期刊名称：Discussion Paper Series / Universität Heidelberg, Department of Economics
出版年度：2015
出版社：Universität Heidelberg, Department of Economics
摘要：The success of global climate policies over the coming decades depends on the di.u- sion of 'green' technologies. This requires that international environmental agreements (IEAs) and trade-related intellectual property rights (TRIPs) interact productively. Using a simple and tractable model, we highlight the strategic reduction in abatement commitments on account of a hold-up e.ect. In anticipation of rent extraction by the innovator signatories might abate less than non-signatories turning the IEA 'brown'. Self-enforcing IEAs have fewer signatories and di.usion can reduce global abatement under TRIPs. Countries hosting patent holders extract rents from TRIPs, but may be better o. without them
关键词：International climate policy; di.usion of innovations; intellectual property ; rights; hold-up problem
