期刊名称：Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
印刷版ISSN：0027-8424
电子版ISSN：1091-6490
出版年度：2003
卷号：100
期号：2
页码：593-598
DOI：10.1073/pnas.0134966100
语种：English
出版社：The National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America
摘要：Mutualisms provide benefits to those who participate in them. As a mutualism evolves, how will these benefits come to be allocated among the participants? We approach this question by using evolutionary game theory and explore the ways in which the coevolutionary process determines the allocation of benefits in mutualistic interactions. Motivated by the Red Queen theory, which states that coevolutionary processes favor rapid rates of evolution, we pay particular attention to the role of evolutionary rates in the establishment of mutualism and the partitioning of benefits among mutualist partners. We find that, contrary to the Red Queen, in mutualism evolution the slowly evolving species is likely to gain a disproportionate share of the benefits. Moreover, population structure serves to magnify the advantage to the slower species.
