出版社：Economic Laboratory for Transition Research Podgorica
摘要：This paper deals with application of game theory model to insurancemarket. We observed a form of mutual insurance in conditionsof full and partial information obtained by insurance buyers. Firstpart of the paper defines the model of non-cooperative game, followedby principles of optimality, types of stability and equilibrium.Here, model of non-cooperative game has been analyzed under theassumption that players are fully informed. Situation where playersare only partially informed requires model which takes into accountdecision process and analysis of every player’s actions. This analysisrequires that hierarchical structure among players need to beestablished. Model of conflict situation, with established hierarchicalstructure with informational reflexivity, represent the model ofreflexive game. We define that reflexive game model, followed byrequired conditions for which some strategy is informational equilibriumstrategy. We then proceed to perform analysis of game theoreticapplication to mutual insurance model, with hierarchical structurein agent positioning, in conditions of both full and partial informationobtained by the player, with the goal of finding equilibriumstrategies.
