Economic, social and political globalization and terrorism.
Lutz, Brenda J. ; Lutz, James M.
Terrorism is a phenomenon that has spread to all parts of the world
in the last part of the twentieth and the beginning of the twenty-first
century. Sub-Saharan Africa has been no exception to this trend as the
region has suffered from both domestic and international terrorist
actions. While it is abundantly clear that there is no single cause of
terrorism, it is possible that increasing globalization and
modernization have been a factor that has contributed to outbreaks of
terrorist attacks. If such is the case, then higher levels of terrorism
would be associated with higher levels of globalization. The following
analysis will focus on various indices of globalization and their
relationship to incidents of terrorism in sub-Saharan Africa.
Globalization
Globalization is a complex process, one that has been defined in a
sometimes bewildering variety of ways. There is, however, some general
agreement that in the economic sphere it involves "the widening,
deepening, and speeding up of international connectedness" (McGrew
2011: 275). Globalization, however, goes beyond simple increases in
economic interactions to include cultural, military, political and
social aspects (McGrew 2011: 277).
There are a number of factors that can contribute to increased
levels of globalization. For example, recent increases have resulted
from a conjunction of technological, political, and economic
circumstances (Castells 2000: 104). Globalization, moreover, involves
the movement of goods, services, people, ideas, and cultures across
space (Held et al 1999: 16). Frequently, one of the consequences of the
movements of these ideas and materials is that socially dissimilar
groups will be brought into closer physical proximity to each other (Lia
2005: 23).
It seems to be quite likely that globalization has been linked to
political difficulties in a number of countries. Economic globalization
can generate stresses for local societies and economies. The level of
inequality present in societies will increase, moreover, as they adapt
to external actors, competition in the global economy, and other changes
in their situations. The spread of market capitalism that has been
associated with globalization in the 19th and 20th centuries has
undermined the structure of local economies (Clausen 2010; Mousseau
2002/2003; Nieman 2011). Traditional economic systems, although
frequently distinguished by high levels of inequality, also have
expectations of reciprocity that include obligations on the part of the
well-to-do and the less well-to-do. More modern economic practices can
undermine the reciprocity elements while not reducing the inequality,
thus increasing societal tensions. Under these circumstances, even
though globalization often generates economic growth and increased
wealth at a societal or national level, some groups will benefit and
other groups will suffer. Greater economic interactions with the outside
world can also lead to greater anxiety about the social and cultural
changes that come with economic adaptations (Margalit 2012: 485).
Groups that are disadvantaged by the changes that come with
globalization may naturally oppose the leaders, groups, or political
systems that are associated with these changes. This opposition may take
acceptable forms through existing political channels, but it can also
take more violent forms if the disadvantaged groups cannot gain
satisfaction by peaceful means. Ironically, the violent opposition can
in turn weaken governments and make it more difficult for them to manage
the changes that are occurring or to meet the resulting challenges
(Clausen 2010; Zimmermann 2011: 154). This type of situation can result
in a vicious circle of unrest and challenges that continue to reduce the
capacities of government, inducing political decay instead of political
development (Huntington 1965). The actions of foreign governments and
international organizations in conjunction with failures by local
political elites has led to state weakness in African countries/ This
sets the stage for terrorist outbreaks (Hailu 2010: 42-3). Globalization
will not always have negative effects. Some forms of interaction with
the world system have been linked with lower levels of transnational
terrorism (Li and Schaub 2006). If such is the case, globalization may
be a mixed blessing and curse. Countries that have become more
integrated into the global system may eventually be able to become more
stable, but countries undergoing the process of integration or facing
globalization shocks could be likely to suffer greater disruptions or
problems (Bussman and Schneider 2007). Perhaps more importantly for a
region like sub-Saharan Africa, the "destabilizing factors and
uncertainties in the global arena are increasing" (Bangura 2010:
129).
There has been significant evidence that globalization has led to
political violence in different eras and locations. Wilkinson (2003:
124) noted that modern terrorism has been a reaction to globalization.
There have also been indications that in even earlier times increasing
globalization was linked with violent outbreaks. In the ancient world,
the incorporation of Judea--first into Greek empires and then into the
Roman Empire--led to changes in the economic structure of the local
society and marginalization of some groups in the province (Defler 1989:
72-3; Pedahzur and Perliger 2011: 2; Sievers 1990: 37). One consequence
of this disruption was a series of Judean revolts against the Greeks and
the Romans. These revolts initially relied on terrorism and guerrilla
warfare and eventually on full scale warfare (Lutz and Lutz 2013b: 7).
The Boxer Rebellion in China was in many ways an ethnic and cultural
reaction to globalization and the resulting intrusion of foreign ideas
into traditional Chinese society. The attacks by the Boxers against
Chinese Christians and foreigners used classic terrorist techniques
designed to drive out the foreign influences (Chesneaux 1972: 10; Duiker
1978: xvii, 40, 206; Lutz and Lutz 2013b: 13-5). Eventually, the Boxers
escalated to open warfare against foreigners with the support of regular
military units.
In more recent times, left-wing extremists that were prevalent in
the latter part of the twentieth century were actively opposed to the
spread of global capitalism (Pillar 2001: 63). The increasing reach of
multinational corporations that came with globalization was seen as an
unmitigated evil that had to be opposed by violence. Violent groups with
right-wing ideologies have also been reacting to what they perceive to
be the negative effects of globalization. These groups frequently have
opposed the migration of people from culturally and religiously
dissimilar areas (Bjorgo 1995: 9; Wilkinson 2003: 119). The current
debates about immigration in Europe and the United States are another
manifestation of these types of concerns. The earlier Red Scare in the
United States after World War I was a similar reaction to the spread of
what many in the United States saw as radical ideologies of the left
such as socialism, communism, and anarchism that threatened the American
way of life (Coben 1964; Lutz and Lutz 2007: 79-83). Opposition to
foreign influences is not restricted to majority populations. Smaller
ethnic communities have also seen their cultures in danger of being
overwhelmed or absorbed by larger groups as a consequence of the
homogenizing trends that are often associated with globalization
(Dingley and Kirk-Smith 2002; Karunakar 2011).
Religious terrorism increased towards the end of the twentieth
century. On at least some occasions different religious groups have
reacted negatively to the challenges that come with globalization.
Globalization by its very nature has the potential to undermine
traditional religious values in societies. Western secularism has
threatened indigenous cultures and religions exposed to the broader
world (Cronin 2002/03). "[S]ecularizing powers of globalization
have not been entirely successful in assimilating inward-looking
parochial places that retaliate to protect their religiosity"
(Chatterjee 2012: 134). There are Jewish extremist groups in Israel that
have reacted to globalization not only by targeting Palestinian Arabs
but by also attacking Jewish citizens that they see as too secular
(Pedahzur and Perliger 2011: 33). Islamic groups have clearly responded
to threats that globalization represents to them (Ousman 2004: 69). The
global jihad has represented a continuing response to the threat that
exposure to the broader world has represented to Islamic communities.
Boko Haram ("Western Civilization is Forbidden") in Nigeria is
just one of the latest manifestations of this trend. The economic
dislocations that came with globalization have marginalized individuals,
many of them in northern Nigeria, including groups of Muslims who have
lost both economic and social status. Many of these individuals have
been attracted to Boko Haram (Eveslage 2013: 49). Boko Haram has
attacked the government, local Christians, and foreigners that it sees
as being responsible for or complicit in permitting foreign values to
undermine Islam (Forest 2011: 69; Sampson and Onuoha 2011: 44). More
recently, the groups have developed links with the broader global jihad
(Forest 2011: 69). Elsewhere, militant Hindus in India have attempted to
drive out foreign religious influences. Muslims have been the major
targets but Christianity is also considered a threat (Chatterjee 2012;
Greenaway 2001). Some right-wing groups in the United States that are
opposed to foreign influences and immigrants have clear religious
elements to their ideologies. The Aum Shinryko cult in Japan, which
launched the sarin gas attacks in the Tokyo subway system, reflected a
high level of concern about the cultural and religious changes that came
with globalization (Lutz and Lutz 2013a: 103-4; Watanabe 1998: 95).
Overall, increasing modernization and globalization have resulted
in a situation in which there are many cases where "politicized
religion can be seen as a response to modernity" (Sandler 1997:
134).
Clearly, globalization can engender religious, ethnic, economic,
and ideological opposition movements that will lead to violent
responses, including terrorism. Globalization may cause such violence,
contribute to it, or be largely irrelevant in some cases. Since there is
no one cause for terrorism, globalization and modernization will not
explain all outbreaks of violence, but there could well be some
connection. It has been noted that, "There is little doubt that
globalization positively impacted the expansion and threat of
transnational terrorism in Africa" (Davis 2010: 141). An analysis
of terrorist incidents in sub-Saharan Africa presents an opportunity to
determine whether relative levels of globalization has, in fact, led to
more terrorism in the countries in the region.
Data
In order to determine if there were possible links between levels
of globalization and the occurrences of terrorism, it was necessary to
use databases with information on both variables. The data on terrorism
was drawn from the Global Terrorism Database maintained by the
University of Maryland (Global Terrorism Database 2012). The database
contains information on the number of incidents, fatalities, and
injuries suffered in terrorist attacks from 1970 to 2010. With this
database it was possible to derive the number of attacks, injuries, and
fatalities on an annual basis for the years from 1970 to 2010.
Frequently the information on the number of injuries suffered in attacks
was listed as unknown; therefore, those data were not included in the
analyses to follow. The information on the number of incidents and
fatalities, on the other hand, was more precise. These data on incidents
and deaths were standardized to reflect the different population sizes
of the countries in question. Terrorism becomes more likely with
increases in population size (Abrams 2012; Meierrieks and Gries 2012;
Savun and Phillips, 2009). Simple probability, of course suggests that
terrorist incidents will be more frequent in larger countries. For the
years from 1970 to 1979, the number of incidents and fatalities was
divided by population (in the millions) in 1975. Population in 1985 was
the divisor for the data for the 1980s; population in 1995, the divisor
for the 1990s; and population in 2005, the divisor for the years in the
21st century (World Bank 2012). Further, since a lack of incidents or
fatalities would be more meaningful in Nigeria than in Djibouti or the
Seychelles, each zero entry for incidents or for zero fatalities was
coded 0.01 instead of 0.00 for purposes of standardization, giving
slight greater weight to the absence of any activity in more populous
countries--as was done in one earlier analysis that considered the
economic effects of terrorism in Latin America (Lutz & Lutz 2006).
Data on globalization from 1970 to 2010 was drawn from the KOF
Index of Globalisation developed by the Swiss Economic Institute. This
comprehensive database has an economic index of globalization, a social
index, and a political index for each year. There is also an overall
composite index based on these three individual indices. The values were
not available for each individual index for every year, but there were
measures for at least some of the indices for most years. The cumulative
index value represents a weighted average for the three indices. The
economic index is based upon financial flows and trade in addition to
restrictions on international interactions. The social index is based on
information flows, foreign citizens in residence, and measurements of
personal contacts with the outside world. The political index is based
on the number of embassies present in a country, membership in
international organizations, international treaties, and participation
in United Nations peacekeeping efforts. UN peacekeeping involvement has
been a more recent addition, and African countries have become involved
in such operations in the region. Since none of the indices was based on
a single measure, there was a built-in smoothing function that would
have leveled out any dramatic changes from any one economic, social, or
political measure. The overall index, of course, reflected an even
greater smoothing function since it was based on a weighted calculation
drawn from the three indices. The economic index was weighted 36%, the
social index 37%, and the political index 26% for the calculation of the
overall index (Dreher 2006; Dreher et al 2008; ETH Zurich 2013). Data
was available for all the sub-Saharan African countries that were
independent in 1970. The former Portuguese colonies were included after
they became independent in 1975 with the withdrawal of Portugal from its
empire. Data for Rhodesia/Zimbabwe only became available when that
country came under majoritarian rule. South Africa was included for all
years as data were available for both the period of minority rule and
the period of majority rule. The availability of three individual
indices and the overall index value meant that it was possible to
measure the effects of different types of effects from globalization as
well as more comprehensive influences.
In the analyses to follow, the basic measure of linkages between
globalization and terrorist activities was a series of correlations
between these indices and the standardized measure of terrorist
incidents and fatalities. Correlations were run for economic, social,
political, and total globalization. If globalization were indeed
contributing to outbreaks of terrorism as hypothesized, then there would
be positive associations between the indices and incidents and
fatalities that would represent more serious attacks. While there could
be an immediate link between globalization and terrorism, it was also
possible that the effects of globalization might take some time to
develop. As a consequence, the levels of economic, social, and political
globalization as well as the overall level in a given year were
correlated with incidents and fatalities in not only year t, but also in
years t+1, t+2, and t+3. The tests for lagged effects provided an
opportunity for a better understanding of possible connections between
ongoing globalization and terrorism.
Results
If globalization was in fact placing stress on societies in Africa,
then the number of incidents or fatalities would be higher in those
countries with greater levels of interaction with the outside world. It
is possible that there could be differences between the effects of
economic, social, and political interactions. Economic interactions have
been seen as particularly disruptive to traditional societies, and it is
possible that the analyses of sub-Saharan African countries could
provide support for this view that economic activities could have a
greater impact than social or political ones. It is also possible that
social interactions that bring in their train new (and potentially
threatening) ideas and viewpoints could lead to increased violent
opposition to outside influences from disgruntled segments of the
population. Greater political interactions could be seen as potentially
threatening to sovereignty or independence.
In the 1970s there were some very strong connections between
globalization and levels of terrorism (see Table 1). There were no
recorded terrorist incidents in 1972, but for the other nine years of
the decade economic globalization was linked to terrorist incidents in
six of the nine years. The index for social globalization was linked
with incidents and fatalities less frequently, especially when potential
lagged effects were taken into account. The index of political
globalization was not positively linked to incidents or fatalities in
any of the nine years. The associations, in fact, were contrary to the
expected direction, and in some cases at relatively high levels. These
results indicated that countries with greater political links to the
world were less likely (rather than more likely) to have experienced
terrorism. In general, the correlations for incidents and fatalities
were similar for all the indices of globalization. Neither measure of
terrorism was consistently more likely to be associated with higher
levels of globalization.
In the 1980s the high levels of economic globalization continued to
be associated with higher levels of terrorist incidents even more so
than in the 1970s. The index of economic globalization was positively
linked with incidents for every year either in the same year or one of
the following years, and usually in both situations (see Table 2). Since
the economic globalization levels for most countries were similar from
year to year, the high correlations in any given year would also have
reflected at least some earlier effects from the increased economic
interactions with the outside world. In any event, it was very clear
that higher levels of economic globalization in the decade were
positively associated with more widespread terrorist actions. Similar
patterns were present for the overall levels of globalization for the
number of incidents. While there were links between these two indices
and the number of incidents, there were virtually no significant
associations for the number of fatalities in this decade.
There were only a few significant associations between the index of
social globalization and incidents of terrorism in the same year or
following years. Links between social globalization and fatalities were
completely absent. While the associations that were derived were not
usually at significant levels, many of the associations between
terrorist attacks and fatalities for the social index were negative,
contrary to the expectation that more globalization led to more
casualties. The index for political globalization in the 1980s was
largely unrelated to the number of terrorist incidents that occurred in
the decade. The political index, like the other indices, showed no
consistent pattern of associations with fatalities. It would appear that
some elements of greater globalization in this decade, especially the
economic ones, generated more terrorist actions, but the resulting
actions did not necessarily result in higher casualty levels.
In the 1990s the connection between globalization and terrorism
shifted. In slightly less than half of the years, the connection between
economic globalization and terrorist incidents or fatalities was
negative at a relatively high level, indicating that in this period
countries with lower levels of global economic interactions were more
likely to suffer from an increased number of incidents and casualties
(see Table 3). The same connection was present in the overall index. The
social and political indices, however, had no consistent relationship
with terrorist incidents or fatalities in either direction. It is
interesting that the political index was not more negatively linked with
globalization, since it had been in the past. The associations were
usually negative, but at relatively low levels and easily within the
realm of random probability of occurrence. In this period it was
possible that the effects of globalization were changing. Another
possibility is that the earlier attacks by dissident groups had
negatively affected globalization levels.
In the first decade of the twenty-first century, the countries that
were less involved in the world were now the ones that were more likely
to experience more terrorist incidents and higher numbers of fatalities,
sometimes in the same years and sometimes in later years. The economic
index was generally negatively associated with both incidents and
fatalities. In a few cases these connections were at relatively high
levels of probability (see Table 4). With the economic index, lagged
effects were more noticeable than effects in the same year. The
countries at lower levels of social globalization and political
globalization were also more closely linked with higher levels of
terrorism. Interestingly enough, the lower scores on social
globalization were more likely to be linked with higher levels of
fatalities while the associations on the political index were more
likely to be linked with a higher number of incidents rather than
fatalities. These results raise the possibility that there can be
different effects from globalization resulting in somewhat different
responses by local societies to the problems that dissidents have
perceived to be present. Low levels of social globalization resulted in
more lethal attacks while political integration was linked to the number
of incidents. It is possible that greater political integration with the
outside world led to attacks directed at property or which were against
more symbolic targets. In the case of the social and the political
indices there was no indication that lagged effects were more likely to
be present more than associations in the same year. The overall index
for globalization paralleled the results for the economic index in terms
of the strength and direction of the associations.
Conclusions
Later here, we will discuss causal factors that more than likely
have resulted in the correlations, both positive and negative, that we
have seen. There was clear support in the first half of the period used
for analyses for the idea that globalization contributed to outbreaks of
terrorism by forces that opposed it. In the 1970s and 1980s the
sub-Saharan African states that had higher globalization scores in the
economic sphere and the overall index were the countries that suffered
the most from terrorism. In the 1990s and 2000s, the circumstances had
changed, as we will see, so that it was the states that had the lower
scores on some of the indices (economic and overall in the 1990s and the
social and political indices in the 2000s) that experienced the higher
levels of terrorism. In the 1970s and 1990s the correlation results for
incidents and fatalities were generally similar, indicating that the
globalization effects appeared to be leading groups towards violent
protest as well as actions that led to casualties. In the 1980s, there
was a disconnection with the earlier decade in that the number of
attacks was linked with globalization, but not the level of fatalities.
In the 2000s, as noted, there were distinctly different results for the
social and political indices, suggesting that were was at least a
possibility that globalization effects or the lack of globalization
effects was threatening but that they were impacting different parts of
societies in different ways. Different groups affected by social or
political events might have decided to choose different targets to
achieve their objectives than groups that were experiencing some
negative effects from the broader economic system. Some dissatisfied
elements may have focused on more deadly attacks while other elements
focused on economic targets and attempted to minimize fatalities.
The index for political globalization was different in the 1970s
and 1980s from the other indices. Economic and social effects of
globalization were linked with increases in terrorism, indicating that
social and economic effects were negative. It would appear that a
government's political involvement in the wider world, however, was
less threatening and less disruptive. Since the political index did
represent government- to- government contacts, it is possible that the
higher levels of contacts with external countries in the case of
sub-Saharan African countries may have provided resources that helped to
reduce the issues or disruptions that came with globalization and which
contributed to outbreaks of terrorism.
The change in relationships that occurred between the first 20
years of the analysis and the second 20 years could have resulted from a
number of factors. It is possible that there were changes in the ways in
which globalization was taking place in the sub-Saharan African nations,
but determining what types of variations were present is difficult, if
not impossible, to test for. Another possibility is that there was a
threshold level for globalization effects. The countries in the first
two decades had been affected to varying degrees, but as states
approached the threshold they were more affected and suffered more from
terrorist violence. Eventually, all or most of the countries in the
region reached or passed the threshold of globalization. At this point
societies or economies could be sufficiently disrupted so as to drive
individuals or groups that have been negatively affected to rely on
terrorism. Under these circumstances, it was the countries that were now
lagging behind in terms of globalization that began to face the most
difficulties after having passed the threshold.
Outside circumstances beyond the level of globalization could also
have played a role. Terrorism as a phenomenon was changing from the
1970s to the 1990s and into the twenty-first century. These trends could
have played a role in the patterns of associations and perhaps the
changing nature of groups involved in terrorist violence. Rapoport
(2003) has suggested that there have been waves of terrorist violence.
While not all groups or incidents fit into particular waves, he did
identify broad patterns. Three of his waves came after World War
II--first a nationalist wave, then a wave involving new left groups that
began in the late 1960s, and finally a religious wave that began in
earnest at the end of the twentieth century. The ethnic and nationalist
wave continued into the later years with groups like the Basque ETA, the
Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, and the nationalist PLO (as opposed to the
more religious Hamas). The new left wave corresponded to the first
decades of the present analysis. The critiques by the left of the
failures and problems of global capitalism argued that greater
integration into the world economic system created significant problems
for developing countries. Integration also exacerbated issues of
inequality among groups in all parts of the world according, to these
critics; whether the critique of the system was valid or not, those who
believed in the evil of capitalism were willing to resort to violence to
combat it. The results from the 1970s and 1980s would have been part of
this terrorist wave, which may help to explain why economic
globalization was so closely linked to outbreaks of terrorism. The 1990s
and 2000s, however, would have been part of the religious wave
represented by al Qaeda and the global jihad, the Sikh uprising in the
Punjab, Aum Shinrikyo in Japan, and Hamas displacing the PLO in the
Palestinian struggle against Israel. In Africa Al Qaeda in the Islamic
Maghreb is clearly part of this trend in areas of West Africa. The
appearance of Boko Haram in Nigeria would also be part of this wave,
whereas the earlier appearance of ethnic group violence in the Niger
Delta region, which protested the activities of multinational oil
companies that created environmental damage and economic losses would
have been part of earlier waves (Lutz and Lutz 2013a: 212-6). This
earlier violence had elements of ethnicity and leftist elements but
lacked religious elements. Given the different motivations of the groups
using terrorism as a technique in different decades, it may not be so
surprising that relationships to globalization changed. In the more
ideological and nationalist waves, greater globalization scores were
linked to terrorism while in the later periods it would have been groups
that were less affected initially that were facing disruption, including
greater challenges to religious beliefs and more religious mobilization,
that resorted to violence in greater proportions for religious or
cultural reasons. These changes could help to explain the new results
for social globalization and the changes with the economic index.
In the final analysis the results from the present study were
ambiguous, suggesting that both terrorism and globalization are complex
and the relationship between them doubly so. For the first two decades
the results supported the basic hypothesis that greater globalization
and modernization have led to increases in terrorism. In the second
twenty years, the circumstances changed and the relationships obviously
differed. There is a very good possibility that the changes reflected
shifts in patterns of globalization, shifts in the major sources of
terrorism from ethnicity and ideology to religion, and/or the responses
to changing levels of globalization. There are obviously temporal
differences and there could be regional differences as well. Ultimately,
additional research is necessary to determine what the possible links
between globalization and terrorism are.
References
Abrahms, M. 2012 "The Political Effectiveness of Terrorism
Revisited," Comparative Political Studies, 45, 3: 366-93.
Bangura, A. K. 2010 "Terrorism and Islam in Africa," in
J. Davis, ed., Terrorism in Africa: The Evolving Front in the War on
Terror. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 103-32.
Bjorgo, T. 1995 "Introduction," in T. Bjorgo, ed., Terror
from the Extreme Right. London: Frank Cass, 1-15.
Bussman, M., and Schneider, G. 2007 "When Globalization
Discontent Turns Violent: Foreign Economic Liberalization and Internal
War," International Studies Quarterly, 51, 1: 79-97.
Castells, M. 2000 The Rise of the Network Society. Oxford: Basil
Blackwell.
Chatterjee, I. 2012 "How Are They Othered? Globalisation,
Identity and Violence in an Indian city," The Geographical Journal,
178, 2: 134-46.
Chesneaux, J. 1972 "Secret Societies in China's
Historical Evolution," in J. Chesneaux, ed., Popular Movements and
Secret Societies in China, 1840-1950. Stanford, CA: Stanford University
Press, 1-21.
Clausen, A. 2010 "Economic Globalization and Regional
Disparities in the Philippines," Singapore Journal of Tropical
Geography, 31, 3: 299-316.
Coben, S. 1964 "A Study in Nativism: The American Red Scare of
1919-1920," Political Science Quarterly, 79, 1: 52-75.
Cronin, A. K. 2002/3 "Behind the Curve: Globalization and
International Terrorism," International Security, 27, 3: 30-58.
Davis, J. 2010 "Understanding terrorism in Africa," in J.
Davis, ed., Terrorism in Africa: The Evolving Front in the War on
Terror. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 133-58.
Derfler, S. L. 1989 The Hasmonean Revolt: Rebellion or Revolution,
Ancient Near Eastern Texts and Studies, Vol. 5. Lewiston, NY: Edwin
Mellen Press.
Dingley, J. and Kirk-Smith, M. 2002 "Symbolism and Sacrifice
in Terrorism," Small Wars and Insurgencies, 13, 1: 102-28.
Dreher, A. 2006 "Does Globalization Affect Growth? Evidence
from a New Index of Globalization," Applied Economics, 38, 10:
1091-1110.
Dreher, A., Gaston, N., and Martens, P. 2008 Measuring
Globalisation-Gauging its Consequences. New York: Springer.
Duiker, W. J. 1978 Cultures in Collision: the Boxer Rebellion. San
Rafael, CA: Presidio Press.
ETH Zurich 2012 KOF Index of Globalization (database) (Zurich:
Eidgenossische Technische Hochschule [Swiss Federal Institute of
Technology]), http//globalization.kof.ethz.ch/
Eveslage, B. S. 2013 "Clarifying Boko Haram's
Transnational Intentions, Using Content Analysis of Public Statements in
2012," Perspectives on Terrorism, 7, 5: 47-67.
Forest, J. J. F. 2011 "Al-Qaeda's Influence in
Sub-Saharan Africa: Myths, Realities and Possibilities,"
Perspectives on Terrorism, 5, 3/4: 63-80.
Global Terrorism Database. 2012 National Consortium for the Study
of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, University of Maryland,
http//www.start.umd.edu/gtd accessed October/November 2012.
Hailu, A. 2010 "The State in Historical and Comparative
Perspective: State Weakness and the Specter of Terrorism in
Africa," in J. Davis, ed., Terrorism in Africa: the Evolving Front
in the War on Terror. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 25-56.
Held, D., McGrew, A., Goldblatt, D., and Perraton, J. 1999 Global
Transformations: Politics, Economics, Culture. Cambridge: Policy Press.
Huntington, S. 1965 "Political Development and Political
Decay," World Politics, 17, 3: 386-430.
Karunakar, P. 2011 "Threat of Globalization to Indigenous
Peoples' Culture and Identities in India," Fourth World
Journal, 10, 2: 153-66.
Li, Q., and Schaub, D. 2006 "Economic Globalization and
Transnational Terrorism: A Pooled Time-Series Analysis," Journal of
Conflict Resolution, 48, 2: 230-58.
Lia, B. 2005 Globalisation and the Future of Terrorism. London:
Routledge.
Lutz, B. J., and Lutz, J. M. 2007 Terrorism in America. New York:
Palgrave.
Lutz, J. M.. and Lutz, B. J. 2006 "The Effect of Terrorism on
Foreign Investment and Tourism: The Example of Latin America,"
Journal of Social, Political, and Economic Studies, 31, 3: 321-38.
Lutz, J. M., and. Lutz, B. J. 2013 a Global Terrorism, 3rd ed.
London: Routledge.
Lutz, J. M., and Lutz, B. J. 2013b "The Role of Foreign
Influences in Early Terrorism: Examples and Implications for
Understanding Modern Terrorism," Perspectives on Terrorism, 7, 2:
5-22.
McGrew, A. 2011 "The Logics of Economic Globalization,"
in J. Ravenhill, ed., Global Political Economy, 3rd ed. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 275-311.
Margalit, Y. 2012 "Lost in Globalization: International
Economic Integration and the Sources of Popular Discontent,"
International Studies Quarterly, 56, 3: 484-500.
Meierrieks, D., and Gries, T. 2013 "Causality between
Terrorism and Economic Growth," Journal of Peace Research, 50, 1:
91-104.
Mousseau, M. 2002/3 "Market Civilization and Its Clash with
Terror," International Security, 27, 3: 5-29.
Nieman, M. D. 2011 "Shocks and Turbulence: Globalization and
the Occurrence of Civil War," International Interactions, 37, 3:
263-92.
Ousman, A. 2004 "The Potential of Islamist Terrorism in
Sub-Saharan Africa," International Journal of Politics, Culture and
Society, 18, 1: 65-105.
Pedahzur, A., and Perliger, A. 2011 Jewish Terrorism in Israel. New
York: Columbia University Press.
Pillar, P. R. 2001 Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy. Washington,
DC: Brookings Institution.
Rapoport, D. C. 2003 "The Four Waves of Rebel Terror and
September 11th," in C. W.
Kegley, Jr. ed. The New Global Terrorism: Characteristics, Causes,
Controls. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 36-52.
Sampson, I. T., and Onuoha, F. 2011 "'Forcing the Horse
to Drink or Making It Realise Its Thirst?' Understanding the
Enactment of Anti-Terrorism Legislation (ATL) in Nigeria,"
Perspectives on Terrorism, 5, 3/4: 33-49.
Savun, B., and Phillips, B. J. 2009 "Democracy, Foreign
Policy, and Terrorism," Journal of Conflict Resolution, 53, 6:
878-904.
Sievers, J. 1990 The Hasmoneans and their Supporters: From
Mattathias to the death of John Hycarnus I. Atlanta: Scholars Press.
Watanabe, M. 1998 "Religion and Violence in Japan Today: A
Chronological and Doctrinal Analysis of Aum Shinrikyo," Terrorism
and Political Violence, 10, 4: 80-100.
Wilkinson, P. 2003 "Why Modern Terrorism? Differentiating
Types and Distinguishing Ideological Motivations," in Charles W.
Kegley, Jr, ed, The New Global Terrorism: Characteristics, Causes,
Controls. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 106-38.
World Bank 2012 "Population, Total," World Development
Indicators. New York: World Bank,
www.worldbank.org/data?qterm=population&language=EN&_databaseex
act=WDI accessed December 2012.
Zimmermann, E. 2011 "Globalization and Terrorism,"
European Journal of Political Economy, 27, Supplement: 152-61.
Brenda J. Lutz *
Indiana University
James M. Lutz
Indiana University-Purdue University at Fort Wayne
* Address for communication: Lutz James and Brenda
<lutz@ipfw.edu>
Table 1 Correlations: Globalisation and
Terrorism in the 1970s
Year Incidents
Variable t t + 1 t + 2 t + 3
1970
Economic .186 .313 * [a] .286 +
Social .375 * .291 * [a] .259 +
Political -.381 -.237 [a] -.208
All .160 .282 + [a] .260 +
1971
Economic .305 * [a] .282 + .322 *
Social .291 * [a] .259 + .201
Political -.265 [a] -.239 -.338
All .253 + [a] .234 + .210
1972
Economic [a] .274 + .299 * .136
Social [a] .253 + .148 .088
Political [a] -.156 -.294 .100
All [a] .262 + .194 .189
1973
Economic .273 + .306 * .135 .068
Social .282 * .170 .113 .117
Political -.206 -.261 .009 -.065
All .230 + .190 .163 .078
1974
Economic .298 * .149 .071 .383 *
Social .174 .113 .121 .003
Political -.248 .000 -.060 -.032
All .167 .068 .068 .225 +
1975
Economic .114 .035 .361 * .431 **
Social .006 .050 -.008 .050
Political -.005 -.100 -.012 -.113
All .157 .052 .220 + .257 +
1976
Economic .035 .371 * .389 * .200
Social .077 .006 .075 .241 +
Political -.118 -.036 -.109 -.048
All .045 .225 + .245 + .235 +
1977
Economic .356 * .386 * .199 .300 *
Social .001 .075 .233 + .072
Political -.027 -.086 -.018 .046
All .221 + .259 * .252 + .276 *
1978
Economic .377 * .191 .297 * .060
Social .074 .235 + .071 .049
Political -.097 -.035 .067 -.089
All .237 + .228 + .280 * .032
1979
Economic .197 .298 * .076 .339 *
Social .239 + .072 .051 .232 +
Political -.026 .044 -.104 -.209
All .241 + .271 * .037 .231
Year Fatalities
Variable t t + 1 t + 2 t + 3
1970
Economic .545 *** .322 * [a] .285 +
Social .537 *** .320 * [a] .205
Political -.550 -.268 [a] -.145
All .223 + .293 * [a] .259 +
1971
Economic .311 * [a] .275 + .631 ***
Social .320 * [a] .205 .554 ***
Political -.293 [a] -.169 -.551
All .262 + [a] .229 + .289 +
1972
Economic [a] .271 + .323 * -.016
Social [a] .200 .198 -.013
Political [a] -.076 -.284 .215
All [a] .267 + .239 .062
1973
Economic .270 + .329 * -.016 .555 ***
Social .223 + .221 + -.004 .552 ***
Political -.120 -.256 .160 -.467
All .243 + .233 + .054 .326 +
1974
Economic .320 * .007 .528 ** .287 +
Social .224 + -.005 .555 *** -.005
Political -.242 .147 -.405 -.047
All .210 .075 .276 * .153
1975
Economic -.012 .296 * .262 + .123
Social -.009 .317 * -.006 .009
Political .151 -.396 -.033 -.109
All .007 .221 + .148 .113
1976
Economic .281 * .281 * .118 .019
Social .370 ** .003 .129 .160
Political -.417 -.052 -.121 -.063
All .210 + .158 .108 .070
1977
Economic .262 + .110 .028 .228 +
Social .131 .136 .156 .063
Political -.231 -.105 -.007 .117
All -.011 .116 .106 .256 +
1978
Economic .112 .035 .228 + -.100
Social .136 .156 .062 -.145
Political -.111 -.018 .079 .011
All .115 .098 .234 + -.117
1979
Economic .027 .212 -.087 .127
Social .160 .062 -.144 -.025
Political .050 .062 .020 -.009
All .132 .216 -.105 .065
+ [alpha] = .10 * [alpha] = .05 ** [alpha] = .01
*** [alpha] = .001 Number of observations vary somewhat
for the variables; thus, levels of significance are
different. Entries in italics would be significant if
a negative relationship between globalisation and
terrorism had been predicted.
Table 2 Correlations: Globalisation and
Terrorism in the 1980s
Year Incidents
Variable t t + 1 t + 2 t + 3
1980
Economic .128 .054 .348 * .132
Social .124 .046 .228 + .092
Political -.039 -.109 -.209 -.135
All .136 .020 .234 + .066
1981
Economic .058 .375 * .146 .450 **
Social .049 .230 + .092 .093
Political -.123 -.219 -.145 -.163
All .017 .244 + .069 .248 +
1982
Economic .358 * .185 .411 * .362 *
Social .230 + .093 .096 .089
Political -.218 -.152 -.165 -.061
All .235 + .091 .225 + .238 +
1983
Economic .167 .391 * .344 * .351 *
Social .095 .104 .089 .149
Political -.163 -.183 -.066 -.105
All .076 .212 + .228 + .243 +
1984
Economic .356 * .342 * .335 * .368 *
Social .117 .096 .158 .211
Political -.207 -.074 -.121 -.144
All .191 .230 + .234 + .232 +
1985
Economic .334 * .358 * .360 * .381 *
Social .100 .163 .218 .217
Political -.073 -.132 -.157 -.149
All .239 + .259 + .236 + .245 +
1986
Economic .372 * .362 * .383 * .452 **
Social .158 .223 + .220 + .181
Political -.143 -.168 -.158 -.141
All .265 * .241 + .251 + .331 *
1987
Economic .356 * .386 * .199 .300 *
Social .001 .075 .233 + .072
Political -.027 -.086 -.018 .046
All .221 + .259 * .252 + .276 *
1988
Economic .347 * .359 * .460 ** .275 *
Social .226 + .226 + .197 -.124
Political -.154 -.146 -.135 -.091
All .238 + .243 + .343 * .067
1989
Economic .448 ** .317 * .163 .183
Social .186 -.129 -.017 .067
Political -.074 -.061 -.076 .084
All .321 * .090 .076 .126
Year Fatalities
Variable t t + 1 t + 2 t + 3
1980
Economic .062 -.103 .146 .160
Social .116 -.151 -.025 -.189
Political -.038 .001 -.008 -.046
All .088 .125 .007 -.016
1981
Economic -.106 .131 .165 .075
Social -.148 -.030 -.187 -.209
Political -.008 -.003 -.061 -.020
All -.132 .066 -.023 -.068
1982
Economic .134 .169 .064 .173
Social -.039 -.186 -.209 -.004
Political .001 -.070 -.030 -.028
All .065 -.024 -.079 .095
1983
Economic .165 .071 .170 .062
Social -.188 -.211 -.004 -.096
Political -.075 -.029 -.027 -.087
All -.028 -.074 .095 -.050
1984
Economic .036 .143 .043 -.007
Social -.203 .002 -.085 .079
Political -.041 -.044 -.119 -.144
All -.101 .074 -.073 -.041
1985
Economic .137 .028 -.015 .164
Social .003 -.080 .008 -.157
Political -.038 -.121 -.154 -.104
All .080 -.070 -.041 -.014
1986
Economic .040 -.013 .195 -.040
Social -.073 .099 -.156 -.145
Political -.132 -.166 -.114 -.024
All -.066 -.039 .001 -.104
1987
Economic .262 + .110 .028 .228 +
Social .131 .136 .156 .063
Political -.231 -.105 -.007 .117
All -.011 .116 .106 .256 +
1988
Economic .056 .206 .015 .137
Social .113 -.145 -.128 .048
Political -.143 -.106 -.004 -.063
All .016 .012 -.051 .090
1989
Economic .036 .146 .152 .058
Social -.145 .028 .024 .149
Political -.028 -.037 -.068 -.017
All -.060 .096 .062 .047
+ [alpha] = .10 * [alpha] = .05 ** [alpha] = .01
*** [alpha] = .001 Number of observations vary
somewhat for the variables; thus, levels of
significance are different. Entries in italics
would be significant if a negative relationship
between globalisation and terrorism had been
predicted.
Table 3 Correlations: Globalisation and
Terrorism in the 1990s
Year Incidents
Variable t t + 1 t + 2 t + 3
1990
Economic .310 ** .183 .143 .231 +
Social -.141 .031 .001 .092
Political -.049 -.140 .104 -.135
All .073 .122 .057 .066
1991
Economic .150 .148 .235 + -.154
Social .029 .001 .006 -.048
Political -.214 -.047 -.028 -.129
All .052 .041 .010 -.074
1992
Economic .138 .187 -.184 -.274
Social .005 .011 -.044 -.062
Political -.003 -.023 -.128 -.145
All -.007 .083 -.204 -.266
1993
Economic .211 + -.212 -.291 -.223
Social .029 -.029 -.060 -.132
Political -.040 -.154 -.181 -.091
All .087 -.172 -.255 -.217
1994
Economic -.113 -.316 -.283 -.366
Social -.021 -.042 -.110 -.085
Political -.151 -.178 -.150 -.165
All -.118 -.248 -.250 -.315
1995
Economic -.336 -.283 -.375 -.187
Social -.037 -.081 -.089 -.168
Political -.169 -.127 -.116 -.196
All -.259 -.235 -.298 -.261
1996
Economic -.237 -.340 -.166 -.173
Social -.108 -.107 -.178 -.242
Political -.115 -.160 -.193 .018
All -.202 -.301 -.233 -.006
1997
Economic -.333 -.187 .170 .085
Social -.112 -.178 -.239 .155
Political -.154 -.186 .041 .081
All -.304 -.245 .006 .168
1998
Economic -.102 .211 + .118 .044
Social -.172 -.243 .174 -.027
Political -.236 -.040 .032 -.069
All -.238 -.024 .166 -.026
1999
Economic .213 + .091 .038 -.210
Social -.240 .169 -.014 -.179
Political -.075 -.001 -.109 -.179
All -.027 .135 -.035 -.273
Year Fatalities
Variable t t + 1 t + 2 t + 3
1990
Economic .115 .148 .059 .042
Social .032 .057 .120 -.144
Political -.044 -.097 .006 .096
All .090 .088 .031 -.019
1991
Economic .148 .066 .037 -.352
Social .059 .124 -.148 -.144
Political -.154 -.024 .069 -.089
All -.021 -.017 -.065 -.146
1992
Economic .086 .016 -.362 -.359
Social .128 -.142 -.136 -.150
Political -.021 .072 -.079 -.105
All .027 -.042 -.324 -.336
1993
Economic .051 -.392 -.363 -.251
Social -.128 -.123 -.142 -.105
Political .019 -.112 -.132 -.110
All -.037 -.291 -.292 -.217
1994
Economic -.325 -.392 -.314 -.346
Social -.104 -.123 -.091 -.082
Political -.149 -.164 -.140 -.106
All -.279 -.327 -.266 -.257
1995
Economic -.409 -.298 -.391 -.282
Social -.119 -.086 -.089 -.215
Political -.161 -.132 -.116 -.119
All -.344 -.261 -.298 -.301
1996
Economic -.266 -.349 -.274 .255 +
Social -.107 -.111 -.229 -.215
Political -.131 -.107 -.114 -.018
All -.236 -.263 -.281 .028
1997
Economic -.344 -.295 .265 + -.203
Social -.115 -.226 -.209 -.141
Political -.104 -.112 -.015 .047
All -.267 -.296 .040 -.125
1998
Economic -.257 .250 + -.093 .131
Social -.226 -.215 -.121 -.189
Political -.158 -.080 -.026 -.125
All -.295 -.007 -.120 -.075
1999
Economic .273 * -.149 .150 -.074
Social -.199 -.118 -.173 -.198
Political -.119 -.061 -.149 -.144
All -.003 -.135 -.069 -.189
+ [alpha] = .10 * [alpha] = .05 ** [alpha] = .01
*** [alpha] = .001 Number of observations vary
somewhat for the variables; thus, levels of
significance are different. Entries in italics
would be significant if a negative relationship
between globalisation and terrorism had been
predicted.
Table 4 Correlations: Globalisation and
Terrorism in the 2000s
Year Incidents
Variable t t + 1 t + 2 t + 3
2000
Economic .086 .031 -.191 -.216
Social .188 .003 -.173 -.127
Political -.019 -.138 -.218 -.196
All .147 -.043 -.275 -.259
2001
Economic .006 -.173 -.196 .023
Social -.023 -.193 -.154 .108
Political -.136 -.218 -.200 -.148
All -.038 -.281 -.268 -.044
2002
Economic -.189 -.234 .235 + -.137
Social -.208 -.165 -.016 -.086
Political -.215 -.194 .083 -.161
All -.299 -.292 -.141 -.159
2003
Economic -.192 .045 -.106 .045
Social -.189 .074 -.100 .004
Political -.209 -.160 -.002 -.269
All -.284 -.069 -.064 -.069
2004
Economic .105 -.134 -.006 -.261
Social .074 -.113 .002 -.317
Political -.021 -.040 -.272 -.160
All .051 -.094 -.076 -.124
2005
Economic -.128 -.041 -.265 -.187
Social -.124 -.015 -.313 -.168
Political -.225 -.357 -.168 -.196
All -.194 -.149 -.298 -.261
2006
Economic .011 -.224 .068 -.095
Social -.022 -.305 .150 -.268
Political -.385 -.179 -.245 .223
All -.136 -.090 .019 -.216
2007
Economic -.261 .004 -.134 -.325
Social -.285 .128 -.244 -.270
Political -.033 -.043 -.035 -.032
All -.094 -.017 -.211 -.247
2008
Economic .006 -.111 -.350
Social .135 -.220 -.272
Political -.327 -.278 -.253
All -.016 -.139 -.246
2009
Economic -.108 -.365
Social -.221 -.278
Political -.271 -.251
All -.117 -.246
2010
Economic -.387
Social -.288
Political -.260
All -.250
Year Fatalities
Variable t t + 1 t + 2 t + 3
2000
Economic -.140 .143 -.063 -.142
Social -.105 -.173 -.194 -.174
Political -.054 -.143 -.185 -.179
All -.100 -.067 -.044 -.218
2001
Economic .150 -.039 -.112 -.013
Social -.184 -.214 -.194 -.097
Political -.142 -.187 -.182 -.025
All -.072 -.197 -.219 -.051
2002
Economic -.084 -.158 -.054 -.143
Social -.209 -.185 -.075 .009
Political -.171 -.165 -.008 -.135
All -.208 -.227 -.051 -.121
2003
Economic -.096 .016 -.103 -.084
Social -.192 -.071 -.019 -.193
Political -.187 -.031 -.131 -.072
All -.208 -.028 -.115 -.136
2004
Economic .074 -.075 -.100 -.143
Social -.082 -.031 -.199 -.241
Political .085 -.064 -.007 -.121
All .052 -.042 -.106 -.111
2005
Economic -.077 -.105 -.166 -.210
Social -.058 -.205 -.245 -.220
Political -.080 -.124 -.129 -.163
All -.065 -.173 -.124 -.050
2006
Economic -.107 -.175 -.190 -.231
Social -.206 -.244 -.223 -.257
Political -.111 -.135 -.174 -.207
All -.163 -.121 -.042 -.247
2007
Economic -.210 -.209 -.308 -.196
Social -.243 -.218 -.260 -.250
Political -.042 -.033 -.035 -.030
All -.141 -.042 -.265 -.321
2008
Economic -.217 -.296 -.069
Social -.221 -.243 -.212
Political -.258 -.264 -.304
All .058 -.245 -.291
2009
Economic -.283 -.190
Social -.245 -.230
Political -.263 -.310
All -.231 -.320
2010
Economic -.176
Social -.228
Political -.317
All -.318
+ [alpha] = .10 * [alpha] = .05 ** [alpha] = .01
*** [alpha] = .001 Number of observations vary
somewhat for the variables; thus, levels of
significance are different. Entries in italics
would be significant if a negative relationship
between globalisation and terrorism had been
predicted.
