摘要：In a previous paper of mine I offered solutions to three paradoxes, two of which were solved in Stalnaker’s famous paper ’Indicative Conditionals’ in terms of his distinction between valid and reasonable inference. In a sense my solutions to the two paradoxes are very similar. In this paper I explain why, despite the similarity, I looked for a different solution and new distinctions. After explaining the similarity, I argue that my distinctions point to a more basic phenomenon, which I try to show by applying the distinctions to problems that cannot be solved in terms of Stalnaker’s distinction. The third paradox is one such problem. Beside that, each of the paradoxes, originally formulated in terms of indicative conditionals, can be formulated in terms of counterfactual conditionals. I solve these cases in exactly the same way, while Stalnaker’s distinction is not applicable to them.
