期刊名称：Discussion Paper Series / Universität Heidelberg, Department of Economics
出版年度：2015
出版社：Universität Heidelberg, Department of Economics
摘要：This study provides evidence from a laboratory experiment showing that manager- ial bonuses can a.ect adversely a manager's subordinates. In our set up, managers compete to obtain a large bonus which dep ends partly on the e.ort exerted by their subordinates. Managers can suggest an e.ort level and coerce sub ordinates who dis- obey by punishing them. When managers compete for individual bonuses, we find that subordinates do not ob ey their demands. This doubles co ercion rates relative to a control treatment without bonuses. In contrast, when managers compete for pooled bonuses which give managers discretionary power over the allocation of the b onus, most subordinates exert maximal e.ort. Although managers share a substantial fraction of the bonus, they are not worse o. than they are with an individual bonus. A model in which agents care about inequality in earnings can account for the main findings in our experiment.
