Oakeshott vs. America.
McIntyre, Kenneth B.
Oakeshott on Rome and America, Gene Callahan, Imprint Academic, 250
pages
An obscure college professor once wrote that the reception of
English philosopher Michael Oakeshott by American conservatives
resembled the sound of one hand clapping. Although interest in
Oakeshott's work among U.S. academic historians and political
theorists has increased exponentially since his death in 1990, his
influence on public intellectuals and policy makers here has remained
negligible--with the notable exception of Andrew Sullivan, who, like
Oakeshott, happens to be British.
This lack of influence among the movers and shakers of American
political life should not be surprising, given Oakeshott's
insistence on the irrelevance of political philosophy to practical
politics. As he once wrote, "reputable political behavior is not
dependent upon sound or even coherent philosophy." Such behavior is
instead related to the concrete practical knowledge of an actual
political tradition and what such a tradition intimates. Oakeshott was
skeptical of philosophers who meddled in practical affairs, insisting
that he was not concerned with establishing "a seminary for
training political hedge-preachers in some dim orthodoxy."
Further, Oakeshott's critique of ideological or rationalistic
politics makes him an unlikely source of inspiration to a people whose
entire political tradition has been informed by that style of political
discourse. The rationalistic or ideological style manifests itself in
the abstract and often vacuous pronouncements about foundational
principles that animate American political life. As Oakeshott observed
in a review of a book by Walter Lippman:
when Mr. Lippmann says that the
founders of our free institutions
were adherents of the philosophy
of natural law, and that 'the free
political institutions of the Western
world were conceived and
established' by men
who held certain abstract
beliefs, he speaks
with the shortened perspective
of an American
way of thinking
in which a manner of
conducting affairs is inconceivable
without an
architect and without a
premeditated 'dedication
to a proposition.'
But the fact is that nobody ever
'founded these institutions.' They
are the product of innumerable
human choices, over long stretches
of time, but not of any human
design.
Such a long view is not likely to be welcome in a country that has
from the beginning considered itself a novus ordo seclorum.
With these considerations in mind, it was with a great deal of
excitement that I read Gene Callahan's new book, Oakeshott on Rome
and America, which is a well-written examination of Oakeshott's own
work, but also a novel application of Oakeshott's critique of
rationalist or ideological politics to American constitutional history.
Callahan argues quite convincingly that Oakeshott's analysis of the
errors of modern rationalism is both acute and accurate and that the
American constitutional tradition has been informed by a highly
rationalistic rhetorical style from the beginning.
So what is rationalism, in the Oakeshottian sense of the term?
First, it involves the claim that the only adequate type of knowledge is
that which can be reduced to a series of rules, principles, or
methods--and thus it is also a claim that "knowing how" to do
something is nothing more than "knowing that" the rules are
such and such. Second, because of this denigration of practical
knowledge, it is a claim that rational action can only take place
following the creation of a theoretical model. As Oakeshott once
observed, modern rationalism is literally "preposterous"
because theoretical reflection can only occur after a practice already
has made itself distinct and more or less concrete.
Finally, as Callahan points out, since rationalism is a mistaken
description of human knowledge and its relation to human activity, it is
also an impossible way of acting, politically or in any other sphere.
Human action, including political action, is inherently an engagement of
practical reason working within a particular tradition or and attempting
to follow through on some of the inchoate suggestions that the vagueness
of the practice offers. The opposite of rationalism for Oakeshott is not
irrationalism but authentic practical reasonableness. Thus, and contrary
to many of his reading-impaired critics, his critique of rationalism is
not a critique of reason but a defense of it against a false modern
conception of it.
To use one of Oakeshott's favorite examples, if one has no
knowledge of cookery, a cookbook is useless. If, on the other hand, one
is an experienced chef, a cookbook is superfluous. The cookbook is
relevant only in a situation where either the great majority of cooks
are relatively inexperienced and there is a dearth of connoisseurs or in
a situation in which the traditions of cookery are in a state of
confusion and a reminder is needed of some of the tradition's
neglected resources.
Oakeshott used the term "ideology" to describe the
attempted application of this rationalistic style to political activity.
The rationalist's or ideologist's desire is to solve
permanently the problems of political life and leave everything else to
administration. Yet politics isn't concerned with the search for
truth. Instead, as Oakeshott noted, "it is concerned with the
cultivation of what from time to time are accepted as the peaceable decencies of conduct among men who do not suffer from the
Puritan-Jacobin illusion that in practical affairs there is an
attainable condition of things called 'truth' or
'perfection.'"
Thus the alternative to ideology is not nescience. As Callahan
writes, it is instead a politics that
remains grounded in the concrete
circumstances and earlier experiences
of the participants in a
polity, and resists the temptation
to reject the ambiguities and uncertainties
of the practical world
by embracing some theoretical
abstraction of political life that
boasts it can provide definitive
resolutions, incontrovertibly justified
through their deduction from
first principles, to any and all political
issues.
The relevance of ideology to political experience is the same as
the relevance of the cookbook to cookery. If there is little or no
experience of, for example, liberal democratic institutions in a
particular political community, a written constitution supposedly
instantiating such principles will be useless; while, where there is
extensive experience of and commitment to liberal democracy, a written
constitution will be redundant.
A written constitution might serve as a reminder of the
"admitted goods" of a political community, but it won't
serve as a replacement for the actual conduct of politics within that
community. If, over the course of time, the admitted goods change, then
the constitution in the widest sense will change as well, whether there
is any amendment to a written document or not. As Callahan notes,
"a written constitution can offer, at best, a subsidiary support
for the maintenance of some particular, desired manner of ordering a
nation's political life, the continuation of which depends
primarily on the importance that citizenry assigns to preserving that
form of government."
We can see in Callahan's account further reasons for the
neglect of Oakeshott's work by contemporary policy-mongers.
Obviously, if Oakeshott is wrong about rationalism, then they are
sensible to ignore him. But if he is right about the deficiencies of the
ideological style, then they are unlikely even to understand him. The
rationalist, when he fails, is like an American trying to speak to a
foreigner who knows no English; the American thus continues by merely
repeating himself in a much louder voice. If the rationalist's
project doesn't work at first, his answer is to repeat it in a more
expensive and expansive fashion.
[ILLUSTRATION OMITTED]
Callahan offers an Oakeshottian explanation of the radical
discontinuity between American constitutional fundamentalism and actual
U.S. political practice. His book goes beyond an examination of
Oakeshott's critique of rationalism and investigates the relevance
of that critique for contemporary American politics. He asks, first,
"has the American political tradition been characterized by
rationalistic discourse?" and second, "has the American
constitution, which is an example of the rationalist disposition at
work, been especially effective at limiting government?"
In answering these questions, Callahan undermines one of the
central myths of American political culture (as well as movement
conservatism): that the Founders created a nearly perfect Constitution
which, if followed to the letter, would provide remedies to all of our
political problems. The mythical element here is of a prelapsarian purity in which a lawless document appears like Athena emerging from the
forehead of Zeus. However, as the myth continues, a subsequent fall from
grace and straying from the original constitution has led us into the
sinful land of relativism and the "living Constitution." We
can only be rescued from the slough of despond by returning to the
oracular pronouncements of the original document.
The question of the ideological or rationalistic character of the
Founders is rather easily answered by briefly perusing the
justifications advanced by those who rebelled against British rule and
by their political descendants. Here is just a brief sample. Alexander
Hamilton claimed that "the sacred rights of mankind are not to be
rummaged for among old parchments or musty records. They are written, as
with a sunbeam, in the whole volume of human nature, by the Hand of
Divinity itself, and can never be erased or obscured by mortal
power." (Does Hamilton believe that, in the entire history of
mankind, he and his fellows are the first rational human beings?) His
colleague in the ratification debates, John Jay, argued that "the
Americans are the first people whom Heaven has favored with an
opportunity of deliberating upon, and choosing the forms of government
under which they should live. All other constitutions have derived their
existence from violence or accidental circumstances." (Was Jay
suggesting that the American Revolution was nonviolent?) And even that
changeling John C. Calhoun pronounced that "we have a government of
a new order, perfectly distinct from all which has ever preceded it. A
government founded on the rights of man, resting not on authority, not
on prejudice, not on superstition, but reason.... All civilized
governments must in the course of time conform to its principles."
(This was before he discovered his real allegiance was with South
Carolina.)
Examples could ill multiple volumes, but these should suffice to
suggest that, at the very least, the tradition of American political
rhetoric has been rationalist or ideological in the Oakeshottian sense
from the beginning of the Republic. Oakeshott himself certainly thought
so, and noted, "it was in a flight of fancy that the Federalist writer urged his contemporaries to bend themselves to the completion of
their political task so that succeeding generations might be
undistracted in their devotion to the arts of civilized living" In
other words, the Founders meant what they did, rather than merely what
they said.
In suggesting that, Oakeshott neglected the exemplary rationalist
of the early American Republic, but fortunately Callahan does not.
Thomas Jefferson is exhibit A in Callahan's case that, despite the
rhetoric, American political practice has not really been so
rationalistic after all because, as previously noted, rationalist human
action is an impossibility. Jefferson, who claimed that each generation
should wipe the slate clean and start again, and who also claimed an
absolute allegiance to the letter of the Constitution, was notable
throughout most of his presidency for disregarding it. Jefferson quite
obviously ignored his own strictures on constitutional literalism when
making the Louisiana Purchase and when engaged in his vengeful pursuit
of Aaron Burr. The former was the decision of a pragmatic and
forward-looking politician, while the latter was a manifestation of
Jefferson's personal vindictiveness. Further, the bombastic
character of Jefferson's public pronouncements on the natural
equality and freedom of men rested quite uneasily with his rather
traditional treatment of those men and women whom he owned. Jefferson as
practical politician and traditionalist planter trumped Jefferson the
ideologist every time.
Callahan offers many more examples of the discontinuity between
American ideology and American practice, but he focuses on the
rationalistic character of constitutionalism in contrast to the
pragmatic character of American political life. He offers a conspicuous
example in the election of 1800, which he describes as "a notable
instance of the inability of rationalist planners to devise a scheme
that could foresee the multitudinous contingencies thrown up by actual
political practice." Despite the almost infinite wisdom of the
writers of the Constitution, they somehow did not foresee the emergence
of the single most important force in U.S. electoral history: political
parties. In the presidential election of 1800 there were significant
problems with the balloting which should have voided Georgia's
ballot and thrown the election to the House of Representatives. But
Jefferson (an interested party, perhaps) was the vice president and thus
in charge of the decision, and predictably accepted the Georgia ballot.
There was also no distinction made on the original Electoral College ballot between president and vice president, and there was no
contingency described in the Constitution if the House could not come to
a final decision.
Decisions were ultimately made, of course, and Jefferson took
office, but none of it had anything to do with the original intent of
the Founders. As Callahan soberly concludes, "the failure to follow
the letter of the Constitution ... is something that began almost as
soon as the U.S. Constitution was adopted, and is not (primarily) a
symptom of bad faith but, rather, an inevitable consequence of the fact
that no such rationalist design can ever dictate subsequent practice in
the way that it is meant to do."
So what are the implications of Callahan's assertions? I think
there are two distinct sets of conclusions to take away from the book.
First, the academic conclusion would be that a new approach to American
political history and political thought is necessary. The first order of
business will be to devise a more adequate periodization in which it is
acknowledged that today's U.S. constitutional arrangement has about
as much to do with that of either 1785 or 1805 as the contemporary
British constitutional arrangement has to do with its 18th-century
"mixed constitution" ancestor. There have been at least four
distinctive American republics, if not more, though, unlike the French,
we don't normally rip up our document and start over when we change
constitutions.
Academic historians of American political thought should eschew hagiography and pay attention to what the participants actually say, why
they say it, and how far what they say differs from the actual political
and social reality of their time. Leave the hagiography to the
journalists and focus on the historical meaning of various utterances
and actions and the connection between such meanings and the
self-conceptions (largely mythical) of Americans contemporary to the
subjects of study.
Second, since the traditional discourse of American politics has
been predominantly rationalist, there is little hope of an immediate
cure. To paraphrase R.G. Collingwood, a person may think that he is a
duck; that will not make him one, but it will affect his conduct, and
for the worse. American politicians and those who serve them think that
they're ducks, and although they aren't, they are likely to
continue to quack ideologically. Thus it is doubtful that a
non-ideological politics, which emphasizes both the limitations and the
necessity of political activity--the need for real consensus, the need
to address actual not "potential" problems, etc.--could
succeed in the United States.
To look to Oakeshott's work for a practical solution, however,
is a mistake since he has no doctrine to sell in the market of
ideologies, given that his alternative to rationalistic politics is a
traditionalist pursuit of intimations. Indeed, as Oakeshott observed,
"it is always depressing for a patient to be told that his disease
is almost as old as himself and that consequently there is no quick cure
for it, but. this is usually the case."
Kenneth B. McIntyre is the author of Herbert Butterfield: History,
Providence, and Skeptical Politics.