期刊名称：Discussion Paper Series / Universität Heidelberg, Department of Economics
出版年度：2014
出版社：Universität Heidelberg, Department of Economics
摘要：Anecdotal, empirical, and experimental evidence suggests that o.ering ex- trinsic rewards for certain activities can reduce people's willingness to engage in those activities voluntarily. We propose a simple rationale for this 'crowd- ing out' phenomenon, using standard economic arguments. The central idea is that the potential to earn rewards in return for an activity may create incentives to play 'hard to get' in an e.ort to increase those rewards. We discuss two specific contexts in which such incentives arise. In the first, re- fraining from the activity causes others to attach higher value to it because it becomes scarce. In the second, restraint serves to conceal the actor's in- trinsic motivation. In both cases, not engaging in the activity causes others to o.er larger rewards. Our theory yields the testable prediction that such e.ects are likely to occur when a motivated actor enjoys a su.cient degree of 'market power
