文章基本信息

标题：Competition on Common Value Markets with Naive Traders – A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis -
本地全文：下载
作者：Chlaß, Nadine ; Güth, Werner ; Max Planck Institute of Economics 等
期刊名称：Jena Economic Research Papers
电子版ISSN：1864-7057
出版年度：2007
卷号：1
出版社：Max Planck Society
摘要：
Theoretically and experimentally, we generalize the analysis of acquiring a company (Samuelson and Bazerman 1985) by allowing for competition of both, buyers and sellers. Naıvety of both is related to the idea that higher prices exclude worse qualities. While competition of naive buyers increases prices, competition of naive sellers promotes eﬃciency enhancing trade. Our predictions are tested experimentally.
关键词：common value auction;experiment;incomplete information