Sahopalambhaniyama: Struktur und Entwicklung des Schlusses von der Tatsache, daB Erkenntnis und Gegenstand ausschlieBlich zusammen wahrgenommen werden, auf deren Nichtverschiedenheit.

Krasser, Helmut

At the end of the first chapter of his Pramanaviniscaya (ed. T. Vetter [Vienna, 1966]; abbr. Pvin I), Dharmakirti formulates two proofs in order to establish that an object of cognition and its cognition are not different from each other. He deduces their being not different from each other, on the one hand, from the fact that they are necessarily perceived together (Pvin I 94, 18f. = v. 55ab) and, on the other hand, from the fact that consciousness of an object essentially is consciousness (PVin I 98, 7f.). The first of these proofs, the subject of Iwata's investigation, runs as follows: sahopalambhaniyamad abhedo nilatad-dhiyoh [vertical bar] (v. 55ab) ... dvicandradivat (PVin I 94, 18-23) = Blue and its cognition are not different from each other, because they are necessarily perceived together ... like the two moons (seen by one suffering from a timira eye disease)." From this Dharmakirti draws the conclusion that any cognition bears two aspects, one subjective (grahaka) and one objective (grahya). From the cognition's bearing two aspects, moreover, he infers the self-consciousness (svasamvedana) of each cognition, which serves as the effect of a means of valid cognition (pramaliaphala). This theory applies, according to Dharmakirti, to the doctrine of the Sautrantikas, who assume an external object to be existent, as well as to the teaching of the Yogacaras, who do not accept such an idea. Thus, this theory plays an important role in Dharmakirti's epistemology and it was for this reason that in the following period it became a subject of dispute among Buddhists themselves, as well as between the Buddhists and philosophers belonging to other schools.

Iwata in this comprehensive work - the first volume consists in a study of the topic under consideration, the second includes the notes - treats all the essential problems connected with this proof. Besides the function of the sahopalambhaniyama proof in Dharmakirti's theory of knowledge and a historical survey of the idea, he discusses the structure and the development, from the sahopalambhaniyama, of this inference of the non-difference (abheda) between a cognition and its object. He deals with the various opinions regarding the elements of the proof such as sadhyadharmin, sadhyadharma, hetu or drstanta, as well as those regarding the meaning of its words, such as saha or niyama. The questions of vyapti and pakyadharmata are considered as well. In doing so, he translates and shows the mutual relation of the relevant passages in the works of Devendrabuddhi, Sakyabuddhi, Santaraksita, Kamalasila, Dharmottara, Prajnakaragupta, Ratnakarasanti, Manorathanandin, Jitari and Jnanasrimitra. Furthermore, he adds a critical edition and translation of the Tibetan text of the Sahopalambhaniyamasiddhi, ascribed to Prajnakaragupta.

The work is clearly arranged and the chapters dealing with the topics mentioned above are subdivided according to the different authors. An exhaustive index at the end of the second volume comprising terms and names in Sanskrit and Tibetan, as well as a list of all the passages quoted from Dharmakirti and his commentators facilitate access to the material presented in both volumes. Disturbing is, however, the quite inconsistent usage of the symbols such as, for example, "[arrow right]" or "[symbol omitted]" According to the list of symbols used (vol. I, p. ix), "A [arrow right] B" means that A implies B. Nevertheless the arrow is often used in the sense of "that means," "that is," or "compare": "... so ([arrow right] als damit verbunden)...," "Deswegen ([arrow right weil keine der moglichen Verbindungen in Frage kommt)..." (vol. I, p. 12); "... ran rig 'bras bur grub pa ([arrow PV II 341-53) la..." (vol. II, p. 9 n. 40); "... rgyu dan rgyu dan ldan pa ([arrow right karya) rim gyis ..." (vol. II, p. 35 n. 8). In some cases the arrow is completely superfluous: "... im Nichtgleichartigen (vipaksa) ([arrow right d.h. im Falle der Verschiedenheit) fehlt" (vol. I, pp. 12f.); "... in Erscheinung treten la[beta]t ([arrow right adarsayati)..." (vol. I, p. 178); or ".. die Erkenntnis frei von Irrtum ([arrow right] * abhranta o.a) ist" (vol. I, p. 279).

Sometimes this inconsistency in the usage of the symbols is quite puzzling: each of the important statements of the authors discussed by him or of Iwata himself is designated by a certain combination of numbers and/or letters. References to them are made by using these numbers and many of these references are also expressed in a formal logical way by combining these numbers with symbols such as "[arrow right]", "[symbol omitted]" or "[approximate]". Thus we read, for example, in vol. I, p. 23: "Von unserem Gedanken her jedoch scheint mir die Ableitung von sahopalambhaniyama aus (1) und (2) (d.h. (1)[arrow right](1.1)[symbol omitted](1.a)[approximate] [8.2'] und (2)[symbol omitted](1.a) [approximate] [8.'] nicht total unmoglich."(1) If in this formula we now replace the numbers by the statements they stand for (see vol. I, pp. 21f.) and the symbols by their definitions to be found in the list of symbols,(2) the formula may be understood as follows:

(1) = If the factor to be grasped is present, its cognition is

present. = "Wenn der zuerfassende Faktor vorhanden

ist, ist die Erkenntnis davon vorhanden." [arrow right]

= this implies (1.1) If the cognition is not present, the factor to be

grasped is not present. = "Wenn die Erkenntnis

nicht vorhanden ist, ist der zuerfassende Faktor

nicht vorhanden." [symbol omitted] = this is cause for (1.a) = If the cognition <is> not <perceived>, the factor to be

grasped <is> not <perceived>. = Wenn die Erkenntnis

nicht <wahrgenommen wird>, <wird> der zuerfassende

Faktor nicht <wahrgenommen>." [approximate] = this corresponds to a large extent with [8.2'] = If the grasping form is not perceived, the form to be

grasped is not perceived. = Wenn die erfassende

Gestalt nicht wahrgenommen wird, wird die zuerfassende

Gestalt nicht wahrgenommen." and

(2) = If the factor to be grasped is not present, its cognition

is not present. = Wenn der zuerfassende Faktor

nicht vorhanden ist, ist die Erkenntnis davon

nicht vorhanden." [symbol omitted] = this is cause for (2.a) = If the factor to be grasped <s> not <perceived>, the

cognition <is> not <perceived>. = "Wenn der zuerfassende

Faktor nicht <wahrgenommen wird>, <wird>

die Erkenntnis nicht <wahrgenommen>." [approximate] = this corresponds to a large extent with [8.1'] = If the form to be grasped is not perceived, the grasping

form is not perceived. = "Wenn die zuerfassende

Gestalt nicht wahrgenommen wird, wird die

erfassende Gestalt nicht wahrgenommen."

It is not clear here why (1.a) and (2.a) should be caused by (1.1) and (2), respectively, the more because statement no. (1), which implies (1.1), should be understood as "logical proposition" ("logische Aussage") but not as "ontological proposition," according to Iwata, whereas the causal relation indicated by "[symbol omitted]" can only be understood on an ontological level. Moreover, according to Iwata's previous explanations, (1.a) and (2.a) are his own reformulations of the statements (1.1) and (2) respectively, where he substitutes the words "wahrgenommen werden" ("being perceived") for "vorhanden sein" ("being present"). Thus the reader now either may relinquish his hope of understanding the formula or may assume that the symbol "[symbol omitted]" here is not used in the meaning of "(1.1) is caused by (1.1)," etc., but somehow refers to the substitution. In fact, such a definition of "[symbol omitted]" is found on the following page.(3) After having successfully solved this problem, one now would expect that the supposition verbalized in the first part of this sentence should be identical with that of the formula in brackets in the second part, as the latter is introduced by "d.h." ("das hei[beta]t"], which means "that is" or "that means." What should be deduced from the statements (1) and (2) is the sahopalambhaniyama. What in fact is deduced in the formula, namely (1.a) [approximate] [8.2'] and (2.a) [approximate] [8.1'], is only that the factor to be grasped is not perceived when the cognition is not perceived and that the cognition is not perceived when the factor to be grasped is not perceived, i.e., sahanupalambhaniyama. And this is, according to Iwata, a presupposition for the sahopalambhaniyama. Thus, Iwata's ideas could be understood more easily had he abstained from using this kind of formula.

In spite of these shortcomings, Iwata's work is a valuable contribution to the understanding of Dharmakirti's theory of knowledge and the Buddhist epistemological tradition and a must for everybody interested in this field.

(1) Translation: "Following our thinking it seems to me not completely impossible to deduce the sahopalambhaniyama from (1) and (2) (i.e., (1)[arrow right](1.1)[symbol omitted](1.a)[approximate][8.2'] and (2)[symbol omitted](1.a) [approximate [8.1']" (2) Vol. I, p. ix: "[arrow right] Implikation (A[arrow right]B: A impliziert B); [symbol omitted] Verhaltnis von Ursache und Wirkung (A[symbol omitted]B: A verursacht B); [approximate] weitgehende Entsprechung." (3) Vol. I, p. 24: "...(([alpha.sup.1])[approximate] ([alpha].a) [approximate] [8.2'] und (beta].sup.1]) [approximate] (2) [symbol omitted] [8.1'], [approximate]: Substitution das Wortes "wahrgenommen werden" fur das Wort "vorhanden sein")." = "(...,[symbol omitted]: substitution of the words "being perceived" for the words "being present")."