期刊名称：Discussion Paper Series / Universität Heidelberg, Department of Economics
出版年度：2014
出版社：Universität Heidelberg, Department of Economics
摘要：We conduct experiments to investigate the e.ects of di.erent major- ity requirements on bargaining outcomes in small and large groups. In particular, we use a Baron-Ferejohn protocol and investigate the e.ects of decision rules on delay (number of bargaining rounds needed to reach agreement) and measures of "fairness" (inclusiveness of coalitions, equality of the distribution within a coalition). We find that larger groups and una- nimity rule are associated with significantly larger decision making costs in the sense that first round proposals more often fail, leading to more costly delay. The higher rate of failure under unanimity rule and in large groups is a combination of three facts: (1) in these conditions, a larger number of individuals must agree, (2) an important fraction of individuals reject o.ers below the equal share, and (3) proposers demand more (relative to the equal share) in large groups
