期刊名称：Journal of Theoretical and Applied Information Technology
印刷版ISSN：1992-8645
电子版ISSN：1817-3195
出版年度：2013
卷号：48
期号：2
页码：1025-1031
出版社：Journal of Theoretical and Applied
摘要：This paper deals with the Stackelberg game model based on the buyback contract predominated by the supplier, and the equilibrium solutions to the model are available when wholesale price and maximum buyback rate are determined by the supplier and the order quantity is determined by the retailer with respect to the stochastic market demand. Coordination of different supply chains and risks shared by supply & demand parties are analyzed. The supply and demand parties share different risks because of their different leading statuses and maximum buyback proportion offered by the supplier to the retailer. When the supplier is in the leading role, he can determine the proportion or relation of risks shared by supply and demand parties. As a constraint condition, the proportion or relation the risk is of guiding significance for determination of maximum buyback proportion.
关键词：Supply Chain; Buyback Contract; Risk; Stackelberg Game
