摘要：This paper establishes an optimal time incentive/disincentive-based compensation in a contract between a principal and a team of agents. The establishment is based on solving an optimization problem. In order to validate the paper's theoretical development practitioners were engaged in a designed exercise. The paper demonstrates that, at the optimum: the proportion of time incentive/disincentive compensation among agents with the same risk-attitude should reflect the levels of their contributions; the proportion of time incentive/disincentive among agents with the same level of contribution should be lowered for agents with higher levels of risk aversion; and the proportion of time incentive/disincentive to a team of risk averse agents should reduce, and the fixed component of the team fee should increase, when the agents in the team become more risk-averse or the level of the uncertainty in project completion time increases. The paper’s outcome provides guidance to those involved in contracts design for choosing the best way to reward (penalise) multiple agents, form a team, and allow for any time saving (overrun) through the terms of a contract.
