期刊名称：International Journal of Hybrid Information Technology
印刷版ISSN：1738-9968
出版年度：2016
卷号：9
期号：11
页码：337-352
出版社：SERSC
摘要：Through the establishment of the capital flight model of asymmetric evolutionary game, this paper focuses on the study of game relationship among perpetrators, perpetrator assistants and government, and analyzes the evolutionary stable process under different conditions by three-dimensional figures. This paper also analyzes and compares features between the two parties’ model and the three parties’ model, connecting the two kinds of evolutionary games and providing a theoretic basis for a better understanding of the mechanism of capital flight and motivation of all groups. The result shows that by making use of expectation, government can control the ESS of capital flight groups by adjusting relative benefits and punishment in different regulation modes. It can also expand the strategy space that is in favor of capital control through the adjustment. In the end, this paper will propose policy suggestions for the control of capital flight according to the research findings above.
关键词：Capital flight; three asymmetric parties; Evolutionary game theory; ;Dynamic replication; Evolutionarily stable strategy
