摘要：This paper makes three points. The first is that inter-member external imbalances are a relevant objective for the performance of a monetary union. The second is that policy should aim at reducing inter-member external disequilibria, by setting targets on current-account imbalances applied symmetrically to both deficit and surplus countries. The correction of external imbalances needs to be taken as seriously as that of fiscal imbalances and debt-to-GDP ratios. The third is that, while the principle of the unified supranational monetary policy should remain the core of the monetary union, the heterogeneity in economic performances and current-account imbalances of member states calls for a more flexible common monetary policy. Our specific proposal is that National Central Banks should add a risk premium cost to official interest rates on banks that accumulate “excessive” borrowings or deposits to compensate, respectively, for outflows and inflows of the monetary base due to the effect of external imbalances. JEL classification : E42, E52, E58.
