摘要：From the ‘Agency Theory' and the conflict of interest assumption the aim of this study is verify the impact of the use of two classes of shares (dual class) on the value in brazilian companies. The sample consisted of non-financial traded companies, with concentrated ownership structure, data are available in Economática®, totaling 354 companies and 1,915 observations. The data refer to the period 2005 to 2012. It terms of methodology, to research the hypothesis of the study it was used a regression by ordinary least squares, with panel data. The results indicate that companies using two classes of shares, such as separation mechanism between the cash flow and the equity control, have lower value then the ones not using such a mechanism. Additionally, it can be inferred that the governance levels and the higher dividend payment policy in the preferred shares are not able to mitigate the higher level of conflicts of interest and agency costs in dual class companies.
关键词：Conflitos de Interesses;Dual Class;Estrutura de Propriedade;Teoria de Agência.
