期刊名称：Discussion Paper Series / Universität Heidelberg, Department of Economics
出版年度：2016
出版社：Universität Heidelberg, Department of Economics
摘要：This paper investigates whether the strategic behavior of expected utility players di.ers from that of non-expected utility players in the context of incomplete information games where players can choose mixed strategies. Two conditions are identified where uncertainty-averse non-expected utility players behave di.erently from expected utility players. These conditions concern the use of mixed strategies and the response to it. It is shown that, if and only if these conditions fail, non- expected utility players behave as if they were expected utility players. The paper provides conditions, in terms of the payo. structure of a game, which are necessary and su.cient for behavioral di.erences between expected and non-expected utility players. In this context, games are analyzed that are especially relevant for the design of experiments
