期刊名称：International Business & Economics Research Journal
印刷版ISSN：1535-0754
电子版ISSN：2157-9393
出版年度：2011
卷号：6
期号：6
语种：English
出版社：The Clute Institute for Academic Research
摘要：The role of trust in economic exchange is ill-defined. Trust between alliance partners is argued to sometimes be an alternative to costly governance mechanisms and can therefore lead to superior performance. On the other hand, relying on anything but investments to secure credible commitment to deterrence is described as myopic. This paper explores a middle ground where, in the context of a reputation network, governance costs can decline without the strict necessity of intentional trust. Using an experimental approach, we show that reputation effects lead to significant advantages for reliable players in terms of offers to ally and the quality of those offers. These advantages resulted in lower governance costs and better performance.
