期刊名称：Discussion Paper Series / Universität Heidelberg, Department of Economics
出版年度：2015
出版社：Universität Heidelberg, Department of Economics
摘要：We experimentally study behavior in a finitely repeated coalition formation game played in real time. Sub jects interact in groups of three, bargaining over the distri- bution of payments which o ccur at regular time intervals. During a given interval, payments occur if and only if a ma jority is in agreement about their allocation. Aside from these rules, we purposefully impose little structure on the bargaining process. We investigate the frequency and stability of di.erent typ es of agreements, as well as transitions between them. The most frequent agreement is an equal split between two players, leaving the third with nothing. The most stable is the three-way equal split. Transitions between agreements are frequent and generally consistent with myopic payo. maximization. We find evidence that both fairness concerns and risk aversion may explain the prevalence of the three-way equal split, and that loyalty can play a role in cementing coalitions
关键词：Bargaining; group choice; experiments; coalition formation
