摘要：Mireille Hildebrandt’s Smart Technologies and the End(s) of Law (2015) raises questions for law that are best characterized as meta-institutional. This review essay considers the implications of Hildebrandt’s work for the conceptualization of fundamental rights. One consequence of the shift to a world in which smart digital technologies continually, immanently mediate and preempt our beliefs and choices is that legal discourses about fundamental rights are revealed to be incomplete along a dimension that we have simply failed to recognize. To remain effective in the digital age, rights discourse requires extension into the register of affordances.
其他摘要：Mireille Hildebrandt’s Smart Technologies and the End(s) of Law (2015) raises questions for law that are best characterized as meta-institutional. This review essay considers the implications of Hildebrandt’s work for the conceptualization of fundamental rights. One consequence of the shift to a world in which smart digital technologies continually, immanently mediate and preempt our beliefs and choices is that legal discourses about fundamental rights are revealed to be incomplete along a dimension that we have simply failed to recognize. To remain effective in the digital age, rights discourse requires extension into the register of affordances.
