摘要：L’étude porte sur νόος (νοεῖν, νόημα), dans les trois genres de la poésie archaïque non épique, iambique (Archiloque, Sémonide), élégiaque (Solon, Théognis), mélique (Alcée, Sappho, Simonide, Bacchylide, Pindare). En insistant sur les enjeux pragmatiques de la performance rituelle (par exemple symposiaque ou épinicique) et les effets de la transmission, reconstruction et interprétation post-classique des énoncés, surtout des fragments, qui peut tirer l’analyse sémantique vers une abstraction dualiste de type étique (vs. émique), on observe la multifonctionnalité du νόος figuré poétiquement, en action, comme une faculté rythmée, à la fois sensorielle, expressive, éthique, décisionnelle, cognitive, logique, fondée sur des jeux d’empathie visuelle et kinesthésique, et de maîtrise, par exemple dans les relations entre hommes et dieux. La poéticité des fragments de Xénophane s’en trouve aussi réévaluée.
其他摘要：This study is about νόος (νοεῖν, νόημα), in the main genres of non-epic archaic poetry, i. e. iambic, elegiac, melic. It insists on the pragmatic aspects of ritual performance, e. g. in symposiac or epinician context, and on the implications of post-classical transmission, reconstruction, and interpretation of poems, mostly fragmentary, which may imply a dualist and abstract conception of semantics, mostly in an etic (vs. emic) perspective. This paper scrutinises the multi-functionality of νόος as poetry represents it in action, as a rhythmic capacity, both sensorial and expressive, related to ethics, decision-making, cognition, and logics, and based on interplays of visual and kinaesthetic empathy, and self-control, especially in relations between mankind and gods. The poeticity of Xenophanes’ fragments may thus be re-evaluated. The iambic uses of νόος intend to make a symposiac audience laugh at irregular behaviour and thoughts, deprived of “common sense”, like, in Archilochus, those of drunk parasites (fr. 124b W.), powerful men turned mad by gods (fr. 94 W.), or women, as mindless animals, essentially different from men (Simonides fr. 7 W.). Conversely, cunning foxes have a “solid mind”, i.e. “shrewd, wise” (Archilochus fr. 185 W.). In elegiac poetry, νόος plays an important role, in ethical and social terms: - in Mimnermus, this type of mind is a faculty which older people lack, and it is compared to eyes and vivid sight, fr. 2 W., and associated with the conscious joys of youth, fr. 8 W.. - in Solon, in poems for public performances, we find a description of what should be the mind of a right and honourable citizen or political leader: the spirit of good men is “moderate” and “without excess” (fr. 4bc W., in Aristotle’s Constitution of the Athenians), while dangerous personalities have minds described as “unjust” and “full of vanity and excess” (fr. 4 W.), “excessive” and “not adjusted” (fr. 13 W.), “hard” (fr. 34), “spongy”, i.e. “weak” (fr. 5 W., about Peisistratos’ partisans), or even “misled” (fr. 22a W.). Three other Solonian examples appear in later religious texts: the Stromata of Clement of Alexandria quote Solon about (the Christian) God, as “the invisible measure of judgement”, difficult to understand (fr. 16 W.), and as “a mind invisible to the humans” (fr. 17 W.); Philo of Alexandria (De opificio mundi 104) presents a long quotation (fr. 26 W.) about the ages of man and the “achieved and perfect mind” of best men. - in the Theognidea, a collection of short elegiac poems, with around 40 occurrences. In the first part (v. 1-466), with more religious overtones at the end, νόος mainly refers to the addressee, especially the young Kyrnos, who should protect his pure and truthful soul from the influence of bad men, with “not adjusted” (v. 154) and even “crazy” (v. 223) minds. After the pleasures and dangers of wine consumption, which may mislead hearts and minds, the poem returns to cognitive, psychological, and social differences between good and bad men, wisely connecting or not their νόος, θυμὸς and φρήν, and their minds, eyes, and speeches. In melic poetry, Alcaeus describes νόος in ways similar to Theognis, about the wise and benevolent minds of Sisyphus, Dionysos, or a pious man (fr. 38A, 129 and 361 L.-P.). The same may be noticed of Sappho, in more impulsive terms (fr. 41 and 51 V.). From Simonides we keep two occurrences about the radical separation of men and gods (fr. 42 W. and fr. 581 P.M.G.). And from Bacchylides we have seven examples, in mostly gnomic statements about similar issues (III.75, IX.18, XI.54, IV.6, V.95), associated with praise (Hiero of Syracuse, XIII.44). In Pindar, human “mind” is inseparably sensorial (especially visual, aural, and kinaesthetic), moral, and social, as well as inchoately logical and “rational”. The lexical group here described refers to activities of observation, reflexion, and decision-making, with strong emotional and rhythmical overtones. The word νόος itself (20 x) often participates in the thematic and pragmatic structure of whole poems, mostly about the intentions and will or wise and skilful minds of divinities or heroes, and of the choir, poet, audience, or dedicatee. The connection of these two meanings (intentional / cognitive – active) is well exemplified in Ne.VI.1-5 and Py.V.107-111. Finally it is suggestive to compare those poetic texts with some fragments of Xenophanes (fr. 23, 24, 25), oscillating between religious or philosophical wisdom, logic, and gnomic poetry, especially as they were transmitted and reconfigured by Clement of Alexandria, Sextus Empiricus, or Simplicius. And it does not seem neither easy nor quite useful to maintain a strict difference between sensorial / ethical meanings of νόος and more rational / philosophical ones. Here poetry is active and embodied thinking, and philosophical thought a kind of poetic experiment.
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