期刊名称：Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
印刷版ISSN：0027-8424
电子版ISSN：1091-6490
出版年度：2010
卷号：107
期号：12
页码：5500-5504
DOI：10.1073/pnas.0912214107
语种：English
出版社：The National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America
摘要：Evolutionary game dynamics of two players with two strategies has been studied in great detail. These games have been used to model many biologically relevant scenarios, ranging from social dilemmas in mammals to microbial diversity. Some of these games may, in fact, take place between a number of individuals and not just between two. Here we address one-shot games with multiple players. As long as we have only two strategies, many results from two-player games can be generalized to multiple players. For games with multiple players and more than two strategies, we show that statements derived for pairwise interactions no longer hold. For two-player games with any number of strategies there can be at most one isolated internal equilibrium. For any number of players[IMG] /medium/pnas.0912214107i1.gif" ALT="Formula "> with any number of strategies[IMG] /medium/pnas.0912214107i2.gif" ALT="Formula ">, there can be at most[IMG] /medium/pnas.0912214107i3.gif" ALT="Formula "> isolated internal equilibria. Multiplayer games show a great dynamical complexity that cannot be captured based on pairwise interactions. Our results hold for any game and can easily be applied to specific cases, such as public goods games or multiplayer stag hunts.
