Social dialogue in European professional football.

Colucci, Michele ; Geeraert, Arnout

Introduction

'Autonomy' and 'specificity' are the two key words in the regulation of sport. (1) Sports organisations adopt their own rules and regulations which take into account the peculiarities of the games, the nature and structure of the associations at international, national and local levels. (2) Nevertheless, as professional sports increasingly became more commercialised, governments have been trying to intervene in the sports world and stakeholders have started to question the legitimacy of sports organisations in an attempt to have a greater input in their activities and regulations. As a result, the increasing litigation within the sports sector often arises out of (labour-related) disputes involving athletes, clubs and sports associations and usually reveals a dissatisfaction of the stakeholders regarding their lack of representativeness in the governance of their respective sports.

In this context, the so-called 'social dialogue' is considered as a means to conclude agreements and to foster co-operation between employers and employees, sometimes with the assistance of a third party (often the government). (3)

At the EU-level, European social dialogue is defined as 'discussions, consultations, negotiations and joint actions involving organisations representing the two sides of industry (employers and workers). It takes two main forms - a tripartite dialogue involving the public authorities, and a bipartite dialogue between the European employers and trade union organisations'. (4)

Social dialogue can take different forms. First, the EU institutions, namely the European Commission, can simply consult the relevant social partners; second, social partners can conclude sectoral and cross-sectoral joint actions and negotiations; and third, social partners and EU institutions can conduct tripartite deliberations. (5) European tripartite social dialogue takes place within the Tripartite Social Summit for Growth and Employment, established in March 2003, as well as the dialogues on macroeconomics, employment, social protection and education and training. European bipartite social dialogue takes place within the cross-industry social dialogue committee and sectoral social dialogue committees. (6)

In this article, the authors make an assessment of the composition, work and functioning of the sectoral social dialogue committee in professional football. It is their aim to evaluate the recent (August 2011) compromise agreement on the implementation of the European Professional Football Player Contract Minimum Requirements, taking into account its genesis, the parties' interests and difficulties linked to their implementation.

1. The Genesis of Social Dialogue in Sport

1.1. The European Sports Forum

In an attempt to deal with the above described issues, the European Union (EU) started encouraging dialogue within the sports sector as early as 1991, when the European Sports Forum initiated by the European Commission met for the first time. This Forum, which continued to meet until 2003, brought together representatives of the sports movement and of Member States' governments in order to discuss and promote sport policies. In 2008, the Commission decided to reinstate the Forum to follow up on the initiatives presented in the White Paper on sport. (7)

1.2. The Declarations on Sport

Since 1991, several initiatives have been taken by the EU to encourage dialogue within the sports sector. The Amsterdam Declaration, by the Heads of State and Government in 1997, encouraged the dialogue between sports associations and EU institutions. (8)

In the 1999 Helsinki Report, issued by the European Commission, it was recognised that at each level a greater consultation between the sport movement, the Member States and the European Union was needed to stimulate the promotion of sport in Europe. (9)

In the 'Declaration on the specific characteristics of sport and its social function in Europe, of which account should be taken in implementing Common policies', issued at the Nice European Council of December 2000, the European Council stressed that the sporting organisations had to fulfil their task to promote their particular sports on the basis of a democratic method of operation. (10) Moreover, the European Council expressed its support for a dialogue on the transfer system between the sports movement, in particular the football authorities, organisations representing professional sportsmen and -women, the Community and the Member States. (11)

1.3. The 2001 Gentlemen's Agreement

In 2001, an agreement on the new FIFA rules on international transfers of football players was reached between the main football associations, Federation Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) (12) and the Union of European Football Associations (UEFA) (13), on the one side, and the EU Commissioners in charge of competition, sport and social affairs, on the other side. (14) These new regulations replaced the old transfer rules which had to be abolished as a consequence of the Bosman ruling (15), in which the European Court of Justice held that FIFA's transfer regulations infringed upon the right of every European (worker) to move freely under Article 45 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). (16) On the occasion of this agreement, the involved Commissioners at the time invited FIFA and UEFA to encourage clubs to start or pursue social dialogue with the representative bodies of football players. They stressed that social dialogue could be an effective method to find common solutions on matters pertaining to the employment relationship between clubs and players. Thereunto, they offered the Commission's assistance to the establishment of a social dialogue in the sport sector at European level and ever since, the Commission has been supporting projects for the consolidation of social dialogue in sport in general and in football in particular. (17) Amongst others, these projects were aimed at identifying the relevant social partners in the sector at both the EU and the national level.

2. The White Paper on Sport

The 2007 White Paper on Sport (18), issued by the European Commission, was the result of a consultation process which started in 2005 following the reconsideration of the Commission's dialogue with the sports movement. (19) Together with other high-level meetings held between the Commission throughout 2004-2006, these conferences resulted in the White Paper on Sport, which defined the Commission's sport policy for a period of at least 5 years. In this document, the European Commission addressed the main challenges in the field of sports and recalled the autonomy of sports associations which nevertheless needs to be 'respectful of good governance principles'. (20) In that regard, the White Paper strongly encouraged the use of social dialogue in the sports sector, because '[it] can contribute to addressing common concerns of employers and athletes, including agreements on employment relations and working conditions in the sector in accordance with EC Treaty provisions'. (21) The Commission acknowledged the difficulty to predetermine the form of a social dialogue in the sport sector and therefore, it declared to be ready to 'examine any request to set up a sectoral social dialogue committee in a pragmatic manner'. (22)

3. Who should dialogue? The representativeness issue

At the beginning, the troubles with predetermining the form of a social in football in particular followed from the difficulty to identify among all the sport stakeholders the 'appropriate' social partners, i.e. those who could negotiate about working conditions and other issues such as doping, players' agents, transfer and training compensations, related to the particular nature of the employment relationship in sport. This is a consequence of the situation of the sector, which is quite complicated to define because it is made up of several segments organised not only around sports activities in the strict sense, but also around a wide range of services. In the sports world we can identify four categories which enjoy relative autonomy: professional sports businesses, competitive sports associations, sporting leisure associations and not-for-profit organisations. (23) This complexity of the sector has certainly slowed down the creation of social partners at the EU-level. Moreover, in some cases national legislation sets apart the workers' organisations from social dialogue and on employers' side, there are very few single organisations representing all the employers in the sector. (24)

The European Commission even gave important economic support to the sports stakeholders in order to consolidate the social dialogue in the sports sector and therefore facilitated the creation of the European Association of Sport Employers (EASE) in 2003. (25) EASE amongst others identifies suitable national employers' organisations in the sports sector. Thereto, it co-operates with EURO-MEI, the Media, Entertainment, Arts and Sports sector of UNI Europa which helps to establish a trade union awareness in the sector through EU funded projects. (26) UNI-Europa/EURO-MEI and EASE have recognised each other as the European social partners for the sports sector in February 2008. (27) Currently, EASE and EURO-MEI have decided to submit jointly to the European Commission an application for the establishment of a European Sectoral Social Dialogue Committee for the sport and active leisure sector. (28) EASE and UNI Europa Sport -following their mutual recognition- have already agreed on minimum requirements regarding employment contracts and health and safety regulations in the sport and active leisure sector through joint statements signed in 2008 and 2009. Those minimum requirements aim to secure the working relations between employers and workers (including athletes). (29)

In the professional football sector, projects funded by the Commission relating to the encouragement of social dialogue in the sports sector have had a substantial impact on the emergence of suitable social partners for a social dialogue in European professional football. On 10 December 2007, a request was submitted to the Commission for the establishment of a Social Dialogue Committee in the Professional Football sector by the International Federation of Professional Footballers Associations- Division Europe (FIFPro) and Association of European Professional Football Leagues (EPFL). (30)

In March 2008, the Commission confirmed the representativeness of FIFPro and EPFL and later on, the European Club Association (ECA). The Employment and Social Affairs Commissioner, Vladimir Spidla, and the Education, Training, Culture and Youth Commissioner, Jan Fige, launched a new social dialogue committee, bringing together FIFPro, EPFL and ECA. Given the specificity of sport governance, the social partners invited the European Federation of Football Association (UEFA) to chair their dialogue. The aim of the committee was to improve employment relations for all players and reduce disputes through dialogue. Hereto, minimum requirements for professional players' contracts were the first issue to be discussed in the committee. (31)

4. European sectoral social dialogue

4.1. Legal Basis

Aimed at strengthening the sectoral dimension of the European social dialogue, the sectoral social dialogue committees were established through the Commission Decision of 20 May 1998. (32) In those sectors where the social partners make a joint request to take part in a dialogue at European level, organisations representing both sides of industry must fulfil the following criteria, which are assessed by the Commission:

a they shall relate to specific sectors or categories and be organised at European level;

b they shall consist of organisations which are themselves an integral and recognized part of Member States' social partner structures and have the capacity to negotiate agreements, and which are representative of several Member States; (c) they shall have adequate structures to ensure their effective participation in the work of the Committees. (33)

Provisions on the EU's social policy are at present to be found under title X of the TFEU, which captures the important role for the social partners as representatives of management and labour in the governance of the EU. (34) These provisions continued the path which the EU has followed for several decades. Pursuant to article 152 TFEU:

 The Union recognises and promotes the role of the social partners
 at its level, taking into account the diversity of national
 systems. It shall facilitate dialogue between the social
 partners, respecting their autonomy. (35)

In particular, on the basis of art. 154 (1) TFEU, the European Commission has a special role in promoting the consultation of social partners and taking action to support social dialogue. The encouragement of social dialogue by the Commission is one of the key elements of the European social policy. (36) With every legislative proposal in the social policy field, the Commission has to consult the relevant social partners twice. A first time about the possible direction of EU measures and in a second phase about the content of the Commission's proposal. In each of these steps, the involved social partners may make recommendations or opinions pursuant to articles 154(2) and 154(3) TFEU.

In addition, the social partners have the possibility to autonomously start formal negotiations concerning the legislative initiative by the Commission. Subsequently, the partners have 9 months to reach a mutual agreement, during which the Commission cannot continue its own legislative proposal. (37)

Even when there is no legislative initiative by the Commission, the social partners are free to autonomously -after a consultation by the Commission or on their own initiative- conclude agreements. (38) Once the social partners have jointly adopted a text, the Treaty provides two routes for the implementation of the agreement. As article 155(2) TFEU states:

 Agreements concluded at Union level shall be implemented either
 in accordance with the procedures and practices specific to
 management and labour and the Member States or, in matters
 covered by Article 153, at the joint request of the signatory
 parties, by a Council decision on a proposal from the Commission.
 The European Parliament shall be informed.

 The Council shall act unanimously where the agreement in question
 contains one or more provisions relating to one of the areas for
 which unanimity is required pursuant to Article 153(2). (39)

Firstly, implementation of an agreement is possible according to national procedures and practices; this is the so-called 'voluntary route', based on the different structures of industrial relations within the respective Member States. (40) In this case, the responsibility to implement lies with the national divisions of the European social partner organisations. The latter play a prominent role in overseeing the implementation of these so-called 'voluntary agreements', which are not generally binding, do not form an integral part of EU-law and, therefore, have no direct effect. In its first Communication concerning the application of the Agreement on social policy, the Commission confirmed that the terms of these agreements merely bind the members of the social partner organisations and will affect solely them and only in accordance with the practices and procedures specific to them in their respective Member States. (41) Pursuant to the Declaration, annexed to article 155(2) TFEU, 'this arrangement implies no obligation on the Member States to apply the agreements directly or to work out rules for their transposition, nor any obligation to amend national legislation in force to facilitate their implementation'. (42) According to Franssen, the legal duties and obligations of the national affiliates have to be derived from the internal rules of the European social partner organisations in combination with international private law. (43) Because article 155(2) TFEU uses the phrasing 'shall be implemented' (emphasis added), an obligation to implement these agreements and for the signatory parties to exercise influence on their members in order to implement the European agreement is implied. Also, it should be noted that the 'voluntary route' does not exclude the agreement from being applied or transposed through national legislation. (44)

As a second choice for the implementation of their mutually agreed texts, the social partners can submit a joint proposal to the Commission requesting to submit their agreement to the Council of the European Union. Although -in theory- this may also result in a Council Regulation, this procedure will in practice result in a Directive, which the Member States subsequently have to convert within a given period into their respective national legislations. (45) This way, European social dialogue has the capacity to be an autonomous source of European social policy legislation. However, according to article 155(2), the implementation through a Council decision is only possible for agreements falling under one of the fields listed in article 153 TFEU. (46)

While the European Parliament has no role in this second implementation route (47), the Council shall decide on the implementation of the collective agreement by qualified majority (48) or, for agreements relating to any of the territories mentioned in Article 153 (2) TFEU, by unanimous votes. (49) The Council cannot make amendments and it only retains the political choice to adopt the agreement or not. (50) In the latter case, the Commission may still decide to produce a normal legislative proposal (51), according to the appropriate (normal or special) legislative procedure stipulated in 153(2) TFEU.

Because of the possibility to bypass the democratic involvement of the European Parliament, it is very important that the Commission ensures that the management and labour sides really represent who they claim to represent. (52) Hence, the above mentioned representativeness criteria for the social partners are an important prerequisite for ensuring the democratic legitimacy of the bipartite sectoral social dialogue.

4.2. Social dialogue in motion

Sectoral social dialogue committees are composed by 40 representatives from both sides of industry represented in equal manner. (53) They are chaired by a representative from one side of industry or, at their own joint request, by a Commission representative. (54) Each Committee establishes, together with the Commission, its own rules of procedure (55) and holds at least one plenary session a year. (56)

Currently, there are over 40 sectoral social dialogue committees, which cover more than 145 million workers in the EU. They have issued around 500 texts of varying legal status going from joint opinions and responses to consultations, to agreements that have been implemented through Directives. (57) The latter is however quite rare and atypical for sectoral social dialogue, as demonstrated in infra.

Since the Maastricht Treaty, legally binding agreements were gradually replaced by voluntary agreements within European social dialogue. (58) In December 2001, the inter-sectoral partners fixed their vision on the future of European social dialogue in the Laeken Declaration. (59) They opted for more emphasis on autonomous bipartite dialogue which ought to be focussed on voluntary non-legally binding agreements. The European Commission also endorses this clear movement away from legally binding agreements. (60) The reason for this desire for more autonomy is different for the respective sides of industry. For the unions, this follows from the cautious attitude of the Commission to launch legislative initiatives in the EU social policy. On the one hand, the Commission gave less and less response to the demands of the unions, resulting in a redefinition of its role. Employers, on the other hand, wanted once and for all to get rid of the pressure from the Commission. (61)

As a result of this shift toward more voluntary/autonomous agreements, alongside the more traditional methods of concluding agreements between the social partners as provided in Article 155(2) TFEU, a whole range of categories of instruments approved by the Commission exists. In its 2004 Communication on 'enhancing the contribution of European social dialogue', the Commission proposes a typology to classify possible outcomes of the sectoral social dialogue committees. (62) By doing this, the Commission aimed to stress that the added value of texts not only depends on whether they are legally binding or not, but also on the operational follow-up and effective implementation of the outcome. When assessing the outcomes of EU sectoral social dialogue, one must conclude that most of them are of a 'soft' nature, meaning that they aim to raise awareness, disseminate good practice, or help to build consensus and confidence (see figure 1). (63)

There are several completely autonomous agreements like process-oriented texts, declarations, joint opinions and tools. These texts form the vast majority of the produced texts, with joint opinions as an absolute outlier. These outcomes mirror what Pochet described as a lack of pressure from the Commission and the Member States for the development of an ambitious European social policy and the lack of interest in the social dialogue on employers' side. (64) On the other hand, the peak in joint opinions, which are mostly aimed at influencing EU policy and by no means force obligations on the partner's national affiliations (65), shows that the sectoral social dialogue has mainly taken a place within the European multilevel system of policymaking. Indeed, the influence the sectoral social partners can exercise is not limited to EU's social policy, but it extends over a range of European policies. As such, one of the key values of the sectoral dialogue committees (and, by extension, the European social dialogue) is that it gives the social partners a certain amount of clout within the European agenda and the whole European policy process. (66)

5. Social Dialogue in European Professional Football

5.1. The Stakeholders

As mentioned in supra, the EU Sectoral Social Dialogue Committee (hereafter: ESSDC) in the Professional Football sector was installed in July 2008, following the signing of the Rules of Procedure by the participating parties. According to the latter document, the ESSDC is composed by up to a maximum of 54 representatives, equally composed from both sides of industry. (67) The employers' side is composed of representatives from EPFL and ECA. On the workers' side, FIFPro Division Europe (hereafter FIFPro) provides representatives for the committee. The social partners agreed to invite the UEFA President to chair the ESSDC (see figure 2). (68)

Chairman

UEFA President

Employers Workers

EPFL FIFPro Division Europe
ECA

Figure 2: composition of the European Sectoral Social Dialogue
Committee in the Professional Football Sector

In this section, we discuss the stakeholders of the ESSDC in professional football. More specifically, for each party, we concentrate on three important questions, namely: a) Who are they?; b) Why do they engage

in a social dialogue?; and c) What is their degree of representativeness?

While the first question seems to be an obvious one, the two others may need some clarification. The question as to why the stakeholders engage in a social dialogue is asked to identify the possible motives and incentives for their participation and co-operation in the ESSDC. More specifically, the authors seek to identify the 'added value' of a European social dialogue for each stakeholder. According to the research conducted by De Boer et. al., agreements between the social partners are only possible when these contain an added value for both sides of industry. (69) When one or more of the involved stakeholders fail to identify clear benefits associated with a European social dialogue, this will lead to unfavourable prospects for the development of a fruitful dialogue in the ESSDC. Moreover, if more favourable results with regard to European policy can be achieved through other channels of the European multilevel decision-making, the social partners will not be committed to the European social dialogue. (70)

As regards to the third question on the stakeholders' representativeness, one must understand that most European sectoral social partner organisations are characterised by a low degree of centralisation, meaning that they have limited capacity to influence their national affiliates. However, involving national sectoral social partners effectively in EU dialogue is crucial to assure an effective follow-up at the national level. Also, the ESSDCs should be as inclusive as possible because the effective follow-up at the national level is also clearly linked to the representativeness of social partners. Moreover, national organisations which are not involved in the work of the committees at European level may not want to implement provisions which they do not endorse and to whom they made no contribution. (71) Thus, a strong mandate to negotiate at the European level is of vital importance.

Given the fact that every organisation that wishes to participate in a ESSDC must fulfil the representativeness criteria established and assessed by the Commission (72), one might conclude that an additional assessment of the representativeness of the stakeholders in the professional football ESSDC is rather unnecessary and quite redundant. However, there is no information available about the method used by the Commission to asses these criteria. An analysis conducted by Siekmann on the existing ESSDCs shows that the Commission has a rather flexible approach regarding the application of the criteria for representativeness of social partner organisations. E.g., as long as the relevant interests are more or less represented and the geographic area of the EU is to some extent covered by the representative organisations, the social partner organisations may comprise of a limited number of undertakings. (73) For this reason, an assessment of the capacity of the stakeholders to influence their national affiliates and their inclusiveness does not seem redundant at all.

5.1.1. UEFA

UEFA was founded on 15 June 1954 by 28 European national football associations which at the time felt that their interests were not being served adequately by FIFA's structures. (74) Extending to 53 national football associations, UEFA's geographical scope is wider than that of the EU, which currently comprises 27 Member States, or the European Economic Area (EEA). UEFA membership is however largely dominated by football associations located in EU Member States. In the hierarchical network that governs world football, UEFA is one of the 6 continental organisations that are located under the global football association FIFA. (75) This means that UEFA has to comply with FIFA's rules and regulations, (76) in particular FIFA's regulations on the status and transfer of players. (77) UEFA's national member associations are in the same way required to comply with and to enforce UEFA's statutes and regulations in their jurisdiction. (78)

Why do they engage?

With the growing importance of the economic aspect of football due to the extensive commercialisation of the sport, stakeholders who are traditionally at the bottom of the hierarchical structure of the sport became more powerful. (79) Especially top professional clubs and national football leagues started criticising UEFA's position in the governance of European football by questioning its legitimacy to govern European football unilaterally. (80) (81) For this reason, UEFA has been seeking recognition by the European authorities as the sole rulers of their sport on the European continent. However, the White Paper on Sport did not officially recognise the sports bodies as the governing bodies for their respective sports, which was heavily criticised by football's governing bodies and the International Olympic Committee (IOC). (82) Moreover, the Commission refused to recognise one specific organisational model as typical for the European sports world and it acknowledged the emergence the new stakeholders in professional football, i.e. FIFPro, ECA and EPFL. (83)

For all these reasons it seemed only natural that when EPFL and FIFPro submitted a joint request to the European Commission to start up a new ESSDC, UEFA wanted to participate in order to keep matters in the governance of European football under its reign and control.

UEFA itself has responded to the threats to its legitimacy by giving FIFPro, ECA and EPFL a place within its professional Football Strategy Council (PFSC), created in 2007. (84) The PFSC is a consultative body created to build a network for (social) dialogue and consultation with other stakeholders in the governance of professional football. It has no decision making power and merely informs the Executive Committee, the actual decision making body of the UEFA. (85) So, with the PFSC, UEFA created a forum for social dialogue within its own structures. Moreover, according to the rules of procedure of the ESSDC in professional football, every item for discussion must first be submitted to - and agreed by- the PFSC. (86) This way, some could argue that UEFA has de facto a strong control over the ESSDC. In the White Paper on Sport, the European Commission acknowledged that 'relevant third bodies' could be invited to take part in the social dialogue 'as observers'. The Commission however stressed that '[i]t should be kept in mind social dialogue is, above all, a bi-partite dialogue between social partners'. (87) When considering UEFA's control of the ESSDC, questions can be raised on the actual bi-partite nature of the committee and certainly about UEFA's supposed observer status.

UEFA -like FIFA- traditionally has a strong aversion for any government interference, certainly from the traditionally very market-oriented EU. Ever since the Bosman case, FIFA and UEFA argue that they should be afforded decision-making autonomy by the EU institutions. As Parrish describes, according to FIFA and UEFA, the need to promote competitive balance, to encourage the education and training of young players, to maintain the integrity and proper functioning of sporting competition and to protect national team sports all justify the imposition of market restrictions in the professional football sector. This urged them to adhere to a strong protectionist vision of sport governance. (88) Concluding, one cannot expect UEFA to be strong advocates for a European social dialogue which increases EU-interference in the sector and also empowers EPFL, ECA and FIFPro even more.

Finally, UEFA does not need the ESSDC to gain more influence within the EU institutions. As Garcia already pointed out, UEFA has rightly built up a strong partnership with the European Commission and uses clever lobbying strategies with the EU institutions to promote their policies. (89) Also, national politicians have traditionally been supportive of the 'football community' and the European Parliament is regarded as a loyal ally. (90)

Representativeness

Although UEFA in theory is not a social partner, because of its powers as a rule making body within European football, any agreement concluded within the ESSDC will surely also need its signature. UEFA's objectives are amongst others to deal with all questions relating to European football and monitor and control every type of football in Europe. (91) As already mentioned in supra, UEFA however has to comply with FIFA's rules and regulations, (92) in particular FIFA's regulations on the status and transfer of players. (93) This means that they have no mandate to conclude any agreements contrary to FIFA's rules and regulations. Therefore, a wider bargaining agreement in European football that contravenes with FIFA's rules is not an option within the context of the ESSDC.

5.1.2. FIFPro

Founded in December 1965 under the chairmanship of the Belgian professor Roger Blanpain in Paris, FIFPro is a worldwide federation of national associations with 42 members. (94) FIFPro Division Europe was founded in July 2007 and currently has 24 member associations. (95) FIFPro's specific intention is to pursue and defend the rights of professional football players. (96) The membership of FIFPro is composed of national representative associations, of which one per country is admitted as a member. (97)

Why do they engage?

Due to football's hierarchical governance network, professional football players, who are at the very bottom of this so-called 'football pyramid', are subjected to the rules and regulations of the governing bodies when exercising their profession. As a result, for decades they had no voice in the governance of their sport. The extensively discussed Bosman ruling (98) of the ECJ initially seemed to change this. As 'Guardian of the Treaty', (99) and therefore guarantor of the fundamental rights therein enshrined, the European Commission initiated negotiations with FIFA and UEFA on a new transfer system and strongly encouraged them to involve FIFPro. (100) FIFPro's eventual input in the new transfer rules, approved by the Commission in 2001, was close to none. This was mainly due to their limited organisational capacity at the time. Moreover, there were serious doubts regarding their legitimacy as a representative organisation, (101) strong internal divisions (102) and a constantly changing position of its then president, Gordon Taylor. (103) Altogether, at the time, there was no strong representative players' union at the European level that could adequately defend players' interests.

The European social dialogue in professional football and the European Commission's encouragement in this matter strongly improved FIFPro's position in the governance of European football, making it a stronger stakeholder with whom the other stakeholders are now forced to be reckoned with. First of all, the European Commission's support (104) truly improved FIFPro's organisational capacity. Moreover, the encouragements by the Commission for a social dialogue in professional football strengthened FIFPro's representativeness and legitimacy. Today, FIFPro is recognised by not only the Commission but also by UEFA (105) and the other stakeholders. Finally, the ESSDC in professional football, outside UEFA's structures, certainly allows FIFPro to put more pressure on UEFA to change its policy into a more 'workers oriented' direction.

Taking into account the above, it is clear that FIFPro has a strong interest in conducting a European social dialogue. The ESSDC not only increases its influence regarding UEFA, but also regarding the clubs. In this context, it is important to realise that professional football players are at the very bottom of the football pyramid, not only subject to the rules of FIFA and UEFA, but also contractually bound to their clubs. In recent years, we witnessed an increase in labour related disputes between players and their clubs, the latter still holding a strong preponderance within their employment relationship. (106)

Representativeness

As already mentioned in supra, one of the causes of FIFPro's lack of input in the 2001 FIFA transfer regulations was its (perceived) lack of representativeness. (107) Today, FIFPro is recognised by all the parties in the ESSDC as the only umbrella organisation of trade unions for professional association football players. Moreover, the Universite Catholique de Louvain Study on the representativeness of the social partner organisations in the professional football sector confirmed the representativeness of FIFPro. (108)

However, there are some concerns raised on FIFPro's internal division. The different points of view from the national unions were painfully exposed during the negotiations on new FIFA transfer rules and this also proved to be a factor leading to FIFPro's lack of input in the eventual 2001 agreement. The associations from the stronger leagues had substantially divergent views with those from smaller competitions. (109) Currently, at least on the matter of contractual stability, there are no signs that this situation has changed.

5.1.3. EPFL

Professional football leagues usually negotiate with their respective national Football Associations in matters such as management of league championships, division of competencies and selling of TV rights. In recent years, they have become active at the European level as well. In 1997, the EUPPFL (Association of European Union Premier Professional Football Leagues) was created on the initiative of the English and Italian football leagues, as there was a need for an organisation to represent the views and positions of Leagues and clubs on matters of mutual interest and concern. The EUPPFL objectives were to participate in and appoint representatives to UEFA's Professional Football Committee and to work with UEFA for the good of professional association football in Europe and to foster friendly relations between the Association and the players' unions operating within the territory of member Leagues. (110)

It was however not until October 2005 when a Constitution containing Statutes was signed between EPFL's members and EPFL was created as a result of this. (111) (112) Under its statutes, it is EPFL's aim to be the voice of professional football leagues in Europe on all matters of common interest (113), to consider social dialogue issues at a European level and act as a social partner. (114) EPFL is thus an umbrella organisation for the national football league organisations that organise national competitions. Remarkably, these organisations are controlled by the clubs that play in these national leagues. EPFL therefore indirectly represents the European football clubs that play in the top national European leagues.

UEFA recognised the EPFL as the legitimate representative of the professional leagues in Europe (115) and commits to ensure that the views of the leagues are incorporated in its decision-making process. (116) In return, the leagues commit among others to abstain from organising 'any supra-national sporting competitions, tournaments or football matches'. (117) The EPFL currently works in close co-operation with UEFA. An expression of the latter can be found in article 4.4 of the Memorandum of understanding between the UEFA and the EPFL, which states that if requested by the EPFL, UEFA would provide administrative and logistical support for EPFL close to the UEFA headquarters including office spaces. Currently, in recognition of its close relationship with UEFA, the EPFL has its main office very close to the UEFA headquarters. (118)

Why do they engage?

Since EPFL indirectly represents the European football clubs, their incentives to participate in a social dialogue at the EU-level are very similar to those of the ECA. In addition, a recognition of EPFL at the EU-level by means of a participation in a ESSDC also increases its credibility and contributes to its raison d'etre and consequently to its organisational strength.

Representativeness

In his Study into the possible participation of EPFL and G-14 in a social dialogue in the European professional football sector, (119) Siekmann reached the conclusion that the EPFL is very representative. This conclusion is confirmed by the in supra mentioned study on the representativeness of the social partner organisations in the professional football sector. (120) Siekmann however noted that EPFL is not independent from UEFA's structures and argued that, analogous to the fundamental principle in a democratic society of independent social partner organisations, social partner organisations involved in a European social dialogue should be independent from national and international football governing bodies. (121)

In addition to this, the power to negotiate and conclude agreements from EPFL is seriously undermined by the fact that, analogous to similar issues in other industries, their strongest national member leagues (such as for instance the English, Italian, or Spanish ones) will never give away their bargaining powers to their representatives in Brussels.

5.1.4. ECA

Founded only in 2008 and simultaneously recognised by UEFA, (122) the ECA is an independent autonomous body directly representing the European football clubs. The 197 represented clubs are drawn from every one of the 53 National Associations within UEFA. (123) The ECA is composed of 103 clubs with the precise number of clubs from each member association to be established every two years at the end of the UEFA season on the basis of the then current UEFA ranking position of its member associations. (124) Under article 2(c) of its statute, one of the objectives of the ECA is 'to represent the interests of the clubs as employers in Europe including in the social dialogue process and to act as a social partner where appropriate'.

The ECA was founded as a result of the dissolution of the G-14, the association of 18 of the leading professional football clubs in Europe, constituted in 2000 but originating from an informal network founded in 1997. (125)

Why do they engage?

Due to football's hierarchical governance network, professional football clubs are subjected to the rules and regulations of the governing bodies just like professional football players. With the growing commercial nature of professional football, clubs began contesting the monopolistic power of football's governing bodies. In this sense, the G-14 was founded as a pressure group against UEFA and FIFA (126) and it used the EU institutions as mediators in its conflict with them. (127) This conflict reached a climax with the so-called Charleroi/Oulmers case (128) concerning the payment of compensation to the national football clubs when their players are called up for their national team. The G-14 decided to join this case citing a lack of clubs' representation in the governance of professional football rules, which results in unfair and undemocratic rules for its decision. (129)

The parties to the dispute however decided to arrange matter out of the courts and met in January 2008 in FIFA's headquarters. There, representatives of FIFA, UEFA and the clubs agreed on a set of actions aimed at regulating their future relationship. The Charleroi/Oulmers case was withdrawn and the payment of financial contributions to clubs for player participation in European Championships and World Cups was agreed. Furthermore, the G-14 was dissolved and in its place the ECA was established and subsequently recognised by FIFA and UEFA. (130) Finally, UEFA agreed to grant four ECA-representatives a seat in its Professional Football Strategy Council.

With the above described tensions, it is clear that football clubs can use the EU institutions as a means to pressure football's governing bodies. The added value of the ESSDC, which in general is often used to lobby EU policies, (131) must be seen in this sense. However, since the amicable settlement of the Charleroi/Oulmers dispute out of the EU's Courts, tensions between the clubs and UEFA have dramatically decreased. Some clubs are nevertheless not satisfied with the mere consultative role they have been given within the context of the Professional Football Strategy Council and seek representation in UEFA's Executive Body. (132)

Representativeness

Unlike EPFL (see supra), ECA is very much independent of UEFA. (133) With a member base extending even far beyond the EU-territory, there can also be no doubt about ECA's representativeness. However, because its membership is based on the UEFA ranking of its member associations, wealthy and powerful clubs are clearly overrepresented. Also, ECA does not fulfil the criterion set by the European Commission that a social partner organisation at European level should consist of organisations which are themselves an integral and recognized part of Member States' social partner structures and with the capacity to negotiate agreements. (134) Contrary to the EPFL, whose member leagues in some countries act as representative organisations, the ECA represents clubs directly so that they can never fulfil this criterion. The Commission however acknowledged the difficulty to predetermine the form of a social dialogue in the sport sector and stressed that it would examine any request to set up a ESSDC in a pragmatic manner. (135) It seems that this has encouraged the Commission to be rather flexible in the application of its own criteria when assessing ECA's suitability for the ESSDC. Given the above described difficulties in determining suitable social partners in the professional football sector and by extension the sports sector globally, this seems only reasonable. Moreover, ECA's independence from UEFA is certainly an advantage compared to EPFL's stronger ties with UEFA.

6. Negotiations: key points

Recently, FIFPro has reported about the many abuses in Eastern Europe regarding players' contracts. Amongst these are: incentives and bonuses only paid in the event of good performance, to be determined by the club; no contract guarantee during illness and/or injuries; a net salary of which only 10 percent is guaranteed; penalties from 10% to 100% of salary and bonuses unilaterally determined by the club management; the club can reduce the level of the incentive premiums and bonuses during the term of the contract, etc. (136) The adoption of Minimum Requirements in standard players' contracts at European Union level becomes thus very important in order to better define duties and obligations of the contractual parties in conformity with EU law and FIFA relevant rules on the status and transfer of players.

Already in 2006, FIFPro, EPFL and UEFA agreed upon Minimum Requirements for a professional football players' contract, elaborated by a working group consisting of members of the three parties. (137) The implementation of this agreement thus seemed like a suitable starting point for the ESSDC.

Table 1 depicts the emergence of the ESSDC in the professional football sector from the Joint Request by FIFPro and EPFL to the establishment of the Rules of Procedure.

10 December EPFL and FIFPro joint request to the
2007 Commission for the establishment of a
 Social Dialogue Committee in the
 Professional Football sector

13 March 2008 European Commission's letter, confirming
 the existence of the conditions for the
 creation of a Social Dialogue Committee
 in the Professional Football sector

14 May 2008 Professional Football Strategy Council
 agreement on EU social dialogue (Rules
 of Procedure and Work Programme)

1 July 2008 Official Launch of the ESSDC in the
 Professional Football sector

27 October 2008 Addendum to the Rules of Procedure of the
 European Social Dialogue (agreed by the
 PFSC)

Table 1: the ESSDC: from Joint Request to Rules of Procedure

The first Work Programme of the ESSDC (138), annexed to the rules of procedure, set the framework for the next two years by identifying the strategy and goals the social partners jointly wanted to achieve and react on. Should UEFA, FIFPro, EPFL and ECA so decide, other issues may also be included on the agenda. According to the Work Programme, the main objective of the Committee was to discuss and, where agreed, promote and develop the concept of 'the European Professional Football player contract minimum requirements' throughout the European Union Member States. The Programme is silent about the national football associations affiliated to UEFA which are not situated in EU Member states.

FIFPro's hopes were that the conclusion of the agreement on Minimum Requirements would serve as a starting point for a broader cooperation at the European level between the social partners. They already had their minds set on new topics that could be added to the agenda of the ESSDC, like the establishment of a general pension fund for professional footballers. (139) FIFPro's eventual goal was to conclude a real Collective Bargaining Agreement at European level on fundamental labour conditions in professional football. (140)

6.1. The European Professional Football player contract minimum requirements

A compromise proposal has been reached in January 2011 on the European Professional Football Player Contract Minimum Requirements (hereafter referred to as 'MRSPC'), elaborated by a working group comprising members of UEFA, FIFPro and EPFL. The first fifteen articles of the Agreement are almost identical to the provisions of the 2006 agreed minimum requirements. (141) Added to these provisions are quite innovative articles like those concerning anti-racism and discrimination, more favourable provisions, implementation and enforcement, the complete agreement and revision, the length of the agreement and, finally, the role of UEFA.

In the preamble of the Agreement it is made clear that the provisions of the EU Treaties, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, and secondary EU law apply to professional football players' contracts without prejudice to more stringent and/or more specific provisions contained in this agreement. The Parties commit to further elaborate provisions regulating the employment relationship in the professional football sector, taking into account its specific nature, in future agreements. Where appropriate, agreements on matters falling into the scope of Article 153 of the TFEU may be submitted to the Commission for adoption by Council decision in line with the procedure laid down in Article 155 TFEU.

The first minimum requirement concerns the contract, its form and essential elements. Pursuant to art. 3 'the Contract must be in writing, duly signed by the Club and the Player with the necessary legal binding power of signature. It also includes indications with regard to place and date of when the Contract was duly signed. In the case of a minor the parent/guardian must also sign the Contract'. Following the current procedure in many national sports associations, the Club and the Player each (must) receive a copy of the Contract and one copy has to be forwarded to the professional league and/or national association for registration according to the provisions of the competent football body. Then reference must be made to the essential data to identify the contracting parties, such as the name, surname, birth date, nationality(-ies) as well as the full address of the residency of the Player (only an individual person). In the case of a minor the parent/guardian must also be mentioned accordingly. The Contract states the full legal name of the Club (incl. register number) and its full address as well as the name, surname and address of the person who is legally representing the Club. (142)

Of course, the Contract should define a clear starting date as well as the ending date and Club and Player have equal rights to negotiate an extension and/or an earlier termination of the Contract in accordance with the relevant international and national legislation land case law. This is by far one of the most important minimum requirements whereas several clubs in Europe still foresee such a clause only in favour of the clubs and this despite a consolidated jurisprudence of the FIFA Dispute Resolution chamber which expressly forbids these so-called 'potestative clauses'. (143)

Any early termination must be founded (just cause). In cases of prolonged periods of injury/illness or of permanent incapacity of the Player, the Club may serve a reasonable notice to the Player (144)

The national legislation of the country where the Club is duly registered applies to the Employment agreement unless another legislation is not explicitly otherwise agreed. Moreover, the Contract shall be governed by the law chosen by the Club and the Player. Such a choice may not, however, have the result of depriving the Player of the protection afforded to him by provisions that cannot be derogated from by agreement under the law of the state where the Club is established.

The Contract regulates the employment relationship among the parties and no further contract should cover the employment relationship between the Player and the Club. If another contract exists or is signed at a later stage then the parties are obliged to refer to this Contract or to any subsequent employment agreement. Any additional contract related to the Contract must be sent to the professional league and/or the national association. (145)

The Contract must contain all rights and duties between the Player and the Club. In particular pursuant to art. 6 the Contract should define the Club's financial obligations such as, for example: a) salary (regular; monthly, weekly, performance based); b) other financial benefits (bonuses, experience reward, international appearances); c) other benefits (non-financial ones such as car, accommodation, etc.); d) medical and health insurance for accident and illness (as mandatory by law) and payment of salary during incapacity (definition to be determined including its consequences with regard to salaries paid); e) pension fund/social security costs (as mandatory by law or collective bargaining agreement); f) reimbursements for expenses incurred by the Player. The Contract must define the currency, the amount, the due date for each amount (e.g. by the end of each month) and the manner of payment. In that regard it is important to stress that in order to guarantee transparency the payment -at least for an international transfer- should be done only via bank account or via the so called FIFA Transfer Match System. The Contract also regulates the financial impact in case of major changes of revenue of the Club (e.g. promotion/relegation). As minimum requirement, the Club and the Player agree on the payment of taxes according to national legislation. Also, the Contract should define the paid leave (holidays) (146), clearly explain health and safety policy of the Club (147), and should even include provisions which are quite uncommon in a national collective bargaining agreement in football, such as those concerning gambling, (148) protection of human rights (e.g. right of free expression of the player) and the non-discrimination against the Player. (149)

Peculiar is the clause according to which the Contract also regulates the keeping of proper records on injury (incl. those incurred on national team duty) whilst respecting confidentiality. If law does not provide otherwise, as a principle the records on injury are kept by the responsible team doctor. (150)

Of course, to the above enumerated obligations for clubs correspond those for players which are listed in art. 7 of the minimum requirements and which are de facto the obligations already inserted in the vast majority of contracts around the world. (151)

A specific provision is foreseen for the protection of minors (152) which makes reference to Council Directive 94/33/EC of 22 June 1994 on the protection of young people at work. The Contact ensures that every youth player involved in its youth development programme has the possibility to follow mandatory school education in accordance with national law and that no youth player involved in its youth development programme is prevented from continuing their non-football education. This may also apply to prepare a second career after football (retirement). This provision is in line with the policy adopted by FIFA at international level in its Regulations on the Status and transfer of players. (153)

Since the employment relationship between a club and a player may end in a labour dispute, art. 10 of the minimum requirements is dedicated to player discipline and grievance. It is expressly stated that the Club establishes in writing appropriate internal disciplinary rules with sanctions/penalties and the necessary procedures, which the Player abides by. And then - it is quite curious to read that 'The Club has to explain such rules to the Player'. The Club fixes these rules and procedures as well as the sanctions including fines according to local agreement and standards. If the Player violates any of the obligations to which he is subject under the Contract, according to these disciplinary regulations the Club may impose a range of penalties, depending on the severity of the offence, The Player has a right to appeal and the right to be accompanied/represented by the Club captain or a union representative. The Contract fixes the process for disputes between the Player and the Club on issues not covered by the Contract. Particularly important are the provisions on Dispute resolutions. Subject to national legislation and national collective bargaining agreements, any dispute between the Club and the Player regarding the Contract shall be submitted of Players, (154) disputes may be settled by the Dispute Resolution Chamber, with an appeal possibility to the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). (155)

6.2. The implementation strategy of the European Commission

Implementation is the key issue of the Minimum Requirements as because of their legal nature, they are not legally binding per se. As the European Professional Football player contract minimum requirements were for the most part already agreed upon by FIFPro, EPFL and UEFA in 2006, the actual content of these provisions was not so much subject to debate in the ESSDC. The discord between the parties was on the method of implementation of these minimum requirements.

On this note, FIFPro but also other stakeholders wanted a full agreement between all the parties, not only for the territory of the European Union but for the whole UEFA territory. (156) Bearing in mind the two implementation routes provided for by the Treaty, this a priori poses a problem. An agreement through a Council decision resulting in a Directive would definitely mean a full agreement which would ensure a uniform implementation in all EU Member States. However, the implementation would naturally be limited to the 27 EU Member states and as a consequence it would not be extended to the remaining national football associations who are outside the EU or the EEA but nevertheless affiliated to UEFA. FIFPro nonetheless aimed for a binding agreement for all the parties for the whole UEFA territory, which was not agreed in the Work Programme, and refused to conclude an agreement through the voluntary route. The latter would impose no real binding obligations on the parties and would hardly be enforceable. Tensions in the ESSDC between FIFPro and the other parties mounted as the latter were reportedly not prepared to sign a binding agreement. (157)

In an attempt to resolve the differences among the signatory parties and in order to reconcile their diverging visions (the players' representatives aiming at having a legally binding document while the clubs willing to have a voluntary agreement), the European Commission -on the basis of a specific request from all negotiating parties- proposed a compromise agreement to the professional football ESSDC parties on the implementation of the European Professional Football player minimum contract requirements. (158) By doing this, the Commission took an important role within the committee. Pursuant to article 152 TFEU, the Commission shall merely 'facilitate dialogue between the social partners, respecting their Autonomy'. Article 154(1) TFEU however adds that '[...]the Commission [...]shall take any relevant measure to facilitate their dialogue by ensuring balanced support for the parties'. Consequently, the drafting of a compromise agreement can be seen as a relevant measure to facilitate the dialogue through a balanced support of the parties. In addition, as the Commission did not lay down any rules on the method of implementation of agreements, the ESSDC parties may conclude agreements in any way they mutually agree. This would have allowed the professional football ESSDC partners to implement the Commission's compromise proposal, if they had decided to do so.

The Commission's implementation proposal was largely aimed at strengthening the implementation through the 'voluntary route' in all countries covered by UEFA. In case a national collective bargaining agreement existed, the relevant partners concerned would implement the Minimum Requirements in the national collective bargaining agreement. An analysis on the existence of Standard Player Contracts and collective bargaining agreements in the UEFA territory, conducted within the context of the ESSDC in Professional Football (159)shows that in England, The Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, Sweden, Latvia, Portugal, Spain, France, Italy, Austria, Greece and Macedonia, the minimum requirements would be implemented in the existing bargaining agreements.

In case no national bargaining agreement exists, implementation would have to be supervised by a taskforce created under the compromise agreement. Composed of experts from each of the four ESSDC parties, the 'European Professional Football Social Dialogue Taskforce' would have the assignment to coordinate the promotion and implementation of the agreement in close cooperation with the Parties on a country-by-country basis.

Within 6 months after the signing of the Commission's proposal, the agreement on minimum requirements already had to be implemented in the following countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, England, N.Ireland, Wales, Scotland, Norway and Switzerland. The Universite Catholique de Louvain Study on the representativeness of the social partner organisations in the professional football sector showed that in these countries, there is already a model contract or standard employment contract, which serves as a reference at the time of setting up and signing a contract. (160) Therefore, there is no valid reason to postpone the implementation of the agreement in these countries and thus, this provision in the Commission's proposal seems only fair.

FIFPro immediately was prepared to sign the Commission's proposal. However, the other involved parties still had serious concerns about its legal implications. On Monday 28 February 2011, ECA, EPFL and UEFA refused to sign the Commission's proposal, stating that they needed more time to study its legal consequences and to have the agreement approved internally. FIFPro declared that 'the parties apparently were not ready to sign a legally binding agreement'. (161) It seemed that the ESSDC in professional football had come to a severe impasse.

6.3. The August 2011 compromise Agreement

In the summer of 2011, UEFA, ECA and EPFL issued a proposal regarding the implementation of the MRSPS to the board of FIFPro Division Europe. The latter accepted this compromise proposal and at the time the authors are finalising this article small details remain to be drawn up in order to complete the relevant approval procedures. (162) Nevertheless, in August, the parties reached a final agreement on the MRSPC. The Agreement will now have to be approved or ratified by the internal bodies of the signatory parties. If this goes well, the official signing ceremony of the Agreement should be held in 2012.

The Agreement is strongly based on the above treated compromise proposal by the European Commission. However, compared to the latter proposal, the provisions concerning the implementation of the MRSPC -i.e. article 18 MRSPC- are considerably more extensive. Explicit reference is made to article 155 TFEU, emphasising that the parties agreed to transform the MRSPC into a European autonomous agreement in the framework of the ESSDC in the professional football sector. Unlike in the Commission's proposal, it is also stressed that the Agreement commits the Parties to use best endeavours (emphasis added) to ensure the implementation at national level where possible, not only in the EU territory but also in the rest of the UEFA Territory. Furthermore, article 18 MRSPC stipulates that implementation of the Agreement will follow only after it has been approved and/or ratified by the appropriate Organs of the Parties (i.e. General Assembly, Congress etc.). This provision was also not included in the compromise proposal by the Commission. Finally, any disagreement concerning the implementation process at national level must be resolved by negotiations both at national and at European level.

In Annex 8 to the Agreement, the implementation and enforcement of the MRSPC are dealt with in more detail. Again, it is stressed that the parties will use best endeavours to ensure the implementation of the Agreement. Whereas the proposal by the Commission envisioned a period of maximum six months in the relevant countries, article 1.1 of Annex 8 stipulates that within one year after the date of signature of the Agreement, the members of the Social Partners will implement this Agreement in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, England, N.Ireland, Wales, Scotland, Switzerland and Norway. Pursuant to article 1.2, the members of the Social Partners will implement the Agreement in Bulgaria, Greece/Cyprus, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Slovenia within 2 (or 3) years after the date of signature of the Agreement. In the remaining countries the Agreement should be implemented no later than three years after the date of signature of the Agreement. (163)

Pursuant to article 1.4 of Annex 8, the Parties have individually the right to postpone the deadline for all countries mentioned in articles 1.2 and 1.3. However, a party doing this has to consult the rest of the Parties to the Agreement before effecting the postponement and all Parties to the Agreement have to agree on the duration of the postponement.

The remaining provisions in Annex 8 on the implementation of the Agreement in existing national bargaining agreements are the same as those envisioned in the implementation strategy of the European Commission. If there is no collective bargaining agreement in place, the most appropriate and effective implementation method will be used. Finally, a European Professional Football Social Dialogue Taskforce will be established.

It is clear that the compromise Agreement is weaker than the compromise proposal of the European Commission. Nevertheless, thanks to the fact that UEFA is one of the stakeholders which is at the moment very engaged in the so-called 'Financial Fair Play', it could facilitate the acceptance of the minimum requirements by clubs and leagues.

Conclusions

Social dialogue in professional football is essentially about the credibility of the autonomy of sports associations and the EU institutions have always expressed great respect for their self-regulations. However, in its recent (January 2011) Communication 'Developing the European Dimension in Sport', the Commission of the European Union stresses that good governance is a condition for the self-regulation and autonomy of the sports sector, which must also respect EU law. (164) In general, transparency, democracy, accountability and representation of stakeholders (associations, federations, players, clubs, leagues, supporters, etc.) are considered as principles of good governance. (165) In this sense, social dialogue is an important element of good governance because it contributes to the shaping of employment relations and working conditions in an active and participative way by giving the stakeholders the opportunity to give their input.

Finding the right balance between treating football (and sports in general) as a 'normal' economic activity and taking into account the notion of 'specificity' is yet very difficult. The recognition of too few specificities of sport may lead to an ineffective sports market, while too many will undermine the fundamental rights of stakeholders within the sector. (166)

Therefore social dialogue is the best instrument for allowing the stakeholders to take into account the specificity of sport while guaranteeing a right balance between the fundamental rights of professional football players but also those of professional clubs to compete in a free market.

In addition, it is an essential tool which enables the sports organisations to better define their own legal framework in compliance with the relevant EU rules as well as with the needs of their members. The alternative to this is the regulation of the sector through the enforcement of private rights by the Court of Justice of the European Union. Given the fact that the Court only rules on a case by case basis regarding the conformity of (international) sport regulations with EU law, this can lead to an uneven regulation in the sector.

In this article, we demonstrated that despite many difficulties related to the nature and role of the stakeholders as well as the (sporting and economic) interests at stake, they were eventually able to agree on an agreement on minimum requirement which is probably the best they could achieve for the time being. The fact remains that social dialogue is a tool for ensuring a balanced regulation of the sector which is respectful of the fundamental rights of all the parties involved. If the professional football sector wants to remain autonomous, it is of vital importance that all football stakeholders get an equal input in its governance.

Caption: Figure 1: Joint outcomes of the European sectoral social dialogue committees (1998-February 2010)

Caption: Source: Commission of the European Union, Commission staff working document on the functioning and potential of European sectoral social dialogue, SEC (2010) 964 final, annex 4.

(1.) See Commission of the European Union, White Paper on Sport, COM (2007) 391 Final, July 2007, 13 (see: ec.europa.eu/sport/white-paper/doc/wp_on_sport_en.pdf, accessed 10 July 2011; Declaration on the Specific Characteristics of Sport and its Social Function in Europe, of which Account Should be Taken in Implementing Common Policies, (see: ec.europa.eu/sport/information-center/doc/timeline/doc244_en.pdf, accessed 9 July 2011); M. Colucci, 'EU Sports Law and Policy beyond the White Paper on Sport and the Treaty of Lisbon', in M. Colucci, R. Blanpain and F. Hendrickx (eds.), The Future of Sport in the European Union, The Hague, Kluwer Law, 2008.

(2.) On the autonomy and specificity of sport, see R. Blanpain, 'The Specificity of Sport from a Legal Perspective'; M. Colucci, 'EU Sports Law and Policy beyond the White Paper on Sport and the Treaty of Lisbon'; R. Siekmann, 'Is Sport "Special" under EU Law and Policy?'; J. Zylberstein, 'The Specificity of Sport in the EU Policy'; J. de Dios Crespo Perez, 'The Specificity of Sport in the CAS Jurisprudence' in M. Colucci, R. Blanpain and F. Hendrickx (eds.), The Future of Sport in the European Union, The Hague, Kluwer Law, 2008.

(3.) The International Labour Organization (ILO) defines social dialogue as follows: 'to include all types of negotiations, consultation or simply exchange of information between or among representatives of governments, employers and workers, on issues of common interest relating to economic and social policy'. ILO, Social dialogue, 2011 (see: http://www.ilo.org/public/english/dialogue/themes/sd.htm, accessed 9 July 2011).

(4.) Commission of the European Union, Social Dialogue, (see ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=329&langId=en, accessed 9 July 2011).

(5.) S. Smismans 'The European Social Dialogue between Constitutional and Labour Law', European Law Review, vol. 32, 2007, 342.

(6.) Commission of the European Union, Communication from the Commission: Partnership for change in an enlarged Europe - Enhancing the contribution of European social dialogue, COM (2004) 557 final, 12.

(7.) Commission of the European Union, White Paper on Sport, COM (2007) 391 Final, July 2007 [Hereinafter White Paper on Sport], 18 (see: ec.europa.eu/sport/white-paper/doc/wp_on_sport_en.pdf, accessed 10 July 2011).

(8.) Declaration 29 on sport to the Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties Establishing the European Communities and Certain Related Acts, 1997 O.J. C 340/1.

(9.) Commission of the European Union (1999), Report from the Commission to the European Council with a view to safeguarding sports structures and maintaining the social significance of sport within the Community framework: The Helsinki Report on Sport, COM(1999) 644, p.10.

(10.) Declaration on the Specific Characteristics of Sport and its Social Function in Europe, of which Account Should be Taken in Implementing Common Policies, [section] 7 (see: ec.europa.eu/sport/information-center/doc/timeline/doc244_en.pdf, accessed 9 July 2011). The Declaration of Nice was not incorporated into the Treaty and was merely adopted by the Council as a joint declaration. Discussing and summing up the relevance of sport for shaping the European Union comprehensively and in such detail at top political level for the first time, it proved to be of great political relevance and influence.

(11.) Ibid, [section] 16.

(12.) FIFA is the worldwide international governing body of football (for further information see: http://www.fifa.com, accessed 10 July 2011)

(13.) UEFA is the governing body of European football and has the responsibility for safeguarding the development and interests of the sport at all levels (both professional and amateur) both in the EU and the rest of Europe (for further information see: www.uefa.com, accessed 10 July 2011).

(14.) Letter from Mario Monti to Joseph S. Blatter, D/000258, 5 March 2001.

(15.) ECJ, Union Royale Belge Societes de Football Association and others v. Bosman and others, Case C-415/93, [1995] E.C.R. I-04921.

(16.) Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 45, 2008 O.J. C 115/47 [hereinafter TFEU].

(17.) A list of these projects can be found at Commission of the European Union, Commission Staff Working Document, The EU and Sport: Background and Context, Accompanying Document to the White Paper on Sport, footnote 149, COM (2007) 391 final, July 2007 [Hereinafter White paper on sport staff working document], (see: ec.europa.eu/sport/white-paper/doc/dts935_en.pdf, accessed 8 July 2011). Recently Commission of the European Union, Developing the European Dimension in Sport, 12, COM (2011) 12 final, January 2011 (see: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2011:0012:FIN: en:PDF, accessed 10 July 2011).

(18.) White Paper on Sport, supra note 7.

(19.) 'The EU & Sport: matching expectations': Consultation Conference with the European Sport Movement, 14-15 June 2005 and 'The Role of Sport in Europe': Conference with the European Sport Movement, June 2006.

(20.) White Paper on Sport, supra note 7, section 4.

(21.) Ibid, section 5.3.

(22.) White paper on sport staff working document, supra note 17, section 5.3.

(23.) R. Blanpain and M. Colucci, 'The European Social Dialogue in Sports' in: G. Di Cola (ed.), Beyond the Scoreboard. Youth employment opportunities and skills development in the sports sector, Geneva, ILO, 2006, 109.

(24.) Ibid, 110.

(25.) See: www.easesport.org/art.php?id=3210, accessed 10 July 2011.

(26.) UNI Europa is a European trade union federation. It unites trade unions organising in services and skills sectors in 50 different countries and has over 320 affiliated trade union organisations, representing 7 million workers. EURO-MEI, the Media, Entertainment, Arts and Sports sector of UNI Europa, is developing worker representation in the sport and active leisure sector. For more information, see: http://www.uniglobalunion.org/Apps/iportal.nsf/pages/20100319_pee9En, accessed 10 July 2011.

(27.) EURO-MEI and EASE sign joint statement on sport social dialogue, 27 May 2009, (See: www.uniglobalunion.org/Apps/UNINews.nsf/0/2557CCAAC9559E42C125761500544B79, accessed 10 July 2011).

(28.) For more information, see: ease.franceolympique.com/art.php?id=26274, accessed 10 July 2011.

(29.) EASE and UNI EUROPA Sport, 'Common position on European Social Dialogue in the European Commission's Communication "Developing the European Dimension in Sport"', 21 February 2011 (see: www.easesport.org/ease/fichiers/File/Communucation_CE_2011/Positions_communes/EASE__UNI_Europa_Sport/ease_uni_europa_sport_common_position_ec_com_feb11_en.pdf, accessed 30 July 2011).

(30.) EPFL was founded only in June 2005. EPFL, History (see: www.epfl-europeanleagues.com/history.htm, accessed 11 July 2011).

(31.) Commission Press Release, IP/08/1064 (Jul. 1, 2008), Footballers and employers launch new EU forum for social dialogue (see: europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/08/1064, accessed 10 July 2011.).

(32.) Commission of the European Union, Commission Decision on the establishment of Sectoral Dialogue Committees promoting the dialogue between the social partners at European level, 20 May 1998 [hereinafter Commission ESSDC Decision] COM (1998) 500 final.

(33.) Id., art. 1

(34.) This Social Chapter of the Treaty was introduced with the amendment of the Treaty of the European Community (TEC) by the Treaties of Amsterdam and Nice (Articles 136 ff. TEC, now Articles 151 ff. TFEU), and incorporated the Agreement on Social Policy of 31 October 1991 between 11 of the then 12 Member States (the U.K. was not party to the Agreement), which proposed a radical change in the Community legislative process in the sphere of social policy.

(35.) Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 152(1), 2008 O.J. C 115/47 [hereinafter TFEU].

(36.) R. Blanpain and M. Colucci, l.c., 105.

(37.) TFEU, supra note 35, art. 154(4), 2008 O.J.C. 115.

(38.) Id. art. 155(1).

(39.) Id. art. 155(2).

(40.) S. Smismans, l.c., 343.

(41.) Commission of the European Union, Communication concerning the application of the Agreement on social policy presented by the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, COM (93) 600 final, (December 1993), point 37.

(42.) Declaration annexed to TFEU, supra note 35, art. 155(2), 2008 O.J.C.

(43.) E. Franssen, Legal Aspects of the European Social Dialogue, Antwerp, Intersentia, 2002, 128-136.

(44.) See: Commission of the European Union, Commission Staff working Paper of 2 July 2008: Report on the implementation of the European social partners' Framework Agreement on Telework SEC (2008) 217.

(45.) TFEU, supra note 35, art. 288, 2008 O.J.C. 115.

(46.) These fields are (a) improvement in particular of the working environment to protect workers' health and safety; (b) working conditions; (c) social security and social protection of workers; (d) protection of workers where their employment contract is terminated; (e) the information and consultation of workers; (f) representation and collective defence of the interests of workers and employers, including codetermination, subject to paragraph 5 153 TFEU; (g) conditions of employment for third-country nationals legally residing in Union territory; (h) the integration of persons excluded from the labour market, without prejudice to Article 166; (i) equality between men and women with regard to labour market opportunities and treatment at work; (j) the combating of social exclusion; (k) the modernisation of social protection systems without prejudice to point (c).

(47.) This essentially means a deviation from the normal legislative procedure as listed in TFEU art. 294. According to TFEU art. 155(2), the European Parliament shall be informed.

(48.) TFEU art. 16 (3) states: 'the Council shall act by a qualified majority except where the Treaties provide otherwise'.

(49.) TFEU, supra note 35, art. 155(2), 2008 O.J.C. 115.

(50.) Commission of the European Union, Communication concerning the application of the Agreement on social policy presented by the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, COM (93) 600 final, (December 1993), point 41.

(51.) Id, point 42.

(52.) S. Smismans, l.c., 346.

(53.) Commission of the European Union, Commission Decision of 20 May 1998 on the establishment of Sectoral Dialogue Committees promoting the dialogue between the social partners at European level, COM (1998) 500 final, art. 3.

(54.) Id., art. 5(2)

(55.) Id., art. 5(1)

(56.) Id., art. 3

(57.) Commission of the European Union, Commission staff working document on the functioning and potential of European sectoral social dialogue SEC (2010) 964 final.

(58.) P. Pochet, European Social Dialogue between Hard and Soft Law. Conference paper presented at the EUSA Tenth Biennial International Conference, Montreal, 17-19 May 2007, 5 (see: http://www.unc.edu/euce/eusa2007/papers/pochet-p-08f.pdf, accessed 12 March 2011).

(59.) The Laeken Declaration on the Future of the European Union, Annex 1 to the Presidency Conclusions of the European Council Meeting in Laeken, 14-15 December 2001, Brussels, No. SN 300/1/01 REV 1, 19-27.

(60.) Commission of the European Union, Communication from the Commission: The European social dialogue, a force for innovation and change COM (2002) 341 final; R. De Boer, H. Benedictus and M. van der Meer, 'Broadening without Intensification: The Added Value of the European Social and Sectoral Dialogue', European Journal of Industrial Relations, vol. 11, 65.

(61.) E. Arcq, A. Dufresne and P. Pochet, 'The Employers: Hidden Face of European Industrial Relations', Transfer, vol. 9, 2003, 302-321; A. Branch and J. Greenwood 'European Employers: Social Partners?' in H. Compston and J. Greenwood (eds.), Social Partnership in the European Union, Houndmills, Palgrave, 2001, 41-70.

(62.) Commission of the European Union, Communication from the Commission: Partnership for change in an enlarged Europe -Enhancing the contribution of European social dialogue COM (2004) 557 final.

(63.) Commission of the European Union, Commission staff working document on the functioning and potential of European sectoral social dialogue, SEC (2010) 964 final, 9.

(64.) P. Pochet, l.c., 17.

(65.) R. De Boer et al., l.c., 61.

(66.) Ibid., 66; P. Pochet, l.c., 15.

(67.) European Commission, Rules of procedure for the European sectoral social dialogue committee in the professional football sector, July 2008 [hereinafter ESSDCPF Rules of Procedure], art. 3 (see ec.europa.eu/employment_social/dsw/public/actRetrieveText.do?id=8679, accessed 11 July 2011)

(68.) Id., art. 4.

(69.) De Boer et al., l.c., 55.

(70.) Ibid., 55-56.

(71.) Commission of the European Union, Commission staff working document on the functioning and potential of European sectoral social dialogue SEC (2010) 964 final, 17.

(72.) Commission ESSDC Decision, Supra note 32, art. 1.

(73.) R. Siekmann, 'Study into the possible participation of EPFL and G14 in a social dialogue in the European Professional Football Sector', The International Sports Law Journal, vol. 3, 2006, 80.

(74.) UEFA, Vision Europe, the Direction and Development of European Football over the Next Decade, Nyon, UEFA, 2005.

(75.) The other continental organisations are AFC (Asian Football Confederation), CAF (Confederation Africaine de Football), CONCACAF (Confederation of North, Central American and Caribbean Association Football), CONMEBOL (Confederacion Sudamericana de Futbol) and OFC (Oceania Football Confederation).

(76.) FIFA Statutes, August 2010 edition, art. 20(3) a (see: www.fifa.com/mm/document/affederation/generic/01/29/85/71/fifastatuten2010_e.pdf, accessed 11 July).

(77.) FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, edition 2010 [hereinafter FIFA Regulations] (see www.fifa.com/mm/document/affederation/administration/01/27/64/30/regulationsstatusandtransfer2010_e.pdf, accessed 11 July 2011).

(78.) UEFA Statutes, edition 2010, art. 7bis (see: www.uefa.com/MultimediaFiles/Download/Regulations/uefaorg/General/01/47/69/97/1476997_DOWNLOAD.pdf, accessed 11 July 2011).

(79.) See e.g. S. Szymanski, 'The future of football in Europe'. in P. Rodriguez, S. Kesenne, and J. Garcia (eds.), Sports Economics After Fifty Years: Essays in Honour of Simon Rottenberg, Oviedo, University of Oviedo, 2007, 200; M. Holt, 'The Ownership and Control of Elite Club Competition in European Football'. Soccer & Society, vol. 8, 2007, 51.

(80.) M. Holt, 'The Ownership and Control of Elite Club Competition in European Football' Soccer & Society, vol. 8, 2007, 52-53.

(81.) For instance in 2000, Media Partners, a private business group linked to the Fininvest conglomerate that owns the club A.C. Milan had plans to set up a European Super League by luring fourteen of the most successful European clubs away from their respective national leagues.

(82.) IOC-FIFA, joint declaration, 2007 (see: www.fifa.com/aboutfifa/organisation/news/newsid=550327/index.html, accessed 11 July 2011).

(83.) B. Garcia, 'Sport governance after the White Paper: the demise of the European model?', International Journal of Sport Policy, vol. 1, 2009, 274.

(84.) These movements however fall short of the ambitions expressed by some professional leagues and clubs, who are seeking direct representation (i.e. on the executive committee). See: B. Garcia, 'The European Union and the Governance of Football: A Game of Levels and Agendas' [Thesis (PhD)], Loughborough University, 2008, 37.

(85.) UEFA Statutes, supra note 78, art. 35.

(86.) ESSDCPF Rules of Procedure, supra note 67, 5.

(87.) White paper on sport staff working document, supra note 17, section 5.3.

(88.) R. Parrish, 'Social Dialogue in European Professional Football', European Law Journal, vol. 17, 2011, 215-216.

(89.) B. Garcia, 'UEFA and the European Union: From Confrontation to Cooperation', Journal of Contemporary European Research, vol. 3, 2007, 202-223.

(90.) M. Holt, l.c., 2007, 62.

(91.) UEFA Statutes, supra note 78, art. 2.

(92.) FIFA Statutes, supra note 76, art. 20(3) a

(93.) FIFA Regulations, supra note 77.

(94.) See: http://www.fifpro.org/about, accessed 12 July 2011.

(95.) FIFPro, 'About Division Europe' (see: http://www.fifpro.org/division/index/1/show:details, accessed 12 July 2011).

(96.) FIFPro Statutes, art. 1(2) (See: www.fifpro.org/img/uploads/file/FIFPro_Articles_eng.pdf, accessed 12 July 2011).

(97.) Ibid., art. 3(1).

(98.) Supra, note 15.

(99.) Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union art. 17, 2010 O.J. C 83/01.

(100.) Letter Mario Monti to Michael Zen-Ruffinen (FIFA general secretary), November 2000. Also, see: 'Statement from Mario Monti on football transfers', annexed in R. Blanpain, The Legal Status of Sportsmen and Sportswomen under International, European and Belgian National and Regional Law, The Hague, Kluwer Law, 2003, 143.

(101.) J. Irving, 'Red Card: The Battle over European Football's Transfer System', University of Miami Law Review, vol. 56, 2002, 713.

(102.) B. Dabscheck, 'International Unionism's Competitive Edge: FIFPro and the European Treaty', Industrial Relations, vol. 58, 2003, 97-102.

(103.) J. Irving, l.c., 713.

(104.) Supra, note 17.

(105.) UEFA, Memorandum of understanding between the UEFA and the FIFPRO, 2007, (see: www.uefa.com/MultimediaFiles/Download/uefa/Others/601340_DOWNLOAD.pdf, accessed 12 July 2011).

(106.) The tensions between players and clubs largely concern issues regarding the restrictions of labour market mobility through contractual stability. Divergent views have been expressed regarding the interpretation of the rather vague article 17 of the FIFA Regulations. Especially some rulings of the Court of Arbitration for Sport have been heavily criticised by FIFPro. E.g. see: W. Van Megen, 'The Olivier Bernard case compared'. European sports law and policy bulletin, vol. 1, 2010, 93-103.

(107.) Supra, note 101.

(108.) Universite Catholique de Louvain, Study on the Representativeness of the Social Partner Organisations in the Professional Football Players Sector, Report for the European Commission, Project No VC/2004/0547, 2006 (see: http://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=4111&langId=en, accessed 12 July 2011).

(109.) Supra, note 102.

(110.) EUPPFL, Accord of the Association, art. 2

(111.) EPFL Constitution, version November 2007 (see: www.epfl-europeanleagues.com/files/EPFL_Constitution_2007.pdf, accessed 12 July 2011).

(112.) EPFL, History (see: http://www.epfl-europeanleagues.com/history.htm, accessed 12 July 2011).

(113.) EPFL Constitution, supra note 111, art. 1.3.1

(114.) Ibid., art 1.3.8

(115.) UEFA, Memorandum of understanding between the UEFA and the EPFL, 2009, art. 1.1 (see: www.uefa.com/MultimediaFiles/Download/uefa/KeyTopics/88/17/84/881784_DOWNLOAD.pdf, accessed 12 July 2011).

(116.) Ibid., art. 4.2

(117.) Ibid., art. 3.2

(118.) B. Garcia, l.c., 2008, 45.

(119.) Supra, note 73.

(120.) Supra, note 108.

(121.) Ibid.

(122.) UEFA, Memorandum of understanding between the UEFA and the ECA, January 2008 (see: www.uefa.com/MultimediaFiles/Download/uefa/KeyTopics/88/17/82/881782_DOWNLOAD.pdf, accessed 12 July 2011).

(123.) ECA, Vision and mission (see: www.ecaeurope.com/Default.aspx?id=1085058, accessed 12 July 2011).

(124.) For the current ranking, see: www.ecaeurope.com/Default.aspx?id=1102433, accessed 12 July 2011; for a list of the current members, see: 25.enable.com/epa/getfile.asp?k:A3:5E:24:D0:10:89b:D6, accessed 12 July, 2011).

(125.) B. Garcia, l.c., 2008, 40.

(126.) In 2000, the G-14 even threatened to establish a Super League, see supra, note 81.

(127.) B. Garcia, l.c., 2008, 41.

(128.) Sporting du Pays de Charleroi, G-14 Groupment des Clubs de Football Europeens v Federation Internationale de Football Association (FIFA), Case C-243/06, [2006].

(129.) BBC, 'Fifa set for Charleroi court case', 20 March 2006 (see: news.bbc.co.uk/sport2/hi/football/europe/4825680.stm, accessed 13 May 2011).

(130.) Supra, note 122.

(131.) R. De Boer et al., supra note 60.

(132.) Supra, note 84.

(133.) Siekmann also agrees on this, see R. Siekmann, 'Some Thoughts about the European Club Association's Possible Participation in a Social Dialogue in the European Professional Football Sector', The International Sports Law Journal, vol. 1-2, 2008, 95-96.

(134.) Ibid.

(135.) European Commission, White Paper on Sport Staff working document, supra note 17, section 5.3.

(136.) FIFPro press release, 'You can always change a bizarre standard contract', 9 September 2011 (see: www.fifpro.org/news/news_details/1693, accessed 10 September 2011)

(137.) FIFPro press release, 'FIFPro confident about Social Dialogue meeting', 11 February 2010 (see: www.fifpro.org/news/news_details/162, accessed 14 July 2011); The Minimum Requirements have already been approved by the PFSC, See Annex 1 'European Professional Football Player Contract Minimum Requirements' of the Memorandum of understanding between the UEFA and the FIFPRO, 2007, (see: http://www.uefa.com/MultimediaFiles/Download/uefa/Others/601340_DOWNLOAD.pdf, accessed 12 July 2011) and Annex 2, art. 4 of the Memorandum of understanding between the UEFA and the EPFL, 2009 (see: www.uefa.com/MultimediaFiles/Download/uefa/KeyTopics/88/17/84/881784_DOWNLOAD.pdf, accessed 12 July 2011).

(138.) European Commission, Work programme annexed to the ESSDCPF, supra note 67.

(139.) FIFPro press release, 'FIFPro confident about Social Dialogue meeting', 11 February 2010 (see: www.fifpro.org/news/news_details/162, accessed 14 July).

(140.) W. Van Megen, 'Minimum Requirements: FIFPro', Presentation to the ESSDC in Professional Football, 11 December 2008 (see: circa.europa.eu/Public/irc/empl/sectoral_social_dialogue/library?l=/professional_football/2008/20081119_plenartagung/081119_requirements/_EN_1.0_&a=d, accessed 15 July 2011).

(141.) See Annex 1 'European Professional Football Player Contract Minimum Requirements' of the Memorandum of understanding between the UEFA and the FIFPRO, supra, note 137.

(142.) A Contract can only be concluded by a Club and its legal entity. Such entity is defined according to the national club licensing manual/regulations as license applicant. It must be a direct or indirect member of the national football association and/or professional league and be duly registered. Any other legal entity may not conclude such a Contract without the prior written consent of the competent national football body.

(143.) For all, see FIFA DRC case 74508 of 22 July 2004; case 55161 of 13 May 2005; case 75975 of 28 July 2005 (see www.fifa.com/mm/document/affederation/administration/75975_954.pdf, accessed 4 August 2011), where 'the Chamber deemed that in view of its potestative nature, the aforementioned contractual clause shall not have any effect'; case 261245 of 21 February 2006; case 36858 of 23 March 2006; case 117707 of 30 November 2007; case 58860 of 7 May 2008; case 19174 of 9 January 2009.

(144.) Art. 4.5 MRSPC. See FIFA Regulations, Supra note 77, art. 15. An established professional who has, in the course of the season, appeared in fewer than ten percent of the official matches in which his club has been involved may terminate his contract prematurely on the ground of sporting just cause. The existence of sporting just cause is established on a case-by-case basis and in such a case, sporting sanctions shall not be imposed. A professional may only terminate his contract on this basis in the 15 days following the last official match of the season of the club with which he is registered.

(145.) Art. 5.2 MRSPC.

(146.) Art. 6.7 MRSPC, the minimum is four weeks in each 12-month period. Periods of paid leave must be agreed by the Club in advance and must be taken outside the regular football season. It has to be ensured that at least two weeks are taken consecutively. The Contract defines the length of the player's normal working day or week.

(147.) Art. 6.8 MRSPC, the Contract explains the, which includes the mandatory insurance coverage for the Player for illness and accident and regular medical/dental examination as well as medical/dental treatment with qualified personnel during football duties. It also covers anti-doping prevention. The Council Directive 89/391/EEC applies, in particular provisions on risk assessment, preventive measures, as well as information, consultation, participation and training of players.

(148.) Art. 7.2(n) MRSPC.

(149.) Art. 6.8 MRSPC.

(150.) Art. 6.10 MRSPC.

(151.) Among the players' obligations there are a) to play matches to the best of his best ability, when selected; b) to participate in training and match preparation according to the instructions of his superior (e.g. head coach); c) to maintain a healthy lifestyle and high standard of fitness; d) to comply with and act in accordance with Club officials' instructions (reasonable; e.g. to reside where suitable for the Club); e) to attend events of the Club (sporting but also commercial ones); f) to obey Club rules (including, where applicable, Club disciplinary regulations, duly notified to him before signing the Contract); g) to behave in a sporting manner towards people involved in matches, training sessions, to learn and observe the laws of the game and to accept decisions by match officials; h) to abstain from participating in other football activities, other activities or potentially dangerous activities not prior approved by the Club and which are not covered by Clubs' insurance; i) to take care of the property of the Club and to return it after termination of the Contract; j) to immediately notify the Club in case of illness or accident and to not undergo any medical treatment without prior information to the Club's doctor (except in emergencies) and to provide a medical certificate of incapacity; k) to undergo regularly medical examination and medical treatment upon request of the Club's doctor; l) to comply with the terms of any association, league, player's union and/or club anti-discrimination policy; m) not to bring the Club or football into disrepute (e.g. media statements); n) not to gamble or undertake other related activities within football.

(152.) Art. 6.5 MRSPC

(153.) See FIFA Regulations, Supra note 77, art. 15. The transfer of a minor is allowed only when it takes place within the territory of the European Union or European Economic Area (EEA) and the player is aged between 16 and 18. In this case, the new club must provide the player with an adequate football education and/or training in line with the highest national standard and it must guarantee the player an academic and/or school and/or vocational education and/or training, in addition to his football education and/or training, which will allow the player to pursue a career other than football should he cease playing professional football.

(154.) FIFA Regulations, Supra note 77, art. 24.

(155.) Art. 12.2 MRSPC

(156.) W. Van Megen, 'Minimum Requirements: FIFPro', Presentation to the ESSDC in Professional Football, 11 December 2008 (see: circa.europa.eu/Public/irc/empl/sectoral_social_dialogue/library?l=/professional_football/2008/20081119_plenartagung/081119_requirements/_EN_1.0_&a=d, accessed 15 July 2011), slide 6.

(157.) FIFPro press release, 'Only FIFPro is ready to sign minimum requirements', 1 March 2011 (see: www.fifpro.org/news/news_details/1469, accessed 10 July 2011).

(158.) European Commission, Compromise proposal HW 24 January 2011 based on comparison of "employers November 2010 and FIFPro January 2011", not published.

(159.) UEFA, ESSDC in the Professional Football Sector, 'Analysis of Questionnaires on Standard Player Contracts, Results of all 4 stakeholders', Version 21.10.2009, unpublished.

(160.) Universite Catholique de Louvain, Study on the Representativeness of the Social Partner Organisations in the Professional Football Players Sector, Report for the European Commission, Project No VC/2004/0547, 2006 (see: ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=4111&langId=en, accessed 12 July 2011).

(161.) FIFPro press release, 'Only FIFPro is ready to sign minimum requirements', 1 March 2011 (see: www.fifpro.org/news/news_details/1469, accessed 10 July 2011).

(162.) 3/4.

(163.) Annex 8 to the MRSPC, art. 1.3

(164.) Commission of the European Union, Developing the European Dimension in Sport, 10, COM (2011) 12 final, January 2011 (see: eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2011:0012: FIN:en:PDF, accessed 10 July 2011).

(165.) White Paper on Sport, supra note 7, 12.

(166.) S. Van den Bogaert, Practical Regulation of the Mobility of Sportsmen in the EU Post Bosman, The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 2005, 391-400.

by Michele Colucci * and Arnout Geeraert **

* Director of the Sports Law and Policy Centre -Rome. Professor of European Union Law at the European College of Parma and Assistant Professor of International and European Sports Law at Tilburg University. Member of the FIFA Dispute Resolution Chamber.

** M.Sc. International and Comparative Politics, K.U. Leuven, Leuven, Belgium, LL.M. International and European Law, V.U.B., Brussels, Belgium PhD Student on 'enhancing the democratic legitimacy of the governance of European football'.