期刊名称：Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
印刷版ISSN：0027-8424
电子版ISSN：1091-6490
出版年度：2003
卷号：100
期号：19
页码：11153-11157
DOI：10.1073/pnas.1633736100
语种：English
出版社：The National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America
摘要：Combinatorial auctions allow for more expressive bidding in which participants can submit package bids with logical constraints that limit allowable outcomes. This type of auction can be useful when participants' values are complementary or when participants have production and financial constraints. However, combinatorial auctions are currently rare in practice. The main problems confronted in implementing these auctions are that they have computational uncertainty (i.e., there is no guarantee that the winning bids for such an auction can be found in a "reasonable" amount of time when the number of bidders and items becomes larger) and that the auction is cognitively complex and can lead participants to pursue perverse bidding strategies. This article describes a type of combinatorial auction that, during laboratory testing, eliminated these problems and produced extremely efficient outcomes.
