期刊名称：Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
印刷版ISSN：0027-8424
电子版ISSN：1091-6490
出版年度：2017
卷号：114
期号：11
页码：2876-2880
DOI：10.1073/pnas.1608514114
语种：English
出版社：The National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America
摘要：In most parliamentary democracies, proportional representation electoral rules mean that no single party controls a majority of seats in the legislature. This in turn means that the formation of majority legislative coalitions in such settings is of critical political importance. Conventional approaches to modeling the formation of such legislative coalitions typically make the “common knowledge” assumption that the preferences of all politicians are public information. In this paper, we develop a theoretical framework to investigate which legislative coalitions form when politicians’ policy preferences are private information, not known with certainty by the other politicians with whom they are negotiating over what policies to implement. The model we develop has distinctive implications. It suggests that legislative coalitions should typically be either of the center left or the center right. In other words our model, distinctively, predicts only center-left or center-right policy coalitions, not coalitions comprising the median party plus parties both to its left and to its right.
关键词：legislative coalitions ; incomplete information ; mechanism design ; bargaining
