Nepal: five years following the Social Summit.

Mishra, Chaitanya

Introduction

This paper, principally, attempts to describe and assess the efforts of His Majesty's Government of Nepal in programming and implementation of the commitments made at the Social Summit in Copenhagen in March 1995. The governmental efforts are described and assessed in relation to policies, strategies and other measures undertaken. In addition, this paper also seeks to describe and assess the obstacles encountered during the process of formulation and implementation of policies and strategies of social development. The analysis focuses on the commitments around the three main themes .i.e. poverty eradication, employment promotion and enhancement of social integration, rather than in relation to the 10 specific and discrete commitments concretized during the Social Summit. In addition, the paper also describes and assesses a few key issues intrinsically tied to social development, e.g. mobilization and utilization of resources for social development, capacity to implement social policies and programmes, and domestic and international factors impeding social development. "Civil society" positions and processes in relation to the implementation of the commitments are also selectively described and assessed within specific sections. Finally, the paper also briefly discusses future initiatives required in order to fulfil the commitments made during the Social Summit.

It should be noted that, because limiting the presentation strictly to the 1995-2000 interval can be rather artificial as well as counter-productive, the paper occasionally interjects somewhat longer-run historical trends. As a corollary, and because processes are almost as important as their culmination, policies, strategies and other instruments which have taken hold during recent years, many of which are not directly attributable to the social summit per se, are described and assessed as well. Finally, because all these issues have to be addressed within the limits of an article, all of the sections are necessarily brief.

A Glimpse of Nepal

Like many other "least developed" countries, Nepal has been transiting into the ranks of peripheral capitalism. This process, which took hold approximately two centuries ago, was structured and mediated principally through the longstanding regime of open movement of commodities and labour between Nepal and British India (and after 1947, independent India) (Blaikie, Cameron and Seddon 1980, Mishra 1987a). This transition has become particularly rapid within the last two decades in keeping with the mandates of global neo-liberalism, which has been accepted as the cardinal policy of governance by successive Nepali governments since the mid-1980s (cf. Mishra 1987b). In keeping with the essence of peripheral capitalism, the transition has both been slow--in comparison to those in core capitalist regions and countries--and internally highly segmented and unarticulated. Most of the inhabitants of the rural regions, home to the overwhelming proportion of the population, continue to draw their livelihood from "subsistence" production (which is by no means un-capitalistic or outside of the domain of capitalism, and which has gradually been transforming itself as an extremely convenient and integral adjunct to market production; cf. Wallerstein 1991: 164-5), even as they draw increasingly larger share of the total household income from participation in commodity and labour markets. Simultaneously, the transition is also characterised by increasing moves away from feudalism-tinged, locally bounded and largely local-organisations-ordered agrarian political economy to a more service sector-oriented and encompassing market and state organised structure. Again, in keeping with the nature of peripheral capitalism, the space for "formal" wage-labour, in the Hills region, remains highly limited. The slowness of transition and the low level of structural diversification of economy in relation,to employment (although not in terms of aggregate value; this disjunction itself being a crucial feature of the internally unarticulated nature of peripheral capitalism) has meant that even as "subsistence" agriculture remains the principal source of livelihood for an overwhelming proportion of households, the proportion of the underemployed is very high at 47 percent. In consequence, circulation of labour, both seasonal and more permanent, from the Hills region to the Hams areas along the South (and towns and cities) within Nepal and to India has been a pronounced routine since the 1950s. More recently, labour has also begun circulating to the expanding economies of East and West Asia and beyond, leading to the expansion of the remittance economy (Seddon with Gurung and Adhikari 1998: 3-10). The openness of the Indo-Nepal border, on the other hand, together with the clearance of forests for agriculture and the intensification of agriculture along the Plains region, has also led to a large-scale opening for labour and the growth of a "counter-remittance" economy from Nepal (Mishra, Uprety and Panday 2000).

Average household farm holding is not only very small; it is also becoming smaller. Approximately 70 percent of all farms are less than 1 ha. in size (1991 data). Inequality in household land holding also remains pronounced. Agricultural productivity, which had been one of the highest till the early 1960s, i.e. before the introduction of the green-revolution modes of economic and social organisation and technology the world over, is very low. Rural-urban inequality, which is large and growing, remains another salient feature. While the service sector is growing, manufacturing is very small in scale and has remained stagnant for a long period. It is also largely limited to the primary processing of food items, carpets and garments. (The latter two primarily cater to the export market.) On the other hand, slowly increasing access to irrigation water and transportation, diversification of the cropping pattern--principally dairy farming, cultivation of vegetables, fruits, sugarcane and other cash crops, and wage labour in the urban areas are providing employment and income benefits to a relatively small body of farmers and wage workers.

One of the principal outcomes of such features has been large-scale income-poverty (real GDP per capita/year purchasing power parity dollar = 1,090; UNDP 1999). Even according to governmental statistics, 42 percent of the population, the size of which is nearly l0 million, is absolutely poor, i.e. unable to fulfil daily basic needs. Other agencies put the proportion of the poor at much higher levels. According to a World Bank estimate of several years ago, which posits an income cut-off point of US$1/capita/day to demarcate the poor from the non-poor, the proportion of the poor in Nepal is approximately 53% of the total population. Consumption expenditures show that the poor households spend two-thirds of their total income on basic food items, and can spend only a tiny amount to fulfil other needs, e.g. those related to clothing, education, health, shelter, utilities, etc.

The level of human development, as measured by the human development index (HDI), is both very low and uneven. In 1999, the HDI, which is a composite index of capabilities in relation to health, education and income, was 0.46 (on a scale in which the maximum value is 1.0). In terms of global ranking, Nepal's position was 144th among the 174 countries ranked (UNDP 1999). HDIs for many districts and regions as well as for women, the poor and the "low caste" groups remain much below the national average as well (NESAC 1998).

The 1990 constitution of Nepal, which was promulgated following a mass movement for the restoration of democracy, is of a liberal nature, with certain social-democratic features incorporated in the section on the directive principles of the state. The directive principles, as elsewhere, however, are non-justiciable. While the constitution and the parliamentary system of governance it has provisioned have, within last 10 years, legalised and legitimated political parties and associations, the political utility of parties and associations in relation to the empowerment of peasants, the attached workers, the "informal" wage workers, the poor and the marginalised has lately begun to be seriously questioned. In addition, for the large majority, the "developmental" outputs of the constitution and the parliamentary system have been puny, if not downright negative. While potential contradictions between the liberal constitution on the one hand and the neo-liberal economic policies and programmes on the other--and the consequences of such contradictions on the social development of specific categories of peoples--are yet to be debated, it is clear enough from the experience of last decade that neither has been helpful to the poor, the unemployed and the excluded.

One specific consequence of such potential contradiction in general and the expansion of the ranks of the poor in particular has been the rise of a Maoist political party which has been waging a "people's war" for last four years. For the limited, period that the party has come into being, it has been quite successful in gaining political and military workers as well as sympathisers, as also in broadening its geographical area of operation, generating financial and military resources, challenging the security-related, electoral, developmental and other governmental policies and mechanisms to a highly significant degree. It has also apparently been successful in regrouping together after periods of ideological-politicaL and other conflicts within the party hierarchy.

Eradication of Poverty

As noted, the magnitude of poverty is large. In addition, reliable sets of information clearly show that both the proportion and the number of the poor have been increasing during last 25 years. A marginal downturn during the 1990-95 period has been attributable to a change of a specific criterion--daily calorie intake--used to measure poverty. A 1996 national survey (HMG 1997), which indicated such a "downturn", has not been replicated since. But there is widespread agreement that the scale of poverty, if at all, might have increased during the 1995-2000 period.

Income poverty has many faces: the landless; the marginal holder; the unemployed and the underemployed; the itinerant/"informal" wage worker; the unschooled and the unskilled; the peasant whose farm was washed away by the last flood, who suffered expensive medical treatment of a member of the family or the death of the breadwinner during the last season, who has to pay an exorbitant rate of interest on a loan; the family who is waiting for remittance from a member who has migrated elsewhere; the family with a number of small children; the woman who faces various legal inequalities, including those related to inheritance of assets, etc. Then, there are the annual "hungry seasons" when the poor have already consumed what little they produced during the last season, and they have little opportunity for wage work. Then, there are the "low-caste" Dalits many of who do possess skills such as tailoring, metalwork, leatherwork, etc., but for which there is no market due to invasion of urban, "industry-made" goods. More recently, there are the peasants who cannot farm their land or engage in other income-earning opportunities because they are caught in the "crossfire" between the Maoist forces and the state security apparatus. Government policies since 1995 have made little headway either in addressing "poverty-in-general" or the more specific categories of poverty described here.

The government, since 1995, however, has taken and implemented a number of policy decisions in relation to poverty alleviation (see below, however). Since 1997, poverty alleviation has come to be regarded as the prime responsibility of the government (HMG 1998). Since 1997, and in keeping with the commitment made at the Social Summit, the government has set time-bound targets for poverty reduction, under which the proportion of the poor is to be reduced from the existing 42 percent to 32 percent, 23 percent, 15 percent and 10 percent by 2002, 2007, 2012 and 2017, respectively. A number of strategies have been elaborated to this end. The principal strategies include liberalisation of the economy, input-intensive commercialisation, intensification and diversification of agriculture, prioritisation of infrastructure (principally transportation and electrification), expanding the financial and banking sectors, promoting craft and cottage industries, implementing programmes/projects specifically targeted to the poor, the unemployed and the excluded, devolving and decentralising political and administrative power, and rendering the administration simple and effective.

In addition, a number of other policies taken by the government bear poverty-reducing potential. Some of these specific initiatives and targets, the associated commitments made at the Social Summit, the current output of these initiatives and likelihood of achievement of the time-bound government-set targets are summarised in Table 1.

Non-governmental initiatives on poverty reduction are sizeable large in scale. Such initiatives range from literacy and sanitation promotion to organising groups for savings and credit programmes. A number of financial institutions (FIs) of the Grameen Bank (of Bangladesh) mould, approximately 100 international non-governmental organisations (INGOs), thousands of non-governmental organisations and many more local-community based. organisations are in the forefront of such initiatives. Some such initiatives have led to a reduction in poverty in specific locations. But the sustainability. and replicability of the INGO and NGO initiatives, in particular, remain far from assured. Assessing oneself sincerely and learning lessons from the "best practices" of one another has not been a notable strength of the INGO/NGO "fraternity". In addition, the FIs, INGOs, NGOs and even the CBOs have relied far too heavily on the savings and credit mode in order to reduce poverty. Such organisations are also almost exclusively engaged in provision of services and not in furthering the agenda of poverty reduction through advocacy and political organisation.

Note: Most of the "targets" in this and following tables are drawn from HMG 1998. Some "targets" have been drawn from the 1990 constitution of Nepal. All of the commitments are drawn from UN 1995.

Partly as a result, the agenda of poverty reduction has hardly entered into the public, political domain. Even the poor almost exclusively see poverty as a problem to be addressed at the household level; both poverty and the poverty reduction agenda remain almost exclusively privatised. Politicisation and political organisation of the poor both remain extremely weak.

To summarise, despite the fact that poverty alleviation is now a declared principal objective of the government, and despite the fact that it has set time-bound poverty-reduction targets, the country is no nearer to poverty reduction than it was five years ago. Despite the centre-staging of the objective of poverty reduction, the macroeconomic policies and strategies adopted are not friendly to poverty reduction. Policies and strategies elaborated specifically for poverty reduction are much too weak to fulfil specified targets and commitments. In particular such policies are developed, in the first instance, as adjuncts to the de facto principal objective of economic growth. Second, anti-poverty policies and plans are fashioned around a few "targeted" programmes rather than being economy-wide and comprehensive (cf. UNDP 2000: Chapter 2). Third, and only partly because of the above, a host of reasons exist to doubt the sincerity of the declaration and the wisdom with which the declaration is going to be implemented.

Expansion of Productive Employment and Reduction of Unemployment

Given the high rate of growth of population (average for 1990-1999 = 2.4 percent/year) and the large size of young adults within the demographic structure, approximately 300,000 persons enter the work force annually. Partly because of lack of job opportunities in other, off-farm, sectors, the bulk of this work force, women in particular, is "absorbed" within the family farm. (Hence the low level of unemployment of 4 percent.) Much of this work force also engages in agricultural wage labour within the community. Given the specific climatological-topographical constraints of seasonality, combined with the much more "man-made" regime of a low level of diversification of crops and a high level of reliance on the cultivation of a few staple crops, labour demands are spread out highly unevenly through the year. There are very narrow peaks and long periods of "layoff". The very high under-employment rate of 47 percent, which speaks of the severe lack of opportunity to engage in productive labour, is, to a large extent, attributable to such conditions. Furthermore, the small land holders and the landless, in particular, are additionally restricted in utilising their labour power because they hold little or no agricultural land of their own. In addition, the availability of large "surplus labour" keeps the wage rate very low.

The self-employment and agriculture dominant nature of the work/labour regime, in turn, implies that policies and strategies for the reduction of unemployment and under-employment, at least up to the medium term, will have to firmly focus primarily on the family farm and community-level agriculture. Of course, expansion of the labour market in the off-farm sectors will have to be emphasised as well. Within the highly important family farm and agricultural domains, however, promotion of productive employment and reduction of under-employment will be highly contingent on land reforms--including land redistribution (both of private and public land), local control of resources of public land--such as those under the community forestry programme, intensification and diversification of agriculture, and the expansion of irrigation and transportation networks. Regulation of the open border with India, through which a large stream of seasonal and other labour flows to Nepal, will have to become another key element of the policy-set designed to promote employment in Nepal. Technical support structures at local levels will have to be reconfigured substantively such that they not only respond promptly to farmers' needs but also plan ahead, along with the farmers, for the solution of existing as well as next-generation problems. For the technical support structures to function in a sustained manner, in turn, it will be necessary for the farmers to organise themselves along spatial and technical, as well as political, fronts. In addition, the support structures will have to be run, in effect, even if not in a formal sense, by farmers' organisations themselves. In addition, public work programmes will have to be prioritised during the agricultural slack seasons.

Government policy and strategy statements do note that employment promotion is the key to poverty reduction. Since 1994/95, small-scale public work programmes have been a regular feature of employment programming. However, government policies and strategies-have incorporated only some of the above-mentioned reform measures, e.g. those on diversification and intensification, expansion of irrigation and transportation networks. But, even on these fronts, the scale and speed of reforms are much too small and much too slow.

Key policies and strategies of the government in relation to the promotion of employment, together with the commitments made at the Social summit. along with the status of their outcome and the likelihood of the attainment of targets and commitments are summarised in Table 2.

Like in the case of poverty reduction, FIs, INGOs, NGOs and CBOs are contributing, to small but significant extent, to the direct promotion of productive employment. The contribution of the INGOs, NGOs and CBOs in advocating the importance of productive employment, however, has been singularly weak. These institutions, as yet, have not internalised politicisation and political organisation of the unemployed and underemployed as a legitimate domain of non-governmental action.

To summarise, government policies and strategies on employment promotion show a severe lack of commitment. Indeed, declared policies and strategies indicate that the government remains highly dubious of its ability to actively pursue the objective of employment promotion. In consequence, no institutional set up within the government is specifically charged to promote employment and to periodically monitor its status and progress. The Ministry of Labour is almost exclusively concerned with labour in the "organised sectors" and, to an increasing extent, with regulation of labour "exported" to other countries. The bulk of the work force, including the unemployed and the under-employed, remains effectively un-incorporated within government policies and strategies.

Promotion of Social Integration

As a human and social space which lies between the great Indic and Sinic cultures, Nepal has historically been, and remains, a truly inter-civilisational zone. In addition, as a geographical space which is forbidding and as an economic space which is based largely on subsistence production, movement of peoples, cultures and goods have historically remained highly restricted. These conditions, in turn, have given rise to multiple cultures, religions, languages and modes of living. Furthermore, the ascription-based and hierarchising caste system, legally de-recognised as late as 1962, continues to be a highly salient feature of the social structure, as also to significantly affect patterns of inter-household and inter-personal valuation and behaviour. Under the caste system, the various non-caste ethnic groups and, in particular, the "lowest-caste" Dalit groups, bear heavy costs of social exclusion. Hierarchisation of gender continues to seriously affect the life chances of women. In addition, the poor face a variety of exclusions. Furthermore, rural-urban and regional inequalities continue to exact a heavy human and social toll from those living in the rural areas and the high-mountain terrain.

As could be expected, neither the bases of social exclusion nor the legitimacy of such exclusion has remained constant historically. At present, a variety of ethnic, Dalit, regional, religious and women's movements have started to contest the legitimacy of the rules governing exclusion, particularly since the restoration of liberal democratic governmental system since 1990. Among others, these have been directed at specific clauses of the constitution which privileges the Nepali language and the Hindu religion. Removal and reduction of socio-economic inequalities and regional inequalities is another platform on which such movements are based. Women's movements, in turn, have been directed along areas as diverse as alcohol abuse, inheritance of property, identity formation, discriminatory laws (despite constitutional provisions which uphold equality between the genders) literacy promotion, savings and credit, etc.

In the meanwhile, new bases of social exclusion--and inclusion as well--have been generated. The urban setting, the more universalistic legal system, the school system, the media, the market system, the slowly expanding domain of wage work, the migratory regime, etc. have, in certain specific ways, helped generate a more open, and less caste, ethnicity, religion, gender, etc. based social form.

This, of course, does not mean that these systems have not contributed to social exclusion themselves. As noted, the liberal democratic constitution itself contains serious exclusionary flaws. The education system, in turn, has done little to discourage large gaps in attainments of men and women, upper and lower caste groups, rural and urban residents and so forth. So also with the market system which has exacerbated pre-existing inequalities and created new ones, which has celebrated consumerism in the urban areas, and which has created new strains of poverty and, thus, generated new rules of social exclusion.

Key "targets" of the government, its commitments at the Social Summit, the present status of the targets and commitments and the likelihood of their attainment are summarised in Table 3.

To summarise, the liberal democratic constitution has opened up more and substantive avenues for greater social integration, particularly in relation to inputs and struggles from/by organised people's groups. However, the existing structure of the economy, entrenched economic interests and the neo-liberal economic agenda pose formidable barriers to social integration. Political expediency of political parties and governments and administrative ineffectiveness and inefficiency also produce huge gulfs between government policy pronouncements on the one hand and their implementation on the other.

Mobilisation and Utilisation of Resources for Social Development

While the scale of financial resources available for fulfilment of the targets and commitments of the government remains inadequate, in relation to the "social sectors", e.g. literacy and education, health, sanitation, the magnitude of public expenditure has been increasing gradually within the last decade (despite showing signs of stagnation during the later years). This also holds true for devolution and decentralisation. All of these domains have acquired political legitimacy not only on the part of the government but also on the part of organised people's groups. These domains are slowly becoming public domains. Enhanced public spending on these fronts is seen as electorally crucial for political parties and governments as well. In all of these domains, effectiveness and efficiency of expenditure, together with intra-sectoral restructuring, have become the pressing concerns (NESAC 1998). This, however, does not imply that the scale of financial resources annually allocated for the promotion of the social sector within the last decade is adequate to meet the targets and commitments. The 20/20 initiative, in particular, remains unfulfilled on the part of both the donors/development partners as well as the government. More pressing, nonetheless, is the question of how successes on these fronts can be made contributory to the reduction of unemployment, under-employment and income poverty.

Promotion of social integration is being prodded primarily by specific citizen groups and fronts and is being slowly and grudgingly being incorporated within its policies by the government. Many citizen group initiatives, however, have been of a sporadic, rather than sustained, nature. The scale of public financial resources allocated to this domain, in addition, remains extremely small.

The agenda and commitment of in relation to the promotion of productive employment and reduction of unemployment and under-employment remains seriously questionable. While a significant portion of the annual public expenditure does flow to "sectors" expected to promote employment, the magnitude is nowhere near adequate. Vast labour resources, thus, remain under-utilised, and unemployment and underemployment stares down at a vast number of people through their lives. The landless, the marginal land holders, the migrants, women and the Dalits are particularly haunted by unemployment and underemployment.

Surely, the government cannot directly provide employment to the unemployed and the under-employed. But it must develop and implement appropriate policies such that unemployment and under-employment is substantially reduced over the short and medium terms. As it is, however, the macroeconomic and other policies under which the reduction of unemployment and under-employment is based on are in need of fundamental overhaul. As much was conceded by the Finance Minister, during the last week of May this year, in his presentation of the annual budget proposal. The minister also agreed explicitly that no substantial gain was made in relation to the promotion of employment during the preceding year. The budget proposal, nonetheless and once again, failed to open up any new substantive frontier for the promotion of employment. Indeed, blaming the past and not reforming for the future has become a routine feature of periodic plans and annual budget statements.

The notion of resources, however, should not draw exclusive attention to financial resources alone. Political and cultural resources must be seen, and utilised, as key components of the overall resource-set available to a government (or to any other organisation for that matter). However, political resources, primarily sustained political initiatives on the part of established political parties and organised and authentic citizen's groups, has suffered a serious decay during the last decade. In particular, political parties have become highly centralised. Centralisation has meant that local units of the established political parties have for some time not been able to make their voice heard in the policy-making organs of the parties. This ineffectiveness, in turn, has contributed to a process under which the units are no longer responsive in listening to, and acting upon, the problems faced by local citizens. The bond between the party and the local citizen, thus, has become extremely weak. As regards cultural resources, the recent governments have shown a significant lack of imagination in identifying, elaborating and developing such resources for promoting social development. The recent initiatives on devolution, if implemented as envisaged, however, constitutes a positive step and will go some way in re-establishing the significance of cultural resources for social development.

Capacity to Implement Social Policies and Programs

As indicated, the record of the government on the elaboration of policies on social development is spotty at best. Part of this has to do with the policy-making process itself which is largely undemocratic (see next section). As far as the capacity to implement social policies is concerned, much remains to be desired as well. As already noted, the gap between policy statements and their implementation is gaping. First, financial resources to implement policies in a number of domains of social development are far from adequate. Second, political and cultural resources necessary to complement financial resources remain largely unidentified, and otherwise underdeveloped and highly under-utilised. Financial resources, in particular, are often used not to "activate" or further expand and sharpen political and cultural resources but to pass over them, thus, in effect, blunting and decaying them. The financial and "developmental" domains and actors generally perceive the political and cultural domains not as resources but as problems that hinder the smooth functioning of the "necessary" development process. As such, the financial and "developmental" domains seek to "buy off" the political and cultural domains. Third, the administrative machinery that implements the policies is much too centralised and over-stretched. (The impact of recent initiative at devolution and decentralisation as well as administrative reform on the reduction of the scale of such problems can only be assessed in future.) The bureaucracy has also not developed requisite professionalism. Financial corruption, which has broad non-financial negative implications as well, is also widely noted to be increasing within the last decade. Fourth, local government agencies, which are autonomous only in the legal sense, are not effectively allowed and assisted to develop their own agenda and to pursue them. To be sure, there are scores of "responsibilities" listed in the official books, but they are neither prioritised nor do local bodies receive adequate support to implement them. The responsibilities are not mandatory either; these merely stand as options, none of which might actually be carried out.

Domestic and International Factors Inhibiting Social Development

A number of structures and features are inhibiting social development on the "domestic" front. Structural issues related to the distribution of ownership of productive resources, principally of agricultural land but also of urban and other property, longstanding and structured gender and caste/ethnicity related subordination and centralisation of the state apparatus are intrinsically related to the low level of social development. The long tradition of privatising collective problems and troubles, which is essentially the hallmark of an subsistence-oriented and feudal modes of organising production, high level of social segmentation and economic inequality, undemocratic and un-civil governance, and the associated regime of relatively unorganised and weak struggles and actions on the part Of citizen's groups--whether at the local or the more encompassing levels--erect barriers to the promotion of social development as well. At the more economistic and bureaucratic level, the narrow revenue base and weak revenue administration, multiple provisions for "hidden" subsidies to the non-poor and the super-ordinate, the very high incidence of indirect taxation and various forms of rent-seeking and corruption within the ranks of the bureaucracy as well as the political domain are also hindering social development.

It is opportune to recall at this point, when considering international factors impeding social development, that the commitment made at the Social Summit is a globally collective commitment. As such, each (in effect) of the 10 separate commitments made during the Summit details national and international initiatives required in order to fulfil the targets. Yet, most of the international commitments have gone un-honoured. Indeed, if one were to construct tables detailing the extent of fulfilment of such international commitments--to go along with the three tables provided earlier in this paper--there is little doubt that there would be as many or more negatives along each of the rows. The scale of global international assistance (barring from a couple of industrialised countries) has dwindled or stagnated (also see Bissio 2000: 6-9, RRN 1999: 27-30). A political and ideological climate is being generated in the industrialised countries that the low level and slow pace of social development should be attributed exclusively to "local" policies, economies, polities and cultures. Yet, more and more profit is being repatriated from the South to the North. The large debt burden of the South is expanding more rapidly and is gobbling up an increasingly larger proportion of the public expenditure. The debt-social development expenditure swap proposal, discussed beginning the early 1990s, is at a stand still. Progress on the debt cancellation proposal in relation to Africa and the "least developed" countries has stagnated. Discussions on the "Tobin tax" have grounded to a halt. Further, the "Structural Adjustment Programme" (SAP) and other policy initiatives of the genre, whose primary purpose appears to be the enlargement of the Northern market system and the perpetuation of debt-and-recovery cycle, has given states in the South a credible reason for lowering or stagnating investments in social development. The debt burden and the SAP associated policies are the principal reasons for the stagnation of "social sector" expenditures in Nepal as well. Non-governmental organisations at the more encompassing levels in Nepal, wedded as they are to the service-delivery mode, and extremely dependent as they are on donors, development partners INGOs (cf. Mishra 2000), have almost totally failed to centre-stage these specific barriers to social development. It should be noted that such dependence and service delivery-mode specialisation, an overwhelming proportion of the NGOs have been fully co-opted within the governmental, INGO and donor/development partner systems and, therefore, cannot qualify as authentic organs of the civil society.

Initiatives for Future

To continue with the theme identified in the preceding paragraph, for social development to proceed ahead in the under-developed countries as targeted during the Social Summit, first, it is fundamentally necessary for the G-7 and OECD countries to immediately reassess themselves vis-a-vis the fulfilment of the "international" commitments (made during the Summit). It is saddening, although not surprising, that such commitments have gone un-honoured by the "international system" precisely during a period when much of Europe and the USA are under the sway of "the third way" and "progressive governance", which, among others, disagree with the state-minimalist and market-exclusive policies. Whether such a disagreement is likely to be concretely reflected in international policies within the near future, or whether these are exclusively meant for short-term home consumption, needs to be made explicit. A universalistic agenda of globalisation, certainly, cannot be successful without adequate concern for global social development. In addition, while the relatively more democratic United Nations system is unlikely to budge the monopolistic international financial system, it is necessary, in the interest of global and national social development policy making that the two organs carry out sustained dialogue and come up with coherent policy recommendations. If the two cannot seek coherence, the contradictions, at the least, must be made sincerely explicit. It would serve to provide an explicit recognition of the extent of incompatibility between the Social Summit commitments on the one hand and the global economic regime on the other. Such recognition, in turn, would pave the way for a more actionable global agenda on social development. The UN, because of its mandate, must take initiative to start such a dialogue.

Moving on to the national level, primary health, basic education, and a minimum, threshold, level of productive employment must be constitutionally defined as fundamental rights of all citizens and development policies must revolve around these rights. Redistribution of agricultural land (including public land), progressive taxation of urban property, income and consumption, and devolution should be pursued in order to raise resources for, create stakeholding in, and lower social exclusion from, the process of social development. In addition, constitutional and legal privileges of specific groups, religions and languages must be abrogated. Furthermore, policy-making, strategising and programming in relation to international development assistance must be much more indigenised.

Finally, it is essential that the government--and possibly the donors, development partners, INGOs and NGOs--charge a specific institution with regularly monitoring progress in relation to the commitments made during the Social Summit. The monitoring process and its outputs should be made public and the key actors as well as people-at-large should be regularly invited to provide inputs on the policy making as well as implementation processes in relation to social development.

Note: This is a revised version of the earlier paper presented at a gathering of academics, journalists, NGO workers and government personnel at two separate workshops in Kathmandu and Copenhagen, Denmark. Both presentations were carried out as preparatory exercises in NGO deliberations which ran parallel to the United Nations General Assembly meeting in Geneva, Switzerland during the last week of June 2000, which sought to assess global progress in implementing the Social Summit commitments made in Copenhagen in 1995 and to chart the road ahead. The preparation of this paper and the organisation of workshops from which I have benefited were supported by the Danish Association for International Development. I am alone responsible, however, for the views presented here.

Table 1: Targets, Commitments and Achievements on
Poverty Reduction

 Present target of Government Present
 government commitment at output
 Summit status

Poverty reduced to Focus on public No specific
32% by 2002 efforts to eradicate information
 absolute poverty;
 integrate poverty-
 reduction goals
 into overall
 policies

Poverty reduced to Address structural Time-
10% by 2017 causes; produce bound plan
 time-bound plan prepared;
 structural
 causes not
 addressed

Reduce rate of Reduce IMR by IMR being
infant mortality to 2000 to 1/3 of the reduced
62 (per 1000 live 1990 level; reduce slowly but
births) by 2002 IMR to 35 by 2015 significantl
from the 1997 ratio y through
of 75/1000 1990s

Life expectancy Raise life Life
raised from 56 expectancy to 60 expectancy
years in 1997 to years by 2000 increasing
60 in 2002 and 69 significantl
in 2017 y for last 2
 decades

Enrollment of Completion of Literacy
children in primary primary grades by ratio
grades raised from 80% and 100% of increasing
70% in 1997 to all children by slowly;
90% and l00%, 2000 and 2015, very wide
by 2002 and 2017, respectively; gender gap
respectively; adult close gender gap persists
literacy to be by 2005
raised from 40% in
1997 to 70% and
100% by 2002 and
2017, respectively

Reduce maternal Reduce MMR to Serious
mortality ratio half the 1990 level problem of
(MMR) from 475 in by 2000; by a reliable
1997 to 400 by further half by information;
2002 and to 250 2015 MMR very
by 2017 high;
 reduction
 rate slow

Food security and Achieve food Both PEM
nutrition not a security; reduce and micro-
priority area malnutrition nutrient
despite its among children to deficiency
singular half the level of widespread
significance and 1990 ; iodised
despite the fact salt has
that 53% of all come into
children are wide use;
malnourished in limited
(1996 data) areas,
 micro-
 nutrient
 deficiency
 being
 addressed

 Present target of Achievement of present target
 government and Summit commitment

Poverty reduced to Unlikely. Among others, policy is
32% by 2002 neo-liberal and pro-growth, posits
 unrealistic growth rate of 6%;
 emphasises targeted, rather than
 overall, economy-wide, anti-
 poverty policies/strategies.
 Targeted programmes, on the
 other hand, are too small and
 cannot generate national impact.

Poverty reduced to Highly doubtful. Structured
10% by 2017 inequalities not addressed;
 implementation of "land reform" in
 favour of larger holders; neo-
 liberalism prime policy driver;
 posits high growth rate of 7.2%
 for next 20 years; decreasing
 politicisation and increasing
 bureaucratisation of political
 parties

Reduce rate of Government target likely to be
infant mortality to nearly met; summit commitment
62 (per 1000 live for 2000 will not be met; summit
births) by 2002 commitment for 2015 will be met
from the 1997 ratio only with broad-ranging reforms
of 75/1000

Life expectancy Target likely to be fulfilled;
raised from 56 commitment close to being
years in 1997 to fulfilled
60 in 2002 and 69
in 2017

Enrollment of The five-year target not at all
children in primary likely to be met even in relation
grades raised from to enrolment, commitment in
70% in 1997 to relation to completion ratio by
90% and l00%, 2000 will not be met; no new,
by 2002 and 2017, comprehensive, policy/strategy
respectively; adult to close gender gap; wide gender
literacy to be gap likely to persist; five-year
raised from 40% in adult literacy target will not be
1997 to 70% and met; long-term target and
100% by 2002 and commitment may not be met
2017, respectively either; on the other hand,
 education, much more than any
 other social sector domain, has
 become a public issue and
 public demand for schools, etc.
 is organised and vocal

Reduce maternal Target and commitment unlikely
mortality ratio to be met; health-delivery
(MMR) from 475 in structures function very poorly;
1997 to 400 by very weak health information
2002 and to 250 system supervision of pregnant
by 2017 mothers weak as well;
 reproductive ill-health, on the
 other hand, a key feature of the
 process of feminisation of
 poverty.

Food security and Commitment will not be fulfilled;
nutrition not a access to adequate food is the
priority area single most important problem
despite its facing the country; lack of
singular access to adequate food is a
significance and serious problem for a large
despite the fact majority; such access is tied,
that 53% of all among others, to fundamental
children are issues of land ownership,
malnourished productive employment and
(1996 data) income; also tied to poor
 transportation network and
 ineffective public administration;
 under neo-liberal macroeconomic
 policies, extremely limited food
 subsidies are being largely
 withdrawn
Table 2: Targets, commitments and achievements on
employment promotion

 Present target of Government Present
 government commitment output
 at Summit status

Generate manpower Place Paucity of
according to promotion of information;
national needs and productive productivity
augment its employment at increasing
productivity; the centre of in capital-
produce skilled national intensive,
manpower; open up policies urban
employment in "sectors"
various economic
and social sectors

Reduction of (a) Promote and No
unemployment from pursue monitoring
4.9% (in 1997) to 3 policies for mechanism
percent and (b) full, in place; no
under-employment productive, institutional
from 47% (in 1997) appropriately set up to
to 10 percent by remunerated implement
2017 and freely policy
 chosen
 employment

Ensure full-time (Not No
employment to at considered) institutional
least one member set up; no
of a family living in monitoring
poverty mechanism

Generate capable Facilitate No concrete
and skilled labour access to information
in keeping with productive available;
demands in internal employment in policy
as well as rapidly setting
international market changing mildly
 world and favourable
 develop better in relation to
 quality jobs urban
 market

In view of emerging Promote No
role of the state as patterns of information
a facilitator, policy economic on
platforms will be growth that additional
created to maximises employment
encourage local employment created by
governments, creation; non-
NGOs and private minimise the government
sector to generate negative al sectors,
employment; impact of high-growth
promotion of both macroeconomi and/or
high-growth and c stabilisation labour-
labour-intensive on jobs and intensive
modes job market modes

 Present target of Achievement of present target
 government and Summit commitment

Generate manpower Government policies, strategies
according to and targets reflect serious lack of
national needs and commitment to centre-stage
augment its employment promotion; there are no
productivity; intermediate targets, rather there is
produce skilled a long-term wish; key
manpower; open up employment/productivity policy
employment in instrument, i.e. land redistribution,
various economic scuttled; rights to farm ownership of
and social sectors many tenant farmers, in effect,
 declared null and void

Reduction of (a) No reason to believe that
unemployment from unemployment and under-
4.9% (in 1997) to 3 employment have come down;
percent and (b) bondage labour prevalent at small
under-employment but significant scale; an ineffective
from 47% (in 1997) employment promotion committee
to 10 percent by attached to the prime minister's
2017 office disbanded recently; on the
 other hand, minimum wage laws
 enacted but ineffectively
 implemented

Ensure full-time A concrete and significant policy
employment to at departure, which also is equity-
least one member promoting; but remains undefined
of a family living in and there is no strategy elaborated;
poverty No mechanism developed to
 identify such households; target
 will not be fulfilled; just about
 abandoned already

Generate capable Slow progress, primarily in relation
and skilled labour to encouragement to private
in keeping with educational/training initiatives in
demands in internal urban areas; ineffective and
as well as inefficient training regime within
international market government system reviewed, but
 not revamped; education/training of
 most students remains largely
 unresponsive to job market
 requirements

In view of emerging As is obvious, contradictions
role of the state as between government "targets" and
a facilitator, policy its commitments at the Social
platforms will be Summit are acute; the neo-liberal
created to macro-economic agenda is so
encourage local strong that it does not even allow
governments, space for remedial measures; there
NGOs and private is no admission that such an
sector to generate agenda can have, at least within
employment; the short-term, negative impact on
promotion of both jobs; some evidences show that
high-growth and the structural adjustment and may
labour-intensive have reduced employment among
modes women and made them poorer
Table 3: Targets, commitments and achievements
on social integration

Present "target" Government Present status
of government commitment
 at Summit

Protection of Promote and Judicially, human and
fundamental protect all fundamental rights
rights and other human rights, protected; but the
human rights including executive branch
mandated by the right to extremely harsh on
constitution; development, "Maoists" who frequently
render and make face "encounter" killing;
governance public Maoists have engaged
responsive to institutions in violence as well;
peoples' needs more small-scale,
 responsive to unconstitutional
 people's bondage labour
 needs prevalent; "softer"
 violations much more
 common

Incorporate Make Elections implemented
peoples' wisdom decisions regularly at various
in governance; with the levels, except in
promote participation locations of contest
devolution and of those who between government
decentralisation will be and Maoists; local
 affected, bodies not yet
 including the autonomous
 different
 levels of
 government

Eradicate Strengthen Literacy programmes
illiteracy; Pursue the slowly moving ahead;
identity capacities wide gap in quality of
promotion and and private and public
development opportunities education which is
programmes for of all, giving rise to new
ethnic and Dalit especially "classes"; opportunities
peoples and the in politics and
women vulnerable government continue to
 and the exclude the "low caste"
 disadvantage groups, women, and
 d; expand certain ethnic groups
 and improve and regions
 basic
 services and
 move towards
 universalisati
 on

Social justice Respond to Equality in courts of law
shall be a special needs largely implemented;
primary plank of of specific access to courts and
democratic groups; efficient judicial
polity; equality ensure equity administration
before law; and equality problematic; equity and
priority to of opportunity; social justice promotion
developmental promote not a salient concern;
needs of equality and the disadvantaged face
"remote" regions, social justice; serious inequality of
women, Dalits, ensure opportunity
ethnic groups equality
 before law

Present "target" Achievement of "target"
of government and Summit commitment

Protection of Even as a processual
fundamental commitment, the political
rights and other impasse between Maoists
human rights and government likely to
mandated by the exacerbate human rights
constitution; violations; human rights
render commission formed
governance recently; mild
responsive to programmatic improvement
peoples' needs on cultural rights;
 economic rights of the poor
 not a salient agenda;
 public institutions'
 responsiveness to people
 weak

Incorporate Political crisis brewing on
peoples' wisdom various fronts; structurally,
in governance; although not functionally,
promote devolution largely in place;
devolution and "civil society" strong at
decentralisation local, but not more
 encompassing, levels;
 liberal democracy and
 devolution creating
 conditions for
 encompassing civil
 society

Eradicate Universalisation of basic
illiteracy; Pursue services not likely to be
identity fulfilled within medium
promotion and term; there is, however,
development increasing pressure from
programmes for the disadvantaged to
ethnic and Dalit promote equality and
peoples and equity; development
women programmes for the
 disadvantaged puny and
 ill-managed

Social justice Many of the commitments
shall be a unlikely to be fulfilled by
primary plank of the medium term, social
democratic justice and equity in
polity; equality particular; equality of
before law; opportunity increasing
priority to slowly but long way to go;
developmental needs of women, Dalits,
needs of ethnic groups, people in the
"remote" regions, "remote" regions far from
women, Dalits, adequately addressed but
ethnic groups mild concern in evidence

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