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  • 标题:Expresiveness and Complexity Results for Strategic Reasoning
  • 本地全文:下载
  • 作者:Julian Gutierrez ; Paul Harrenstein ; Michael Wooldridge
  • 期刊名称:LIPIcs : Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics
  • 电子版ISSN:1868-8969
  • 出版年度:2015
  • 卷号:42
  • 页码:268-282
  • DOI:10.4230/LIPIcs.CONCUR.2015.268
  • 出版社:Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum fuer Informatik
  • 摘要:This paper presents a range of expressiveness and complexity results for the specification, computation, and verification of Nash equilibria in multi-player non-zero-sum concurrent games in which players have goals expressed as temporal logic formulae. Our results are based on a novel approach to the characterisation of equilibria in such games: a semantic characterisation based on winning strategies and memoryful reasoning. This characterisation allows us to obtain a number of other results relating to the analysis of equilibrium properties in temporal logic. We show that, up to bisimilarity, reasoning about Nash equilibria in multi-player non-zero-sum concurrent games can be done in ATL^* and that constructing equilibrium strategy profiles in such games can be done in 2EXPTIME using finite-memory strategies. We also study two simpler cases, two-player games and sequential games, and show that the specification of equilibria in the latter setting can be obtained in a temporal logic that is weaker than ATL^*. Based on these results, we settle a few open problems, put forward new logical characterisations of equilibria, and provide improved answers and alternative solutions to a number of questions.
  • 关键词:Temporal logic; Nash equilibrium; game models; formal verification
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