期刊名称：Principia : an International Journal of Epistemology
印刷版ISSN：1414-4247
电子版ISSN：1808-1711
出版年度：2013
卷号：16
期号：2
页码：341-344
语种：English
出版社：Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina, Brasil
摘要：http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2012v16n2p341 Current supervaluation models of opinion, notably van Fraassen’s (1984; 1989; 1990; 1998; 2005; 2006) use of intervals to characterize vague opinion, capture nuances of ordinary reflection which are overlooked by classic measure theoretic models of subjective probability. However, after briefly explaining van Fraassen’s approach, we present two limitations in his current framework which provide clear empirical reasons for seeking a refinement. Any empirically adequate account of our actual judgments must reckon with the fact that these are typically neither uniform through the range of outcomes we take to be serious possibilities nor abrupt at the edges.
关键词：Belief;models of opinion;subjective probability;supervaluation;uncertainty;van Fraassen;vagueness;Belief;models of opinion;subjective probability;supervaluation;uncertainty;van Fraassen;vagueness.
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