Women and empowerment in the Arab world.
Zuhur, Sherifa
EMPOWERMENT, JUST LIKE THE TERM "liberation" is a complex
and relative notion that implies a scale of power, and a linear
progression from one end of that scale to another. One could debate
whether the purpose of social welfare policies are to empower citizens,
women among them, or whether they are intended to give the impression of
empowerment, thereby legitimizing nation-states, international
organizations or other actors. I cannot engage in that debate in this
article, so let us begin with the premise that women's empowerment
is indeed the goal of such policies.
The daunting task of describing and evaluating women's
empowerment precedes and should accompany planning--daunting, although
more data has been collected, and there is an increased awareness of
gender as a category of power and status. That is because we
increasingly see empowerment alongside, or in combination with other
phenomena and the study of gender has in many ways, revolutionized the
study of other power constellations in society. The task is also
intimidating because most scholars agree that it is important to avoid
the essentialization of women in ethnic, religious, or national
categories. Yet, we here refer to an explicit category of "Arab
women" in order to theorize, (1) and so that readers of this essay
can appreciate any discernible trends, despite the diversity of Arab
women
The premise of social welfare policies is that women (and men) lack
power and basic rights as citizens when they have limited income or
access to other important services. These policies may not and usually
do not acknowledge discrimination of women on the basis of gender, race,
ethnicity, or religion; for instance, social welfare policies in Israel
refer to Arab women's disadvantages on the basis of their low
income status, but never to the element of racism or discrimination
which accord to them as Palestinians (or Bedouin) as a group, but
factors that oppress as women in Muslim societies are of great interest.
Women are by no means globally empowered. It seems that everywhere,
economic and political power appear to be equally necessary components
of empowerment. Women's disproportionate lack of political power is
accompanied by their status as the majority of the poor. Their lack of
power is demonstrated in the fact that one third of the world's
women will be subjected to violence. Two million girls under the age of
15 are forced into the sex trade each year, and about twice as many
women as men are affected with H1V in Africa. We must begin with this
mention of the global problems of women so that the problems of Arab
women are not overemphasized, or misconstrued.
We are not fully agreed on the definition of empowerment or what it
in turn, will produce--political or economic power? Positive self-image?
More or less serious exploitation of others (other poorer, or non-Arab
women, (2) or men)? It has been very difficult to coordinate efforts
aimed at empowerment with the various competing ideas concerning the
tactics to be employed. And finally, I think it is important to reflect
on the explicit aspects of empowerment that may have a bearing on the
subjects of other articles in this issue that variously deal with social
policy and women.
With this in mind, I will comment on some key events in various
Arab countries or within communities of Arab women that highlight the
uncertain track record of women's "progress" toward
empowerment. For the purposes of this task, let us define empowerment as
a condition in which women hold or are in the process of obtaining
educational, legal and political rights that are equivalent or nearly
equal to those of male citizens. Further, women are able to work, and
advance in any career they select; possess economic rights to own and
dispose of property, and pay for goods at the same rate as others. And,
women should obtain bodily rights--the rights to control their own
health and fertility, and prosecute those who engage in domestic
violence, rape, harassment, or other violations of women's bodies.
Empowerment may also include legal rights that actually accord women
certain advantages such as hiring or educational preferences in areas
where women have historically lacked access or differential rights such
as paid maternity leaves, or the state and criminal justice
system's cooperation in enforcing laws that protect women.
Empowerment extends beyond acts or attitudes of governments, for it
should include women's increased knowledge of the history of women
in their own country/region, and the social and psychological effects of
patriarchy, and access to creativity.
Social welfare systems have however primarily focused on stop-gap
systems for economic and health security. They have not, for the most
part, caused, or intended social transformation. Yet, they implicitly
include certain aspects of the above-defined goals of empowerment, at
least, the ideas that an increase in the years of education, and
increased ability to earn income will empower women in both public and
private spheres.
The Arab states embody various patriarchal structures and Arab
society clings to a patriarchal system in which women's position
within and duties toward the family precede their rights as individuals.
Many who argue for empowerment do so either with or without a full
understanding of the conflicts between the historical and contemporary
status of women and the goals of empowerment. Certainly we may track a
great many changes that have occurred in the direction of empowerment,
but women have yet to achieve or realize many of the ideal stages of
empowerment. Hence it is certainly more rational to define empowerment
as a process rather than an end-point.
The scholarly literature on women in the region (as many issues are
shared with non-Arab states) has since the mid-1980s focused a great
deal of attention on the "patriarchal bargain" (Kandiyotti,
1991) struck between elite (and in many cases, middle class women) women
and the state. Within this arrangement, elite women acquired more power
so long as they did not challenge the basic patriarchal structures of
state and society. Cultural authenticity was important to relatively
young modern states and often relied heavily on Muslim mores that
discouraged any attacks on the patriarchal family structure. But it must
be noted that other religious groups in the region, for example the
Eastern churches observe many of the self-same patriarchal features.
These elite (and middle class) women benefited from state actions which
involved movement toward women's empowerment and which challenged
patriarchal authority, but not as strongly as they might have--for
example, the promotion of women in the professions, along with the idea
that women would not sacrifice their families for their careers. Such
women have played a leading role in state organizations and NGOs that
claim the improvement of women's status as their primary goal.
Whether because of these woman and their own participation in the
patriarchal bargain, or Arab states' reluctance to introduce
policies that would irritate their religious establishments, the
patriarchal and paternal nature of political leadership, or a
combination of all of these factors, very little has bean introduced
that would severely challenge or question the prevailing conception of
gender roles in the years since independence from colonial oversight, or
mid-century. Rather, the patriarchal nature of the family has been taken
as a given, and policies developed around it.
Over the last twenty years, scholars have also investigated the
interaction of Islamic revival, or Islamism and ideas concerning gender.
This area of inquiry as well as the more purely social science oriented
examinations of economic change and women's status has not always
featured the state as a key actor. There are clear differentiations
between NGOs that are independent of the state and those deeply entwined
with it. We may also differentiate between Islamist women who espouse
many feminist ideals of empowerment although they may eschew others, and
male Islamist or conservative Muslim authorities. Their views differ,
but more importantly their degree of power differs. For example,
A-Muhammad Sha'arawi or Yusuf Qaradawi are inherently more powerful
and influential and known to more citizens than female counterparts. The
point however is that very few Arab states have ignored the Islamist
trends and the consequent entanglement of the goals of women's
empowerment with fears of Western ideologies, or the perception that
women's empowerment is a feminist (read, Western) target.
How should we measure the degree of empowerment women experienced
after a very active century of social and political change? We are
confronted with recent events that illustrate a very ambivalent success
rate.
SUCCESSES
* The passage of the new law in Egypt in January 2001 that makes a
no-grounds divorce easier for women by allowing a "khul"
(surrender of the mahr and gifts) divorce.
* Statistics that show girls catching up to boys in elementary,
secondary and tertiary educational institutions, and evidence that
members of rural, neglected, or minority communities are slowly
benefiting from access to higher education (for example, the numbers of
Arab women college graduates in Israel, including Bedouin).
* Royal commitment to parliamentary seats reserved for women in
Morocco who competed in the fall 2002 elections.
* An important shift in discourse--in literature and history, this
has meant the incorporation of "women's voices," the
politicization of the personal, and a revived interest in the lost or
misplaced history of women and their forms of expression in the past up
to the present.
* A marked decrease in the fertility in some urban areas of the
Arab world, although other areas (the Gaza strip and Algeria) continue
to evidence extremely high fertility rates. I am not trying to argue
that population control is the prime feature of any decrease in poverty
(distribution plays a role). Still with women's empowerment in
mind, it is impossible to accept Islamist and Third Worldist ideas such
as those of Adil Husayn that women should have even larger families than
they do now (Karam, 202).
* Stories and studies of prominent women who have entered male
dominated professions, run successful businesses, or are professional
sportswomen (Sullivan, 1986, Al-Raida, XVI, 83-84, 1998-1999).
* Numerous (thousands) of NGOs focused on creating sustainable
development end projects that bring income to women, literacy, girls
education (Morocco), enhancing women's political power (Morocco,
Egypt, Lebanon) and legal reforms (Jordan, Lebanon, Tunisia, Egypt).
* More evidence that people oppose violence against
women--including a) generally more negative attitudes toward
wife-beating b) a state coordinated program to identify and punish men
who harass women in the Emirates, c) a coordinated campaign to punish
honor killings in Jordan d) NGOs dedicated to this issue in Lebanon and
Egypt.
AMBIGUOUS FACTORS
* The legalization of 'urfi marriage in Egypt--perhaps success
in that de facto unions are now legal, but could mean another increase
in the fertility rate at a younger age.
* The increasing cost of marriage in urban areas around the region.
* The decreasing cost of marriage in a few areas--such as the
Negev, where a concomitant rise in polygamy appears to have occurred
(Al-Krenawi, 2000, 2001).
* Increasing numbers of women as heads-of-household in rural areas
due to male migration, for example in Yemen and Morocco, or women who
migrate for work themselves (Juntenen, 2001, Salih, 2001, Ennaji, 2001).
FAILURES
* The arrest of 47 women in a "driving demonstration" in
Saudi Arabia in 1990 and subsoquent fatwa issued by bin Baz against
women's driving
* Statistics showing that the practice of FGM (female genital
mutilation) involves a huge number of women in Egypt alone, and the
death of several young girls like 11 year old Mona Abdul Hafees due to
complications following FGM conducted in public health facilities
despite the 1996 ruling upholding the illegality of the procedure in
such environs (Al-Krenawi & Lev-Wiesel, 1999).
* The continuity of "old" and rise of "new"
versions of polygamy. It is argued that polygamous households represent
only 2 to 11.5 % of the all in the region, but women and children of
polygamous marriages suffer (Al-Krenawi, 2001). Moreover, in countries
where polygamy has been targeted as a social ill, the practice
continues--husbands however divorce their older wives and may be less
likely to continue supporting them economically.
* Another fatwa approved by the same Saudi Committee (CRLO) that
says women and their guardians should not be able to postpone marriages
for the purpose of continuing education, since women only need a primary
school education (Abou El Fadl, 2002, 224).
* The continuing valuation placed on virginity and male
responsibility for female sexuality means that many women are still
strongly encouraged to many instead of pursuing careers and advanced
education. Others resort to hymen replacement or subterfuge to maintain
their "honor." Marital kidnapping continues in rural places,
as do crimes of honor in both rural and urban settings.
* The public beating and sentencing of women demonstrators in the
Sudan for infractions of the dress code while acting in opposition to
the state.
* Street shootings of women who would not wear the hijab in
Algeria.
* The stymied campaign to legalize civil marriage in Lebanon.
* The laws in numerous Arab states which grant citizenship on the
basis of the father's--not the mother's--nationality.
* Attacks by Islamists on prominent feminists, for example, Toujan
al-Faisal of Jordan and Nawal al-Saadawi in Egypt.
* The defeat of proposed female suffrage in Kuwait.
* The terrible disadvantages of Palestinian girls in the Israeli
educational system, due to lack of funding, the policies of separation,
and discrimination which have a direct relationship to the very small
number of "successes" in the list above.
It is not possible within the scope of this article to describe
each of the oddly varied indicators of trends toward or away from
empowerment enlisted above. We do need to understand that the complex
task of changing women's status on economic, social, political and
legal bases is just that--highly complicated. It is not without foes and
not immune to the process of globalization, which at present appears to
mean a more precarious economic situation in the region, and
"culture wars" that invoke women and gender.
It is clear that efforts to improve income and living conditions (the basis of the early social welfare approach) are insufficient in
empowering women unless considerations of the basic patriarchal features
of society are brought into the equation and the responsibility of
states to address its negative effects is addressed. Policy-makers must
also take note of the backlash women have faced in their entry into
public space, and coordinate vigorous efforts to continue legal reform,
and enhance women's political participation.
Feminists--Arab and Western--understand that transformative change
must occur in many areas of women's lives. Gains in one area may
not be matched by incremental advances in other areas. Thus simply
gaining access to educational rights does not necessarily lead to a
stronger female presence in politics--perhaps wholesale changes of
public perceptions of women, changes in constitutional rights,
women's networking and special training for political leadership
are required. Changing the laws that pertain to women's bodily
integrity--as in the illegalization of FGM (female genital mutilation,
or female circumcision) in public facilities cannot realize their intent
if medical personnel are unconvinced of the merit of the law, and
continue performing circumcisions in their private clinics.
I will now highlight aspects of certain trends mentioned above in
order to explain their relevance to the processes of empowerment and the
potential of social welfare policies for women.
ISSUES OF PUBLIC SPACE
In the Arab world, a large and highly differentiated region, women
unaccompanied by men (sometimes even when they are accompanied!)
experience harassment from men in public places as they do in other
parts of the world. This harassment heightened when specific historical
practices created to ensure the modesty and chastity of women resulting
in the harem system passed into disuse. States promoted the employment
of women in the public and private sectors and the gandering of public
and private spaces changed. Laurence Michalak commented on the gendering
of public space in Tunisia. On a recent visit, he reflected on the
changes in the gendered space of Tunisian cities over the last two
decades (Michalak, 2001). Couples walking hand in hand and young women
walking unveiled may be seen in many cities of the region. Obviously,
this is not the case in the Gulf States, or in the Sudan.
One of the latest fashions, which demonstrate women's ability
to mirror men in public space, is the craze for smoking shisha (or water
pipes) in Cairo and Beirut in outdoor (sometimes indoor) cafes, an
environment and activity that have always been heavily male. But even in
areas where "mingling" is now permitted, harassment of women
who walk alone, with each other, or sometimes with family members
occurs. One theory is that the changes in the gendering of public
spaces, and the appearance of women in service occupations has
"shocked" society and men, or often boys, act out their
aggression and hostility toward women by annoying them in public--to
demean them, and make them understand they are inferior to men.
Dress codes created to protect the modesty of women in public space
were dropped in some areas, but continued to be imposed in other areas
(the Gulf States) or self-imposed (by urban lower class, Islamist and
other women). An Islamic revival that ensued in the 1970s brought about
new debates over covering, modesty and modes of dress. The hijab was
voluntarily adopted by millions of Muslim women in Egypt, Gaza, the West
Bank, Lebanon, Syria, and other Arab nations, and we will never be able
to ascertain precisely how many other women adopted it as a result of
peer or family pressure. Disputes over this modern version of Islamic
covering has ensued in Tunisia and elsewhere where and when it is
associated with Islamism or opposition to the state and secularism.
Although women who adopted the hijab sometimes asserted that it
prevented them from harassment, this is not in point of fact, strictly
true. Others argue that the increasing popularity of Islamic dress
served to increase male teasing and taunting of unveiled women. Indeed
street harassment appears to be endemic throughout the region (Rim
Zabra, "The High Price of Walking," in Ilkkaracan, ed. 2000)
and with the exception of the UAE where penalties have included posting
of men's pictures in the press in addition to a fine, little has
been done. Beyond the matter of covering, which has been so exoticized
by the West, and which may involve religious or political ideas there
are other measures of women's use of public space.
Research on the issues of public space, harassment, and dress has
primarily focused on the veil because the wave of new veiling coincided
with a growth in religiosity and Islamist movements and activism around
the region. (Zuhur, 1992, MacCleod, 1991; El Guindi, 1999; Karam, 1999;
Olson, 1984). This research has been useful in demonstrating that dress
has powerful social, political, and religious meanings sometimes
considered so crucial that the state will step in to discourage the new
veiling as in Tunisia.
It is important to take note of the regional distinctions in this
phenomenon since they are closely linked to other important social
distinctions. So for example, in Egypt, the hijab is not worn by all
women. Yet, in the Negev, nearly all younger Bedu women now wear the
hijab, a dress unseen here some 30 years ago. In this situation, where
the population is divided between Jews and non-Jews, the hijab becomes a
particular marker of a religion that has come to mean an ethnicity and a
sign of political, social, and economic status lower than the dress of
any Jewish woman (whatever the actual economic status of its wearer).
But for young Bedouin women, it can demonstrate their modesty while
attending the mixed-sex university.
The hijab has played a role in women's access to public space.
Many women now feel compelled to don the hijab as a means of
demonstrating their modesty, or their religiosity in transit to work,
school or volunteer activities. Some controversy and discussion has
arisen, for example, when the hijab was declared an emblem of loyalty to
the Intifada in Gaza, and despite the protests of by the Women's
Committees on behalf of woman who were attacked or harassed, the
discussion ceased to have any effect at the higher levels of leadership
as Fatah could not then afford to antagonize Hamas. With the exception
of one leaflet, and one "round" of the battle, women's
concerns were subordinated to political considerations.
In Egypt, the rights of private "language" (French,
English or German) schools to disallow the hijab recently stirred up
controversy (Bahgat, 2001). Public or national schools have de facto
lost their ability to dictate students' dress, although the
government attempted to discourage the wearing of the niqab, after the
recapture of the Imbaba neighborhood of Cairo from its Islamist masters.
Moving to a more extreme case, in the Sudan, where the local dress,
the thob (a rather lovely voluminous and diaphanous garment worn
sail-style to cover the head if desired) was the most commonly worn
garment before the National Islamic Front came to power. Since there
have been stem punishments of women who did not wear hijab, and a
flogging ordered for a woman protester wearing trousers. Outrage about
the imposition of the hijab could only expressed outside of the country
and in the context of regional or international fear of Islamist
measures imposed on women. But also, the Sudan's surprising
transformation (once the site of the largest Communist Party in the
Middle East) grants the hijab a broader symbolism.
In Saudi Arabia, female covering has been imposed strictly, but the
form of outer veiling worn is not identified with a religions opposition
movement as in some other cases. However, in March 2002 there was a
horrifying report of a fire at a school and that rescue workers were
hatred from entering since the girls were considered to be improperly
dressed without their outer cover (BBC News, 15 March 2002). As women
have gained increasing riots to education, and some have entered the
world of business and work, the presence of women's bodies in
public space remains problematic.
Let us also recall that on 6 November 1990, forty-seven Saudi women
drove their own cars--an action that was merely forbidden by custom, but
not illegal until their particular rebellion. These women were forced to
sign a statement declaring that they would never drive again, false
rumors were spread that they were not properly dressed (covered) in the
demonstration, they were blacklisted and threatened, they lost their
jobs and were not allowed to leave the country. A fatwa was issued
declaring that women's driving was contrary to Islam. In a plea to
non-Saudis, one woman described the events following their demonstration
and observed:
Sometimes I wish that I never went to school or learned
anything so I would not see the unfairness and the wrongdoing
and not be able to do anything about it, and most of all, so I
would not know that I do not have rights (Letter printed in "In
These Times," Austin Peace and Justice (16-22 January 1990
and reprinted May 1991).
Another interesting point of the woman's letter is that she
attributes state and society's absolute power to retaliate against
the women demonstrators to a lack of "human rights" in Saudi
Arabia--a condition pertaining to men as well as women, rather than
simple discrimination against women. Since all is controlled by the
royal family, there is little recourse for protesters, or rather;
whatever movement toward liberalization of this restriction can take
place only with the permission of the royal family. Liberal Saudi
spokesmen explained that not all were opposed to women's driving,
but that the incident came at an unpropitious moment.
Oddly, Sandi women are chauffeured by male, unrelated, usually
foreign men. Since the fatwa rules against driving using the argument
that women will run the risk of mixing with unrelated men if they are
allowed to drive themselves, this is a little strange. These men, often
Asian immigrants, have rights superior to women's with regard to
freedom of movement in public space, although their social and economic
status is far inferior to their mistresses in every other respect. This
particular rule has not yet been ameliorated, despite many hints that it
might occur.
POLITICAL RIGHTS
The area of political rights involves suffrage and women's
rights to run for office, or hold appointed positions of power in
government. Political empowerment for women is important to the subject
of this journal issue because without politicians and officials who
consider the effects of various policies, laws and measures on
women's status--no cohesive headway toward social change or reform
may be made. It has been assumed that more women with increased
political power will work toward women's empowerment. Although some
women politicians and decision-makers may be as ambivalent toward the
empowerment of women as male counterparts, it is also clear that others
(who may influence male counterparts) are responsive to certain basic
conditions of their constituencies such as the greater number of women
who are poor or illiterate, and the increasing number of woman-headed
households in various districts.
Women in Algeria, Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Libya, Jordan,
Sudan, Yemen and Morocco may vote. Women in Kuwait may not. Female
suffrage has been a contentions issue in Kuwait whore many hoped for,
and anticipated the granting of this civil right, as well as the right
to stand in parliamentary elections by 2003, once the Amir Sheikh Jahar
al-Ahmad al-Sabah of Kuwait issued a degree to this effect in May 1999.
Instead, in November of the same year, the all-male Kuwaiti Parliament
officially rejected this decree to applause from men in the public
gallery, and more applause when an Islamist yelled, "Kuwaiti people
don't want women's rights. Why do you want to force it on
them?" (Reeves, 1999). The vote was close and feminists and
supporters of women's rights were deeply disappointed by the tribal
representatives and Islamist antipathy to the decree. Historically this
seemed to represent a misogynist response to actions by other state
leaders (Ataturk, Reza Shah, Hahib Bourgulba, Anwar Sadat) of the region
in attempts to empower women. Like Anwar Sadat's passage of
"Jihan's laws" of 1979 which granted a number of
important reforms to Egyptian women, the Amir's decree was first
attacked on procedural grounds. Opponents claimed it was
unconstitutional since it was issued when parliament was not in session.
The first vote on the decree reflected objections on parliamentary
principles (with 41 opposed and 21 in support) while a second vote on 30
November was much closer (32 opposed, 30 in favor and 2 abstaining) and
one of those who abstained was an Islamist member of parliament Hasan
'Ali al-Qallaf (Al-Mughni & Tretault in Joseph, ed. 2000, 255).
Analysis of this issue indicates that the Amir's position changed
and that women are to some degree casualties of the divisions between
Islamist and liberal factions in the government, or it was suggested
that the liberal side might have lobbied hold-outs more effectively.
Arab women have turned their attention to the issue of women's
political leadership, since suffrage alone is insufficient to add to the
empowerment of women as a sector. Lebanese women have decried their own
lack of participation in government and in the most recent elections,
more women than ever before ran for seats in Parliament but only three
won seats. Analysis of this problem has noted that women really were
excluded from Lebanese politics for many years. The few exceptions, as
in other parts of the world, were widows of candidates, and then
daughters or wives associated with particular zu 'ama families.
This pattern held for the United States earlier in the twentieth century
as it did in South Asia (Jayawardena, 1986).
Lebanese observers and proponents of women's political
leadership also inferred that women are socialized to regard women as
being inferior to men and these attitudes which may be seen in voting
patterns, must be overcome. These exist alongside a political
environment in which egalitarianism is included by the Constitution but
has been denied in the specific areas that have been refuted in the
discussions over the UN's CEDAW (Mobassaleh, 2001).
In Egypt, the National Council for Women, an umbrella organization now headed by Farkhonda Hassan, has also turned its attention to this
issue and cooperated with the Egyptian Center for Women's Rights
which groomed and prepared women candidates in the most recent election
(Garwood, 2000; Elbendery, October 2000, November 2000). One hundred and
twenty women stood as candidates for Parliament and seven women were
elected (considering Egypt's population this is not much better
than Lebanon, although only five were elected in 1995). President Anwar
Sadat had initiated a system of guaranteed seats for women, and since
this quota system was dropped, it has proven fairly difficult, but not
impossible for women candidates to achieve political success. Education,
family support, social, and to some degree, economic status are initial
factors. In Egypt as in Lebanon, it appears that candidates believe that
women voters lack confidence in female politicians, and there are a host
of other factors to be taken into consideration in addition to the sharp
contrast in voting alliances in the two cases.
In Morocco, the USAID Democracy officer urged me to include the
efforts made there to groom female candidates for the fall 2002
elections. A special program led by the Center for Women and Democracy
at the University of Washington conducted several "campaign
schools" over the year to impart specific skills (like public
speaking) to candidates, pre-electoral and post-electoral planning,
strategies and use of the media, and to boost their confidence. (3)
It is interesting to note that etatism may lead to more or less
political rights and political participation for women. Fairly
"liberal" Arab states, such as Lebanon may be compared to
states with a mass party, like Syria or Iraq, where women participate
through party politics, but not necessarily in positions of political
leadership. However, state-backed feminism has been extremely important
in the efforts made at legal reform on behalf of women, in these two
cases and in other Arab countries.
LEGAL REFORMS
The area of legal reform is one in which significant steps have
been taken toward the empowerment of women, or at least toward more
equity. This area has been problematized by a long historical debate
over secularism and the complicated derivation of civil laws from
various codification systems. In some cases, there has been a failure to
create civil laws, while in others the success of new modifications is
not entirely complete.
Proposed Optional Civil Marriage in Lebanon
President Elias Hrawi first proposed to legalize civil marriage in
Lebanon, on 22 November, 1996, Lebanon's Independence Day. To the
present, couples must be married by religious officials or via a
religious contract. Couples who do not wish to contract a religious
marriage must travel out of the country, often to Cyprus or Greece to
marry. This presents all sorts of difficulties for mixed-faith couples
(as also occurs in Israel). Hrawi was quoted as saying that 80 percent
of the Lebanese public supported the idea, and as controversy rose and
his cabinet dragged their feet, he said he would call for a public
referendum by February 1998.
Women's and progressive political parties which support
non-sectarianism were in favor of the proposed civil marriage, but
opposition arose first in the Sunni religious establishment, spread to
other religious officials and then was mirrored in Prime Minister
Hariri's decision to postpone this decision, and finally even the
Syrian President's stance that the issue was divisive and should be
avoided.
Lebanon granted women the right to vote in 1953 and the delicate
balance of the various confessional groups in the country is balanced by
the sloganeering of the Taif accords that ended the Civil War which also
call for the reduction of sectarianism (ta'ifiyya). Sectarianism
has a bearing on this issue which could pertain to inter-religious
marriages--precisely what the Sunni religious leaders sought to rein in as well as retaining their own control over matters of personal status.
Just next door in neighboring Syria, civil marriages are firmly
legal, whereas religious marriages are insufficient in the eyes of the
state. However the state ceremony and contract is nearly identical to
that used in a religious marriage. Nadia El-Cheikh analyzed the
responses of the Sunni, Shi'i, and communities and the women's
groups to the proposed law. She explains that Sunni opposition to the
measure grew after the wording was revealed. When the cabinet voted--21
in favor, six against and one abstention to the measure-which was after
all, just "optional" in March 1998, the debate began in full.
The Sunni Grand Mufti of Lebanon, Shaykh Muhammad Rashid Qabbani, led a
very strong attack on the proposed change, saying that it opposed the
shari'a in that a Muslim woman was specifically forbidden from
marrying a non-Muslim man. It outlawed polygamy, although the former
point was highlighted rather than this particular change. Furthermore
the new form of marriage would promote "secularism at the expense
of the religious authorities and religious courts;" and
"endanger the well-being of the family" (El Cheikh, 1999).
Eventually other objections based on omissions of items that would
pertain to Muslims under the law such as the length of the 'idda
and so on were raised. Demonstrations, sit-ins and protests against the
bill were convened in Tripoli, Sidon and elsewhere.
The Shi'i response was milder and more ambivalent to begin
with, but the Sunni response began to include charges of apostasy for
those who would submit to a civil procedure. Fadiallah and Shams al-Din
came out against the measure, but Nabih Berri, Speaker of Parliament,
voted for it. Indeed, the most progressive of the Shi'i clerics,
Muhammad Hasan al-Amm, advisor to the Ja'afari court, held a forum
with two Christian clerics in January 2000, upholding his previous
overall approval of the position of civil marriage, and of the principle
of secularization, although he acknowledged the doctrinal objections to
intermarriage.
The Christian religious officials were at first hesitant, but
later, some of the bishops published a document saying that the church
denies the possibility of civil marriage, since marriage is a sacrament
and those who married otherwise exist in a state of sin. The Maronite
patriarch opposed the law from a religious standpoint but most of all
because he was concerned by the Sunni opposition (Chahine, 1998). In the
end, religious officials and their political patrons triumphed over the
rather large numbers of the general public who continue to support the
reform. Hardly anyone emphasized the matter of empowerment for women,
who are in many ways restricted by religious marriages. Rather,
opponents and proponents saw the proposed law as blow to sectarianism,
ta'ifiyya (Zuhur, 2002).
In the end, sectarianism triumphed. The Prime Minister used the
issue of "timing" just as the Saudi royal family or the
Kuwaiti government decided that the time was not ripe for reforms that
might benefit women.
Divorce Reform in Egypt
A new law affecting divorce was passed by the Egyptian Parliament
after lively debates and charges of political steamrolling and President
Hosni Mubarak signed the draft law on 29 January 2000. This new law
seemed to bring women's empowerment to a new stage in which
additional obstacles (the rights to freely obtain a passport and
therefore travel) were identified, but not yet dealt with. Most
importantly, the new law provides a way for women to divorce regardless
of the legal grounds for their action so long as they forfeit monetary
compensation of the second half of the mahr (dower) and the
"girls" (jewelry given for the marriage). It includes the
creation of a family court able to facilitate divorce cases and a family
insurance plan. As this women's right to invoke "khul," a
category of divorce, the law is referred to as the "khul" law.
Women are thus able to ransom themselves from marriages, although the
better educated and wealthier will obviously be better able to benefit
from the new law.
Following a failed intervention by an arbiter for each side in
accordance with a Quranic principle (Surah IV:35) the divorce may be
granted in three months and is to be irrevocable. The new law prevents
men from divorcing their wives without immediately informing them (talaq al-ghiyabi)--a very important reform.
Debates concerning the laws of personal status, which have been
codified in some but not all Arab states, first emerged in the
nineteenth century, when the customs of female seclusion and the lack of
education for women were also questioned. The Ottoman Empire issued two
imperial edicts allowing women to sue for divorce on limited grounds in
1915 and codified family law in the Ottoman Law of Family Rights two
years later. Subsequent laws were passed in Egypt in 1920 and in 1929
and these broadened the grounds for divorce by incorporating principles
acceptable in the more lenient Maliki madhhab into the Hanafi based law.
Women could obtain a divorce under certain conditions: if they were
deserted, mistreated, denied financial maintenance, or whose husbands
were imprisoned or had a serious contagious disease (Esposito, 1982,
53-55). Other reforms were proposed but rejected by King Fuad and
re-proposed during the 1940s. These would have allowed women to write
clauses into their wedding contracts restricting their husband's
right to take another wife.
Subsequent efforts ensued in 1971, due in part to efforts by the
Minister of Social Affairs (c) A'isha Ratib. Special reforms
affecting divorce, custody, retention of the family home were eventually
decreed by President Anwar al-Sadat in 1979 during a parliamentary
recess, and then later passed by the legislature--these were dubbed
"Jihan's laws" for First Lady Jihan Sadat (Zuhur, 2001a).
Because of their extra-parliamentary method of legal passage, the Higher
Constitutional Court declared these reforms to be unconstitutional in
1985. Many of the reforms were lost, but the essential momentum and
partnership between the state, the ruling party and women reformers
remained. Thirty seats set aside for women in parliament under Law No.
30 (a quota system, modeled on the Sudan) wore also lost at this point.
The 1979 personal status reforms had incorporated new grounds for
divorce by a woman if her husband took another wife without her consent.
She was to be informed if her husband divorced her (this need not occur
in various other countries, Kuwait for example) and allowed her to
obtain a notarized certificate of divorce. The divorced wife could keep
the custody of her children--until the ages of 10 for a boy and 12 for a
girl--and was to be awarded the family apartment as a residence until
she remarried. These reforms permitted female employment so long as it
did not interfere with their "family duties" (this is similar
to the Lebanese government's position) and ended the practice of
bayt al-ta'a (home of obedience) wherein the husband could lock up
a wife who had tried to leave the marriage (or to initiate a divorce) at
home until he obtained her "obedience."
The 2000 reforms were very important indeed, and many regard Mona
Zulficar as one of the architects of these laws, illustrating the ways
in which women's education and empowerment can enhance further
empowerment (Zulficar, n.d.).
One article was sacrificed, as if it were a bone thrown by the
National Democratic Party to its opposition. This important article
would have allowed women to obtain a passport without their
husbands' permission. Another principle, not addressed at all,
concerned the nationality of children which they receive through their
father. This leaves many children without a nationality at all, or
unable to attend schools for there are a large number of Egyptian
children fathered and then abandoned by men from the Gulf (and they
rationalize this with reference to a fatwa allowing for temporary
marriage while abroad).
Finally, it must be observed that the reforms involving divorce and
matters of personal status do not apply to Coptic women. Although the
intent of such legal reforms has been to create a civil personal status
code, the Church refused to recognize divorces that did not involve
grounds of adultery and has denied couples who were divorced in
"civil" proceedings the right to remarry (Zuhur, 2001a; Harem
"The Pitfalls of Nationalist Discourses on Citizenship in
Egypt," in Joseph, ed. (2000, 54-56; Zulficar n.d; Shukri, 1991).
It is perhaps appropriate to observe that Egypt, with its larger Muslim
population and leading political party was able to use both of these
factors in implementing legal reforms, whereas the situation of the more
numerous "minorities" in Lebanon mirrors the independence of
the Copts--or their sense of being outside of the civil law.
(c) Urfi Marriage
The new reform to personal status law includes the recognition of
(c) urfi marriages. "Urf is actually a category of law derived from
customary practice and tribal law which has, in certain cases, been
employed as a licit source of Shari'a. Marriages contracted in this
way via simple oral agreement were practiced in Egypt in the 1930s, 40s
and 50s, and since, but were never considered to be legitimate marriages
implying transference of property, duties to financial support or
inheritance. They became far more widespread in the last five to seven
years and might involve simple written agreements or oral agreements
recorded on audio cassette. They were not registered as are nikah (the
"normal" category of the marriage contract) marriages, and
were criticized and stigmatized because young people availed themselves
of 'urfi in some cases without their families' knowledge, or
permission 0VIutawwi, April, 2000). 'Urfi therefore could be
categorized with other forms of marriage that are suspect to the Sunni
madhahib like muta' marriage, known as sigheh in Iran (Haeri,
1989), with customs like kidnapping (Zuhur, 2000, 2001b) that often
defied parental controls, and worst of all, close to the Western pattern
of "living together" without benefit of marriage.
(c) Urfi marriages, however, proliferated, and it was said that
half of Cairo University's students were "in" (c) urfi
marriages. Many young Egyptians, reportedly often including university
students, resort to (c) urfi marriages because "regular"
marriage is beyond their financial means, costing more than six
years' wages on average for young Egyptian men. The funds include
payment of the dowry (mahr) gifts, formal engagement and wedding
parties, purchase of an apartment and major appliances and furniture.
Young people have to postpone marriage for many years and in the
meantime are not, according to local custom and Islamic law, supposed to
have sexual relations. As early as 1980, Andrea Rugh had cited comments
in the press regarding the unmanageable costs of marriage (Rugh, 1984,
254-56). Diane Singerman estimated the cost of marriage at $10,490 in
the mid 1980s (in Diane Singerman & Homa Hoofar, eds. 1996 p. 169),
and with inflation it is much higher now (Singerman & Ibrahim,
unpublished paper, 2000).
Although many have engaged in (c) urfi marriages, the courts had
previously refused to consider the legal issues such couples might
encounter when they sought to divorce, or had children. Mona Abaza
pointed out that that jurists issued conflicting fatwas on (c) urfi some
denying its legitimacy, just like mut'a or misyar (the form of
marriage borrowed from Saudi Arabia which does not even have to involve
cohabitation, and which is allowed if men do not reveal to women their
intent to leave them at the end of their sojourn). The most interesting
sociological aspect was the way in which the press created a discourse
about the deviance of youth and women who engaged in this practice
(Abaza, 2001). As women are empowered and many more are independent
adults, society's morals are endangered as the entire fabric of
viriginity, honor, and chastity is worn away from within. Coinciding
with campaigns against modern Arabic literature accused of
"pornography," Abaza discusses the press charges that many
upper-class women engage in mizyar marriages or of women who apparently
married four and six men respectively through 'urfi (Al-Ahram, 22
Mareh1999; Al-Akhbar, 28 September 1999, cited in Abaza, 2001).
BODILY RIGHTS AND SEXUALITY
The death of an eleven year old girl in Cairo in 1999 illustrates
the complicity of the medical profession in the upholding of traditional
beliefs about sexuality. In this exploration of empowerment, we would
hope to see that women gain rights through the intervention of
nation-states to be free of violence, and that social welfare policies
take that sort of violence into consideration. This can mean beatings by
family members, honor-killings, rape, or FGM, female genital mutilation
which we euphemistically refer to as "female circumcision."
Female circumcision, just like the preservation of virginity until
marriage, is believed to be a "good tradition," in that it
controls both female sexuality and the designation of paternity. In
fact, the practice has numerous negative effects on women's
reproductive and psychological health. These effects notwithstanding the
medical establishment in Egypt has never educated doctors about the
negative effects of FGM (or female sexuality generally). Many promoted
the idea of "medicalization" of FGM, meaning that the main
problem was infection at the hands of non-professionals (barbers,
midwives) and that if the practice were done in hospitals and clinics
the infection could be controlled, and more severe forms of the surgery
limited. A decree was issued to this effect following the International
Conference on Population and Development in Cairo in 1994 at which FGM
was addressed. A scandal ensued after CNN aired coverage of a young girl
undergoing FGM in Egypt. The official story that the practice was dying
out, and only involved those of rural backgrounds was challenged
directly. Egypt's reputation was perceived to be under attack. As a
result the succeeding minister of health imposed a ban on FGM in public
places, and despite serious legal challenges which overturned the ban
for a time, it was upheld. The ban should have prevented the death of
the young girl mentioned in 1999. Instead, her mother took two girls to
a clinic to be circumcised, and this child died, presumably from
excessive anaesthesia (Digges, 1999). A Task Force on FGM has been in
place in Cairo since 1994 engaging in a multi-pronged campaign against
the practice (Ayda Seif al-Dawla, "The Story of the FGM
Taskforce" in Ilkkaracan, ed. 2000) but its efforts are hampered by
the nature of the issue which requires a full scale effort at public
re-education and that would mean discussion of women's bodies and
sexual issues in the media which is unlikely to be sanctioned.
Researchers often estimated that 50 to 60 percent of Egyptian women
have been circumcised. The reason that the figures are quite high is
related to the class divisions in Egyptian society. The far more
numerous poorer classes, both Christians and Muslims, follow this Nile
valley tradition, while the families of Turco-Circassian derivation, the
main segment of the small historic elite, do not. Some prominent
Islamists asserted that FGM is an Islamic practice, or recommended a
milder form of FGM, which has not helped the campaigns against it.
Al-Azhar, which has played a role in promoting family planning, for
example, has produced conflicting statements on FGM, and has not
strongly opposed the practice.
New data has suggested that the practice shows no signs of abating
or is even more pervasive than earlier reported. A 1995 EDHS (Egypt
Demographic Health Survey) showed that 97% of Egyptian women who have
been married ("ever-married women" including divorcees and
widows) are circumcised (El Zenaty et al., 1996; Guenena & Wassef,
1999). A separate clinic-based study confirmed these results. Although
the study cannot tell us exactly how many young girls are being
circumcised today, it does illustrate the magnitude of the issue.
In other Arab countries, where FGM is not so heavily practiced, the
involvement of modern medicine in supporting traditional values of
virginity and the code of honor are nevertheless apparent. Hymen
replacement occurs in all the countries we have discussed as do honor
killings--whereby older women as well as younger women may be killed by
their families for breaking the social rules governing sexuality.
Women's empowerment has most recently been involved in several
campaigns on the issue of honor killings, a notable instance in Jordan.
These can only address the aftermath of such incidents mandating more
severe penalties for those who kill women for such "crimes."
Conversely it appears that rape which also involves the traditional
concepts of honor and family ownership of women's bodies has been
codified by the state as well, but not always to women's best
advantage. Women's testimony is often not believed, and women are
held accountable for their own victimization, even when there are
witnesses, as in the 'Ataba bus case, where a girl was raped
although she was "conservatively dressed" and her mother was
with her at the bus station. As a result of their understanding of the
law the police have often attempted to force the victim to marry the
rapist (Sonbol, "Rape and Law in Ottoman and Modern Egypt," In
Ilkkaracan, ed. 2000). It does seem that in this area, the steady
pursuit of equity has not yet taken place, and the double standard
guiding men's versus women's sexual behavior is still in place
modified by new practices like (c) urfi described above.
LINKS BETWEEN LEGAL REFORM AND SOCIAL WELFARE
It is particularly necessary to understand and establish linkages
between legal reform efforts and the policies of social welfare. Take
for example the issue of violence against women that has been codified
in law, or where customary practice has overridden law. Honor-killings
are common throughout the region. State and legal intervention is at the
core of reform of such issues, and social welfare policies should be
involved, particularly when families with children are affected. More
often than not, these are regarded as separate spheres of endeavor.
During the 1990s, efforts in Jordan were mounted to modify the laws
addressing crimes of honor, specifically, honor killings of women by
their male relatives. Efforts were also made by women's groups in
the West Bank and by women's centers serving Arab women in Israel
to draw attention to this longstanding problem. Such legislation has
been proposed as a necessary step on the road to empowerment, although
in countries where it has already taken place--Egypt, for example--it is
clear that legislation alone cannot solve the problem. The police, the
courts, and the judiciary must also regard the problem with an eye
toward social transformation, or it will continue in modified form.
CONCLUSION
Empowerment by means of education, literacy or modest
income-generating projects is clearly insufficient to ameliorate the
prospects for a higher quality of life for women of the Arab world. The
process of empowerment is taking place at so many levels that it is
quite difficult to say whether there has been retrogression, or that
women have advanced four steps forward, and two back, as seems likely at
this time. Certainly the process is entangled in the struggles of civil
society against the state, and under the weight of historical practice
and ongoing debates over the appropriate role of Western and Islamic
ideologies.
Empowerment along with feminist consciousness has been evidenced in
women's life-stories, such as the memoirs written by Leila Ahmed (1999), Hanan Ashrawi (1995) and Fay (Afaf) Kanafani. (1999). But the
distinct disjuncture between the painful process of empowerment and the
day to day efforts to delineate the gains and debits of social welfare
policy are, I think, somewhat telling. Clearly, the state's role in
promoting, allowing, or forbidding social change is crucial. Without
movement toward equivalent legal rights, access to public space, and
political influence, women have little hope of further expansion of
their rights, or of sex roles. Our assumptions about the transformative
capacity of societies are in question as are those of intellectuals,
planners, organizers, and officials. We have not yet figured out how to
coordinate efforts between women, countries, scholars, end disciplines,
nor have we carefully thought out the process toward or the broader
implications and requirements of social transformation.
ENDNOTES
(1.) The category of "Arab women" is problematic because
it implies women in all Arab states (which also include non-Arab women,
for example, Kurdish or Berber women). For the purposes of this article,
I also reflect on the experience of Palestinian women (Arab and Bedu) in
Israel, a non-Arab state, but not on Arab women in Europe or the United
States.
(2.) Here, I allude to the exploitation of female workers from
Africa and Asia now serving the needs of households in Egypt, Lebanon
and the Gulf states.
(3.) Although I found serious references to the project in Moroccan
based publications, the U.S. reportage trivialized the issue and the
women themselves with a humorous opener referring to candidates'
questions regarding the sexual woes of overly-busy married women, and
the closing sentences which provide the solution to "women's
concerns," what else? "Victoria's Secret." See Susan
Paynter, "Women's Concerns Cross Borders," Seattle
Post-Intelligencer (12 December 2001).
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