation between per capita public spending on health care and life
expectancy. It is interesting to note the relative effectiveness of very
different health care spending by USA and by Cuba. With a life
expectancy at-birth of about 78 years, USA expended purchasing power
parity (PPP) was $7,164 per capita in 2008 (PPP is a technique used to
determine the relative value of different currencies and thus allows one
to estimate what the exchange rate between two currencies would have to
be in order for the exchange to be at par with the purchasing power of
the two countries' currencies). For a similar health outcome, Cuba
expended only PPP $495 (WHO, 2011), and in 2008, the average public
spending in Africa (50 countries counted) was PPP $196 and a
corresponding life expectancy of 57 years. It would appear that the
Cuban health care strategy (see for example, Ares Muzio, 2013; de la
Osa, 2013) would be an excellent model to adopt in Africa.
[FIGURE 3 OMITTED]
As given in Figure 4, the correlation between per capital gross
national income and life expectancy also suggests that "money
indeed buys better health care" in a capitalistic society, but up
to a certain longevity threshold value. It may thus be concluded that
"Life Expectancy" may not be a truly independent variable of
the status of human development in the UNDP context.
It is somewhat puzzling to observe that in Figure 5, a correlation,
albeit weak, exists between the LE sub-index and CPI. Superficially,
this observation would imply that "longevity means less
corruption" vice versa. A plausible explanation may be that life
expectancy is not an independent indicator of human development status.
With the notable exception of Cuba, it is dependent on cash wealth, as
characterized by per capita GNI. In a free-market capitalistic society,
cash provides, among other things, higher level of health care,
including critical access to nutritious food and adequate sanitation
services. In other words, the underlying relationship may in fact be
between GNI and CPI.
Educational Attainment (EA)
One of the three components used in the construction of HDI is
educational attainment which is characterized essentially by years of
schooling, with implicit adult literacy. It is important to note that
the "Educational Attainment" does not embody any absolute or
cultural quality of education received. As in the case of the LE
sub-index, the EA sub-index could increase only slowly, even although
there may be a rapid expansion of a free educational system at all
levels over a short period of time.
In Figure 6, the apparent trend is that more public expenditure on
education would result in a higher EA sub-index. Note the effectiveness
of public expenditure on education in Cuba, Latvia and Lithuania. The
high quality of the Cuban education system is world renown; freely
available to all Cuban citizens (see for example Guzman, 2013). It is
thus a good non-EUSAC education delivery model for Africa to emulate.
[FIGURE 4 OMITTED]
[FIGURE 5 OMITTED]
[FIGURE 6 OMITTED]
As shown in Figure 7, the indicative relationship between
educational attainment and per capita GNI implies that "money could
buy a better education" in a cash-based economy. As in the case of
life expectancy, educational attainment would also be a dependent
variable of per capital GNI in a capitalistic society.
In Figure 8, the apparent (albeit highly scattered) correlation
between the EA sub-index and CPI suggests that highly educated people
would be less corrupt. However, recent known corruption dossiers in
EUSAC show a contrary situation (see for example, European Commission,
2014). There is no fundamental reason why highly educated individuals
would be less prone to conduct corrupted practices. Thus, more education
could not be relied upon directly to result in less corruption,
particularly in the segment of EUSAC society which is driven by greed
and a lust for power. It may be just "human nature" whenever
there is a large amount of money (and political power) involved. To
deter grand corruption, the only solution may be severe incarceration,
large financial penalties and forfeiture of ill-gotten properties; this
is the customary practice of the government of Singapore (Quah, 2011).
[FIGURE 7 OMITTED]
[FIGURE 8 OMITTED]
Gross National Income (GNI)
The "per capita GNI" component in Africa's HDI
computation could theoretically be increased substantially by the
provision of a instant cash stipend in the form of a guaranteed income
supplement provided to every African person. Figure 9 shows that
corruption may be driven to a certain extent by economic status as
characterized by per capita GNI. At least in the case of petty
corruption, the "economic survival" element could be removed
from the causes of corruption if the low-income people only had more
money. In comparison to data presented in Figure 2, the data of Figure 9
were substantially more dispersed. This observation suggests that HDI
composing of life expectancy, education attainment and per capita GNI
would be a better correlate of CPI than per capita GNI sub-index alone.
Figure 10 shows a good correlation between per capita GNI and non-GNI
HDI, however, the correlation between non-GNI HDI and CPI in Figure 11
was not substantially better than that between HDI and CPI in Figure 2.
[FIGURE 9 OMITTED]
[FIGURE 10 OMITTED]
[FIGURE 11 OMITTED]
Rectification Strategy
In view of the known computed indicators of human development and
their newly-identified correlations to the quantitative corruption
descriptor (viz., Corruption Perception Index), a practicable strategy
could now be devised to alleviate corruption in Africa by means of
altering one or more of the human development indicators. Table 1 shows
an example of the calculated costs of three possible rectification
strategies for the reduction of corruption through improvements in
social and economic well-being of the people.
In strategy A, the sole focus of this strategy is to improve health
care (viz., increasing life expectancy) and education in Africa. This
strategy would cost about PPP$1 trillion annually. From the correlation
given in Figures 10, collateral improvements in per capita GNI could be
expected as a result of increased public expenditure on health and
education. The HDI for strategy A was re-calculated to be in the range
of 0.878. The CPI of 'new" Africa was calculated subsequently
(from Figure 2) to be about 7.7, viz., at essentially the same
corruption level as in Britain. Second, in strategy B, the scheme
provides a direct increase in per capita GNI in the form of a guaranteed
income supplement to each person. This approach is similar to the
agricultural payment provided to all EU-15 farmers under the Common
Agricultural Policy of the European Union (EU), hence this remediation
strategy would cost about PPP$3.3 trillion annually, an on-purpose
increase in per capita GNI that could also be expected to improve
education and health coincidentally, according to the proposition that
"more money would buy more health care and better education".
The same method of calculations was used to estimate the likely
impacts of increased in per capita GNI on non-GNI HDI (i.e., combined LE
and EA sub-indices), thus the HDI of this remedial strategy was
calculated to be 0.680. Therefore, on the basis of data presented in
Figure 2, strategy B would not achieve any appreciable increase in the
level of CPI, i.e., a situation still mired in the zone of high
corruption at CPI = 3.3.
Next, in strategy C, the 2005 New Partnership for Africa's
Development program was aimed to provide Africa with a target of PPP$25
billion of aids annually over the 10 years from 2010 to 2019 (One
Campaign 2008). With a population of 1 billion people, the per capita
economic benefit would be about $25 annually. This small amount of
funding could not be expected to achieve any meaningful improvements in
Africa in terms of health and education to cause subsequently an
appreciable reduction in corruption, thus, it is interesting to note
that much of the foreign aid pledged at the 2005 summit of G-7 countries
was in fact used to cancel old debts (Curtis 2005), and therefore, the
net amount of new funding to be provided was actually even more
miniscule.
Additionally, the combined GDP of G-7 countries (viz., Canada,
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, UK and USA) was about PPP$29 trillion in
2009 (Hawksworth and Tiwari 2011); the proposed funding of strategy A at
PPP$1 trillion annually would be equivalent to approximately 3.4% of the
combined GDP of the 7 richest nations, and in comparison, the 2005
United Nations Millennium Goal for official development assistance was
set at 0.7% of GDP of developed countries (Townsend, 2010) is a actually
a paltry level of promised economic aid, and even if it was doubled, it
would be grossly inadequate to solve corruption in Africa arising from
severe social and economic deprivation caused to a certain extent by
past colonial exploitation and the wholesale destruction of African
societies.
Funding Issues
The two fundamental questions are what would be the appropriate
form of transfer payment and how would the proposed annual funding
requirement of PPP $1 trillion be sourced, transfer payment and foreign
aid.
Hence, the professed goal of foreign aid from EUSAC is to improve
the human well-beings of the people of recipient countries.
Unfortunately, most of current "increased aid" initiative has
been expended on increasing trade (Vidal, 2002; Sachs, 2005; UNCTAD,
2006; UNECA, 2008) and debt cancellation (Africa Action, 2008; One
Campaign, 2008) as a means of raising the national GDP ultimately to
benefit the commercial interest of EUSAC. In practice, increased GDP
through trade means larger exportation of African commodities virtually
for the sole benefits of Africans (viz., native agents of EUSAC) in
power, and for foreign commercial interest (Sogge, 1999; Kimber, 2005).
This development model provides little or no prospect for improving the
daily lives of ordinary African people significantly, and thus, it
appears to be part of a continual exploitation of African natural
resources in the guise of "partnerships" (Jung et al., 2011;
Bolinger, 2012).
It is well known that foreign aid is rarely given as generous
untied assistance (Trebilcock, 2010). They are generally provided in the
form of loans or grants with specific commercial conditions attached
often designed to favour the political and/or commercial interest of the
donor country. This orthodox free-market model of lending Africa more
money would in fact enslave Africa again. Africa would be constantly
under pressure to implement economic reform which is not necessarily in
congruence with indigenous cultural traditions and societal structure.
For example, private-property rights of land have no meaning in some
African pastoral and agrarian societies, and thus such EUSAC demand is
another manifestation of a neocolonial arrogance to remake Africa for
serving its own commercial and geo-political interests.
The contemporary view of donor countries and institutions is that
Africa must undertake profound "structural reform", i.e.,
strict adoption of the EUSAC free-market economic model via the
privatization of essentials services such as potable water supply which
actually enriches foreign commercial corporations. Also, improved
efficiency in tax collection is often cited as a vital tool of economic
reform in Africa, but the people are often too poor to be taxed further.
And interestingly, EUSAC is always vehemently opposed to any increased
taxation collection of African raw materials needed by EUSAC as tax
avoidance is a finely-honed method for EUSAC trans-national companies to
operate in Africa. For example, the sugar production business in Zambia
removing $2 billion annually from the Zambian national treasury via
Associated British Foods, a British trans-national operating company may
be immoral, but it is legally acceptable to the UK government (Boffey,
2013).
In the disbursement of foreign aid, Easterly (2006) has advocated
gauged spending on smaller selected projects with essentially unchanged
level of foreign aid. In contrast, Sachs (2005) has been arguing for
more foreign-aid money to spend on the high-profile large scale projects
which could transform the local economic structure. And for different
reasons, Moyo (2009) has advocated the termination of foreign aid to
African governments to eliminate dependency, corruption and poor
governance. However, with only relatively small differences in
approaches, Easterly (2006), Sachs (2005), Moyo (2009), and Sumner and
Mallett (2012) are all advocating essentially more free-market policies,
albeit in slightly different form, as the sole effective approach to
reduce poverty in Africa, although the performance of free-market policy
in Africa has been mixed at best.
For example, the reported economic miracle of free-market policies
as practiced for decades in Senegal and Cote d'Ivoire for example
is untrue. The HDIs of these countries have always been near the bottom
of the HDI scale for decades. And in this context, South Africa is also
not a good example of free-market policy achievements as its high
national "economic status" is actually the continued legacy of
severe economic disparity inflicted on the indigenous people built
during the Apartheid years, and thus the rights of workers to fair wages
and safe working conditions were still routinely abrogated and
suppressed in the pursuit of nation building, in a monopolistic
free-market business setting (see, for example, Smith and Macalister,
2012).
The wholesale adoption of the EUSAC free-market approach would
result in the continued exploitation and re-enslavement of Africa. In
essence, Africa will survive as servants of EUSAC economic interest. The
most prominent example of free-market policies is the unfettered land
grab by foreign entities (with the collaboration of native agents of
course) in the name of aiding local development (de Schutter, 2009; de
Schutter, 2010; Vidal, 2012; Mwakideu, 2012). In many cases, the
immediate aftermath is that the natural environment is despoiled and the
people driven from their ancestral land and are left with no means to
develop their own food production (Provost and McClanaham, 2012) as
famine persists in Africa (Devereux, 2009), and the lack of access to
modern crop technologies has often been cited as the underlying cause
(Djurfeldt et al., 2008; Sanchez et al., 2009; de Graff et al., 2011).
And furthermore, under the free-market development model, the
substantial changes in land tenure system (Stamm, 2009; Robertson and
Pinstrup-Andersen, 2010) and the national priority for deploying the
best arable land for the production of exportable food crops (Madeley,
2000; Wong, 2010) has been introduced into the traditional landscape,
resulting in a growing dependency of the people on imported foodstuff of
which prices are subject to intense manipulation in the futures
financial markets in London and New York (Hartwich, 2009; de Schutter,
2011; Ghosh et al., 2011; Worthy, 2011). Hence, perpetuation of
neo-colonialism is exemplified by the "New Alliance for Food
Security and Nutrition" formulated as a foreign aid initiative at
the 2009 G8 Meeting in L'Aquila, Italy (Anon., 2013) which has been
roundly criticized as the latest means to enslave and impoverish the
people of Africa once again under the guise of eradicating poverty
(Provost et al., 2013).
And in view of the past history of EUSAC commercial and
geo-political interest in Africa, it would not be surprising to find
that bribery and coercion was deployed by EUSAC to induce various
African states to join the program.
Considerable discourse is continuing on the achieved benefits of
foreign aid as the miniscule improvements in well-being after the influx
of more than $500 billion of foreign aids to Africa since the 1960 has
often been cited a proof of the failure of foreign aid (Burrows, 2003;
Vasquez, 2005; Nelson, 2007). Failures that are not necessarily always
the fault of African leadership, with few exceptions, but rather on a
foreign aid policy for Africa based on the template to re-make Africa in
the image of the EUSAC free-market market model as the social and
cultural history of Africa is denigrated and ignored (Fanon, 1952). This
orthodox modality of development strategy of modern-day Africa is
fundamentally inappropriate and unworkable, and it is well known that
EUSAC countries have been persistently undermining any indigenous
development policies. Recall, for example, the fate of governments of
Sekou Toure in Guinee and Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana. These progressive
national leaders had chosen not to accept EUSAC "foreign aid"
for the implementation of political and economic framework to serve
EUSAC's geopolitical and commercial interest, and in Congo, Prime
Minister Patrice Lumumba was even murdered for this defiance (Fanon,
1964; Brittain, 2011). Hence, it is evident that the present deprived
state of African society and economy could not be remedied with the
continued self-serving disguised benevolent intervention of EUSAC to
maintain its geopolitical hegemony.
Reparations
Foreign aid denotes charity at the discretion of the donors who
have changing geopolitical and commercial objectives. Foreign aid is
essentially charity disbursed at the whims of the donors. Interestingly,
foreign-aid promotion and administration have become a growth industry
in EUSAC countries during the past few decades, with the participation
of many self-serving musical entertainers and politicians, and thus, the
termination of this growth industry may be very difficult to realize.
Perhaps natural justice could be served if the foreign aid in the
form of cash, was recognized as reparation payments for centuries of
wanton exploitation of African human and other resources by EUSAC
interest. The late 20th century precedent in war-crime reparation
payment was that made by Germany to Israel (Bassock and Marker, 2009).
The initial agreement reached in 1952 was the payment of 3 billion
Deutsche marks (valued at about 14 billion [euro] presently) over 14
years and in 2009, the Israeli government made a new payment demand of
another 1 billion [euro] plus other non-cash concessions for the
remaining 30,000 survivors of the misdeeds of the Third Reich.
In equal application of justice, Africa is unquestionably is
entitled to be compensated for the sufferings endured by its people
during the entire colonial period. For example, over 10 million people
were exterminated by operatives of King Leopold II of Belgium during the
exploitation of the Congo Free State between 1885 and 1908 (Hochschild,
1999). The ownership of the Congo Free State was transferred officially
by King Leopold II to the Kingdom of Belgium in 1908. If the same
German-Israeli reparation formula was applied, i.e., about US$3,700 per
survivor for each year of persecution by the Third Reich regime from
1933 to 1945, then the one-time payment owing by the present-day Belgian
government for crimes committed by King Leopold II against humanity in
the Congo Free State from 1885 to 1908 would be US$850 billion! There is
no statute of limitation on crime against humanity (5) (UNHCHR, 1970;
ICCS, 1998). And to fortify this argument, as of November, 2011, all
EUSAC countries, without the exception of the Unites States of America,
have ratified the Rome ICC Statute which provides no statute of
limitation for war crimes and crimes against humanity.
This calculated indemnity may appear to be a hardship for
present-day Belgians to redeem the sins of their past rulers. But it is
not nearly as devastating to Haitians as the reparation demanded by
France from Haiti for the "grant of independence" to Haiti in
1804. Haiti had taken almost 150 years to pay off entirely the original
demand of 150 million francs, in gold (and reduced in 1838 to 90 million
francs in gold) for its freedom. The smaller 1838 sum is equivalent to
about US$18 billion today (Marquand, 2010). To this day, Haiti has yet
unable to recover from extreme poverty manifested during the 150-year
reparation period.
It may be noted that none of the crimes against humanity in Africa
by other colonial states such as Britain, France and Germany has yet to
be accounted. Some notable examples of crime against African humanity
would include the German 1904 massacre of the Herero and Namib people in
southwest Africa (Biles, 2006; Sarkin-Hughes, 2009) and the atrocities
committed by Britain against the Kiyuyu people of modern-day Kenya
during the 1950s (Elkins, 2004; Cobain et al., 2012). Public apologies
made reluctantly by governments for past atrocities committed against
the people are inexpensive and insufficient. In the case of Germany,
reparations for the crimes committed during the era of the Third Reich
were miniscule in proportion to the long lasting destructive effect of
these crimes against the people. To this day, the British government is
ironically still trying to conceal evidence of its crime against
humanity committed in Kenya in the 1950s (Cobain and Hatcher, 2013;
Cobain, 2013).
Funding Source
The "economic stress" on the donor countries may be very
manageable, if there was a sustained re-deployment of military
expenditure to fund the proposed development plan. And in this regard,
the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) reported
that the 2010 military expenditure of the top 10 countries in the world
was about US$ 1.22 trillion, about 75% of the global total (Africa
accounts for 1.8% of the global total military expenditure). Table 2
shows the European colonial powers spent about US$246 billion on
military activities in 2010, hence, if these colonial-9 countries could
reduce their military budget by 90%, there would be a
"disposable" US$123 billion available for social development
in Africa, a figure that would be miniscule compared to the US$25
billion offered to Africa in the Millennium Development Goal program
(One Campaign, 2008).
As shown in Figure 12, the military expenditure in Africa has been
rising steadily since 2001. African countries spent about US$30 billion
on military affairs in 2010. If the military expenditure could be
reduced by 90%, then another US$27 billion could be freed up for the
implementation of strategy A as described in Table 1.
[FIGURE 12 OMITTED]
Thus, the total money available from (a) avoided military
expenditures by the colonial-9 countries, (b) previously committed
economic aid (viz., US$25 billion) and (c) avoided African military
expenditures could be about US$273 billion, about 27% of the projected
amount required for "rectifying corruption" in the full
implementation of strategy A. But interestingly, we know that it
somewhat unrealistic to expect the "colonial-9" countries to
ever purposefully reduce their military expenditures considering that
their military armament industry is an entrenched element of the
national economy of many EUSAC countries (Smith, 2012). And thus, the
military armament industry needs continuing government-facilitated
exports, even if bribes, coercions and other unethical means had to be
used (Taylor and Maltezou, 2010; Amies, 2010; Anon, 2012).
Therefore, it is recognized lump-sum disbursement of the sudden
annual influx of a large sum of money of the magnitude formulated in
strategy A that will likely cause uncontrollable economic chaos in
recipient countries. However, this money management problem could be
overcome if the annual funding was increased progressively over a
10-year period to the target level of PPP$1 trillion annually.
Concluding Remarks
Low Human Development Index has been shown to correlate to a high
degree of corruption, not only in Africa but also elsewhere in the
world, and poverty as exemplified by the lack of adequate access to the
basic necessities of life such as food, housing, education and health
care, appears to be the underlying cause.
Grand corruption is characterized by greed and a lust for power.
Continuing economic exploitation perpetuated by EUSAC is a significant
factor causing this form of corruption within communities in Africa, an
economic practice is a continuation of centuries of EUSAC colonial
policies, which have included bribery, coercion, murders, and thus, a
practicable remedy for grand corruption.
Petty corruption is driven by poverty and usually perpetuated by
low ranking civil servants and private-enterprise employees, and for the
suppression of petty corruption, a reduction of poverty through
substantial increase in development funding to improve health and
education specifically would be an essential first step. Hence, a
perplexing question might be: does corruption cause poverty or the
reverse? The answer is probably
yes to both side of this circular question. However, the preceding
quantitative analysis of key human development indicators suggests that
a practical solution would lie in addressing the poverty issue first.
And thus, the classical approach of eradicating corruption first, e.g.,
through intensified training in governance, stricter enforcement of
improved laws, greater procurement transparency, accelerated
implementation of free-market economic policies, increased conditional
foreign aids, etc. has shown to be largely ineffective as the basic
needs of the people are not met.
In a comparative analysis of corruption Abdulai (2009) blamed the
lack of political will to combat (petty) corruption in Ghana to
Singapore and Hong Kong, yet the situation is somewhat more complex.
Kwame Nkrumah (Ghana) and Lee Kuan Yew (Singapore) became political
leaders in their respective country at about the same time with the
ambition of building a new society freed from onerous British colonial
rule, but in contrast, Nkrumah was undermined and finally deposed (with
the connivance of EUSAC) because his "communistic" social
justice agenda whereas Lee survived (and tolerated by EUSAC) to
influence Singaporean politics to the present day because of his
capitalistic free-market approach of nation-building, although the
draconian measures to suppress political dissidents in both Ghana and
Singapore were probably very similar, but in Ghana, "political
will" and other economic means to reduce corruption never had a
chance to take root.
Rucker (2014) has presented an interesting argument that personal
dignity (of high officials) is an important factor in deterring
public-sector corruption in Singapore. The proposition about the
deciding role of embedded classical Chinese cultural practices of, among
other things, obedience and filial piety could only be partially valid
as it does not account for the similarly low incidence of corruption in
the significant non-Chinese segment of the Singaporean society.
Moreover, the Rucker argument bordering on the rationalization of
cultural and/or racial superiority is somewhat unfounded because it is
well known that corruption occurs everywhere in the world, i.e., not
particularly culture or race-based. In Singapore, the driving force for
opportunistic corruption has been and is effectively removed by routine
generous remuneration for publicsector workers and elected officials.
The cash input for poverty reduction (and consequentially
corruption decrease) would not and should not be assigned as foreign
aid. Regardless of the free-market economic development model of Sachs
(2005), Easterly (2006) or Moyo (2009), foreign aid is charity which
locks Africa into a state perpetual beggars. This inflow of EUSAC money
should be modeled after the scheme of unfettered cash reparation
provided by Germany to Israel for the former's past misdeeds during
the Third Reich, and thus, Belgian reparation for heinous crimes against
humanity committed by King Leopold's henchmen in Congo between
1885-1908 (Gondola, 2002; O'Siochain and O'Sullivan, 2003)
would similarly be justified, considering there is no statute of
limitation for crimes against humanity (UNGA, 1968).
Acknowledgements
The authors acknowledge the useful discussion held with various
citizens of Burkina Faso, Egypt, Guinee, Liberia, Malawi and Morocco,
for gaining an understanding of comparative viewpoints and circumstances
on corruption in Africa and elsewhere in the world.
References
Abdulai, A.-G., 2009. Political will in combating corruption in
developing and transition economies: A comparative study of Singapore,
Hong Kong and Ghana. Journal of Financial Crime, 16: 387-417
Africa Action, 2008. Campaign to cancel Africa's debt.
Washington (DC): Africa Action. Available online from
http://www.africaaction.org/campaign_new/debt_more.php (Accessed May 2,
2013)
Amies, N., 2010. Probe into German-Greek arms deals reveals murky
side of defense sales. Deutsche Welle-DE, August 12. Available online
from http://www.dw.de/dw/article/0,,5890375,00.html (Accessed April 25,
2012).
Anon., 2011. The BAE files. The Guardian-UK, May 17. Available
online from http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/bae (Accessed May 1, 2012).
Anon., 2012. Former Greek defense minister arrested for corruption.
Deutsche Welle-DE, April 11. Available online from
http://www.dw.de/dw/article/0,,15875204,00.html (Accessed April 25,
2012).
Anon., 2013. New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition--2013
Progress Report Summary. London: UK Department of International
Development.
Ares Muzio, P., 2013. A look at Cuba's model of wellbeing.
GranmaInternational-CU, May 23. Available online from
http://www.granma.cu/ingles/cuba-i/23may-cuba.html (Accessed May 27,
2013)
Bassock, M. and Marker, T., 2009. Israel to seek another 1b euros
Holocaust in reparations from Germany. Haaretz-Israel, December 20,
1999. Available online from
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1136383.html (Accessed April 25,
2012).
Biles, P., 2006. Unfinished business for Namibia's Herero. BBC
News-UK, January 19. Available online from
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4623516.stm (Accessed April 27, 2012).
Boffey, D., 2013. As Zambians demand fair tax rates, a British
sugar giant grows fat. The
Observer-UK, February 9. Available online from
http://www.theguardian.com/world/ 2013/feb/09/zambia-sugar-empire-tax
(Accessed February 9, 2013).
Bolinger, M., 2012. Political interest in raw materials escalates.
Deutsche Welle-DE, April 30. Available online from
http://www.dw.de/dw/article/0,,15917498,00.html (Accessed May 2, 2012).
Braudel, F., 1986. L'Identite de la France. Paris: Les
Editions Athaud.
Brittain, V., 2011. Africa: a continent drenched in the blood of
revolutionary heroes. The Guardian UK, January 17. Available online from
http://www.guardian.co.uk/globaldevelopment/poverty-
matters/2011/jan/17/lumumba-50th-anniversary-african-leaders-assassinations (Accessed April 26, 2012)
Bunting, M., 2005. Spotlight falls on corruption of Africa. The
Guardian-UK, March 5. Available online from
http://www.guardian.co.uk/society/2005/mar/05/
internationalaidanddevelopment.hearafrica051 (Accessed August 10, 2013).
Burrow, S., 2003. Rethinking U.S. aid to Africa. Available online
from http://ccds.charlotte.nc.us/History/Africa/03/burrow/burrow.htm
(Accessed August 10, 2013)
Cabral, A., 1966. The Weapon of Theory. Address delivered to the
First Tricontinental Conference of the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin
America, Havana, Cuba, January 3-15.
Chamberlain, M. E., 2000. The formation of the European Empires,
1488-1920. Harrow: Pearson Education Ltd.
Chamberlain, M. E., 2010. The Scramble for Africa. Third edition.
Harrow: Longman.
Chapman, T., 1998. The Congress of Vienna: origins, processes, and
results. London: Routledge Ltd.
Clements, B., Gupta, S., Pivovarsky, A. and Tiongson, E.R., 2004.
Foreign aid: Grants versus loans. Washington: Finance and Development,
International Monetary Fund. pp. 46-49.
Cobain, I., Bowcott, O. and Norton-Taylor, R., 2012. Britain
destroyed records of colonial crimes. The Guardian-UK, April 18.
Available online from http://www.guardian.co.uk/
uk/2012/apr/18/britain-destroyed-records-colonial-crimes?intcmp=239
(Accessed April 26, 2012).
Cobain, I. and Norton-Taylor, R., 2012. Mau Mau massacre cover-up
detailed in newly-opened secret files. The Guardian-UK, November 30.
Available online from
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/nov/30/maumau-massacre-secret-files (Accessed May 5, 2013).
Cobain, I., 2013. Revealed: the bonfire of papers at the end of
Empire. The Guardian-UK, November 29. Available online from
http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2013/nov/29/
revealed-bonfire-papers-empire (Accessed December 1, 2013).
Commission for Africa. 2005. Our common interest: report of the
Commission for Africa. London: UK Government. pp. 149-153.
http://www.commissionforafrica.org
Curtis, M., 2005. How the G8 lied to the world on aid. The
Guardian-UK, August 23. Available online from
http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2005/aug/23/
debtrelief.foreignpolicy? (Accessed April 25, 2012).
Dahmann, K., 2012. Wulff scandal raises questions over political
sponsorship. Deutsche WelleDE, March 18. Available online from
http://www.dw.de/article/0,,15816541,00.html (Accessed March 19, 2012).
de Graff, J., Kessler, A. and Nibbering, J.W., 2011. Agriculture
and food security in selected countries in Sub-Saharan Africa: diversity
in trends and opportunities. Food Security, 3: 195-213.
de la Osa, J.A., 2013. Training doctors in Cuba: A vision becomes
reality. Granma International-CU, December 4. Available online from
http://www.granma.cu/ingles/cuba i/4dicie-A-vision.html (Accessed
December 6, 2013)
Del Bonido, K., Norms, self-interest and effectiveness: explaining
double standards in EU reactions to violations of democratic principles
in Sub-Saharan Africa. Afrika Focus, 25: 109-120.
de Schutter, O., 2009. Large-scale land acquisitions and leases: A
set of minimum principles and measures to address the human rights
challenge. Addendum A/HRC/13/33/Add.2. UN Special Rapporteur on the
right to food, Thirteenth session, United Nations Human Rights Council,
Geneva, Switzerland. December 28.
de Schutter, O., 2010. Access to Land and the Right to Food. Report
(A/65/281) of the UN Special Rapporteur on the right to food presented
to the 65th General Assembly of the United Nations, New York, USA,
October 21.
de Schutter, O., 2011. Observations on the current food price
situation. Background note. UN Special Rapporteur on the right to food,
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. Geneva,
Switzerland, January 21. Available online from
http://www.srfood.org/images/stories/pdf/otherdocuments/20110124_background-notefood-price-situation_en.pdf (Accessed October 20, 2011).
Devereux, S., 2009. Why does famine persist in Africa? Food
Security, 1: 25-35.
Djurfeldt, G., Larsson, R., Holmquist, B., Jirstrom and Andersson,
A., 2008. African farm dynamics ans the sub-continental food crisis--the
case of maize. Food Economics--Acta Agriculturae Sacandinavica, Section
C, 5: 75-91.
Easterly, W., 2006. The White Man's Burden: Why the
West's efforts to aid the rest have done so much ill and so little
good. New York: The Penguin Press.
Elkins, C., 2004. Imperial Reckoning: The Untold Story of
Britain's Gulag in Kenya. New York: Henry Holt & Co.
European Commission, 2014. EU Anti-Corruption Report. Report from
the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament. Report
COM(2014) 38 final, February 3. Brussels: Home Affairs, European
Commission
Fanon, F., 1952. Peau noir, Masques blancs. Paris: Editions du
Seuil
Fanon, F., 1964. Pour la Revolution Africaine. Paris: Francis
Maspero.
Ferguson, N., 2002. Empire: The rise and demise of the British
world order and the lessons for global power. London: Allan Lane.
Garrisson, J., 1995. A History of Sixteenth-century France,
1483-1598: Renaissance, Reformation, and Rebellion. New York: St.
Martin's Press.
Garrity, D.P., Akinnifesi, F.K., Ajayi, O.C., Weldesemayat, S.G. et
al., 2010. Evergreen agriculture: a robust approach to sustainable food
security in Africa. Food Security, 2: 197-214.
Ghosh, J., Heintz, J. and Pollin, R., 2011. Considerations on the
relationship between commodities futures markets and food prices.
Memorandum to the World Development Movement, April 5.
Gini, C., 1912. Variability e mutabilita. Reprinted in Memorie di
metodologica statistica (Pizetti, E. and Salvemini, T., eds.). Rome:
Libreria Eredi Virgilio Veschi (1955).
Gondola, C.D., 2002. The History of Congo. Weston (CT): Greenwood
Press.
Guzman, A.E., 2013. Over seven million leartn to read with Yo,
sipuedo method. Granma International-CU, April 25. Available online from
http://www.granma.cu/ingles/cuba-i/ 25abril-yosipuedo.html (Accessed
April 28, 2013)
Halliday, J., 2012. Just how close did the Tories fly to the Sun?
The Guardian-UK, April 27. Available online from
http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2012/
apr/27/tories-sun-rupert-murdoch (Accessed April 27, 2012).
Hartwich, F., 2009. When food markets do not provide enough food.
Focus No. 1/09. Zollikofen (CH): InfoResources.
Hawksworth, J. and Tiwari. A., 2011. The World in 2050. London:
PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP.
Hochschild, A., 1999. King Leopold's Ghost. New York: Marinier
Books.
International Criminal Court Statute (ICCS), 1998. Convention to
establish an international criminal court, adopted under the auspices of
the United Nations General Assembly, July 17, 1998.
Jalata, A., 2013. Colonial terrorism, global capitalism and African
underdevelopment: 500 years of crimes against African peoples. Journal
of Pan African Studies, 5 (9).
Jung, A., Kurbjuweit, D., Neubacher, A., Schwagerl, C. and Soibel,
D., 2011. Help for German Industry: Merkel Joins the Global Hunt for
Natural Resources. Der Speigel Nachrichten-DE, February 11. Available
online from http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/
0,1518,795256,00.html (Accessed May 2, 2012).
Kimber, C., 2005. Aid, governance and exploitation. International
Socialism, Issue 107. June 5. Available online from
http://www.isj.org.uk/index.php47idM17issueM07 (Accessed March 12, 2013)
Le Vine, V.T., 2007 Politics in Francophone Africa. Boulder (CO):
Lynne Rienner Publishers.
Madeley, J., 2000. Trade and hunger--an overview of case studies on
the impact of trade liberalisation on food security and poverty.
Stockholm: Forum Syd.
Mamdani, M., 2012. Define and Rule: Native as Political Identity.
Cambridge (MA): Harvard University Press.
Marquand, R., 2010. France dismisses petition for it to pay $17
billion in Haiti reparations. Christian Science Monitor-US, August 17.
Available online from
http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Europe/2010/0817/France-dismisses-petition-for-it-topay-17-billion-in-Haiti-reparations (Accessed April 26,
2012).
Meredith, M., 2006. The State of Africa: A history of fifty years
of independence. Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball Publishers.
Moyo., D., 2009. Dead Aid: Why aid is not working and how there is
a better way for Africa. New York: Farrar, Strauss, Giroux.
Mwakideu, C., 2012. Africa: Land is becoming a scarce commodity.
Deutsche Welle-DE, March 9. Available online from
http://ww.de.de/dw/article/0,,15800699,00.html (Acccessed March 10,
2012).
Nelson, K., 2007. Attacking aid to Africa. Capitalnewsonline, 20
(5), March 30. Available online from
http://www.carleton.ca/jmc/cnews/30032007/n3.shtml (Accessed October 12,
2011).
Oliver, R. and Atmore, A., 1967. Africa since 1800. Third Edition.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
One Campaign, 2008. The data report--keep the G8promise to Africa.
Washington (DC) : One Campaign. Available online from
http://www.one.org/report/en/index/html (Accessed October 12, 2011
O'Siochain, S. and O'Sullivan, M., eds., 2003. The Eyes
of Another Race: Roger Casement's Congo Report and 1903 Diary.
Dublin: University College Dublin Press.
Patnaik, R., 2006. Out of Africa: an ecological critique of
colonialism and nationhood. Studies of Tribes and Tribals, 4: 41-45.
Provost, C. and McClanaham, P., 2012. Sierra Leone: Local
resistance grows as investors snap upland. The Guardian-UK, April 11.
Available online from http://www.guardian.co.uk/
global-development/poverty-matters/2012/apr/11/sierra-leone-local-resistance-land-deals (Accessed May 2, 2012).
Provost, C., Ford, L. and Tran, M., 2013. G8 New Alliance condemned
as new wave of colonialism in Africa. The Guardian-UK, February 18.
Available online from
http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2014/feb/18/g8-new-alliancecondemned-new-colonialism (Accessed February 18, 2013).
Quah, J.S.T., 2001. Combating Corruption in Singapore: What Can Be
Learned? Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, 9: 29-35.
Quah, J.S.T., 2011. Combating public sector corruption in Singapore
& Hong Kong: Lessons for the private sector in Asian countries.
Paper presented at the Australian Public Sector Anti-Corruption
Conference, Fremantle, Australia, November 15-17.
Robertson, B. and Pinstrup-Andersen, P., 2010. Global land
acquisition: neo-colonialism or development opportunity? Food Security,
2: 271-283.
Rucker, F., 2014. Corruption and Remuneration in Singapore: The
Dignity Argument. MaRBLe Research Papers MPR2014, Volume 1, Chapter 4.
Maastricht (NL): Maastricht University.
Sachs, J., 2005. The end of poverty: Economic possibilities of our
time. New York: The Penguin Press.
Sanchez, P.A., Denning, G.L. and Nziguheba, G., 2009. The African
Green Revolution moves forward. Food Security, 1: 37-44.
Sarkin-Hughes, J., 2009. Colonial genocide and reparations claims
in the 21st century: the socio-legal context of claims under
international law by the Herero against Germany for genocide in Namibia,
1904-1908. Westport (CT): Praeger Security International.
Shleifer, A. 2009. Peter Bauer and the Failure of Foreign Aid. Cato
Journal, 29 (3): 379-390. Smith, H., 2012. German 'hypocrisy'
over Greek military spending has critics up in arms. The Guardian-UK,
April 19. Available online from http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/
apr/19/greece-military-spending-debt-crisis?newsfeed=true (Accessed
April 25, 2012)
Smith, D. and Macalister, T., 2012. South African police shoot dead
striking miners. The Guardian-UK, August 17. Available online from
http://www.theguardian.com/world/
2012/aug/16/south-african-police-shoot-striking-miners (Accessed
February 10, 2014).
Sogge, D., 1999. The strings attached to aid in Africa. Amsterdam:
The Transnational Institute. Available online from http://www.tni.org/
(Accessed March 15, 2013)
Stamm, V., 2009. Social research and development policy: Two
approaches to West African land-tenure problems. Africa Spectrum, 44
(2): 29-52.
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), 2008.
Military expenditure in Africa, 1998-2007. SIPRI Yearbook 2008.
Stockholm: SIPRI. http://www.sipri.org/ Table 5A-1.
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), 2011.
Background paper on SIPRI military expenditure data, 2010. Stockholm:
SIPRI. http://www.sipri.org/
Sumner, A. and Mallett, R., 2012. The Future of Foreign Aid
Development Cooperation and the New Geography of Global Poverty. London:
Palgrave Pivot.
Talbot, A., 2000. Justifying the role of imperialism in Africa.
World Socialist Web Site. Available online from
http://www.wsws.org/articles/2000/aug2000/afri-a04_prn.shtml (Accessed
July 3, 2010).
Taylor, P. and Maltezou, R., 2010. Broke? Buy a few warships,
France tells Greece. Reuters-UK, March 23. Available online from
http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/03/23/useurozone-greece-warships-analysis- idUSTRE62M1Q520100323(Accessed April 25, 2012).
Townsend, I., 2010. The UK & the 0.7% aid target, and the Draft
International Development (ODA Target) Bill. Report SN/EP/371412, April
12. London: Economic Policy & Statistics, House of Commons Library.
Transparency International (TI), 2012. Corruption Perception Index.
Berlin: TI. http://www.transparency.org/
Trebilcock, M., 2010. Why foreign aid mostly fails? Public lecture,
Faculty of Law, University of Toronto, Canada, October 22.
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), 2006.
Economic Development in Africa--Doubling aid: making the "bigpush
" work. Geneva: UNCTAD.
United Nations Development Program (UNDP), 2012. Human Development
Index. Geneva: UNDP. http://hdr.undp.org/.
United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), 2005.
African Governance Report 2005. Addis Ababa: UNECA.
http://www.uneca.org/
United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), 2008.
Economic Report on Africa 2008. Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
http://www.uneca.org/era2008/
United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), 1968. The Convention on the
Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes
Against Humanity. Resolution 2391 (XXIII) adopted on November 26.
United Nations High Commission on Human Rights (UNHCHR), 1970.
Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War
Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity.
United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2391 (XXIII) of 26
November, 1968; promulgated November 11, 1970.
Vasquez, I., 2005. The false promise of aid to Africa. Washington
(DC): Cato Institute. Available online from
http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=3979 (Accessed April 28,
2013).
Vidal, J. 2002. Trade not aid. The Guardian--UK, May 27. Available
online from http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2002/may/27/globalisation.johnvidal (Accessed August 24, 2013)
Vidal, J., 2012. Global mining boom is leading to landgrab, says
report. The Guardian-UK, March 1. Available online from
http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2012/mar/01/
global-mining-boom-landgrab-africa (Accessed March 1, 2012)
Wong, A., 2010. Food miles and localized vegetable production in
the North Baltic region. Proc. International Conference on Agricultural
Engineering--AgEng 2010, Clermont-Ferrand, France, September 6-8.
Wong, A., 2012. Socio-economic aspects of corruption in aboriginal
communities. Journal of Administration and Governance, 7: 11-22.
Wong, A. and Gomes, R., 2012. Societal and economic elements of
trafficking in human beings into the European Union.
Etnoantropoloskiproblemi, 7: 831-852.
World Health Organization (WHO), 2010. World health statistics
2010. Geneva: WHO. Part II. Global health indicators: Table 1. Mortality
and burden of disease--2008 life expectancy at birth.
World Health Organization (WHO), 2011. World health statistics
2011. Geneva: WHO. Part II. Global health indicators: Table 7. Health
expenditure--2008 per capita total expenditure on health (PPP$).
Worthy, M., 2011. Broken markets: how financial market regulation
can help prevent another global food crisis. World Development Movement,
London, UK.
by
Alfred Wong
taiping@aboriginalhealth.net
Social Justice Research Group, Friends of Aboriginal Health
Vancouver, Canada
&
Roxanne Gomes
Social Justice Research Group, Friends of Aboriginal Health
Vancouver, Canada
End Notes
(1) The probable origin of the present-day common saying of
"people living in glass houses should not throw stones"
(2) Corruption, n. 1. evil or wicked behaviour; depravity. 2.
bribery. 3. decay; rottenness. (Webster's New World Dictionary)
(3) This acronym groups Europe (especially former and present
colonial powers, viz., Belgium, Britain, France, Germany, Italy,
Netherlands, Portugal and Spain), USA, Australia and Canada. These
countries have largely similar social-cultural-economic-political
structure. EUSAC is considered more appropriate than the commonly-used
"The West". Japan, often considered to be "The
West", was excluded explicitly from this grouping as its societal
traditions are different. Prior to the 1950s, Australia and Canada were
integral subordinate states of the British Empire.
(4) Francisation as a national cultural assimilation policy began
in 1539 under the reign of Francis I with the promulgation of the
Ordonnance de Villers-Cotterets (Garrisson, 1995: 170208). This Royal
edict was designed to impose the dominance of French language and
culture for the development of French identity during the course of
territorial consolidation of the French state over the next 470 years.
Some examples of this cultural-domination policy within present-day
boundaries of metropolitan France are the draconian francisation of
Occitans, Bretons, Catalans, Corsicans and Basques.
(5) ICCS Article 29 states that genocide, crimes against humanity,
and war crimes "shall not be subject to any statute of
limitations". The 1968 Convention adopted by the United Nations
General Assembly Resolution 2391 (XXIII) prohibits signatory state from
applying statutory limitations to war crimes and crimes against
humanity.
Table 1. Different strategies for aiding Africa (based on 2011 est.
population of 1.0 billion)
Strategy Principal Action
Present Life expectancy sub-index = 0.597;
Education attainment sub-index = 0.434; per
capita GNI sub-index = 0.416; non-GNI HDI = 0.509
A 1. Improving health care
Present Africa average Target
Cuban level
LE sub-index 0.597
0.933
Life expectancy 58 years
78 years [right arrow]
per capita PPP$211
PPP$639
public expenditure
2. Improving education
Present African average Target
Cuban level
EA sub-index 0.434
0.875
per capita PPP$164
PPP$737
public expenditure
3. Allocating no specific cash input for
increasing GNI per capita. Estimated
GNI sub-index increase from new
calculated non-GNI HDI.
Present Africa average "new" Africa
Non-GNI HDI 0.509
0.904 GNI sub-index 0.416
0.878 *
B Raising GNI by 100%, in the form of a
guaranteed income supplement for every
person
Present Africa average "new" Africa
GNI PPP$3,257
PPP$6,514
GNI sub-index 0.416
0.598
Non-GNI HDI 0.509
0.725 *
C Target annual economic aid starting by 2010
(One Campaign, 2008) to achieve up to 6%
increase in GDP by 2020 (UNCTAD, 2006).
Strategy Incremental Projected Estimated
Expenditure HDI# CPI **
PPP$ billion
annually
Present 0 0.467 2.7
A 428 0.895 7.7
573
0
1,001
B 3,257 0.680 3.3
C 25 ? ?
# calculations made according to UNDP (2012) methodology
* calculated from Figure 10 correlation
** estimated from Figure 2 correlation
Table 2. Publicly-disclosed military expenditure of former European
colonial powers in 2010.
US$ billion Post-1815 African colonial history
1 Belgium 5.8 Present day Democratic Republic of
Congo was its primary colony
2 Denmark 5.3 No colonies in Africa since 1815
3 France 59.3 Colonies in western and
northwestern Africa
4 Germany 45.2 Present-day Cameroon, Tanzania and
Namibia were its colonies
5 Italy 37.0 Present-day Eritrea, Ethiopia and
Libya were its colonies
6 Netherlands 12.8 No colonies in Africa since 1815
7 Portugal 4.2 Present-day Angola and Mozambique
were the principal colonies
8 Spain 16.8 Western Sahara and Equatorial
Guinea were the primary colonies
9 United Kingdom 59.6 Colonies largely in western,
eastern and southern Africa
Colonial-9 246.0 About 84% of EU-27 total
EU-27 293.7 About 5 million active, reserve
and paramilitary personnel
Source: adapted from SIPRI, 2011
