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文章基本信息

  • 标题:Is There a Role for Central Bank Independence on Public Debt Dynamics?
  • 本地全文:下载
  • 作者:Stephanos Papadamou ; Moïse Sidiropoulos ; Eleftherios Spyromitros
  • 期刊名称:Journal of Applied Finance and Banking
  • 印刷版ISSN:1792-6580
  • 电子版ISSN:1792-6599
  • 出版年度:2017
  • 卷号:7
  • 期号:1
  • 出版社:Scienpress Ltd
  • 摘要:
    Inspired from a simple theoretical macroeconomic model, proposed by Ozkan et al. (2010), which shows a positive link between public debt issues and central bank independence, we empirically investigate if central bank independence has an impact on the net stock of government securities and public debt. Our research has been focused on various levels of independence of the central bank of 22 countries from 1992 to 2000, where significant changes in the index of independence for a large number of central banks have been occurred. By applying dynamic panel data analysis, we show that central bank independence has a significant impact on the effects of deficit, GDP growth and government bonds yield on government bond issues and public debt. The latter result implies that higher levels of central bank independence make countries more affected by market conditions.
  • 关键词:Central bank independence; public debt; panel data.
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