期刊名称：International Journal of Engineering and Computer Science
印刷版ISSN：2319-7242
出版年度：2016
卷号：5
期号：1
页码：15638-15649
DOI：10.18535/ijecs/v5i1.30
出版社：IJECS
摘要：Freenet is a peer-to-peer platform for censorship-resistant communication. It uses a decentralized distributed data store tokeep and deliver information, and has a suite of free software for publishing and communicating on the Web without fear of censorship.Freenet providing freedom of speech on the Internet with strong anonymity protection . Freenet is a popular peer to peer anonymousnetwork, which is a more popular one. It is used to connect two different anonymous persons. The objective of the freenet whichprovides the anonymity of both content publishers and retrievers. Despite more than a decade of active development and deploymentand the adoption of well established cryptographic algorithms in Freenet, it remains unanswered how well the anonymity objective ofthe initial Freenet design has been met. In this paper we develop a traceback attack on Freenet, and show that the originating machineof a content request message in Freenet can be identified; that is, the anonymity of a content retriever can be broken, even if a singlerequest message has been issued by the retriever. We present the design of the traceback attack, and perform Emulab-basedexperiments to confirm the feasibility and effectiveness of the attack. With randomly chosen content requesters (and random contentsstored in the Freenet testbed), the experiments show that, for 24% to 43% of the content request messages, we can identify theiroriginating machines. We also briefly discuss potential solutions to address the developed traceback attack. Despite being developedspecifically on Freenet, the basic principles of the traceback attack and solutions have important security implications for similaranonymous content sharing systems
