摘要：This paper aims to discuss aspects related to contractual arrangements between producers and processors in pork chain, in the state of Paraná. Specifically in that state, the performance of that chain is highlighted, justifying the study of factors and conditions directing arrangement choice (integration contracts). The research is supported by TCE and MCE theories. Methodological procedures included qualitative assumptions and a descriptive field research. As results, it has been identified that the arrangement choice (contracts) is justified by the perception of higher levels of coordination and specificity in transaction, as well as higher control due to power asymmetry in the relation. Despite the existence of asset specificity, the possibility to measure and insert in contracts attributes enables contractual arrangements, as an alternative to vertical integration. Thus, contractual formalization seems to indicate appropriate governance structure for processors, making possible standardization, transaction cost reduction and guaranteeing property rights.
关键词：Sistemas Agroindustriais;Custos de transação;Custos de mensuração
