期刊名称：Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
印刷版ISSN：0027-8424
电子版ISSN：1091-6490
出版年度：1999
卷号：96
期号：19
页码：10933-10938
DOI：10.1073/pnas.96.19.10933
语种：English
出版社：The National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America
摘要：We consider a modified Prisoners' Dilemma game in which each agent can offer to pay the other agent to cooperate. The subgame perfect equilibrium of this two-stage game is Pareto efficient. We examine experimentally whether subjects actually manage to achieve this efficient outcome. We find an encouraging level of support for the mechanism, but also find some evidence that subjects' tastes for cooperation and equity may have significant interactions with the incentives provided by the mechanism.
