The would-be transformer: a portrait of Mulroney as a man whose ambitions exceeded his abilities.

Westell, Anthony

Transforming the Nation: Canada and Brian Mulroney Raymond B. Blake, editor McGill-Queen's University Press 433 pages, softcover ISBN 9780773532151

If you are more interested in what Brian Mulroney did as prime minister than in what he has to say about himself and his enemies, this may be the book for you. But let me emphasize may because it is written mostly by academics and goes into detail on so many topics it must challenge the stamina of even policy wonks. Nevertheless, it is probably the best attempt we will ever see to analyze what actually happened in the Mulroney years.

I have a problem, however, with the title and the conclusion it implies. Few prime ministers transform the country--that is, "change considerably or radically in form, appearance, function, condition or character," as the Gage Canadian Dictionary defines the word. Pierre Trudeau, for one, did by inserting into the constitution a charter of rights, thus radically changing the balance of power between Parliament and judiciary. Most are content to make incremental improvements, or at least to prevent disaster.

But historian Raymond B. Blake at the University of Regina, who conceived this book and brought it to birth, starts with the assumption that Mulroney did transform Canada, for the better, and has invited a score of specialists in areas of public policy to prove his point. Curiously, not all the chosen contributors agree with their editor that Mulroney was a transformer, and others are noncommittal.

If asked to name a radical change brought about by Mulroney, most Canadians would probably cite the free trade agreement with the United States. But Michael Hart, formerly a trade negotiator and now at Carleton University, reminds us that the FTA was not a radical change of direction but continuation of a process already under way. When his "Third Option" strategy of easing away from dependence on the U.S. failed, Trudeau turned almost 180 degrees and offered the U.S. free trade in some sectors, an offer the U.S. rejected. Trudeau was acting on advice in a major study of trade options from within the civil service, which itself followed several studies--from the Economic Council of Canada among others--urging free trade as the best and necessary way to force Canadian industry to be more competitive in the emerging global economy. There was also the question of how to secure access to the U.S. market when relations between the two countries had been severely strained during the Trudeau era, and free trade was one solution.

Mulroney had dismissed the possibility of free trade during his 1983 campaign, but he found on his desk when he took office studies similar to those that had changed Trudeau's mind. It is to his credit, in my view, that he was flexible enough to change his own mind (or break a mistaken promise) and bold enough to act decisively to open free trade negotiations. But free trade was coming one way or another, and was a development rather than a radical change of direction.

Mulroney's other great initiative was to reform the constitution in such a way as to bring Quebec onside, through the Meech Lake agreement, Quebec having refused to sign on to Trudeau's reforms. Displaying his famous negotiating skills, Mulroney lined up all ten provinces, only to have the package fail when the Manitoba legislature ran out of time to approve it. He tried again with the Charlottetown accord but that was rejected in a referendum. Having reviewed this unhappy tale, Ian Peach of the University of Regina is less than kind to Mulroney: "If Canada is united today as it was in 1984, it is so in spite of, not because of, Brian Mulroney ... His legacy, then, is one of failure and defeat, the fate of all tragic heroes."

As Frank J. Strain (from Mount Allison University) tells the story here, Mulroney inherited from Trudeau a large and growing budget deficit and public debt, and his economic policies were dominated by attempts to restore balance. He was not a neo-conservative on the model of Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan, relying mainly on the conventional methods of raising taxes and trimming spending--or at least the rate of increase in spending. He made progress of a sort, but is not justified in claiming, as he now does, that he balanced the budget. He did bring the so-called "primary budget"--government program spending and revenues--under control, but that did not include interest on the debt, which was still rising and leaving the overall accounts in deficit when he left office. Ironically, it was left to Liberals Jean Chretien and Paul Martin to finally beat the deficit and pay down the debt by ruthless slashing and burning.

Strain points out that, contrary to popular belief, both poverty and income inequality declined during Mulroney's watch. This was despite, or perhaps because of, his changes in social policy, which may indeed have been trans-formative. Canada had prided itself on its universal approach to social welfare: all were entitled to the same benefits, but paid for them by taxation based on income. Mulroney reduced benefits to middle- and upper-income Canadians and raised them for those with lower income. The age of universality was over.

There is much more in this dense volume, but in my opinion it tends to show Mulroney as a would-be transformer whose ambitions exceeded his abilities--perhaps anyone's abilities in this difficult country. That is not to say he was not in many respects a good prime minister. Yes, he was deeply unpopular when he retired, but most prime ministers are. Remember Pierre Trudeau, for one.

Anthony Westell is a contributing editor of the LRC.