期刊名称：Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation
印刷版ISSN：1460-7425
出版年度：2006
卷号：9
期号：2
页码：1-21
出版社：University of Surrey, Department of Sociology
摘要：Imitation is fundamental in the understanding of social systems' dynamics. But the diversity of imitation rules employed by modelers proves that the modeling of mimetic processes cannot avoid the traditional problem of endogenization of all the choices, including the one of the mimetic rules. Starting from the remark that metacognition and human reflexive capacities are the ground for a new class of mimetic rules, we propose a formal framework, metamimetic games, that enables to endogenize the distribution of imitation rules while being human specific. The corresponding concepts of equilibrium — counterfactually stable state — and attractor are introduced. Finally, we give an interpretation of social differenciation in terms of cultural co-evolution among a set of possible motivations, which departs from the traditional view of optimization indexed to immutable criteria that exist prior to the activity of agents.
关键词：Social Cognition; Imitation; Cultural Co-Evolution; Differentiation; Reflexivity; Metacognition; Stochastic Game Theory; Endogenous Distributions; Metamimetic Games; Counterfactual Equilibrium
