期刊名称：Discussion Paper Series / Universität Heidelberg, Department of Economics
出版年度：2015
出版社：Universität Heidelberg, Department of Economics
摘要：In oligopoly, imitating the most successful competitor yields very competitive outcomes. This theoretical prediction has been confirmed exp erimentally by a number of studies. A recent paper by Friedman et al. (2015) qualifies those results in an interesting way: while they replicate the very competitive results for the first 25 to 50 periods, they show that when using a much longer time horizon of 1200 perio ds, results slowly turn to more and more collusive outcomes. We replicate their result for duopolies. However, with 4 firms none of our oligopolies becomes permanently collusive. Instead, the average quantity always stays ab ove the Cournot-Nash equilibrium quantity. Thus, it seems that "four remain many" even with 1200 periods
